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The primary aim of this study is to examine the political risks, particularly of 
indirect  expropriation  in  long-term  energy  investment  contracts,  focusing  on 
stabilisation clauses and examining what driving force(s) influence host states to agree 
to insert such clauses in their host governmental contracts. The secondary aim of this 
work is to examine the political structure of Azerbaijan and Turkey and the guarantees 
available to foreign investors under their laws within those nations from a comparative 
perspective. 
 The  work  dedicates  particular  attention  to  how  effective  internal  factors  in 
Azerbaijan and Turkey are in facilitating contractual stability in their respective energy 
investment  projects.  This  study  applies  both  comparative  and  empirical  research 
methods,  fieldwork and library based research.  It  seeks to provide a theoretical  and 
comparative  understanding  of  political  regimes,  foreign  investment  laws  and 
constitutional guarantees and investment policies in Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
The work has provided that the driving forces behind why Azerbaijan and Turkey 
consented to insert stabilisation clauses in the host government agreements of Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan Project (BTC) can be attributed to each of these being in possession of: a 
weak bargaining position, weak formal and informal institutions, insufficient laws on 
foreign direct investment, absence of specific petroleum legislations and a keenness to 
promote investment and economic activities in their regional markets.
It is imperative to lenders and insurers that the host state where the investment 
will be made is a stable environment. In order to be satisfied that this is the case and to 
future-proof themselves against risk, they require the insertion of stabilisation clauses in 
host  government  agreements.  Credit-rating  agencies  assessments  exercise  influence 
over  the  terms  to  be  agreed  and,  indeed  over  the  investor’s  decision  whether  to 
participate  in  a  project.  Further  research  into  stabilisation  clauses  might  invite  the 
analysis  of  specific  petroleum  producing  countries  from different  regions  to  better 
understand how internal and external factors are effective in providing stability.  The 
transferability of the research findings could be further strengthened by surveying and 
interviewing  more  participants  from  petroleum  companies,  non-governmental 
organisations,  law  firms,  financial  institutions,  political  risk  insurance  providers, 
government bureaucrats and international academics.
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     Chapter 1
Political Risks in Host Country Petroleum Contracts
1.     Introduction
Petroleum1 is one of the most crucial natural resources for modern civilisation and 
has long been a key element in the economic development of a state. For this reason, 
energy investment is a major player in today’s global economy. In a broad sense, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), between a host government and an investor in the energy sector 
may encompass a range of energy sources and related activities, such as oil and mineral 
exploitation or other types of natural resources.  The Energy industry as a whole is a key 
source of growth stimulation for developing states. This is true not only in terms of 
economic growth, but also in the transfer of knowledge and skills as well  as in the 
provision  of  employment  opportunities.  Understandably,  developing  states  are  well-
disposed  towards  international  investors,  and  are  eager  to  enter  into  petroleum 
investment  contracts  with  the  expectation  that  this  will  bring  the  aforementioned 
benefits  to  their  countries,  particularly where  the  host  state  is  less  able  to  act  as  a 
provider  of  such  resources  autonomously.  Some  developing  states’  domestic  law 
provides a welcoming investment environment in the form of guarantees and stability, 
while others provide these opportunities by agreeing to investment contracts or treaties 
drafted by international organisations established to facilitate such agreements. 
On a global scale, regardless of their type, all investments face risks and these 
risks are changing in nature and reach as the world economy globalises. It is of course 
true that political risk phenomena  per se are potentially destructive to all industries. 
However, it is fair to say that due to its high stakes, the energy industry is more acutely 
exposed and subject to political risk than most sectors. Therefore, the energy sector and 
its long-term projects require more guarantees of stability than other industries. 
Namely,  ‘the  capital-intensive  nature  of  the  industry,  market  price  volatility, 
geographic  scope  of  assets  and  operations,  the  high  risk  nature  of  exploration  and 
exploitation of natural resources, technology and requirements, environmental concern, 
downstream brand  promotion  and protection  issues,  political  sensitivities,  scale  and 
diversity  of  employee  base,  etc.’2are  contributing  factors  to  the  political  risks 
international  investors  face.  If  these  risks  are  ‘known quantities’ how is  it  that  the 
industry so frequently finds itself the target of political risk phenomena and why are 
1In this project, the term of petroleum refers ‘gas and oil’. The researcher also will be 
using the ‘Energy’ wording which refers also to gas and oil in this work.
2Lovells International Law Firm in Cooperation with association of Corporate Counsel, 
‘Sino-Foreign Oil and Gas Industry : Legal Risk Comparative Analysis’,(November, 
2005) 2, available at:   <http://www.acc.com/vl/public/Article/loader.cfm?
csModule=security/getfile&pageid=16024>December, 2010
7
energy investment projects so frequently a target? Thomas W. Waelde addresses these 
questions with the following arguments: 
Political risk reflects the exposure of technical and business approach to the 
industry  to  the  often  much  more  volatile,  less  forecastable,  and  less 
manageable  events  in  the  political  sphere-as  contrasted  to  the  supposedly 
targets and hits the petroleum industry not only due to its strategic character, 
large capital investment and public visibility, but also because the industry’s  
global nature, imbued with foreign elements resented in nation states, makes 
it a very suitable target. But politics can also hit the petroleum industry rather 
accidentally,  in  particular  when  this  industry  is  in  the  way  of  conflicts 
between states, between conflicting ideologies, or within a country, between 
ethnic groups or classes that hate each other.3
In other words, a number of reasons can be listed as to why petroleum projects are 
vulnerable.4 Firstly, some developing countries’ economies depend on oil, gas or other 
types of natural resources. As a result of being oil and gas dependent, the expectation of 
politicians  in  petroleum producing  and  exporting  developing  countries  is  extremely 
high.5 If a country obtains more rent or royalties from energy investment projects this 
will mean that the citizens of the developing state can enjoy increased earning power, 
and be provided ‘more schools more, employment and general wellbeing…’6. Secondly, 
decisions taken by governments play a significant role in the energy sector. In other 
words, the politically aware citizens of developing states will lobby for more transparent 
policy  and  the  consideration  of  public  interest  by  their  governments.  With  the 
consequence  that  voters  will  use  the  ballot  box to  express  any dissatisfaction  with 
government policy in this regard at the next elections. For this reason, ‘governments are 
likely to play a prominent role in regulating entry, of prices of quality of services, and of 
other aspects of investor behaviour’.7
3 T. W. Waelde, ‘Managing the Risk of Sanctions in the Global Oil & Gas Industry: 
Corporate  Response  Under  Political,  Legal  and  Commercial  Pressures’,  Texas 
International Law Journal, Vol.36 (2001) 183-184
4 M.  Erkan,  International  Energy  Investment  Law:  Stability  through  Contractual  
Clauses Energy and  Environmental  Law and  Policy  Series,  (Alphen  aan  den  Rijn, 
Kluwer Law International, 2011) 27
5 Ibid.
6 J.  L.  Valera,  ‘Political  Risks  for  International  Oil  Companies  Investing  in  Latin 
America, OGEL, Journal of Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 4 (2006)1, available 
at:<www.ogel.org/> September, 2011
7 T. H. Moran, ‘Political and Regulation Risk in Infrastructure Investment in 
Developing Countries: Introduction and an Overview’. CEPMLP Internet Journal  
volume,Art.5-6a,4,available 
at: :<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol5/vol5-6.html> February 2011
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Thirdly, energy investment projects are lengthy and perhaps risks are inevitable in 
a  relationship  that  entails  such  a  long-term commitment.  According  to  Valera,  ‘the 
political risk facing international oil companies is directly related to the behaviour of 
political players in the policy-making process within the host country’8. It would not be 
unreasonable to assert that international politics play as important a role as the internal 
policy making process.9 Evidently, over the course of a project, contractual terms and 
conditions can be breached as a result of government change or changes in the political 
system. 10 The new government and/or political system may not welcome investors or 
respect previously agreed terms. Finally, as mentioned above, some developing states 
suffer from political11 and economic instability. This destabilising influence renders the 
energy sector vulnerable.
This study aims to analyse the political risks, particularly indirect expropriation in 
host  governmental  long  term energy  investment  contracts,  focusing  on  stabilisation 
clauses, and examines which driving force(s) influence host states to agree stability in 
their long term host governmental contracts. It goes on to propose a framework for the 
role to be played by internal and external forces namely: political regimes, domestic 
laws (Foreign direct investment, Petroleum and Energy law), (internal); rating agencies, 
public or private insurers and project finance lenders (external). The secondary aim of 
this work is to examine political regimes and state guarantees to foreign investors in 
Azerbaijan and Turkey from a comparative perspective. The work dedicates particular 
attention to how effective internal factors in Azerbaijan and Turkey are in facilitating 
contractual stability in their energy investment projects. 
1.1 Political risk defined
The era of modern economic understanding was ushered in by Adam Smith with 
the  publication  of  The  Wealth  of  Nations  in  1776.  Following  his  research  into  the 
political economy approach, he acknowledged that politics and economics are related 
and  undividable.12 The  nexus  between  political  risk  and  investment  would  seem to 
8 J. L. Valera (n.6 above) 3
9 M. Erkan (n.4 above)  28
10M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) 69
11 S. C. Wallace, ‘Symposium: Energy and International Law: Development , Litigation 
and Regulation’, Tex. Int’1 L.J.36 (2001) 54, available at: <http://www.tilj.org/> 
February, 2011
12 H.  L.  Lax,  Political  Risk  in  the  International  Oil  and  Gas  Industry, (Boston: 
International Human Resources Development Corporation, 1983) 8
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illustrate Smith’s conclusion, as all types of foreign investments and capital come with 
risks.13 Since  risks  are  unavoidably  attached  to  any  investment,  foreign  investors, 
especially in the energy sector, are inevitably faced with a myriad of political risks as 
part and parcel of an investment scenario. At a global scale, numerous energy projects 
have been made and are currently being committed to by international investors. Energy 
projects, such as oil and gas exploration and their transportation through pipelines, can 
encounter unpredictable economic and political risks. 
Norton defines risk as ‘the possibility that something may or may not happen’.14 
Kolo  and  Lax  seek  to  provide  a  sense  of  the  unpredictability  of  risks  in  energy 
investment  projects.  According  to  Kolo,  such  risks  may  not  only  occur  in  the 
commencement of an energy investment, risks can emerge at any stage of an investment 
project15. Lax, argues that risk is a dynamic concept that centres on the probability of 
change.16 He qualifies what constitutes a risk by asserting that investment conditions 
present from the outset cannot be deemed risks in themselves; rather, risk arises from 
changes in those conditions.17 Lax asserts that the risks affecting an investment form the 
parameters  at  the  time  an  investment  decision  is  made.  Risks  can  also  be  a  future 
incidence that may change the rules. 18 As is the case with all key terminologies in the 
field of social sciences, attempts have been made to provide an accurate definition of 
political  risk phenomena by numerous scholars as well  as organisations  such as the 
Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD),  and  the 
Multinational  Investment  Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The OECD describes  political 
risk as:
 The risk of non-payment is on an export contract or project due to action 
taken  by  the  importer’s  host  government.  Such  action  may  include 
intervention to  prevent  transfer  of  payments,  cancellation of  a  license,  or 
events such as war, civil strife, revolution, and other disturbances that prevent 
the exporter from performing under the supply contract or the buyer from 
making payment. Sometimes physical disasters such as cyclones, floods, and 
earthquakes come under this heading.19
13 K.  M.  Quinley,  ‘Managing Political  Risks’,  The Risk  Report  24,  no.  7  (March, 
2002)1 
14 S. D. Norton, ‘The Natural Environment as a Salient Stakeholder: Non-
Anthropocentrism, Ecosystem Stability and the Financial Markets’,  Business Ethics: A 
European Review Vol. 16, No 4 (October, 2007) 390
15 A. Kolo, ‘Managing Political Risk in Transnational Investment Contracts’, Centre for 
petroleum and Mineral Law Policy (CPMLP), Professional Paper, No: PP11, (1994) 2
16  H. L. Lax (n.12 above) 8
17  Ibid
18  K. M. Quinley (n. 13 above) 1 
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It  is  apparent  that  the  OECD’s  definition  is  broad  and  comprehensive,  as  it 
encompasses all types of investment. Although some risks are outlined in this definition, 
they are not directly related to any specific sector. It is possible that the OECD has erred 
on  the  side  of  caution  in  defining  political  risks  by covering  all  investment  areas. 
MIGA’s  definition  is  also  broad  but  still  more  specific  than  that  of  the  OECD. 
According to MIGA, political risk can be defined as a breach of contract by a host 
government; adverse regulatory changes by host states; restriction on currency transfer 
and convertibility; expropriation; political violence (war, terrorism, sabotage, and civil 
disturbances such as revolution) and the non-honouring of sovereign guarantees.20
In doctrine, several definitions of political risks have been provided by scholars 
such as Comeaux and Kinsella and Boulos. Comeaux and Kinsella present the following 
scenario as an illustration of risk: ‘the laws of a country will unexpectedly change to the 
investor’s  detriment  after  the  investor  has  invested  capital  in  the  country,  thereby 
reducing the value of the individual’s investment.’21 Boulos’s definition is narrower than 
Comeaux and Kinsella’s, however more appropriate to this study, as it focuses on the 
energy sector. According to Boulos, ‘political risk in any oil and gas investment will be 
expropriated, nationalised or otherwise unilaterally changed by the foreign government 
to  the  detriment  of  the  oil  company.’22 After  providing  a  broad  definition  of  what 
political risk is, it is also crucial to apply this to a tangible framework. Political risk is 
categorised  in  academic  literature  and  assessed  by  several  scholars.  The  following 
section explorers the categorisation of political risk. 
1.2   Classification of Political Risks
Political risk phenomena have been classified by various authors in the field of 
international  business.  Wagner’s  classification  separates  political  risks  into  two 
categories. According to this author, the first distinction must be between firm-specific 
political risk and country-specific political risk. 23 The author states that firm specific 
political risks target a specific company. However, country specific political risks are 
19OECD, ‘Glossary of Statistical Terms’, available at: 
<http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5990> February, 2011
20 World Bank Group, ‘World Investment and Political Risk Report’  (2010) 19, 
available at:
<http://www.miga.org/documents/WIPR10ebook.pdf>, February, 2011
21 P. E. Comeaux & N. S. Kinsella, ‘Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilisation Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment 
Insurance’ , N. Y. L. Sch. J. Int’1 & Comp. L.15 (1994) 4
22  A. J. Boulos, ‘Assessing Political Risk’,available at: 
<www.ipaa.org/issues/international/docs/PoliticalRisk.pdf> February, 2011
23  D. Wagner, ‘Defining Political Risks’  , October, 2000, available at: 
<http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2000/wagner10.aspx> September, 2011
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countrywide and may have an influence on a company’s physical activities, although 
they do not necessarily have such an intention.24
                          Table 1 Classification of Political Risks   
Government risks Instability risks
Firm-specific risks Discriminatory 
regulations
Sabotage
‘Creeping’ expropriation Kidnappings
Breach of contract Firm-specific boycotts
Country-level 
risks
Mass nationalization Mass labor strikes
Regulatory changes Urban rioting
Currency inconvertibility Civil wars
Sources: Robert Egge25
Another  categorisation  is  provided  by  Yescombe.  According  to  this  author, 
political risks can be divided into three categories: the first category is investment. The 
second is change of law and the third is quasi-political risk.  26  Other analysts, such as 
the HIS Energy Group prefer a more detailed approach, HIS sub-divides political risk 
phenomena into a further three categories. The first of which is political risk, which 
comprises of war, political unrest violence and instability. The second category is social-
economic risk, which consists of economic, energy, environmental and ethnic factors. 
The third and final category is commercial risk regarding investment, repatriation and 
fiscal  terms.27 While all  of  these  definitions  and categorisations  of  political  risk are 
valid, in the interests of having a clearly delineated frame of reference most appropriate 
to  this  study,  the  researcher  will  focus  on  only  the  following  terminologies: 
expropriation, nationalisation and specifically the most prolific and controversial risk of 
late:  indirect  expropriation.  The  terminological  identification  of  expropriation  and 
indirect expropriation is significant, as one of the central arguments in this subject area 
surrounds the identification and application of appropriate terminology.
1.3      Host country contracts defined
A host government contract28 in the energy sector can also be regarded as a state 
contract. In other words, a host government energy investment contract is an agreement 
created between an investor and the host state (or state-owned agencies) for the purpose 
of  operating  a  particular  investment  project  in  the  host  country.  The  term  host 
government  contract  (HGC)  includes  the  full  variety  of  host  government  contracts 
24 Ibid
25  Robert Egge , cited in D. Wagner (n.23 above)
26 E. R. Yescombe, Principle of Project Finance, (Academic Press 2002): 204-205
27 L.  Bossley,  (HIS Energy Group),  ‘Political  Risk:  A Hedge Too Far’,  Petroleum 
Economist (October, 2002) 33.
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between  international  investor  and  the  host  country,  usually  represented  by  a  state 
owned company. HGCs can be found most frequently in less-developed regions.  29 The 
fundamental principle that underpins a host government contract is to permit, within 
established boundaries, a foreign investor to explore and exploit the natural resources of 
that state. While the host country permits a foreign investor to operate in its territory, it 
also provides a guarantee to that investor that the operation will not be disturbed by 
state  intervention.  Notably,  host  government  contracts  are  either  defined  by 
administrative law or public law contracts.30
2.      Expropriation or Nationalisation
The term ‘to expropriate’ is ‘to exercise eminent domain over; to take, by legal 
action, private land for public purpose’.31 What can be understood from this definition is 
that expropriation is a governmental taking of an individual’s property rights. As an 
individual’s property rights are ‘taken’ by the host government, an important question 
arises regarding whether this ‘taking’ is legal or not.  International customary law does 
not  prevent  a  host  state  from  expropriating  the  private  asset  as  long  as  the  host 
governments meet with certain conditions. The conditions are outlined as follows: the 
taking  should  be  for  public  purpose,  as  provided  by law  and  should  be  in  a  non-
discriminatory manner and with compensation. 32  Furthermore, expropriation itself can 
take different forms; it can be direct,  where an investment is nationalised by a host 
government, or indirectly expropriated.33 Systematic taking of alien investor’s property 
‘…within one or more specific sectors of a nation’s economy within the framework of 
socio-economic or political reform is often referred to as nationalisation. The difference 
28 Notably, the term of host government contract is used in doctrine interchangeably; 
Long-term Investment Contracts or Investment Agreements, Petroleum contracts, Oil 
Contracts,  State  Contracts,  Economic  Development  Agreements,  Foreign  Investment 
contracts, International Investment Agreement, Energy Investment Contracts so on. In 
this study these terms will be used respectively.
29 G. Goolsby & M. Rowley,  ‘Building a Cross-Border Pipeline:  For multi-national 
projects, host government agreements can reduce risk and create a stable investment 
environment’, available at:
<http://www.bakerbotts.com/files/Publication/49e60828-9dbf-4077-a8f5-
a5e6961f7930/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/01376ac1-0b41-4395-b5b6-
a6982cd19139/Goolsby%20Rowley%20PGT%20March%202007.pdf> March 2012
30 K.  Talus  &  S.  Looper  and  S.  Otillar,  ‘Lex  Petrolea  and  Internationalization  of 
Petroleum Agreements: focus on Host Government Contracts’, Journal of World Energy 
Law Business, Vol.5, No.3 (2012) 183. 
31 B. A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage,3rd edn (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 72
32 UNCTAD, ‘Taking of Property’,  (Issues  on International  Investment  Agreements 
(2000) 12-13.
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between expropriation and nationalisation is one of scope and extent rather than of a 
legal nature’.34
2.1   Indirect expropriation
Indirect expropriation is one of the most egregious of political risks that a foreign 
investor may confront when seeking to invest in a host country. It can be described as a 
state  measure  or  measures  taken  by a  state,  which  have  a  similar  or,  indeed  more 
detrimental influence than direct expropriation, although the property is not seized and 
the  legal  title  to  property  is  not  affected.35 UNCTAD  has  described  indirect 
expropriation as ‘...where a measure that does not directly take property has the same 
impact by depriving the owner of the substantial benefits of the property.’36 In the light 
of the aforesaid definition,  Erkan argues that in the case of direct expropriation this 
includes  the  physical  takeover  of  property  by  the  host  government  or  government 
authority.  Indirect  expropriation,  by  this  definition,  has  four  crucial  components. 
According to the author, there ought to be a measure, a state measure or a regulatory 
measure, as a private asset should not be seized directly; the action or inaction of the 
state  should  have  the  same effect  as  direct  takings;  and  this  action’s  result  should 
deprive the owners of the substantial benefit of the profit. 37  He goes further to state that 
the UNCTAD definition covers all the probabilities that may interfere with an investor’s 
property  rights  accruing  from  the  investment.38 This  could  be  any  legislation  or 
administrative action or omission in which a host state interferes with the investment in 
a way that makes it possible to operate. 39  
Indirect expropriation can take two different forms.
33 OECD  working  paper,  ‘International  Investment  Law:  A Changing  Landscape’ 
(2005), 45.
34 K. Hober, Investment Arbitration in Eastern Europe: In Search of a Definition of  
Expropriation, (New York, Jurist, 2007) 1
35 OECD, ‘Indirect Expropriation and Right to Regulate in International Investment 
Law’ (2004) 3-4; Annex B13 (1) Canada Model BIT.
36 UNCTAD,  Investor  State  Disputes  Arising from Investment  Treaties:  ‘A Review’ 
(New  York  and  Geneva:  UNCTAD  series  on  International  Investment  Policies  for 
Development, 2005), 41. Hereinafter referred to as ‘UNCTAD, 2005’
available at:
 <http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf> March, 2011 
37 M. Erkan, (n.4 above) 64
38 Ibid
39 Ibid
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        Creeping expropriation
Creeping expropriation is used to refer to indirect expropriation that arises as a 
result of a series of state measures either introduced gradually or made to come about at 
one  time.  According  to  Hoffman,  creeping  expropriation  is  the  most  feared  and 
destructive risk, in which the host government utilises a combination of taxes, fees and 
other charges and devices to increase its share of the project’s profits.40 The tribunal in 
Generation  Ukraine  defined  creeping  expropriation  as  ‘…a  form  of  indirect 
expropriation with a distinctive temporal quality in the sense that it  encapsulates the 
situation  whereby  a  serious  of  acts  attributable  to  the  state  over  a  period  of  time 
culminate in the expropriatory taking of such property’.41  UNCTAD defines creeping 
expropriation as: ‘…the use of a series of measures in order to achieve a deprivation of 
the economic value of the investment. In this case, no individual measure in itself would 
amount to an expropriation.’42
Regulatory expropriation
The  definition  of  regulatory  expropriation  is:  regulatory  measures  which  are 
generally made in the name of public purpose but deprive the foreign investor of the 
commercial  value  of  the  asset  owned  to  a  degree  sufficient  to  be  considered 
expropriation43. In this scenario, the commercial value of an investors’ property or assets 
is reduced by the introduction of new rules or the adaptation of current laws in the areas 
of  taxation,  the  environment,  health  and  human  rights.  Energy  investment  projects 
require stability, on account of their nature and characteristic features. These projects 
are vulnerable and need to be based on the development of a long-term relationship of 
mutual trust and accountability between an international investor and a host state during 
the life of the project. 
If a host state has a negative impact on its investor’s assets directly or indirectly or 
makes  unilateral  changes  to  the  contractual  terms,  this  long term relationship could 
40 S.  L.  Hoffman,  The Law and Business of  International  Project  Finance 3rd edn, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008) 69
41Generation  Ukraine,  Inc.  V.  Ukraine,  ICSID  Case  No  ARB/00/9,  Award  of  16 
September, 2003, 44 ILM 404 (2005) Para 20-22
42 UNCTAD, 2005 (n.36 above) 42
43 Ibid
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come to a dramatic and costly end. Although political risks cannot be avoided, they can 
be mitigated or managed.44 There are various ways to minimise or manage the political 
risks inherent in energy investment projects, the first of which is by drafting a fair and 
flexible contract  45which references national law 46 and international law 47, as well as 
inserting  contractual  clauses  48,  such  as  arbitration  clauses,  stabilisation  clauses, 
renegotiation clauses and choice of law clauses. Another means of damage limitation to 
mitigate  political  risks  is  to  insure the  energy investment  through public  or  private 
investment insurance mechanisms.49 
3.    Why are Stabilisation Clauses a controversial issue?
A contractual guarantee in the form of stabilisation clauses is widely considered to 
be  a  vaccine  for  political  risks.50 These  contractual  mechanisms  are  inserted  by 
international investors in an investment contract to ensure that the contract shall not be 
unilaterally altered or terminated by a host government’s legislative or administrative 
activities. During the life span of the contract, the laws and regulations applicable to it 
may change. It may be the case that some of the changes may have an impact on the 
economic outcomes or expected profit of the project. Therefore, in order to mitigate 
such risk, investors require host governments to agree to the insertion of stabilisation 
clauses in host governmental agreements or international investment agreements. The 
potential benefit of this clause from the perspective of investors is: a stabilisation clause 
aims to  immunise the foreign investment  contract  from a variety of issues,  such as 
taxation,  environmental  controls  and  other  regulations,  as  well  as  to  deter  the 
destruction of the investment contract itself before the contract terminates. 51 
44 A. Kolo (n.15 above) 3
45 Ibid.
46  Energy Law, Foreign Direct Investment Law, Petroleum Law.
47  It could be Multilateral and Bilateral treaties.
48 T. W. Walde & G.Ndi, ‘Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: 
International Law versus Contract Interpretation’  Int’1 L.J 31 (1996) 216  
49For  instance,  Lloyds,  AIG,  etc.  or  through  national  or  multilateral  government 
insurance programs; OPIC or MIGA
50 D.  Johnson,  International  Petroleum  Fiscal  Systems  and  Production  Sharing  
Contracts (Tulsa, Oklahoma, Penn well Books Publishing, 1994) 171. 
51 M. Sornarajah, (n. above 10), 282.
16
In literature,  scholars argue vehemently about whether stabilisation clauses are 
employed by investors as a legitimate means of safeguarding an investment, or whether, 
in conflict with their intended role of providing mutually-beneficial protection, the main 
effect they have is of disenfranchising a host state of its sovereign rights. The dominant 
view is that inserting stabilisation clauses does not hinder a host state from enjoying the 
full use of its sovereign right to change or create new domestic laws.52 What is meant by 
this  view is  that  stabilisation clauses  cannot  restrict  or  overrule  a  state’s  rights  and 
legislative  power.  Nevertheless,  when  the  impact  they  have  on  environmental 
protection,  health and human rights is  assessed by Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs), stabilisation clauses are often subject to criticism. The reason why such clauses 
often come under fire is that they diminish or reduce the reach of state power in terms of 
legislative power, judicial decision-making and administrative activity to such an extent 
that  it  becomes  very challenging for  the  host  government  to  regulate  in  the  public 
interest53.
From the perspective of investors  and practitioners;  inserting such clauses can 
only  be  seen  as  beneficial  to  a  potential  investment.  From  the  perspective  of 
governments,  agreeing  such  clauses  in  a  host  governmental  contract  or  adopting 
stability in domestic laws, is a way of welcoming investors with a view to fostering the 
flow of capital, the transfer of knowledge and so on. However, cash flow and knowhow 
seem insufficient returns when some of the more negative by-products of stabilisation 
clauses are offset against them. Therefore, this study focuses on the central question; 
what driving force(s) influence host states to agree to inset stabilisation clauses in their 
long term host governmental contracts? 
4.     Host Government Contracts
There  are  three  main  types  of  host  government  contracts  between  host 
governments and investors, however, the first two of these are much more common: 
Royalty and tax contracts (sometimes called oil and gas modern concession contracts), 
Product sharing contracts (PSCs), as well as agreements specifically contemplating a 
multistate  investment  (such  as  a  cross-border  pipeline  development)  and  Service 
agreements.  Royalty and tax  contracts  (concessions)  are  contracts  whereby the  host 
government grants the investor the right to explore and exploit natural sources, or run 
utilities or other public services in an area defined by that government during a specific 
period of  time.54 On the  other  hand,  product  sharing contracts  (PSCs)  are  the  most 
52 K. Hober, ‘Ownership of the Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea: Problems 
and Solutions-International Arbitration and Contractual Clauses’, Stockholm Arbitration 
Report 1 (2004) 14
53 A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, ‘The pursuit of Stability in International Energy Investment 
Contracts:  A critical  Appraisal  of  emerging  Trends’,  Journal  of  World  Energy  & 
Business vol.1. No.2 (2008) 154
54 L. Cotula, Investment contracts and sustainable development: How to make contracts 
for fairer and more sustainable natural resource investments’, Natural Resource Issues 
No. 20. IIED (2010) 24
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common genre of agreement between investors and host states or more commonly, a 
state-owned national oil company in the petroleum industry.55 In this type of contract, 
although the investors are granted with the right to explore and develop a petroleum 
field, they are also responsible for covering all exploration costs and investment risks. 
While the investor explores, develops and produces the petroleum, the exploration and 
production costs will be divided between the host state and the investor as follows: the 
investor receives a share of oil to recover costs (‘cost oil’) and make a profit (‘profit 
oil’).56 The host country obtains a share of the profit oil.57
The  final  type  of  host  government  contracts  are  Service  Contracts.  The 
commonly-applied principle behind this contract type is that the host country hires the 
services of the IOC as a ‘contractor’.58 All of the extraction and production rights are 
retained by the host country 59 while all the risks in the areas of finance, exploration and 
development  are  shouldered  by  the  investor.  In  this  way  ‘commercial  production 
becomes possible from the contract area, the contractor is reimbursed for its costs and 
investments  and  paid  a  fee  for  its  services  from  the  sale  of  the  oil  produced.’60 
Compared to other types of contracts such as concession and PSAs, service contracts are 
held to be the type of arrangement whereby the host government exercises the greatest 
amount of control over a project.61
The concept of a service contract is primarily based upon a simple formula: the 
contractor is paid a cash fee by the investor for performing the service of producing 
petroleum resources. 62 Under a service contract the ownership of the mineral resources 
55 P.  D.  Cameron,  International  Energy  Investment  Law :  The  pursuit  of  stability  
(Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2010) 37
56 K.  Bindemann,  ‘Product  Sharing  Agreements:  An  Economic  Analysis’,  Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, WPM25, October (1999) 1
57 Ibid.
58 E.  E.  Smith,  International  Petroleum  Transactions  2nd edn.  (Denver,  Colorado 
:Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 2000) 480-493 
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 M. Likosky. ‘Contracting, Regulatory Issues in the Oil and Gas and the Metallic 
Mineral Industries’, Transnational Corporations Vol. 18, No.1 April (2009) 14
62 D.  Johnston,  International  Exploration  Economics,  Risk  and Contracts  Analysis, 
(Tulsa, Oklahoma: Penn-Well, 2003) 41. 
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remain with the host state at all times, including after production.  63 Service contracts, in 
the main, can be divided into two types: risk service contract and pure service contract. 
In  risk  service contracts,  the  foreign  investor  bears  all  the  exploration  risk and the 
government  compensates  the  foreign  investor’s  services  through  payments  that  are 
dependent  on  and  limited  by the  amount  of  proceeds  from hydrocarbons  produced 
within the area defined by the agreement.64 The downside of this type of contract is that 
if stores of hydrocarbon are not found in the contract area, then the company is left out 
of pocket.65 Risk service contracts have traditionally been used in states such as Iraq and 
more  recently,  in  Mexico. 66 The  use  of  risk  service  contracts  seems  to  be  on  the 
increase,  particularly  in  situations  ‘where  the  technology  is  high  demand,  but  the 
exploration risk is relatively low.’67 
The second form of service contracts are pure service contracts. In this form, the 
foreign investor carries out exploration and development work on behalf of the host 
state for a set fee. Unlike risk service contracts, the host country bears all the risk. These 
types of contracts are most common in the Middle East, where the host state often has  
substantial capital reserves; but is lacking in the required expertise to exploit them.68 
Following an overview of the main types of host government contracts in the petroleum 
industry, the next logical step is to provide an overview of host governmental contracts 
in cross-border pipeline petroleum projects. 
The diagram below illustrates the categorisation of petroleum agreements.
63 K. Talus & S. Looper and S. Otillar (n.30 above) 188
64  ibid
65 J. S. C. Neto, ‘Risk-bearing service contracts in Brazil’, Journal of Energy and 
Natural Resources Law 3 (1985) 114, cited in M. Likosky (n.67 above)
66 K. Talus & S. Looper and S. Otillar (n.30 above) 188
67 Ibid.
68 Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Philippines and Kuwait are the example countries where 
pure  service contracts  are  used;  See  M.  Mazeel,  Petroleum  Fiscal  System  and 
Contracts, (Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag GmbH: 2010) 27.
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   Table 2   Categories of Petroleum Agreements
                                  PSC Contracts                     Service Contracts
                                                                     Risk Service     Pure Service
                                                         Contracts         Contracts
 
         Source: Compiled by Author
4.1    Host Government Contracts in Cross-Border Pipeline Projects
Cross-border  petroleum pipelines  can  be  regarded as  the  blood vessels  of  the 
global  economy,  the  sustainable  growth  of  which  is  increasingly  dependent  on 
international  investment  in  energy  products  and  materials.69 The  term  cross-border 
pipeline  refers  to  a  pipeline  that  has  its  origin  in  one  sovereign  country  and  that 
traverses one or more other states along its route.70 While these projects are significant 
for  the nations  involved for  a  number  of  reasons,  legal  jurisdictional  issues  are  the 
source of most of the problems they face. Owing to the fact that such projects become 
subject to the domestic laws of the states in question, operating cross-border petroleum 
projects across two different jurisdictions is a complex undertaking. Therefore, with a 
view to achieving a fully integrated international pipeline project, and to give the project 
a firm foundation the investors of the project and project sponsors require additional 
contractual support with the power to exercise a binding effect on the host government. 
This  support  can  be  built  in  via  intergovernmental  agreements  (IGAs)  and  host 
government  agreements  (HGAs).  It  is  apparent  that  the  requirement  of  the  project 
sponsors is to rule a cross-border project is a ‘blending of local law and international 
law.’71
69S.  V.  Vinogradov,  ‘Cross-border  Oil  and  Gas  Pipelines:  Legal  and  Regulatory 
Regimes, Association of International Petroleum Negotiators’ (AIPN), (2001) 7.
70 M. Dulaney & R. Merrick, ‘Legal Issues in Cross-Border Oil and Gas Pipelines’, 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, Vol. 23 (2005) 247
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Furthermore, the usability of HGAs and IGAs in tandem in cross-border projects 
is endorsed by The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Notably, in 2003, the Energy Charter 
Conference confirmed the first addition of Model Agreements (IGA and HGA) in cross-
border pipeline projects.72 In this  respect,  the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Petroleum 
Pipeline project between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey with the BTC co, can be cited 
as the best example of Model Agreements approved in the Energy Charter Conference. 
The said treaty is a multinational agreement that has the explicit purpose of managing 
the transit of energy products and minerals and the goal of increasing the promotion of 
long-term international cooperation in the energy sector between its member states. To 
the present day, 53 signatory states have become members of the Charter.73
Following this brief mention of the ECT, the main features of HGAs in cross-
border petroleum pipeline projects should also be outlined. HGA (or HGC) is a legal 
contract  between  the  state  and  affiliates  of  project  sponsors  that  identifies  both 
contracting  parties’ rights  and  contractual  obligations  to  ensure  the  success  of  the 
proposed investment project.74 As a contract,  a HGA lists and describes the specific 
grants, rights, privileges, exemptions, and obligations that the host government proposes 
to  the  project  sponsors  and  investors.  The  contract  also  outlines  the  host  country’s 
expectations from the agreement in financial and non-financial areas. Tax, duties, and 
fees  constitute  the  expected  economic  return  of  the  agreement.  The  recruitment  of 
employees for the project is an example of a non-financial area.  As the legal status of 
an IGA is that of a treaty; it will prevail over the legal systems of each host state. For 
this reason, most project sponsors and investors seek to attach HGAs to an IGA in order 
to elevate it to international status. By internationalising the agreement  a favourable 
position is granted to investors and additional support against the legislative activities of 
sovereign states.
5.     Objectives and Scope of the Research
The objective of this work is to determine the political risks, particularly indirect 
expropriation, that arise from the unilateral actions of host governments during the life 
span of energy investment projects, focusing on stabilisation clauses as a political risk 
71 ibid
72 For  the  further  details,  please  see  The  Model  Agreements  are  available  at: 
<www.encharter.org>
73 The government of Afghanistan informed the Energy Secretariat on 19 February, 
2013 that the country’s domestic procedures for ratifying the ECT were successfully 
completed. The Treaty will enter into force Afghanistan and the country will be the 54th 
member  states  of  the  ECT.  For  further  information,  please  see  the  ECT’s  official 
website. ECT (n.72 above)
74 A.  Dufey & R.  Kazimova,  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  Project:  Implications  of  Project 
Finance Chapter 12 in S. Leader & D. Ong, Global Project Finance, Human Rights and  
Sustainable Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 381
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manager, and to examine what driving force(s) influence host states to agree stability in 
their long term host government contracts. 
The  study  introduces  comparative  and  empirical  evidence  in  the  context  of 
existing  literature  on  this  subject  to  support  its  arguments  and  also  discusses  the 
outcomes  of  empirical  investigation.  In  order  to  understand  how  effective  internal 
factors in Azerbaijan and Turkey are in facilitating contractual stability in their energy 
investment projects, the political regimes and state guarantees to foreign investors in 
Azerbaijan and Turkey are examined from a comparative perspective. In the interests of 
accomplishing  the  above-mentioned  objectives,  the  researcher  has  intentionally 
constrained the scope of the research. This work does not seek to address all types of 
political risk, energy investment contracts and all manner of contractual mechanisms 
that are used in the management of political risks. 
This study focuses on upstream oil and gas contracts and the pipeline projects that 
are used within the petroleum sector. The upstream petroleum sector is engaged in the 
quest to find potential underground or underwater crude oil and natural gas fields. The 
activities employed in the upstream sectors are known as exploration and production. 
The study excludes electricity contracts, power contracts, and gas and oil sale contracts. 
Furthermore, it should also be noted that for the purposes of this research, there will 
only be a brief examination of purely indirect expropriation over other forms of political 
risks. Nor does the study attempt to provide a detailed legal commentary on the laws of 
Azerbaijan  and  Turkey:  specific  focus  is  given  to  political  regimes,  foreign  direct 
investment laws, constitutional promises, and the BTC agreement.
International energy investors, to avoid the challenge of political risks during the 
life span of their investment, negotiate with host governments the insertion of one or 
more  of  the  following  contractual  clauses  in  their  agreements:  stabilisation  clauses, 
renegotiation clauses, choice of law and alternative dispute resolution clauses, or benefit 
from the power of bilateral or multilateral agreements which provide full protection to 
investors  for  the  duration  of  energy  investment  projects.  However,  rather  than 
examining all the contractual mechanisms and tools available to reduce political risk, 
this work concentrates on the insertion of stabilisation clauses in petroleum projects and 
attempts to find out why host governments give consent to this type of clauses. 
     This research has the following objectives:
• To furnish a theoretical understanding of the following major political 
risks:  direct  and  more  particularly  indirect  expropriation  in  the  context  of  energy 
investment contracts.
• To identify the strengths and weaknesses of stabilisation clauses inserted 
in host government contracts and determine whether, in contradiction of their intended 
guardianship, they instead disenfranchise the sovereign rights of the host state.
• To  analyse,  through  empirical  evidence  and  from  a  comparative 
perspective,  Azerbaijan  and  Turkey’s  political  regimes,  foreign  investment  laws, 
constitutional promises, policies, with particular focus on the BTC agreements.
• To analyse, through theoretical and empirical investigation, the influence 
of lenders, credit rating agencies and political risk insurers on the relationship between 
the host state and the investor.  
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6.    The Gap in Conventional Literature
Extensive literature on stabilisation clauses as a political risk device can easily be 
found. However, much of what is known about stabilisation clauses concerns their role 
as a political risk manager, their importance in terms of FDI flow in host states, the 
protection and exemption they grant to foreign investors in energy investment contracts 
and their potential impact on human rights. Previous studies on stabilisation clauses in 
petroleum producing countries have tended to concentrate on the political, economic75 
and  regulatory aspects  of  this  device,  as  well  as  the  relationship  between  FDI  and 
democracy.76 Several  studies  have  attempted  to  examine  their  function,  validity, 
effectiveness, and how and why they are used in petroleum contracts. 
The  possible  reasons  why  so  many  developing  countries  agree  to  insert 
stabilisation clauses in the investment contracts  they are party to have been touched 
upon  by  Al-Faruque  from  an  economic  perspective.  According  to  this  author,  an 
economically  weak  bargaining  position  at  the  initial  phase  of  the  negotiations  may 
pressurise host states to agree to accept stabilisation clauses with the prospect of being 
able to better exploit their resources and in so doing accelerate economic development 
and  improve  living  standards.77 Furthermore,  in  2008,  the  International  Finance 
Corporation  (IFC)  sponsored  an  empirical  study  on  stabilisation  clauses  in  host 
government  contracts.  The  research  was  led  by  the  United  Nations  (UN)  Special 
Representative of the Secretary General for Business and Human Rights, Professor John 
Ruggie and authored by Andrea Shemberg.78 This constitutes the first study based on 
empirical research into modern stabilisation practice, including a number of industries 
and  regions  of  the  world.  Andrea  Shemberg,  in  cooperation  with  the  IFC and  UN 
Special  Representative,  obtained  76  current  investment  contracts  and  12  model 
contracts from various sectors. 
 The  above-mentioned  research  found  that  contracts  from  non-OECD 
(Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development)  member  countries  are 
75Al-Faruque   ‘Validity  and  Efficacy of  Stabilisation  Clauses,  Legal  Protection  vs. 
Functional Value’, Journal of International Arbitration 23 (4) (2006) 317-336
76  O.  Bayulgen,  Foreign  Direct  Investment,  Oil  Curse  and  Democratization:  A  
Comparison of Azerbaijan and Russia, Business and Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010)
77Al-Faruque (n.75 above) 335-336
78 The UN-IFC Report was authored by (and research for the report was conducted by) 
Andrea Shemberg, a legal advisor to Professor John Ruggie.
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much more likely than those from OECD countries to insulate the investor from new 
social  and  environmental  laws,  or  to  provide  compensation  to  the  investors  for 
compliance with new social and environmental laws in host governmental agreements.79 
In contrast to the contracts made by non-OECD countries, the research also found that 
contracts  and  models  found  in  OECD  states  contained  stabilisation  clauses  that 
protected investors only against new laws that were arbitrary or discriminatory.  80 The 
research went on to identify two factors which might provide evidence for the apparent 
disparity between OECD and non-OECD country practice. In the first instance, it was 
suggested that the practice of including more extensive stabilisation commitments in 
non-OECD contracts was related to the perception of investment risk.81 Secondly, the 
report  asserted  that  lawyers  surveyed  during  research  for  the  UN-IFC  Report  had 
expressed the view that freezing clauses were unlikely to be enforceable under the laws 
of many developed states.82 However, the research did not address the question:  what 
are the driving forces that persuade host states to contain stabilisation clauses in host 
governmental energy investment contracts? It is also worth mentioning that the research 
did  not  cite  any  evidence  that  investors  or  multinational  companies  have  used 
stabilisation clauses deliberately to discourage the adoption of environmental or human 
rights laws in a host state.
There  is  a  discernible  gap  in  the  literature  of  an  exhaustive  inquiry  into  the 
reasons why host governments agree to clauses that are of no obvious benefit to them, 
and that are often appreciably to their detriment. In this regard it is more usually the 
case that the literature presently available oversimplifies why a host state gives consent 
to stabilisation clauses, e.g. the prospect of economic gain. However, host government 
contracts are not merely two-sided relationships. As well as the investor and the host 
country, there is a third group of external players, consisting of rating agencies, project 
finance lenders, political risk insurers, all of which may assert an influence over the 
terms and conditions of the agreement. The extent of influence exerted by each of these 
parties varies from project to project.  This research takes into account not only the 
internal reasons that may compel host states to agree to stabilisation clauses under their 
host governmental contracts, but also takes stock of the external factors and their role in 
advancing  the  inclusion  of  such  clauses,  thereby  providing  a  rounded  and  fully 
comprehensive analysis of these contractual scenarios.
Consequently, the research aims to contribute to the literature in two ways. Firstly, 
this study provides, for the first time, an empirical and comparative work on the internal 
and external reasons which compel host states to commit to stability clauses. Secondly, 
its  re-assessment of the issues that have arisen from the BTC agreement and of the 
79 A. Shemberg, ‘Stabilisation Clause and Human Rights: A research Project Conducted 
for IFC and the United Nations Special  Representative to  the Secretary General  on 
Business and Human Rights’, IFC/SRSG Research Paper, 11 May, 2009 ix
80 ibid
81 ibid
82 ibid
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impact  on  Azerbaijani  and  Turkish  domestic  laws  of  the  terms  prescribed  by  this 
agreement.  Through  the  analysis  of  the  countries’  political  regimes,  FDI  laws, 
Constitutional  promises  as  well  as  their  investment  environments,  valuable 
recommendations are provided to both the governments of these countries and foreign 
investors contemplating entering into contractual agreements or doing business in these 
selected countries.  What differentiates this study from other works is that it compares 
one specific OECD member country with a non-member state in an attempt to answer 
the question that Andrea Shemberg did not.
7.     Research Questions
The main research question posed in this study is which driving force(s) influence 
host  states  to  commit  to  stabilisation  clauses  in  their  long  term host  governmental 
contracts. In order to answer the main question, the research also raises the following 
sub questions: 
• What is the most hazardous political risk for international energy investors and 
why do host states interfere in investment projects?
• What constitutes indirect expropriation and what mechanisms can be deployed 
by foreign investors against such risk?
• To what extent are stabilisation clauses effective in protecting investments or 
conversely,  in  contradiction  of  their  intended  guardianship,  do  they  instead 
disenfranchise the sovereign rights of the host states?
• Do stabilisation  provisions  constitute  a  threat  for  environmental  and  human 
rights issues?
•  Do rating agencies, project finance lenders and political risk insurers play an 
active role in lobbying for the inclusion of stabilisation clauses in host governmental 
contracts?
• How  effective  are  different  political  regimes  in  promoting  FDI  and  giving 
consent to stabilisation clauses in Azerbaijani and Turkish host government contracts?
• What reason(s) has/have caused Azerbaijan and Turkey to agree to contractual 
stability in the BTC host governmental agreements?
8.     Methodology
Research methodology is the means used to steadily solve a research problem.  83 
A researcher ought to be aware of the methods or techniques available to him/her in 
83 C. R. Kumar, Research Methods, (New Delhi, APH Publishing: 2008) 6.
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order to define an effective methodology for the research to be undertaken.84 This study 
applies both empirical and comparative legal research and is based on exploratory and 
descriptive research of internal and external factors investigated via field work.
In this study, the exploratory research method was adopted during the literature 
review and the interviews in the pilot study. This method was selected in order to gain 
insight into and obtain a better understanding about internal and external factors and 
familiarity with stabilisation clauses as a prequel to more rigorous investigation.  The 
Descriptive method was applied as the researcher attempted to answer ‘what is’ or ‘what 
was’ questions. 85 Essentially, this research sought to answer the one central ‘what are’ 
question by asking: what driving force(s) compel host states to agree to stabilisation 
clauses in long term host governmental contracts?
The  study  also  adopted  empirical  legal  research.  Baldwin  and  Davis  have 
described empirical research in law as involving: ‘the study, through direct methods 
rather than secondary sources, of the institutions, rules, procedures, and personnel of the 
law, with a view to understanding how they operate and what effects they have.’ With 
reference to this definition, it should be underlined that empirical legal research helps us 
to comprehend how law works in the real  world.86  In other  words,  empirical legal 
research attempts to discover the impact that law, legal institutions, legal personnel and 
associated  phenomena  have  on  people,  communities  and  societies,  as  well  as  the 
influence  that  various  social,  economic  and  political  factors  have  on  law,  legal 
phenomena and institutions.87
Initially, library based research was carried out in order to review the literature; 
thereafter, empirical legal research methodology was applied to conduct interviews with 
experts in foreign investment law, international oil companies, national oil companies, 
lawyers, and academics, producing a comparison between the legal regime and system 
in place. The design of questions was saved until after the literature review, as creating 
effective interview questions requires a thorough understanding of the issues in hand 
with a view to formulating potential solutions. 
Comparative legal methodology is used to inquire into foreign legal systems in 
order to seek solutions to the issues of a  particular legal  system, or to improve the 
combination of  law between national  legal  systems.88 In this  context,  it  is  therefore 
84 ibid
85 L. Bickman & D. J. Rog,  Handbook of applied social research methods, (London, 
Sage Publications, 1998) 15
86 D. H. Genn & M. Partington and S. Weeler, Law in the Real World: Improving Our 
Understanding of How Law Works, Final Report and Recommendations (London, 
Nuffield Foundation, 2006) 1
87 ibid
88 ibid
26
important  to  recognise  that  comparative  law  presupposes  the  existence  of  the 
multiplicity of legal regulations and institution and examines to what extent they are 
alike  and  divergent.89 The  role  of  comparative  methodology  in  this  research  is  to 
facilitate  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  divergent  political  regimes  and  foreign 
investment laws, and policies of Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
This  study  adopts  a  functional  approach  to  comparative  methodology. 
Functionalism is the basic methodological principle of comparative law, and perhaps the 
only  fruitful  method90  that  can  be  applied.  According  to  Ernst  Rabel,  one  cannot 
compare  legal  regimes,  institutions  or  systems  in  a  vacuum,  i.e.  without  also 
understanding how they function and operate in practice.91 Rabel also argues that one 
cannot recognize how certain legal regimes or systems function unless one examines 
them against their legal, economic, cultural, social and historical background. 92 Rabel 
emphasises that comparative analysis should be executed in a structured and systematic 
manner.  Consequently,  the  comparative  chapter  of  this  study will  adopt  the  format 
described above: an exposition of historical and cultural and economic nexus, followed 
by  foreign  investment  laws  and  political  regimes  and  institutions,  and  finally  a 
conclusion presenting a comparative analysis of Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
This research engages with the following materials: comprehensive literature, host 
government  agreements,  arbitral  decisions,  and  the  on-going  review  of  laws  and 
petroleum legislations are the primary sources of this work. Notably, a major hurdle in 
this study has been the review of energy investment contracts, as they are confidential. 
This project also utilises secondary materials and data has been gathered from books, 
journal  articles,  reports,  conference  papers,  newspapers  and  statistics.  In  order  to 
broaden the scope of the information gathered, and to exploit the research tools of our 
digital age, several online discussion groups have also been monitored.
Why was the BTC Project selected as a case study in this work and why was 
comparative approach was adopted for Azerbaijan and Turkey? 
89 R.  Sacco,  ‘Legal  Formants:  A  Dynamic  Approach  to  Comparative  Law’,  the 
American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 39, No. 1. (1991) 5
90 K. Zweigert & Kotz,  An  Introduction to comparative law, 3rd edn,. Translated by 
Tony Weir, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) 32
91 Ernst Rabel is the founder of function approach to comparative methodology, cited in 
J.  Beckman,  Comparative  Legal  Approaches  to  Home Land Security  and Terrorism 
(Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing, 2007) 7
92 ibid
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One of the principle reasons why the BTC project was chosen as a case study was 
due to the availability of information about it. A major hurdle in energy related studies is 
the restricted availability of information on contractual arrangements between parties. 
This study selected the BTC project as a case study because project backgrounds, issues 
arose  from  the  BTC  project,  Intergovernmental  agreements  between  Azerbaijan-
Georgia-Turkey and  host  governmental  agreements  of  these  states  with  the  project 
consortium are made publicly available. In addition, there is also a significant amount of 
legal documents produced by NGOs, financial institutions as well as project sponsors 
involved to the BTC project that is also publicly accessible. 
Azerbaijan  and  Turkey  have  been  selected  for  the  purposes  of  this  study  to 
examine whether their respective political regimes and legal and regulatory structure 
foster  the  inclusion  of  stabilisation  clauses  in  the  agreements  made  for  energy 
investment projects to be undertaken on their territory (whether this be intentionally or 
through a lack of proper checks and controls). If this proves to be the case, this leads to 
the question: what is/are the other reason(s) these two countries agreed to contractual 
stability in the BTC host governmental agreement? There is no doubt that there are 
considerable differences between these two countries in terms of energy reserves, size, 
and other economic factors, yet Azerbaijan and Turkey are both Turkic countries party 
to a number of significant international energy investment projects, and share common 
ground in terms of language, religion and history. 
The reason for choosing these two countries for comparison is twofold: The first 
reason for drawing comparisons between Azerbaijan and Turkey is that both countries’ 
political  regimes are quite  different.  Evidently,  the legal  regime of Azerbaijan is  an 
authoritarian  presidential  system;  however,  Turkey is  ruled  by hybrid  parliamentary 
regime. In literature, a number of thoughts are suggested regarding the effectiveness of 
legal regimes on foreign direct investment and their crucial role for attracting foreign 
investment.  Analysis  of  these  two  divergent  regimes,  political  and  democratic 
institutions,  laws and foreign investment policy,  may provide the internal reasons to 
understand  why  these  states  agree  stabilisation  clauses  in  their  host  governmental 
contracts. 
Secondly, these two Turkic states are both (along with Georgia) party to the BTC 
agreement. This agreement is arguably the most debated petroleum pipeline project in 
the energy field, particularly because it contains provisions that place heavy burdens on 
its host governments. This study explores the issues that arise from the BTC agreement 
and measures how this agreement and its host governmental contracts have impacted on 
Azerbaijani and Turkish domestic law.
It is also important to justify why Georgia was not selected, although the country 
is  also  party to  the  BTC project.  It  was  in  the  interests  of  the  study to  select  two 
countries with key differences in political regime and role in the agreement.  Georgia 
and Turkey share  the  commonalities  of  having  a  hybrid  political  regime  and being 
transit countries under the BTC agreement, while Azerbaijan, as a petroleum producing 
country with an authoritarian political regime provided the best contrast. Turkey was 
chosen over Georgia due to the fact that the researcher has better access to information 
on this country and as a Turkish speaker was better placed to interview Turkish and 
28
Azerbaijani  nationals  who  share  this  language.  Nevertheless,  Georgia’s  bargaining 
position in the BTC project is examined in chapter 5 of this study.
Interviews 
The  interviews  of  this  research  project  applied  the  qualitative  semi-structured 
interview technique.  The semi-structured  interview is  one  of  the  types  of  interview 
methods that are frequently used in law researches. The importance and value of semi-
structured interviews are described by Mason. According to this author, semi-structured 
interviewing is  an  overarching term used to  explain  a  variety of  different  forms  of 
interviews most commonly related with qualitative research. 93 Mason goes on to state 
that the defining characteristic of semi-structured interviews are that they are flexible 
and fluid in structure, especially when compared with structured interviews that include 
a structured series of questions to be asked in the same sequence and manner to all  
participants.94 
The interviews of this work consist of two parts: the first stage took place between 
May, 2012 and June, 2012, and the second stage took place between November, 2012 
and January, 2013.  These interviews were undertaken with 20 participants, (16 male 
and 4 female) in total, including, experts in project finance and political risk insurance, 
lawyers, company directors, academics and a judge. Interviewees were selected from 
each country to represent a variety of professional backgrounds relevant to the study. 
This  includes  legal  backgrounds  (lawyers  and  a  judge),  commercial  backgrounds 
(company employees in the fields of insurance, finance, foreign trade and accounting), 
and  experts  with  scientific  qualifications  (academics  in  the  field  of  energy  and 
international investment laws).
The interviews of this research were conducted in a variety of locations in Ankara, 
Baku, Istanbul and London; including offices, meeting rooms and cafes. The choice of 
venue was given to  participants  as  the  researcher  wanted  them to  feel  flexible  and 
relaxed during the course of the interview. During the interviews, the researcher used 
recording  equipment  and  note  taking,  as  preferred  by  the  interviewee.  The  most 
effective  method was to  record  the  interviews  with  the  use of  a  portable  recording 
device. The advantages of this method were that it allowed the interviewer to focus their 
attention wholly on the interviewee, maintain eye contact and demonstrate that they 
were  listening  intently,  and  to  be  able  to  adapt  their  line  of  questioning  without 
distraction. 
Several resources were available to validate the legitimacy of the study, including 
the  participant  consent  form  and  participant  information  letter  provided  by  the 
supervisors.  In  July,  2011,  the  researcher  visited  the  BOTAS  Company  in  Ankara, 
Turkey.  The purpose of this initial  visit  was to establish contact with a state-owned 
company in a position to provide valuable practical insights into the proposed area of 
this research and to grant the researcher the possibility to access this via an internship 
93 J. Mason, Qualitative Researching, 2nd edn (London, Sage Publishing:, 2002) 62
94  Ibid
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within the company. Initial contact was made prior to the pilot study with the quality 
and training department of BOTAS and the researcher was also able to utilise some 
personal contacts in the field to commend the approval of this request. 
For the pilot study, the researcher held interviews with nine participants in May, 
2012 and June, 2012. Five of the interviews were conducted during an internship at the 
state owned company, while the remaining four were carried out in Ankara and Istanbul. 
The interviewees were company directors, senior experts in international projects and 
project finance, as well as lawyers and a lecturer. The pilot study of the current project 
was  a  preliminary investigation  into  the  interview approach.  As  well  as  testing  the 
interview technique, an assessment was also made of the adequacy and capability of the 
research questions. This was also an opportunity to gather some initial findings on the 
internal and external reasons that may lead host states to agree to stabilisation clauses. 
Some  of  the  respondents  that  participated  in  the  pilot  study  interviews  were 
subsequently revisited and re-interviewed in order to get  further information for the 
final stage of this study. 
The researcher faced some difficulties regarding participant selection. Despite the 
careful explanation provided by the researcher in both English and Turkish to the Law 
Department  at  BOTAS  Company,  a  participant  referred  from  the  expropriation 
department did not meet the interviewee criteria dictated by the research needs. The 
researcher was of the conviction that interviewing an individual from the expropriation 
department would be beneficial to this research. However at the start of the meeting the 
participant mentioned that he worked in the Construction and Expropriation Department 
and that his background was in engineering. It was instantly clear that his knowledge 
and experience were not relevant to the scope of this study. Subsequently, in order to 
avoid  further  misunderstandings  of  this  kind,  the  researcher  obtained  the  company 
employee profiles of those proposed for interview in order to personally assess which 
employees were most likely to be able to contribute knowledge relevant to this study. 
This  method was very helpful  in  selecting  the  right  participants  for  the  rest  of  the 
interviews. 
The researcher also faced some obstacles in obtaining the participant consent of 
some  interviewees  and  scheduling  interviews  outside  the  company.  Despite  these 
difficulties,  however,  the researcher was able to obtain valuable information for this 
research, by conducting semi-structured interviews. Doing an official internship in a law 
department housed within a state-owned company was a key to easing any potential 
difficulties. Nevertheless, as the second round of fieldwork was carried out in more than 
one country, the researcher needed to make contact with more potential participants. In 
an attempt to broaden the range of contact, the researcher invited suggestions from the 
already secured participants of this study. Through their assistance and referrals, the 
initial contact details of the second round interview participants were gathered. While 
some participants of the pilot study passed on contact details for employees of the State 
Oil Company Azerbaijan (SOCAR), others recommended social networking websites 
for  professionals  such  as  Linked-in.  The  researcher  created  a  profile  on  the 
aforementioned  websites  and  successfully  made  contact  with  additional  prospective 
interviewees for the second round of interviews. This proved to be a very effective 
method of gaining contact details and broadening the range of contact. 
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The pitfall of using the voice recording method was that, as happened in one case, 
an interviewee declined to give permission for the interview to be recorded in this way 
as this participant was afraid of the possibility that the information could be shared with 
other parties and that sharing this information may be seen in some way as breaching 
the confidentiality of their profession. In this instance, note-taking was as a satisfactory 
back-up method for recording the interview. Admittedly, using a digital recorder made 
for a more relaxed atmosphere, because the participants in the interview were free from 
the distraction of note-taking and could concentrate on the questions.      
Qualitative approaches include procedures that are not strictly formal and pre-
defined, with an unlimited range and a more philosophical working method than other 
kinds of research.95 For the purpose of this  work, a qualitative paradigm is applied. 
More significantly, qualitative research methodologies are convenient for the purposes 
of  this  study in  two respects:  first  of  all,  the  qualitative  research  methodology can 
strengthen  the  researcher’s  depth  of  understanding  of  the  issue  that  is  being 
investigated. Adopting this method is appropriate to the study since there is a need to 
gain  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  internal  and  external  forces  in  the  usage  of 
stabilisation clauses in host government contracts. The second benefit of applying this 
research approach in this study is it is flexible and permits the researcher to explore new 
hypothesises. 
Ethical Issues
Studies  in  social  science  are  frequently  concerned  with  gathering  data  from 
individuals.  Almost  unavoidably,  this  raises  questions  regarding  the  way  in  which 
individuals that provide data should be treated by researchers, and such questions are 
often of an ethical nature.96 At this point, the term ‘ethics’ needs to be explained: Ethics 
are a system of moral principles that originate from a branch of philosophy that defines 
what is good for individuals and society.97 The term derives from the ancient Greek 
word ‘ethos’ that means custom, habit or character.98 In the context of research projects, 
ethics can be defined as the moral principles and rules that researchers in any branch of 
science must adhere to when conducting research to guarantee that individuals are not 
pressed in any way to participate or that they meet with harm as a result of participating 
in the study. There is no doubt that ethical issues are serious concerns that must be taken 
95 G. Allan & C. Skinner,  Handbook for Research in the Social Sciences  (Brighton, 
Falmer Press, 1991) 16
96 P.  Oliver,  the  Student’s  Guide  to  Research  Ethics,  2nd edn.  (  Berkshire:  Open 
University Press 2003, 2010) 3
97BBC Guide, ‘Definition of Ethics’, available at: 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/introduction/intro_1.shtml> July, 2012
98  ibid
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into account by  researchers throughout every stage of their academic work; such as in a 
pilot study and in the writing up stage. For this study, ethics approval was granted by the 
Faculty of Research Ethics Panel,  Local  laws and ethical  requirements.  Prior to the 
internship,  the  researcher  fulfilled  all  the  necessary  requirements  by  providing  an 
official letter from the BOTAS Petroleum and Pipeline Company where the internship 
and some interviews were to take place. Before semi-structured interviews were carried 
out, a consent form (in English and Turkish) was provided to each of the respondents. 
The details of the participant consent form were read aloud and explained to them. Each 
of the respondents of the interviews was required to sign each section of the form in 
order to ascertain that they were taking part in the research of their own free will. The 
researcher also verbally inquired whether the respondents would be available for follow 
up interviews in the two stages of this research process as and when further information 
was required.  
Furthermore, as privacy is a key moral principle in ethics,  the researcher took 
pains  to  guard  the  personal  right  to  confidentiality  and  anonymity,  by  omitting  to 
mention some respondents by name, where requested.  The researcher also informed 
respondents of the contribution to knowledge that this research project represents and, 
specifically that the goal of this research project is to promote a better understanding of 
the reasons host states give consent to stabilisation clauses. All the respondents were 
also informed that they were under no obligation to participate in the research and that 
they  would  be  free  to  withdraw  at  any  time.  Finally,  the  researcher  informed  the 
participants that the findings of the research could be sent to them if they wished once 
the project was completed. The researcher can confidently affirm that that the interviews 
of  the  present  project  did  not  cause  any  harm  to  respondents,  whether  physical, 
emotional or psychological. 
9.     Overview of Azerbaijan and Turkey
9. 1.  Political regimes
The Republic  of  Azerbaijan is  located  in  the  south east  of  the  Caucasus,  and 
shares  borders  with  Russia,  Georgia,  Iran  and  Armenia.  The  country  gained  its 
independence in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The political system of 
Azerbaijan is based on the principles of the separation of powers. With regard to this 
principle,  the  constitution  determines  that  executive  power  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
president  of  the  Republic  of  Azerbaijan,  legislative  power  is  the  domain  of  the 
parliament  of  the  Republic  of  Azerbaijan,  while  judicial  power  is  held  by  the 
independent courts of Azerbaijan, the constitution court being the highest court of these. 
The political regime in Azerbaijan is categorised by scholars in the literature; however, 
there  is  little  agreement  on  the  matter.99 The  categories  suggested  range  from neo-
patrimonial  dictatorship;  sultanistic;  authoritarian;  to  decaying  semi-authoritarian; 
sultanistic semi-authoritarian; hybrid and partially democratic100. 
99 O. Bayulgen,  Foreign Direct Investment, and Political Regimes: The Oil Sector in  
Azerbaijan, Russia and Norway, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 97
100 ibid
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Another Turkic country, Turkey, is located in Western Asia has been a republic 
since 1923. More specifically, Turkey is a secular parliamentary republic established on 
the principle of the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judiciary. The 
constitution is the supreme law and the Constitutional Court is the highest court in the 
country. The executive branch is dual-headed in Turkey. The president is the head of the 
state and the prime minister is the head of the Council of Ministers. As determined by 
the  1982  Constitution,  the  country’s  legislative  organ  rests  in  The  National  Grand 
Assembly (Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi) unicameral parliament which is located in 
Ankara.  Furthermore,  the 1982 Turkish Constitution decrees that national courts and 
judges in Turkey are independent. Turkey is often classed as a hybrid regime. 
The  Economics  Intelligence  Unit  published  a  report  it  called  The  Democracy 
Index in 2011. The set of values it proposes can be used to place states within one of the 
four types of regimes; namely, full democracies, flowed democracies, hybrid regimes 
and authoritarian regimes in 167 countries. The hybrid regime scores of the 4 to 5.9 and 
authoritarian regime scores below four.  Using the ranking system of  the report,  the 
political regime of Azerbaijan is classified in authoritarian regimes and Turkey places in 
hybrid regimes101. 
                  Table 3 Democracy Index Ranking in 2011
 Ranking  Country
Democracy 
index  
Political 
regime Government Type
  1
40
Azerbaijan
 
      3.
15
Authoritarian 
regime Presidential system
   
88
  Tu
rkey      5.
13 Hybrid regime
Parliamentary 
republic
Source: Economics Intelligence Unit
101A  Report  from  Economics  Intelligence  Unit,   ‘Democracy  Index,  2011’  : 
Democracy Under Stress, available at: <www.eiu.com> August, 2012
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9.2    Economy
The  Republic  of  Azerbaijan  is  a  dynamic  emerging  economy  with  a  skilled 
workforce and the benefit of rich natural energy resources. The energy sector is the 
backbone  of  the  Azerbaijani  economy.  Azerbaijan  is  richly  endowed  with  natural 
resources and has  a  long history of oil  and gas exploration.  Azerbaijan’s  confirmed 
crude oil reserves were estimated at 7 billion barrels in January 2012.102 The oil sector is 
not new in Azerbaijan. The country is the one of the longest established oil-producing 
countries in the world which experienced an oil boom at the beginning of the twentieth 
century and thereafter  served as one of the main refining centres within the former 
Soviet Union. The involvement of international oil companies in petroleum projects in 
Azerbaijan commenced with the activities of the Nobel brothers in the early 1870s.103 
‘By 1897, the oil fields in Baku delivered more than 45% of the world’s crude oil. And a 
few years later, by the end of the century, these Russian-run wells accounted for more 
than half the total world output.104 In the context of Azerbaijan’s more recent history, the 
oil  sector  has  played  a  key role  in  the  economic  and  political  development  of  the 
country, strengthening the country’s independence, protecting its territorial position and 
stimulating economic growth by attracting international energy investors.
 While it is the case that most former Soviet Union states have been endeavouring 
to  become  a  part  of  the  global  economy  as  new  independent  states,  Azerbaijan 
distinguishes itself from its peers through the sheer extent of its success in adapting to 
the global economy and attracting foreign investors. According to UNCTAD’s inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) index, Azerbaijan ranked the third highest among 140 
countries in the years between 1994 and 1996 and eighth highest from 1998 to 2000.105 
The  Azerbaijani  government  boasts  of  a  successful  record  for  oil  and  gas  policy-
making, signing the ‘Contract of the Century’ in 1994 Azeri, Chirag, and Gunsheli fields 
(ACG), swiftly followed by the Shah Deniz gas field in 1996 which led to a huge boost  
in international investment in the petroleum sector. Moreover, another crucial project 
emerged  in  2006  on  the  signing  of  the  great  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  (BTC)  pipeline 
project.  The economic  aim of  this  project  is  to  transport  oil  from Baku to  western 
markets via the cities of Tbilisi and Ceyhan. The political aim is, technically, to end the 
Russian monopoly of transportation of energy resources from the Caspian Sea.
102  US Energy  Information Administration, available at:  <www.eia.gov> January, 
2012
103 G. Askerov, ‘Oil and Gas Pipeline Strategy of a Landlocked Countries: Case of 
Azerbaijan’, Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol.3 No 4 (2000) 5
104 Robert Ebel, Caspian Energy Resources: Implication for the Arab Gulf, Emirates  
Centre for Strategic Studies  and Research, (Lebanon, Ithaca Press: 2000) 2, cited in G. 
Askerov (n.103 above) 5
105  UNCTAD 2002a, Azerbaijan was ranked the highest in 2004 (UNCTAD, 2006).
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 Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad projects 
are the other significant international projects that helped the country to transport its 
energy resources. However, Azerbaijan’s landlocked location in the Caspian region and 
unresolved conflict with Armenia which occupied 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan 
forced  the  country  to  rely  on  its  other  neighbours  when  delivering  its  oil  and  gas 
products to the world market. These issues placed a heavy burden on the Azerbaijani 
economy. 
In an attempt to provide an estimation of the degree of contribution the oil and gas 
industry make to the Azerbaijani economy, the table below provides the indisputable 
evidence of hard facts and figures. 
Table 4 Significance of the Oil and Gas Sectors to the Economy
     Azerbaijan 200
3
2004 2005 2006 2007 200
8
200
9
201
0
GDP Growth rate (%) 11.2 10.2 26.4 34.0 25.0 10.8 9.3 5.0
Share of oil and gas 
sectors in GDP (%)
30.1 31.3 44.1 53.8 55.9 54.1 47.0 48.5
Share of oil and gas 
sectors in Industrial 
output (%)
62.1 61.6 75.0 82.8 85.7 89 74.0 75.7
Share of petroleum in 
gross
Export (%)
85.7 82.7 86.5 92.2 94.2 93.1 92.8 92.0
Share of oil and gas 
sectors in FDI (%)
98.5 97.5 94.2 90.3 90.1 83.
9
82.
0
81.8
Source:  Ministry of  Economic  Development  & State  Statistical  Committee  of 
Azerbaijan
In the interest of boosting its economy further, Azerbaijan has also established 
trade  partnerships  with  over  147  countries  around  the  world.  Its  chief  imports  are 
reported to be: food, machinery, electric equipment & parts, vehicles & parts, chemical 
products and medical and surgery equipment; while perhaps unsurprisingly its principal 
exports  are:  crude  oil,  other  products  related  to  oil,  natural  gas,  electricity  and 
chemicals.106 The following table demonstrates Azerbaijan’s major trading partners. 
    Table 5   Azerbaijan’s main Trade Partners, 2011
106 For further detail please see: The State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan, 
available at:  <http://www.stat.gov.az/  >  January, 2012
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Countries in Import (%) Countries in Export (%)
Russia 16.8 Italy 35.2
Turkey 13.4 France 15.2
Germany 8.7 United States 6.8
United States 6.5 Russia 4.5
China 6.4 Ukraine 3.5
Source: State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan
During  the  two  decades  of  its  existence  as  a  republic,  the  country  has 
implemented various codes relating to foreign investment in an attempt to grant space to 
its market economy for growth. The chief parts of the codes are: law over the protection 
of foreign investment, the law on investment activity, the law on privatisation of the 
state property, and related presidential decrees.107 These laws provide numerous crucial 
state  guarantees  to  investors,  concerning  non-discrimination,  freedom  of  capital 
movements,  stability of legislation,  compensation for expropriation,  and the right  of 
entry to  international  arbitration.108 The  Azeri  government  also  implemented  crucial 
legislation in the energy sector, notably, the law on energy, the law on use of energy 
resources and the law on subsoil, and the law on Natural Monopolies. 109 
Turkey is a dynamic, growing economy. According to the IMF, the country is an 
emerging market economy and is mainly developed and industrialised.110  Turkey is an 
upper-middle  income  state  with  relatively  few  natural  resources.  The  main  natural 
resources  it  does  possess  are  mineral  (coal,  chromate,  copper,  boron),  steel  and 
petroleum.  The  country  does  not  have  rich  oil  reserves;  however,  its  economy  is 
presently in  transition  from a  high  degree  of  dependence  on  agriculture  and  heavy 
industry. Although Turkey is not an oil producing country, it plays a major role as a 
transit country in international energy projects. 
There are a number of significant oil and gas pipeline projects that Turkey takes 
part in such as the BTC crude oil pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline 
(TANAP) project  and the  Kirkuk–Ceyhan oil  pipeline  project.  The TANAP project, 
aims to transfer Azeri natural gas via Turkey to Europe. The project was announced on 
17 November, 2011 at the Third Black Sea Energy and Economic Forum in Istanbul. On 
26 June, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed up to the project. This major natural gas pipeline 
107  Energy Charter, ‘In-depth Review of the Investment Climate and Market  
Structure in the Energy Sector of Azerbaijan’ (2005) available at: 
<http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=141> January, 2012
108 ibid
109 ibid
110 IMF, ‘World Economic Outlook: Tensions from the Two-Speed Recovery 
Unemployment , Commodities, and Capital Flows’ (April 2011) 173-174, available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf> January, 2012
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project is expected to commence in 2014. The Kirkuk crude oil pipeline project links 
Turkey and Iraq. However, the pipeline has been sabotaged by the PKK terrorist group 
(Kurdish Worker’s Party) on occasion in the past and is still not in full working order. 
The relative success of the BTC project renders it one of the most important oil pipeline 
projects in realising Turkey’s national goals in the oil sector. This major oil pipeline 
project has been in full operation since 2006 and provides a million barrels of oil from 
Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey per day. 111   
According to  the  United  Nations’ world  investment  survey between 2008 and 
2010, Turkey is the 15th most attractive country for FDI in the entire world.112 This 
assessment leads one to question how Turkey has reached its objectives and needs in 
such a short period. There is no doubt that Turkey’s foreign investment policy and new 
legislative reforms have played an effective role in the attraction of FDI and economic 
development of the country.
 In  2003,  Turkey  enacted  significant  legislative  reforms113 to  develop  the 
investment environment in Turkey. The new reforms contain three significant legislative 
acts that intend to remove bureaucratic red tape, ensure equal treatment to both domestic 
and  foreign  investors  and  protect  foreign  investors’  rights  to  meet  international 
standards. The FDI law provides a definition of foreign investors and foreign direct 
investment. Moreover, it also identifies integral principles of FDI, such as freedom to 
invest, national treatment, expropriation and nationalisation, dispute settlement and the 
other areas related to foreign investment. Furthermore, trade partnership with various 
countries from different regions plays a crucial role in Turkish economy. The country is 
a  well-known  exporter  of  products  such  as  foodstuffs,  clothes  and  automobiles.  In 
addition, the country exports mineral fuels and oils, tobacco and steel. The table below 
shows the main trading partners of Turkey.
             Table 6 Turkey’s Trade with Main Partners (2012)
Countries in Import (%) Countries in Export (%)
European Union 33.7 European Union 29.3
Russia 10.3 Iraq 5.4
China 8.2 Iran 5.0
United States 5.4 United Arab Emirates 4.1
Iran 4.6 Russia 3.3
Source: The Directorial General for Trade of the European Commission
111 US Energy, (n. 102 above)
112The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘ World Investment  
Prospect Survey 2008-2010’  available at: 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wips2008_en.pdf>  January, 2012
113Foreign Investment Law no 4875 June 17, 2003
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The table clearly demonstrates that in both import and export, the European Union 
is  the  largest  trade partner  of  Turkey.  The reason why Turkey’s  best  partner  EU is 
because of the Ankara agreement signed between EU and Turkey to implement Custom 
Union in 1995.  According to  this  agreement,  goods can travel  between two entities 
without any barriers (zero tariffs).  It is apparent that trade has been a strong driver of 
the economic growth in Azerbaijan and Turkey; however, both countries still  cannot 
take place in the economically freest countries. While Azerbaijan’s economy is the 88th 
freest economy, Turkey’s economy is in the 69th place according to economic freedom 
index 2013.The following table below provides the economic freedom in Azerbaijan 
and  Turkey  from a  comparative  perspective.  Notably,  100  represent  the  maximum 
freedom.
  Table 7 Index of Economic Freedom in Azerbaijan and Turkey, 2013
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10.   Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project: Timeline, 
Importance and Issues
The BTC is a crude oil pipeline project which spans three countries and runs from 
the Caspian  Sea to  the Mediterranean coast.  The aim of  this  project  is  to  transport 
Caspian crude oil from the Azeri-Chrirag-Gunashli (ACG) fields in the Caspian basin 
via Tbilisi in Georgia to a Turkish port on the Mediterranean Sea for delivery to the 
western market. The project’s pipeline which runs underground along its whole length, 
which measures 1,768 km (1,099 miles) in total: 443 km of which span Azerbaijan, 249 
km in Georgia,  and 1,076 km in Turkey.114 This  mega project  was organised by an 
international consortium (Main Export Pipeline participants) and led by British Petrol. 
Through this project western governments aimed to end the Russian monopoly over the 
delivery of oil supplies from the Caspian region. 
114 British Petrol available at: <http://www.bp.com/> January, 2012
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Source115: British Petrol (BP)
The first negotiations regarding the BTC project commenced in 1992, just after 
Azerbaijan declared itself a republic independent of the former Soviet Union. In spring 
1992, the Turkish prime minister, Suleyman Demirel visited the new independent Turkic 
countries, including Azerbaijan and proposed that a pipeline route should be planned for 
the economic development and strategic integrity of the region. Initially, it was thought 
a pipeline from Azerbaijan would run through Georgia or Armenia. This was found to 
present  too  much  political  risk  due  to  the  unresolved  war  between  Armenia  and 
Azerbaijan over the status of Nagorro-Karabakh and the close military and economic 
ties of Armenia with Russia.  This left  as the only option, the circuitous Azerbaijan-
Georgia-Turkey route, longer and financially more expensive to build than Armenian 
route.116
On 29 October, 1998, the President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, the President of 
Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the 
President of Turkey, Suleyman Demirel and the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov 
met in Ankara to submit and sign the Ankara Declaration.  With this  declaration the 
parties  officially  acknowledged the  importance  and necessity  of  the  construction  of 
more than one pipeline, commercially optimising oil and natural gas exports to the rest 
of the world.117 These countries also confirmed their support for routing the pipeline 
115 ibid
116 Z. Baran,  The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Turkey, Chapter 6 in 
S. F. Starr & S. E. Cornell, The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil window to the West, 
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program- A Joint Transatlantic  
Research and Policy Centre (2005) 105 available at: 
<http://www.silkroadstudies.org/BTC_6.pdf> January, 2012
117Hurriyet Daily News, available at: 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=timeline-of-the-baku-
tbilisi-ceyhan-pipeline-2006-07-13>January,  2012
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from  Baku  to  the  Turkish  Mediterranean  port  of  Ceyhan.  Present  to  witness  the 
declaration was the US Energy Secretary, Bill Richardson.
On 18 November,  1999, at  the meeting of the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in Istanbul, the Inter-Governmental Agreement which formally 
established  the  foundations  of  the  BTC  project  was  signed  by  representatives  of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. The then US president, Bill Clinton counter-signed the 
accord as a witness. In addition to this intergovernmental treaty, the signatory states also 
signed Host Government Agreements between the project consortium and Azerbaijan-
Georgia-Turkey. The HGAs were ratified by Azerbaijan on 26 May, 2000; in Georgia on 
29 May, 2000, and by Turkey on 22 June, 2000. 
Stabilisation  clauses  inserted  in  host  governmental  contracts  provoked 
considerable  alarm  among  civil  rights  groups  when  it  became  apparent  that  such 
contracts enable BTC sponsors to contract outside the rule of law. Indeed, the provisions 
of  the  agreement  extend  a  wide  range  of  privileges  and  immunities  to  investors. 
Moreover, the main purpose of this agreement is to grant immunity to the investor and 
third parties (such as insurers) from the domestic law of the host state. Notably, the BTC 
agreement established a unique legal regime contrary to other similar energy investment 
contracts.  It  goes  without  saying that  when the economic,  environmental  and social 
importance of industries in which stabilisation clauses have been used is considered, it 
is no surprise that they have been the subject of debate and criticism by civil rights 
groups associated with promoting sustainable development. 118 BP came under fire for 
its stabilisation clauses because they prevented the three aforementioned host countries 
from  passing  new  human  rights  legislation  through  their  national  parliaments  and 
required the host states to compensate them for contravening the clause. This restricted 
the states’ capacity to actively honour their obligations to promote or protect human 
rights under international law.119 Amnesty International made the following criticisms 
regarding  the  economic  equilibrium  clauses  inserted  in  the  host  governmental 
agreement signed between BTC investor consortium and the Turkish government:
While Turkey remains bound by its International human rights obligations, it 
has  undertaken  in  the  Host  Government  Agreement  (HGA)  to  pay  the 
consortium substantial compensation for any changes in law or other actions 
that will disturb the economic equilibrium of the project. It  is thus caught 
between two sets of requirements – to live up its undertakings to its citizens 
and to live up to its undertakings to the consortium. Each step in the former 
direction will carry the price tag of damages – which can easily amount to 
many millions of  pounds.  In  this  way,  the  HGA creates  disincentives  for 
Turkey to become more integrated into international human rights norms. At 
the very least, it may have to enter reservations exempting the project from 
118A.  Sheppard  &  A.  Crockett,  Are  Stabilisation  Clauses  a  Threat  to  Sustainable 
Development?,  Chapter  14  in  M.  C.  Segger,  A.  Newcombe and M.  Gehring  (eds.),  
Sustainable Development in International in International Investment law ( The Hague: 
Kluwer, 2010) 338-339
119 Amnesty  International,  Human  Rights  on  the  Line:  The  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  
Project, (London, Amnesty International, 2003) 5
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any new international standards it subscribes to. The effect of being faced 
with punitive costs for protecting the human rights of those affected by the 
pipeline is likely to have a chilling effect on Turkey’s ability to improve its  
general human rights record.120
In December 2003,  the  BTC co.  published a  legal  document  called ‘Human 
Rights Undertaking.’121  With regard to this undertaking, compensation clauses in the 
HGA would not be valid in the event of new laws being adopted or introduced for 
environmental and human rights issues. It is reasonable to assume that this publication 
was  prompted  by  the  criticism  and  intended  to  go  some  way  in  appeasing  such 
objections.
11.    Structure of the Work
The study consists of three parts which are divided into the following chapters. 
The work begins with a general introduction to the research. 
Chapter 1 includes the definition of key terminology and concepts that central to 
this study, such as host governmental energy investment contracts, stabilisation clauses. 
It  also  provides  an  overview  of  political  risk,  as  well  as  a  background  to  the 
geographical,  economic  and  political  background  to  Turkey  and  Azerbaijan.  This 
chapter briefly explores the paradigm of carrying out this study. Understanding political 
risks is very important in order to assess why energy investment contracts are exposed 
to conflict and also to understand why stabilisation clauses are used as a form of risk 
management in host government energy investment contracts. Library-based research is 
used in this chapter as there is comprehensive literature on the subject. 
Chapter 2 identifies the major political risks for foreign investors and explores 
their  origin and causes.  The chapter  begins  by providing a historical background to 
political risk in the energy sector. This overview aids an understanding of how political 
risk  emerged  and  evolved  over  time  in  the  energy industry.  Afterwards,  a  detailed 
analysis of direct expropriation is provided, and the legal requirements for lawful taking 
under international law are outlined with reference to recent arbitral decisions regarding 
expropriation  cases.  Resource  nationalism  is  also  addressed  in  this  chapter,  in 
connection with indirect expropriation. The chapter closes with a comparative analysis 
of the investment environments of Turkey and Azerbaijan which seeks to identify the 
risks and opportunities for investors in these states. This chapter seeks to answer the 
following questions: what is the most hazardous political risk for international energy 
investors? And why do host states disrupt investment projects? Library-based research 
informs the analysis of this chapter as well as interviews conducted with state-owned 
company directors and legal practitioners. 
120 Ibid
121 The BTC Human Rights Undertaking, available at: 
<http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/Human%20Rights%20Undertaking.pdf>January,  2012
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Chapter 3 attempts to define what constitutes indirect expropriation and reviews 
the mechanisms that  can be employed by foreign investors  to  guard against  it.  The 
chapter starts by providing an overview of indirect expropriation. It then moves on to 
address the differences between direct and indirect expropriation. Several case studies 
are cited in order to illustrate what distinguishes the two phenomena. Afterwards, the 
types of government measure that may constitute indirect expropriation are addressed. 
This chapter also seeks to provide criteria for distinguishing between non-compensable 
government measures and indirect expropriation with reference to the approaches and 
findings of international investment tribunals. This is exemplified by comparing and 
contrasting the bilateral investment treaties of Azerbaijan and Turkey and their treaty 
provisions concerning indirect expropriation. Following this, the tools for mitigating the 
threat of indirect expropriation are assessed and the question of what mechanism(s) can 
be used by foreign investors against the risk of indirect expropriation is addressed. The 
analysis  presented  in  this  chapter  is  informed  by  library-based  research,  interview 
participants’ views and a comparison of Azerbaijan and Turkey’s treaties’ provisions on 
indirect expropriation.
Part II forms the core of this study and is composed of chapters 4 to 6, inclusive. 
In Part II, stabilisation clauses and external factors are examined and exemplified 
through a comparative study of Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Chapter  4  examines  host  government  contracts  and  the  stabilisation  clauses 
inserted in these agreements by foreign investors as a political risk management device. 
The chapter addresses several issues including the typology, validity, effectiveness and 
efficacy of stabilisation clauses. Chapter 4 seeks to examine how stabilisation clauses 
manage political  risk,  in particular regulatory change, which is  applicable to  energy 
projects,  changes  of  contractual  terms  and  indirect  expropriation.  This  chapter  also 
makes  reference  to  the  on-going  debate  between  legal  scholars  in  the  field  on  the 
validity and efficacy of stabilisation clauses. Through the analysis of this chapter the 
following questions will be answered: To what extent are stabilisation clauses effective 
in protecting investments or conversely, in contradiction of their intended guardianship, 
do  they  instead  disenfranchise  the  sovereign  rights  of  the  host  states?  And  do 
stabilisation provisions constitute a threat for Environment and Human rights issues? 
Throughout the course of chapter 4, library-based research and interviews with national 
and  international  energy  investment  companies,  lawyers,  and  academics  provide 
evidence. 
Chapter 5 seeks to nominate the external factor(s) which may force host states to 
include stabilisation clauses in energy investment contracts. This chapter analyses the 
range of external factors other than the will of investors which may force a host state to 
agree to have a stabilisation clause included in its energy investment agreements as well 
as their effect on the regulatory powers of states. Chapter 5 examines the role of rating 
agencies, project finance lenders, and political risk insurers in relation to the investor 
and he host state and their influence regarding the inclusion of stabilisation clauses in 
agreements. Chapter 5 also provides a legal analysis of the BTC agreements from the 
perspective of Turkey and Azerbaijan and compares their relative bargaining positions 
in  negotiating  the  contract.  This  chapter  poses  the  following  questions:  Do  rating 
agencies,  project  finance  lenders  and  political  risk  insurers  play  an  active  role  in 
lobbying for the inclusion stabilisation clauses in  host  governmental contracts? This 
chapter draws on library-based research and interviews.
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Chapter 6 focuses on internal factors in Azerbaijan and Turkey and whether the 
legislation, constitutional guarantees and political structure of these countries facilitate 
stability  in  energy  investment  projects.  Each  country’s  FDI  laws,  constitutional 
promises, and the legal status of their international agreements under domestic law as 
well as their respective political regimes are taken into account in the analysis. In the 
case of Turkey, the guarantees available to foreign investors under the country’s defunct 
FDI law (Law for Encouragement of Foreign Capital No. 6224) and the new FDI (FDI 
Law 4875) laws are compared.  Finally this chapter attempts to answer the following 
questions: How effective are different political regimes in promoting FDI and giving 
consent to stabilisation clauses in Azerbaijani and Turkish host government contracts? 
What reason(s) has/have caused Azerbaijan and Turkey to agree to contractual stability 
in the BTC host governmental agreements? The purpose of the comparison here is to 
explore the similarities and differences between state guarantees under the countries 
respective laws, investment policies, and political regimes. Chapter 6 calls upon library-
based  research,  interviews  with  government  bureaucrats,  state-owned  company 
representatives, lawyers, a judge and several academics and the comparative method is 
employed. 
Part III
Chapter 7 conclusions and recommendations 
Chapter 7 pulls together the strands of the research in order to present the internal 
and external factors that motivate states to agree to stabilisation clauses. This chapter 
also proposes  recommendations  to  the  Azerbaijani  and Turkish governments  for  the 
improvement of legislation, political structure and policies in order to be in a stronger 
position to negotiate energy investment contracts in their own interest.
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      Chapter 2
       Sources of Political Risk
1.     Introduction
A host economy with a high degree of political risk tends to discourage FDI flow 
into its market, as the political instability and unpredictability this brings with it impact 
on the profitability of foreign investment. 122 As mentioned in the previous chapter, risk 
phenomena can be the cause of major losses and/or damage to business operations. This 
may be due, in part, to the inherent nature of energy projects: they are vulnerable and 
open to risk. On a global scale, numerous energy projects have been embarked upon and 
continue to be signed up to by international investors. Energy projects, such as oil and 
gas  exploration  and  their  transportation  through  pipelines,  can  be  subject  to 
unpredictable  economic  and  political  risks.  Such  risks  can  arise  from  international 
investment energy agreements by the intervention of host states directly or indirectly, 123 
over the course of the projects. Host states that instigate these risks, may take either 
entire or specific parts of the property of alien investors. As will be stated below, the 
petroleum industry is very exposed to political risk and achieving an acceptable level of 
stability  is  a  sine  qua  non requirement  for  investors.  For  this  reason,  investment 
agreements include stabilisation clauses which aim to limit or control unilateral state 
intervention that could lead to unforeseeable conditions and may result in a decreased 
financial return.124
The chapter starts with a sectorial assessment of political risk from a historical 
perspective. In the third section, an analysis of the historical background of risk aims to 
shed light on how political risk arose and evolved in the sector. Afterwards, attention 
shifts to expropriation. The chapter discusses the legal requirements for lawful taking 
under  international  law.  While  analysing  expropriation  phenomena,  recent  arbitral 
decisions with regard to expropriation cases on ICSID agenda will be referenced. An 
analysis  of  tribunal  decisions  facilitates  an  understanding  of  how  arbitral  tribunals 
operate.  Section  five  of  this  chapter,  focuses  on  resource  nationalism.  It  is  worth 
examining this notion in this section, as a resurgence of the phenomena has brought 
122 B. Kyeonghi & Q. Xingwan,  ‘An Analysis  on Political  Risks and the flow of 
Foreign Direct  Investment  in  Developing and Industrialised  Economies’  Economics,  
Management and Financial Market,Vol.6 (4),(2011), 64.
123 Z. A. Al-Qurashi, ‘International Oil and Gas Arbitration’,  OGEL Journal of Oil,  
Gas and Energy Law Intelligence  Vol. 3, (2005), 63
124 M.  Flores,  ‘A Practical  Approach  to  Allocating  Environmental  Liability  and 
Stabilizing Foreign Investment in the Energy Sector of Developing Countries’, Colo. J.  
Int’I Envtl. L. &Pol’y  12 (2001): 141,159; See also T. Waelde & G. Ndi, ‘Stabilizing 
International  Investment  Commitments:  International  Law  Versus  Contract 
Interpretation’, Tex. Int'l L.J. 31 (1996) 216, 220
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with it its own unique issues. Next, the risk and investment environments of Azerbaijan 
and Turkey will be compared. In the course of this chapter the following questions will 
be answered: what is the most hazardous political risk for international energy investors 
and why do host states interfere to investment projects? 
2.        Political Risk in the Energy Investment
  The historical  background of political  risk in the sector and its  stakeholders 
should be viewed as belonging to two distinct timelines: pre and post-World War II. 
Furthermore,  the  global  growth  of  the  petroleum industry  brought  international  oil 
companies  into  contact  with  more  and  more  non-western  countries  and  their 
representative  governments. 125 These  organisations  are  referred  to  as  the  ‘Seven 
Sisters’, namely: BP, Shell, Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, Texaco and Gulf. These companies 
had secured concessions all over the world and particularly in developing countries in 
the Middle East and Asia. 126  Pre-World War II, there were a number of non-western 
states that were under  the control of European Colonial  rule.  At this  time,  if  an oil 
company acquired and operated its business activities in a non-western country, they 
would be granted diplomatic protection by the home country of the investor.  127 After the 
Bolshevik revolution and the establishment of the Soviet Union, the energy sector found 
itself confronted with its first expropriation case.128 It is apparent that neither diplomatic 
protection nor home country support were adequate to save energy investors from the 
risk of expropriation. 
In the 20th century, the nationalisation of international energy companies was one 
of the major political risks present in the energy sector. After World War II, the main 
concern of petroleum companies was to avoid being exposed to nationalisation by the 
host government. Numerous nationalisation cases were to emerge following World War 
II, in Argentina, Algeria, Ecuador, Nigeria, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Venezuela, Kuwait129 
and some other developing states. In relation to this phenomenon, an important question 
needs to be asked regarding which driving forces and which environmental conditions 
have enabled developing states to nationalise the foreign assets of investors in the 20th 
century. Firstly, not only political factors drove developing states to nationalise foreign 
125 B. Taverne,  Petroleum, Industry and Governments:  A Study of the Involvement of  
Industry and Governments in the Production and use of Petroleum, 2nd Edn, (Alphen 
aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International: 2008) 39
126 A. J. Boulos, ‘Assessing Political Risk’, available at: 
<http://www.ipaa.org/issues/international/docs/PoliticalRisk.pdf>    February, 2013
127 B. Tavern, (n.4 above) 39
128S. J. Kobrin, The Nationalisation of Oil Production, 1918-1980 in D. W. Pearce, H. 
Siebert & I. Walter,  Risk and Political Economy of Resource Development, (London, 
Macmillan Press: 1984), 137
129  A. J. Boulos (n.5 above)
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assets, non-political130 reasons also played a substantial role. These non-political reasons 
are  a  combination  of  social  and  economic  factors.131 Throughout  the  20th century, 
mankind witnessed a divergent stream of ideologies in operation: on the one hand was 
the well-established system of capitalism but on the other hand collectivisms, such as 
Socialist and Marxist ideas were gaining ground. As it transpired, after the Bolshevik 
revolution,  many developing states adopted these collectivist  ideals as policy.  These 
emergent  ideologies  also motivated nationalisation in  non-Communist  states.132 As a 
second  reason,  most  petroleum producing  countries  are  developing  states  and  their 
economies depend on oil and gas; and, bolstered by the new prevailing ideologies and 
the promise of a better standard of living, these countries’ desire to control their own 
resources grew. As Brownlie emphatically states:
Some countries with more than 90 percent of their income from one single 
industry,  e.g.,  oil  or  copper  cannot,  if  they  are  free  of  coercion,  leave 
important decisions as to the pace of production, pricing, marketing, selling, 
etc. to a foreign corporation unfamiliar and maybe uninterested in national 
policies of the state concerned. This has to be viewed against the background 
that it is always admitted the alien is considerable as a visitor who as such 
has a duty to submit to the local law and jurisdiction and that the control and 
regulation of persons and assets in an aspect of domestic jurisdiction of a 
State  an  incident  of  its  sovereignty  and  independence  in  the  territorial 
sphere.133
Thirdly, as the colonial period drew to a close, the newly established independent 
states sought to assert permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.134
The  principle  of  permanent  sovereignty  over  natural  resources  is  one  of  the 
significant  established  norms  under  contemporary  international  law.  The  principle 
emerged  in  the  1950s  as  a  result  of  the  decolonisation  movement,  particularly  in 
developing and newly independent states. The main reason why this principle took root 
quickly in these countries was because the principle provided these states with the moral 
130 G.  White,  Nationalisation  of  the  Property (London:  Stevens  &  Sons  Limited: 
1961)18
131For further details please see K. Katzarov, The Theory Nationalisation,(The Hague: 
Matinus  Nijhoff,  1964),1-19;  M.  Erkan,  International  Energy  Investment  Law: 
Stabilitythrough  Contractual  Clauses,  Energy  and  Environmental  Law  and  Policy 
Series, (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International: 2011) 39
132 G. M. Ingram, Expropriation of U.S. Property in South America: Nationalisation of  
Oil  and  Copper  Companies  in  Peru,  Bolivia,  and  Chile,   (New  York:  Praeger 
Publishers, 1974) 2 
133 I.  Brownlie,  Principle  of  Public  International  Law,  4th end  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press) 522
134  A. J. Boulos (n.5 above) 
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right to regain control over their natural resources within their territory and use them for 
the benefit of their own citizens. In 1962, the General Assembly approved Resolution 
1803, which announced that ‘the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty 
over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national 
development and the well-being of the people of the state concerned’.135
 With this resolution, the UN sought to link the principle of permanent sovereignty 
with  the  state  of  economic  independence  and  self-determination.  For  example,  the 
preamble attaches  ‘particular importance to the question of promoting the economic 
development of developing countries and securing their economic independence, [and 
notes that] the creation and strengthening of the inalienable sovereignty of States over 
their  natural  resources  wealth  and  resources  reinforces  their  economic 
independence…’136 The resolution also permitted countries to implement nationalisation 
measures if deemed only for the good of the general public, security or national interest,  
which are recognised as  overriding individual  or  private  interest  both domestic  and 
foreign. 137 In such cases ‘appropriate compensation’ should be paid by the owner in 
accordance  with  domestic  and  international  law. 138 Under  the  protection  of  such 
policies, many petroleum producing states grew more confident of their own ability to 
assert control over natural wealth and resources within their territory.
Although a number of significant concepts were expressed in the UN’s Resolution 
1803 regarding permanent  sovereignty,  the  resolution  has  been the  subject  of  some 
criticism in academic literature. Several inconsistencies of moment have been pointed 
out by academics.  First,  it  was emphasised that  ‘the Resolution fails  to clarify who 
possesses  the  right  of  permanent  sovereignty.139 The  Resolution  asserts  that  the 
possessor of permanent sovereignty is ‘peoples and nations’.140 However, ‘this clouds 
one’s ability to define sovereignty,  as it traditionally has been understood, to be the 
power of a State’.141 Due to this inconsistency, several authors have claimed that the 
notion of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is not valid as a legal norm,142 
‘representing an attempt to give legal force and validity to what is essential a political 
135 GA Res.1803, 14 December, 1962, reprinted in 1963, 2 ILM 223
136 Ibid, at 223-224
137 Ibid
138 Ibid
139N.  K.  Kale,  The  International  Law  of  Responsibility  for  Economic  Crimes, 
(Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing Company: 2006) 96
140 GA Res.1803, 14 December, 1962, reprinted in (1963), 2 ILM 223
141 P. J.  O’ Keefe,  ‘  The United Nations and Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources,’ Journal of World Trade Law  Vol. 8 (1974) 239-282
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goal.’143 Irrespective  of  its  legal  value  or  validity,  Resolution  1803  embodies  the 
principle  of  permanent  sovereignty and explicitly  illustrates  the  view of  the  United 
Nations on the permanent sovereignty issue.144
Fourthly, the establishment of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) was one of the most significant and ground-breaking events in the petroleum 
industry. The creation of this organisation bolstered the confidence of Member States in 
their negotiations with international energy investors. Following the establishment of 
OPEC,  Member  Countries  of  this  organisation  increased  the  weight  of  investor 
obligation  by  adopting  OPEC  Resolution  XVI  in  1968  and  XXIV in  1970.145 The 
purpose of these resolutions was to grant more control in the exploration, exploitation 
and development of natural wealth and resources to the host state. Moreover, as a result 
of  these  declarations,  Member  States  had an  opportunity to  renegotiate  for  existing 
traditional concession contracts from a new bargaining position, strengthened by their 
improved economic circumstances. A fourth reason why host states seek to nationalise 
the foreign asset may be found in the resource-producing state’s move to maximize 
revenue from oil and gas production by unilaterally changing the terms of the original 
contract.146
2.1    Obsolescing Bargain and Political Risk
 In the literature, the phenomenon is called ‘obsolescing bargain’; this theory was 
first  outlined  by Raymond Vernon.  According  to  Vernon,  in  obsolescing  bargaining 
theory,  the degree of political  risk is  measured by the relative market  power of the 
multinational  companies  and host  governments  and their  bargaining  relationships  in 
terms of the natural product cycle. 147  The theory correlates the power of multinational 
companies and host governments to the stages of their relationship, concentrating on the 
shift in power that arises over time. 148 Since, at the initial stage of the bargain, the oil 
companies are in the position with most leverage,  they are in a position to use this 
142 K. N.  Gess,  Permanent  Sovereignty Over  Natural  Resources,  International  and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 13 (1964) 398
143 Please see P.J. O’ Keefe (n. 20 above) 245
144 N. K .Kale, (n.18 above) 97
145 In 1968 and 1971 OPEC made resolutions XVI. 90 of 1968 and XXIV 135 of 1970
146 A. F. M. Manirruzzaman, ‘the Issues of Resource Nationalism: Risk Engineering 
and Dispute Management in the Oil and Gas Industry’, Texas Journal of Oil, Gas and 
Energy Law Vol. 5 (2009) 82
147 R. Vernon, ‘International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 80 (1966) 190
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advantage to the detriment of the host states. Oil companies have the technology, know-
know and capital to extract the natural resources, rendering host states dependent on 
them to gain access to their own resources. This provides international energy investors 
with the option to invest and extract natural resources in any developing country free of 
obligation from an unchallenged position of control where the nationalisation risk does 
not exist.
In relation to obsolescing bargaining theory, fluctuations in oil prices have always 
played a defining role  in  the bargaining relationship between host governments and 
energy investors.  When  prices  increase,  petroleum companies  are  more  disposed to 
expose themselves to risk. This lends host governments a considerable advantage in 
shaping  the  terms  of  the  investment  relationship.149 Conversely,  when  oil  prices 
decrease,  negatively  impacting  on  the  potential  profitability  of  energy  projects  this 
consequently diminishes  the bargaining position of  a  host  state  in  investment  terms 
negotiation.150 At the start of the 20th century, the petroleum industry witnessed a period 
in  which  oil  companies  enjoyed  virtually  unbridled  control  of  the  industry holding 
governments to ransom as possessors of the technology and capital needed to access 
their valuable resources. During this Golden Age for investment companies price-setting 
and  price  regulation  of  crude  oil  prices  remained  firmly  under  their  control. 
Nevertheless,  as  mentioned  above,  during  the  20th century,  new players  entered  the 
game following the United Nation’s declarations regarding Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources and OPEC resolutions.  The following table gives an overview of 
how oil prices were affected by relative bargaining positions and political risks during 
the course of the 20th century.  The table below illustrates the effect of oil prices on the 
investment environment.
Table 8      Effect of Oil Prices on the Investment Environment
Years Crude 
Oil Prices     
Balance  of  Power 
in Favour
Investment Environment
1950-73      Multinational 
Corporations
Open 
(Major Concession)
148 S.  S.  Andersen  &  A.  Maya,  The  Taming  of  the  Shrewd:  Small  State  Meets 
Multinational Oil Companies, working paper (Bedriftsøkonomisk Institutt,:1990), 51.
149 O.  Bayulgen,  Foreign  Direct  Investment,  Oil  Curse  and  Democratization:  A  
Comparison of Azerbaijan and Russia, Business and Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press: 2010)17-18
150 Ibid
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1973-84       Governments             Restricted
Expropriation/Nationalisation
1985-99      Multinational 
Corporations
Open 
(Deregulation/Privatisation
1999-2008    Governments Restricted 
(Creeping Expropriation)
Source: O. Bayulgen151
It is apparent that between 1985 and 1999, the interventionism trend of host states 
was largely attributed to deregulation and privatisation programs. In order to obtain a 
considerable share of investment capital, oil producing states found themselves engaged 
in fierce competition during those years. 152 It goes without saying that multinational 
companies  benefitted  from  competition  between  petroleum  producing  countries, 
because the competition led the states to relax formerly inhibitive rules around foreign 
investment  into  their  countries  and  also  led  them to  amend  existing  legislation  on 
petroleum and introduce new laws. In this respect, the significant amendments of oil 
producing states to petroleum legislation and their new incentives effectively reduced 
the risk of expropriation/nationalisation in the 20th Century.  
2.2    Political Risks in the New Era
In the years that spanned the close of the twentieth century and the dawn of the 
new  Millennium,  the  energy  industry  found  itself  exposed  to  a  range  of  new  risk 
scenarios. The past century and the beginning of the new era ‘…have brought the issues 
of political risk into focus in a different global economic and political context than the 
earlier days of the international oil and gas industry’153. In the 20th Century political risk 
associated  with  government  interventionist  policy  was  more  common.154 In  the  21st 
Century  some  political  risks  such  as  expropriation  and  confiscation  are  no  longer 
considered a major  threat155 to  the energy investment sphere.  In academic literature, 
Boulos best  describes  why the political  risk of  nationalisation is  no longer  a  major 
problem in the energy industry. 
151 O. Bayulgen (n.28 above) 19
152 O. Bayulgen (n.28 above) 20
153 ibid
154 D.W Conklin, ‘Analysing and Managing Country Risk’ , Ivey Business Journal, 
2002, 66(3) 36-41
155 S. Wilkin, ‘Managing Today’s Political Risks’, The Risk Management Letter 22, 
no.6 (2001)1-2 cited in  M. Erkan (n.10 above) 49
50
According to the author, there are several factors that have lessened the risk of 
nationalisation in recent years:  First, the key role of the World Bank, the International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  International  Finance  Cooperation  (IFC)  and  other  multi-
national organisations has a tendency to considerably reduce a host state’s free rein to 
nationalise.  The  second  reason  is  that  of  privatisation.  In  a  general  sense,  when 
nationalisation cases are considered, national oil companies nationalise the foreign oil 
companies’  asset.156 ‘Privatisation  changes  the  basis  for  nationalisation;  the  state 
transforms National Oil Companies into private enterprises to complete in the market 
for  international  oil  and  gas  ventures  and  obviates  the  need  to  nationalise  foreign 
companies’.157 A final  reason for the lessening of  political  risk of  nationalization in 
today's  world  is  that  the  objectives  of  nationalization  have  in  the  most  part  been 
achieved. The author goes on to state that in the OPEC takeover of production in the 
early  1970s,  for  example,  host  governments  through  nationalization,  buy-in 
participation or government checks and controls have achieved their goal of gaining 
control  over  oil  and  gas  resources.  Even  with  State  control,  the  emergence  of 
privatization  and  market-oriented  economies  further  neutralized  the  political  risk  of 
nationalization.158
After careful consideration of Boulos’s words, privatisation phenomena should be 
briefly  described.  Privatisation  represents  the  decision  of  governments  to  dismantle 
financially inadequate state-owned companies and sell them to private investor(s). The 
main benefit of privatisation is to favour the survival of a former state-owned company 
or companies in the context of a competitive market. Therefore, the immediate benefit 
of privatisation to the state is to rid itself of its responsibility towards a failing company. 
However, the ensuing issues that arise from privatisation scenarios can be manifold and 
complex in nature. Several assumptions can be made regarding the privatisation of a 
state- run oil company. The first of these is that if the privatised state-owned company 
manages to turn itself around and become profitable it is exposed to the risk of enforced 
state nationalisation.159
The second is that following privatisation of the state company, ‘the acquiring 
company would seek to recoup their investment by increasing the prices…’160 In such a 
156 A. J. Boulos (n.5 above) 5
157 Ibid
158 ibid
159 T.C. Tucker, ‘Investment Projects Abroad’, In Canadian Counsel on International 
Law, Extra-Territoriality and Foreign Investment, Proceeding, 12th Annual Conference, 
Ontario, (1983) 110-111
160 C.  A.  Smoots  &  F.  Sellner  ‘Long  Term  Agreements  in  Energy  and  Water  in 
Developing  and  Transition  Countries’,  Transitional  Dispute  Management  Online  
Journal 1 (2004)1, available at: <www.transitional-dispute-management.com> January, 
2013
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scenario, what would the states reaction be? In literature, Smoots and Sellner best sum 
up this hypothetical situation: ‘…no contract and no host country’s promises can save a 
privatisation’.161 The authors add ‘If the privatising state is extremely poor, no matter 
what promises were made, increased price will either not be permitted or will not be 
paid to the acquiring company’.162
In  order  to  provide  a  21st century context  to  the  risk  of  expropriation  and/or 
nationalisation,  the  interview  participant  views  in  this  study  and  recent  survey  on 
political risks should be drawn upon.  According to one of the interviewees, ‘there are a 
number  of  political  risks  such  as  civil  war,  direct  or  indirect  expropriation  and 
nationalisation that should rightly be regarded as the major political risks that foreign 
investors might face over the course of their energy projects. However it is difficult to 
state  categorically that  expropriation/nationalisation  risk is  very common in the  21st 
Century’163.He goes further to state that ‘it is true that it is not very common to see civil 
wars, direct or indirect expropriation or nationalisation in the modern developed world. 
Such  risks  usually  only  appear  in  natural  resource  rich  developing  states,  such  as 
Bolivia,  Venezuela, Ecuador, Kazakhstan or other similar countries which are ruled by 
dictatorships’.164
Another  respondent  disagrees  with  the  previous  participant  and states  that  the 
phenomena  of  expropriation  and  nationalisation  continue  to  pose  a  danger  for 
investors165. The legitimacy of the latter respondent’s view is validated by the recent 
expropriation  case  in  Argentina.  In  April  2012,  the  president  of  Argentina,  Cristina 
Fernandez, announced that the government had expropriated the Spanish Oil Company, 
Repsol’s  subsidiary YPF.  Fernandez claimed that  YPS’s  expropriation was aimed at 
‘recovering sovereignty’ over natural sources. Having furnished this recent example, the 
same interviewee went on to explore whether these actions are taken by governments 
and used  as  a  weapon against  energy investors  with  the  real  purpose  of  protecting 
sovereignty  over  natural  sources  or  not.  According  to  the  interviewee,  ‘…the  YPF 
Company  recently  uncovered  precious  natural  gas  sources  in  Argentina.  Until  this 
exploration, the company had always been regarded as an inconsequential company by 
the Argentinean government. Following the discovery of invaluable natural resources, 
the company’s value soared and, as a result,  it  was expropriated by the government. 
161 Ibid
162 Ibid
163 Interviewee no.1 Anonymity Guaranteed, 8 May 2012
164 Ibid
165 Interviewee no. 5 Anonymity Guaranteed, 11 May 2012
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Expropriation  of  a  foreign  company  by  the  state  meant  that  any  profit  would  be 
absorbed by the state.’166
In  light  of  the  interviewees’ views,  it  can  be  asserted  that,  compared  to  the 
previous century, the risk of expropriation is in relative decline167. However, this should 
not be taken to be understood that expropriation and nationalisation risks do not pose a 
threat to international energy investors. It is evident that since the beginning of the new 
century, the sector has been subject to a “silent disruption”.168 For instance, in 2004, 
Yukos, which is one of the principal and most successful Russian oil companies, was re-
nationalised. 
In the same manner,  in 2006, Bolivia’s President Evo Morales announced that 
Bolivia’s oil and gas sector would be nationalised.169 In 2007, Kazakhstan’s parliament 
revised the Law on Subsurface and Use, granting governments the unilateral right to 
halt  pending  review  subsoil  use  contracts  if  they  were  deemed  to  jeopardise  the 
country’s national or economic security.170 In 2010, Venezuela announced its intention to 
nationalise  oil  drilling  rigs  belonging  to  the  U.S.  Company Helmerich  & Payne.171 
Finally,  in  April,  2012,  Argentinean  congress  nationalised  the  country’s  biggest  oil 
company, YPF.172 In order to identify the most hazardous risk in the energy industry and 
gauge the level of importance of each political risk, a survey was conducted by Erkan. 
In  the  author’s  research,  each  participant  was  required  to  rate  the  level  of  risk  of 
divergent destabilising events from 1 to 5. 1 representing the most significant and 5 is 
the least significant political risk.
Table 9 Main Political Risks to International Petroleum Projects
166 Ibid
167 K.M. Quinley, ‘Managing the Political Risk’ The Risk Report, volume XXIV, no.7. 
(March, 2002) 2
168 L. Pugliaresi, ‘Silent Disruption Limiting Oil Supply’, Oil and Gas Journal, July 7 
( 2008) 24 available at: <http://www.ogj.com>February 2013
169 R. Kennedy, ‘Privatization and Nationalization in Oil and Gas: Foreign Policy and 
Oil Contracts in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan’,(2011) 3-4 available at: 
<http://www.polsci.uh.edu/faculty/rkennedy/WorkingPapers_files/NUPIPrjct2011p.pdf
> February, 2013
170 R. Kennedy (n.48 above) 4
171 Ibid
172Fernandez justifies the renationalization of YPF - which was privatized in the 1990s 
after decades as a state-owned company available at: 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/04/us-argentina-ypf 
idUSBRE8421GV20120504>February 2013
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Types of Political Risks Categories (% Share)
    1     2    3   4    5
War     18.56 11.34 16.49 24.74 28.87
Nationalisation 25.96 28.85 28.85 11.54 4.81
Direct Expropriation 15.69 30.39 30.39 21.57 1.96
Indirect Expropriation 50.91 23.64 16.36 7.27    1.82
Unilateral Change
of Contractual Terms
30.56 36.11 19.44 7.41    6.48
Currency Transfer 4.95 16.83 33.66 26.73 17.82
Sabotage 7.37 8.42    20.00 34.74 29.47
Kidnapping   5.10 9.18    20.41 24.49 40.42
Source M. Erkan173
It  is  immediately  apparent  that  indirect  expropriation  was  considered  by 
participants  to  be the  most  significant  destabilising contemporary political  risk with 
over 50% share174. Indirect expropriation is followed by unilateral change of contractual 
terms (30.56%) and nationalisation 25.96%, with war, perhaps surprisingly, constituting 
only 18.56.175 When considered outside of a specific geographic context, or, at least 
within  the  framework  of  their  own  experience,  the  participants  considered  indirect 
expropriation  to  be  the  most  menacing  of  all  risks.  Nevertheless,  according  to  the 
author,  ‘if  we  focus  on  specific  countries  such  as  Nigeria  or  Iraq,  kidnapping  or 
sabotage or war could be described as the dominant political risks’.176
3.    Direct Expropriation
It may be appropriate to focus on the term of ‘taking’ as a key to unlocking the 
topic itself.  Although it may be the case that international law was clear in the past 
about the outright taking of property the phenomenon that the term describes has now 
become  more  complex  and  multi-faceted  and  this  has  not  been  reflected  in  its 
173 M. Erkan, (n.10 above) 50. In the author’s book, 1 is for the most important risk 
and 5 is the least important risk.
174 ibid
175 Ibid
176 Ibid
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definitions in literature. Providing this definition is a hurdle that needs to be overcome 
before embarking on a broader analysis of the concept and cases of expropriation. To 
this  end,  the  question  of  what  constitutes  ‘taking’ must  be  answered.177 The  terms: 
expropriation, nationalisation and confiscation are used interchangeably and often with 
reference to quite different forms of government intervention of a private property. It 
will  be  instrumental  to  establish  clear  distinctions  between  these  terminologies. 
According to Sornarajah, ‘confiscation is a capricious term for taking the property by 
the ruler or ruling the coterie of the state for personal gain’.178 The author extends the 
definition  to  assert  that  such  taking  can  be  seen  primarily  in  countries  ruled  by 
dictatorships and oligarchies179. The term confiscation is also used to define ‘the state 
taking of private property where such a measure is penal as a part of the sanction to be 
visited on the owner because they violate required regulatory or criminal standards.’180 
Notably, confiscatory taking is motivated by caprice; therefore, it should be recognised 
as  unlawful  taking181 and,  as  a  consequence of  being  unlawful,  the  taking does  not 
trigger the payment of compensation. 
Expropriation  and  nationalisation  are  used  to  define  the  unconcealed  host 
government direct taking of private wealth.182 In a general sense, if the property is taken 
by the host state and compensation is paid to foreign investors, the taking is regarded as 
expropriation.  With  regard  to  this,  The  Iran-U.S.  Claims  Tribunal  defined  the 
expropriation phenomenon in the renowned petroleum case of  AMOCO International  
Finance  Corporation  vs.  The  Government  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  as  the 
‘compulsory transfer of property rights.’183
177M.  Sornarajah,  The  International  Law  on  Foreign  Investment,  (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press: 2010) 365
178 Ibid
179 Ibid
180 World  Investment  Report,  FDI  Policies  for  Development:  National  and  
International
Perspectives, (New York, Geneva, United Nations Publication: 2003), 112 (Hereinafter 
‘UNCTAD 2003’) available at <http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2003_en.pdf>May, 2011
181 M. Sornarajah, (n. 56. above) 365
182 S.  C.  Wallace,  The  Multinational  Enterprise  and  Legal  Control:  Host  State  
Sovereignty  in  an  Era  of  Economic  Globalisation  (The  Hague:  Kluwer  Law 
International, 2002) 980.Notably, the author meant by wealth is private property and 
other related acquired rights.
183 15 Iran-US CTR. 189, at 222-223, Award No. 310-56-3 (14 July, 1987)
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 In  practical  terms,  this  ‘taking’  occurs  when  a  host  government  seizes  a 
company’s development rights or facilities and its produce for the host country’s own 
use, particularly for the purpose of the host country’s national interest.184 In this context, 
nationalisation can also be identified as a risk: nationalisation is regarded as the ‘evil 
twin’ of expropriation and manifests itself when the host state expropriates and hands 
the property or development rights over to a national company.185 In other words, it can 
be  said  that  nationalisation  is  a  large  scale  ‘taking’.  Admittedly,  the  definition  of 
nationalisation and expropriation is complex and can be easily confused. Therefore, The 
Iran-U.S.  Claims  Tribunal  in  the  AMOCO  case  defined  nationalisation  as:  ‘…the 
transfer  of  an  economic  activity  from private  ownership  to  the  public  sector.  It  is 
realised through expropriation of the assets of an enterprise or of its capital stock, with a 
view to maintaining such enterprise as a going concern under the state control’.186
Furthermore, with regard to the definition, several authors in the field have also 
attempted to isolate the two notions. According to Domke, ‘The term ‘expropriation’, 
though usually applied  to  measures  taken in  individual  cases,  is  sometimes  used  in 
instances where ‘nationalisation’ as a measure of general change in the state’s economic 
and social life would be more appropriate’.187 According to Ingram’s distinction, ‘The 
most meaningful distinction is that expropriation refers to the taking of one or several 
properties within a single area of economic activity, whereas nationalisation refers to the 
government’s taking of all properties within the area’.188 Hobber agrees with Ingram’s 
distinction  and  goes  on  to  affirm  that  the  difference  between  nationalisation  and 
expropriation is defined by scope and extension, as Hobber argues that the nature of the 
two is essentially the same. 189 Direct expropriation or nationalisation was both actions 
taken frequently by host governments in the 20th Century, and have more recently given 
way to indirect expropriation.190
3.1    The right to expropriate versus property ownership
184 S.W. Anderson, ‘Expropriation, Nationalisation, Risk Management’, Davis Graham 
& Stubbs, LLP, A Report by Touch Briefing (2008) 20 
185  Ibid
186 The Iran-U.S (n. 62 above) 
187 M. Domke, ‘Foreign Nationalisations: Some Aspects of Contemporary International 
Law’, AJIL, vol.55 (1961), 588
188 G.M. Ingram, (n.11 above) Vii
189 K.  Hobber,  ‘Investment  Arbitration  in  Eastern  Europe  :  Recent  Cases  on 
Expropriation’,Am.Rev.Int’1 Arb.14 (2003) 377,381
190 S. Ripinskyi & K. Williams,  Damages in International Investment Law ,(British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law 2008) 64
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There is no doubt that the right to own property is one of the absolute rights that 
mankind in most modern civilisations lays claim to. Throughout history a wide range of 
philosophers  and  scholars,  from  divergent  backgrounds  and  standpoints,  which 
supported the idea of private ownership, have emphasised this indispensable right in 
their manifestos. For instance, John Locke, an English philosopher is a distinguished 
example from this school of philosophers. Part of his manifesto deemed the protection 
of individual property rights to be the central determination of political society. To this 
end, it is significant to inquire whether a sovereign state has the right to expropriate 
property within its territory by applying its own laws or not. 
In the case of expropriation, one of the respondents asserted that ‘expropriation is 
a legal instrument in law systems; this right derives from its sovereignty.’191  If this right 
is to be seen as a direct expression of sovereignty, it can be assumed that the owner’s 
consent  is  not  required and that  a  sovereign power has  the  right  to  expropriate  the 
private owner’s property. Another significant consideration to be taken into account is 
that of the nationality of the owner. In a broad sense, the expropriation right of states is 
recognised  and  articulated  in  international law  regardless  of  the  patrimonial  rights 
involved or of the nationality of the owner in whom they are vested.192 It should be 
noted that the majority of authorities support the idea of a state’s obligation to pay full  
compensation to its own citizens and foreign individuals in their territory in the case of 
individual and general expropriation cases.
In summary, all evidence suggests that a sovereign state can lawfully exercise its 
right to take property irrespective of the nationality of its  owners and without their 
consent. Nevertheless, if the property and its ownership rights belonged to a foreign 
investor and the relationship between the investor and the host state were based on an 
investment  contract,  would a state  still  be able  to  expropriate  the foreign investor’s 
property?  In  order  to  answer  this  question  and  add  breadth  to  this  discussion,  two 
important principles should be mentioned. The first is the pacta sunt servanda (sanctity 
of contracts) principle. The concept  of pacta sunt servanda  is accepted as a positive 
norm  in  general  international  law.193 With  regard  to  this  principle,  states  cannot 
expropriate  alien  property  without  obtaining  consent  from  the  aforesaid  alien 
investor.194Consequently,  the  state  ought  to  respect  this  fundamental  principle  when 
exercising the right to expropriate.195
191 Interview no.7 with Lawyer, 6 June 2012
192 G. Amador & L.B. Sohn and R. R. Baxter,  Recent Codification of the Law of State  
Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens,  ( USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1974) 46
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In addition to the implications of this obligation, is the inclusion of contractual 
clauses in contracts, particularly stabilisation, or other relevant contractual clauses. It is 
worth mentioning that the absolute application to  pacta sunt servanda in international 
investment contracts between states and aliens has given rise to a serious legal debate 
among both scholars and practitioners.196 Before moving on, it would be appropriate to 
highlight the issue of whether or not a state can limit its sovereign rights via a contract. 
This subject should be discussed briefly, as a precursor to a more in-depth discussion in 
chapter 4, as part of an examination of the validity of stabilisation clauses.  If a state is 
free to bind itself by a treaty with another sovereign state, then can it fetter itself with 
similar restrictions via a contract with an investor?197 The basis of this notion is that the 
insertion of specific contractual clauses in an investment contract, such as stabilisation 
clauses  or  arbitration  clauses  has  an  effect  similar  to  that  of  internationalising  the 
contract198. 
According to this theory, if the contract between a state and an alien company is 
internationalised,  the commitment resides within an external system which has been 
regarded  as  the  transnational  law  of  business,  a  general  principle  of  law  and  lex  
mercatoria. 199 In this respect, it can be said that inserting such contractual devices in an 
investment  contract  with  clauses  to  limit  the  state’s  ability  to  take  the  property,  by 
extension, means that that same state is no longer able to expropriate the property.200 
Other scholars disagree with the notion that a state can bind itself in this way and focus 
instead  on  the  principle  of  state  sovereignty  and  the  succession  of  law 
norm.201According to this principle, ‘the legislative capacity of lawmakers cannot be 
bound, nor can be executed, nor can public powers of the government be fettered by a 
contract  with  a  private  individual  or  corporation,  i.e.,  no  parliament  can  bind  its 
successor  through  a  contract  mechanism.’202Nevertheless,  it  has  been  provided  that 
195Texaco vs. Libya Award 53 ILR (1979),para.68 
196 A.F. M. Manirruzzaman (n.72 above) 141
197 E.  Paasivirta,  Internationalization  and  stabilization  of  Contracts  versus  State 
Sovereignty, British Year Book, Int. L, 60 (1989) 315
198 G. Handi, Year Book of International Environmental Law, Vol. 17, (Oxford, OUP: 
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201 G. Handi (n.77 above) 
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expropriation is a natural right which derives from sovereignty and a sovereign power 
can exercise this right in accordance with their law and as long as they meet certain 
requirements of international customary law. This notional right to expropriate prompts 
the question: why would a state need to expropriate property? 
The  answer  is  simple,  to  provide  better  living  standards  to  its  citizens  and 
accelerate its development. While a state is striving to reach its targets and sustain its 
development, it should not disregard the property ownership of alien individuals and 
their vested possession. Consequently, sovereign rights are not everlasting or unlimited; 
when contracts are entered into in the international sphere, specific constraints are a 
must to maintain the mutual trust between states and foreign individuals for the sake of 
protecting property rights. As mentioned before, there are certain requirements under 
the  umbrella  of  international  law.  An  analysis  of  legal  requirements  is  essential  to 
understand not only direct expropriation,  but also significant to comprehend indirect 
expropriation;  therefore,  the  following  section  will  focus  on  basic  liabilities  for 
sovereign states for lawful taking under international law. 
3.2     Legal Requirements for lawful taking under the International law
 In the previous section, it was established that a sovereign power has the right to 
take the property of a foreign individual, as an expression of its permanent sovereignty 
over its natural resources. However, this should not be taken to mean that the state has 
unlimited rights to take property. States are, nevertheless, subject to certain restrictions 
under international law. In order to regard an expropriation as lawful, the state must 
meet certain criteria under international law.  203 These requirements are referred to as 
public purpose, non-discriminatory, due process of law and prompt, adequate and full 
compensation. Even though there is some discussion with regard to public purpose, due 
process  of  law  and  the  formula  compensation,  relating  to  the  boundaries  of  such 
conditions  among  scholars,  these  requirements  have  been  broadly  addressed  by 
multilateral  investment  treaties  (MITs),204 bilateral  investment  treaties  (BITs),205 and 
some investment agreements.206
In addition, these requirements were also articulated in the Work Bank Guidelines 
on  the  Treatment  of  Foreign  Direct  Investment207 and  the  United  Nations  General 
Assembly  Resolutions  (UNGAR).208 The  following  sub-sections  outline  the  basic 
requirements for expropriation.
a)     Public Interest / Purpose
As stated above, an expropriation may only be made in the public interest. The 
necessity of public purpose in order to legitimise a taking has long been considered part 
of customary international law.209 This requirement was first formulated by Grotius  210 
203 S.  P.  Subedi,  International  Investment  Law:  Reconciling  Policy  and  Principle  
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 102
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‘as a limit on the sovereign right of eminent domain’.211 The purpose of taking can be 
based of various reasons. For example, expropriating government may wish to build up 
new roads, hospitals or schools or want to supply electricity, water or sewerage suburb 
areas. In the same vein, the government may also want to expropriate foreign investor’s 
property to protect its cultural heritage. According to Salacuse, the concept of public 
interest is very broad; therefore, it cannot be subject to a precise definition.212 Although 
there  is  no  specific  definition  of  public  interest  under  international  law,  it  may be 
claimed that any ‘taking’ by a host government is done in the public interest, such as 
developing the national economy, executing its development plans or protecting foreign 
currency reserves.213 In other words, the term public purpose is broadly understood to 
mean that an expropriation measure should be in the interests of public utility, security, 
204 Significant and influential examples of MITs that incorporate such requirements 
should  be  pointed:  The first  example  of  MITs is  that  the European Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT). Article 13(1) (a) of this treaty: ‘Investments of investors of a contracting 
party in the area of any other contracting party shall   not be nationalised, expropriated 
except where such expropriation is:  a)  For a public which is public interest;  b) Not 
discriminatory; c) Carried out under the due process of law; and d) Accompanied by the 
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation’. Second significant example 
of MIT, which has the same approach as ECT, is North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). The agreement entered into force, January 1, 1994, reprinted in 32 ILM 289 
and 605 (1993). Art. 1110(1) (a) of this Agreement: No Party may directly or indirectly 
nationalize or expropriate an investment agreement of an investor of another Party in its 
territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an 
investment  (‘expropriation’)  except:  a)  For  a  public  purpose;  b)  On  a  non-
discriminatory basis;  c)  In  accordance  with  due  process  of  law;  d)  On payment  of 
compensation. Art. 1105 (1) [providing for minimum standards of treatment, including 
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security].
205  Lawful taking requirements are also explained in a number of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs). Please see 2004 U.S Model BIT. Article 6(1) of the 2004 Model BIT 
states: Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly 
or  indirectly  through  measures  equivalent  to  expropriation  or  nationalization 
(‘expropriation’), except: a) For a public purpose b) in a non-discriminatory manner; c) 
On payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and d)In accordance with 
due process of law and Art.5 [Minimum Standard of treatment] (1) through (3).
206With regard to basic requirements in BITs and MITs, similar conditions can also be 
found  in  some  international  agreements.  For  instance,  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  (BTC) 
Petroleum Pipeline Agreement.  According Article 9.4 of this agreement: ‘ in the event 
that the State Authorities should ever carry out any act of Expropriation is: (i) for a  
public  purpose  which  is  an  overriding  public  purpose;  (ii)  not  discriminatory;  (iii) 
carried out  under  the due process  of  law; and (iv)  accompanied by the payment  of 
compensation as provided.’.
207The Work Bank: Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, (1992) 
31I.L.M.1363, fourth Guideline.
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national  interest  or  the  general  welfare  of  society  rather  than  individual  or  private 
gain.214
 Expropriation must truly target social and /or economic improvements and more 
importantly national interest must prevail over individual or private interest.215 It seems 
reasonable at this point to pose the question: can a state genuinely determine what is in 
the public interest? In general, the tendency of authors in the literature is to deem that 
the determination of what is in the public interest broadly lies within the discretion of 
the expropriating government. In the case of public purpose, it can be said that verifying 
a breach of public purpose requirement is not an easy task.216 Baade points out this 
issue. According to the author, ‘it seems perfectly logical to require that nationalisation 
be in the public interest. The question is, of course, whose public interest, as determined 
by whom.  Since  international  law quite  patently  leaves  all  sovereign  states  free  to 
choose their own economic and social systems, the answer can be only that the test has 
208 UNGAR No.  1803 0f  1962 on Permanent  Sovereignty over  Natural  Resources 
which provide that nationalisation should be for purposes of public utility, security and 
national interest. However, it should be underlined that basic requirement do not exist in 
the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) UN Resolution 3281 of 
1974.
209 P. Malanccuk,  Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edn (New 
York,  Routledge  Publishing:  1997)  235;  please  also  see:  K.  Hober,  Investment  
Arbitration in Eastern Europe: In Search of a Definition of Expropriation (New York, 
Juris Publising: 2007) 38
210M. Sornarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalized Property (The Hague, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers: 1986) 174
211 Ibid 
212 J. W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
2009) 57
213 Ibid.
214 A. Akinsanya, The Expropriation of Multinational Property the Third World (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1980) 20
215 S. C. Wallace, The Multinational Enterprise(n.61 above) 983
216 N. Rubbins & N. S. Kinsella, International Investment, Political Risk and Dispute  
Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (New York: Oceania Publication, 2005) 177; see also 
M. Erkan (n.10 above) 72
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to be the public interest of the taking state, as conclusively determined by it.’217 In this 
regard,  it  should be noted that  ‘at  the very least,  there must  be some demonstrable 
public interest and the determination must be made in good faith’.218
The scope of the public purpose requirement and its measure has been endorsed 
and  identified  by  international  tribunals,  such  as  in  the  Aminoil and  Amoco  cases. 
Aminoil is an American independent oil company, which operated its business activities 
in Kuwait, one of the member states of OPEC. The company feared that its business 
operations and activities would be terminated and the company would be ousted by the 
application of the public purpose requirement formula. As a result, the company was 
forced  to  renegotiate  with  the  Kuwaiti  government.  Aminoil  and  the  Kuwaiti 
government failed to reach an agreement regarding future payments. Following this, the 
parties  entered into a  discussion  around the possibility of  nationalising  the  Aminoil 
Company’ assets. Nevertheless, this second attempt at negotiations also ended in failure, 
at which point the Kuwaiti government performed unilaterally by promulgating Decree 
Law no. 124 and terminating the concession contract between the parties.  After the 
termination  of  the  concession  contract,  the  government  of  Kuwait  nationalised  the 
company’s assets and provided that fair compensation ought to be paid as a result of the 
taking. 
The dispute between the parties was over whether Decree Law No. 124 of 1977 
was a valid act of nationalisation or not. While the government of Kuwait argued that 
this was a valid act of nationalisation, the Aminoil Company claimed that it was not. In 
relation  to  this  dispute,  several  objections  were  also  submitted  by  the  company to 
convince the tribunal that nationalisation was invalid. According to the company, the 
nationalisation was illegal as the taking was not made by the Kuwait government for a 
bona fide public purpose. 219 Secondly, the company also claimed that the government of 
Kuwait issued Decree Law with the intention of terminating its contractual relation, and 
nationalised the company. 220 Ultimately, the tribunal rejected the company’s objection 
with regard to Decree law No. 124 and stated that the law implemented by the Kuwait 
government  was  imposed  with  the  goal  of  fulfilling  its  national  program and  was 
therefore justifiably motivated by public purpose.221
217 H. W. Baade, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’, in Essays on 
Expropriations eds. R. S. Miller & R.J Stanger ( Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 
1967), 23 cited in M. Erkan (n.10 above) 71
218 A. Newcombe & L. Paradell,  Law and Practise of Investment Treaties: Standards  
of Treatment., (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2009) 372
219American Independent Oil Company vs. Kuwait Award, 24 March, 1982 21 ILM 
976, para. 85, 1019 ( Hereinafter Aminoil Arbitration)
220 Aminoil Arbitration, 24 ILM (1982) 976, para., 106, 1025
221Aminoil Arbitration 24 ILM (1982) 976, para., 85 & 86, 1019
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By making  reference  to  the  resolution  in  the  Aminoil Case,  the  tribunal  also 
addressed the scope and measure of public purpose in the  Amoco Case. The tribunal 
stated that ‘a precise definition of the ‘public purpose’ for which an expropriation may 
be  lawfully  decided  has  neither  been  agreed  upon  in  international  law  nor  even 
suggested’.222 The  tribunal  also  highlighted  that  states  have  complete  discretion  in 
determining  their  public  interest.223  The  tribunal  went  on  to  point  out  that  ‘an 
expropriation,  the  only purpose of  which would have  been to  avoid the  contractual 
obligation  of  the  state  or  of  an  entity  controlled  by  it,  could  not,  nevertheless  be 
considered  as  lawful  under  international  law.’224 It  is  apparent  that  through  this 
statement  the  tribunal  wished to  emphasise  that  the  taking  should  not  be  based  on 
avoiding contractual commitments; as in this case the expropriation could be considered 
to  be  an  unlawful  taking  and  regarded  as  an  unlawful  expropriation  under  the 
international law.
The lessons that can be learned from the aforementioned cases are that states are 
free to decide whether public interest justifies an expropriation. However, it has also 
been emphasised that an expropriation should not be executed as a means to avoiding 
contractual  obligation.  Finally,  a  host  state  has  the  right  to  expropriate  an  alien 
investor’s property and it is admissible that there may be financial implications in an 
expropriation and that as a consequence of the expropriation the host state may benefit 
financially;  225 however the purpose of the taking should not be based on specifically 
political reasons226.
b)     Non-Discrimination
 Non-discrimination requirement is the second condition of lawful expropriation 
in the context of international law. What constitutes the concept of non-discrimination? 
There are several components for this, among which are nationality, race, ethnicity and 
religion. Notably, if the measure of the host state is based on race discrimination, the 
discrimination  violates  the  jus  congens  norm under  international  law,  automatically 
rendering  the  taking  illegal227.  If  a  state’s  measures  are  motivated  by one  of  these 
reasons, then the taking is regarded as an unlawful expropriation and therefore, contrary 
222Amoco Int’l Fin. Corporation Vs. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,15 
Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 189, 233 
223  ibid
224  Ibid, para., 145
225 Z. A. Al-Qurashi (n. above 2) 106
226 H.V. Houtte,  The Law of International Trade, 2nd edn (London, Sweet &Maxell, 
2002) 249
227 M. Sornarajah, (n.56 above) 409 
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to the rule of international law. In addition to this, a host state’s treatment of foreign 
investors should be equivalent in manner to its treatment of investors from the same 
state.
The  principle  of  non-discrimination  requirement  is  recognised  as  reflecting 
customary international law and, has found its way into numerous multilateral228 and 
bilateral229 treaties  and  arbitral  decisions230.  Notably,  as  far  as  BITs  and  MITs  are 
concerned, many of them state that expropriation measures must not be discriminatory. 
However,  although  they  make  this  provision  in  principle,  they  do  not  define  or 
exemplify what constitutes the discriminatory actions of host states. In this respect, it  
may be observed that treaties would benefit from being more explicitly and consistently 
worded to facilitate interpretation and render their terms more easily comparable.  
In the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, the 
American Law Institute has summarized: 
Discrimination  implies  unreasonable  distinction.  Takings  that  invidiously 
single  out  property  of  persons  of  a  particular  nationality  would  be 
unreasonable; classifications, even if based on nationality, that are rationally 
related  to  the  State's  security  or  economic  policies  might  not  be 
unreasonable.231
With  regard  to  this  statement,  in  doctrine  phenomena  considered  to  be 
‘unreasonable’  are  also  discussed  by  several  legal  scholars.  According  to 
Manirruzzaman, the existence of discrimination ought to be determined by assessing the 
228  For Instance, see North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Art. 1110 (1) 
(b) and the Energy Charter Treaty (ETC) Art. 13 (1) (b) 
229   Most BITs included that provisions to the effect that expropriations shall be on a 
“non-discriminatory manner” please see Art. 5 (1) of the United Kingdom model BIT –
Turkey (1991); see also  Art.5(1)  of the United Kingdom-Czechoslovakia (1990)
230  There is a number of case decisions held by Arbitral Tribunals. For instance, ‘in the 
BP vs. Libya case, a ground for holding of the asset of British oil company illegal was 
that it was” discriminatory in character”, 53I.L.R.297, 329 (1979). In the Liamco Award, 
the arbitrator held that “purely discriminatory nationalization is illegal and wrongful.” 
Libya vs Libyan Am. Oil Co., 20 I.L.M. 1, 20 58 (1981); see also The Norwegian Ship-
owners  Claims,  1  R.I.A.A.  307,  309  (1992)  (Stating  that  ‘the  United  States  are 
responsible for having thus made a discriminating use of the power of eminent domain 
towards citizen of a friendly nation, and they are liable for the damaging action of their  
officials and agent towards these citizens of the Kingdom of Norway)’, cited in A.F.M 
Manirruzzaman,  ‘Expropriation  of  Alien  Property  and  The  Principle  of  Non-
Discrimination  in  International  Law  of  Foreign  Investment:  An  Overview’,  J.  
Transnat’I &Pol’y 8 (1998), 59 
231  Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of The United States, 712, com 
(f) 200 
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individual  particular  circumstances  of  each precise  case232.  He concludes:  ‘thus,  the 
legal  notion  of  discrimination  is  more  contextual  than  hypothetical’233.  Brownlie 
suggests that the concept ‘calls for more sophisticated treatment in order to identify 
unreasonable (or material) discrimination as distinct from the different treatment of non-
comparable  situations’.234 What  becomes  apparent  is  that  it  is  no  small  matter  to 
determine whether the actions of a government are discriminatory or non-discriminatory 
in many cases, given their complexity. Perhaps, in this case, an action test is needed.235 
Brownie defines the test as a measurement of a government intention236. 
Arguably,  Manurrizaman’s  assessment  seems the  most  rational  and reasonable 
approach. According to that author: 
…the principle of  non-discrimination in  both customary and conventional 
international law must be understood in the context to which it is applied. 
The  principle  has  no  blanket  application  in  disregard  of  the  factual 
circumstances concerned; in applying it, the judge or arbitrator must weigh 
cautiously all  the relevant circumstances.  It  remains to be seen whether a 
future Multilateral Agreement on Investment will clarify and settle the many 
issues arising in the context of non-discrimination.237
c)    Due process of Law
The  requirement  of  due  process  of  law  means  that  expropriation  must  be  in 
accordance  with  appropriate  legal  procedures.  Due  process  of  law  embodies  both 
substantive and procedural elements.238 For instance, if a foreign investor’s property is 
taken by a host state, the measures taken must be free from arbitrariness, and safeguards 
and  remedies  at  an  administrative  level  and  through  the  judiciary  system must  be 
viewed holistically.239 Furthermore, nearly all BITs240 and MITs241 require due process of 
law. Nevertheless, it may be assumed that where the wording of due process of law is 
232 A. F. M. Manirruzzaman, (n.108 above) 67 
233 Ibid
234 I. Brownlie, (n 12 above) 531
235 M. Erkan (n.10 above) 73-74 
236 I. Brownie, (n. above 12) 515
237 A. F. M. Manirruzzaman (n.108) 67
238 I. F. I., Shihata, Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment: The World Bank Guidance, 
(Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993) 299 
239 Ibid
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integrated in a BIT, its use is not clear and it is therefore distinguishable from what 
might be the case in internal law.242
d)     Compensation
As far as the business world is concerned, there is no doubt that the prospect for 
an investor of having its property expropriated by a host state and the profit loss entailed 
is a bleak one. It is probable that, if a survey were conducted of energy investors of all 
nationalities,  regarding  the  perceived  necessity  of  compensation,  the  vast  majority 
would declare themselves in favour of the compensation principle which obliges states 
to pay adequate compensation for the injury caused.243 
However,  in reality,  compensation for expropriation is one of the most controversial 
subjects in international law.244
Moreover,  there  is  a  discrepancy between lawful  expropriation  and unlawful 
taking. As mentioned above, the traditional view is that compensation should be paid for 
the expropriated property of a foreign investor. The sovereign state must pay this in 
accordance with general international law.245 If a state wishes to expropriate an alien 
property lawfully, compensation is payable to the value of the property taken.  However, 
for an unlawful expropriation, the state must compensate for the damages that result 
240  R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment  
disputes: Bilateral Investment Treaties (Netherland, Kluwer Publishers: 1995) 106   
241 Please see Art. 13(1) (c) of ECT and Art. 1110 (1) (a) of the NAFTA
242 R. Dolzer& M. Stevens, (n.119 above) 106 
243J. W. Salacuse, (n.91 above) 58. It should be noted that there are some exemptions 
with regard to compensation for  expropriation.   Professor  Brownlie  highlights these 
exceptions in his words: ‘ The most widely accepted of which exception are as follows: 
under treaty provisions; as a legitimate exercise of police power, including measures  of 
defence against external threats ; confiscation as a penalty for crimes; seizure by way of 
taxation  or  other  fiscal  measures;  lost  caused  indirectly  by  health  and  planning 
legislation and concomitant restrictions on the use of property; destruction of property 
of neutrals as a consequence of military operation, and the taken of enemy property as 
part  payment  of  reparation  for  the  consequences  of  an  illegal  war.’ Please  see  I. 
Brownlie, (n.12 above) 511-512 
244 M. Sornarajah,(n.56 above) 413
245 G. Sacerdoti, ‘The Source and Evolution of International Legal Protection for 
Infrastructure Investments confronting Political and Regulatory Risks’, CEPMLP 
Online Journal Vol. 5 Article 7
(2000), available at: <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol5/vol5-7.html> 
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from the taking of the property. It is conceivable that a sovereign state might venture to 
take  property  unlawfully  on  the  assumption  that  the  compensation  payable  will  be 
equivalent to that of the value of the property. In such scenarios, damage in fact includes 
not merely damnum emergens (value of the property) and lucrum cessans (lost profit) as 
a result of the taking, but it also covers consequential damage that is directly related to 
the taking of the property246, i.e. the future earnings.
There is a disagreement between states on the subject of the appropriate standard 
of compensation for expropriation247. There are two competing norms views with regard 
to this. One is that formulation of ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation view 
which is also called the ‘Hull Formula.’248 The Hull formula has been referred to in 
numerous bilateral and multilateral investment agreements and couched in a variety of 
terms.249 Reference has been made variously to  ‘fair  market  value’,  ‘genuine value’ 
‘market  value’ of  the  expropriated  investment.250 Many  western  states  and  several 
arbitral tribunals have adopted and promoted the theory that the expropriation of foreign 
investor’s private property is lawful if ‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’ is 
supplied to the investor251. The second theory is that of ‘appropriate compensation’ or 
‘equivalent compensation’ which means that a state ought to pay the full value, or the 
appropriate market value, of the expropriated property to the alien investor. The term of 
‘appropriate  compensation’ or  ‘equivalent  compensation’  view  has  been  generally 
approved in declaration of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803.252 
With regard to Article 4 of the Resolution, expropriation, nationalisation, or requisition 
ought to be based on the grounds of public utility, security or national interest and also 
requires that the host state should provide ‘appropriate compensation’ in accordance 
with both municipal and international law.253 Similarly, Article 2 of Charter Economic 
Rights and Duties of States (CERDS)254include the term ‘appropriate compensation’. 
246 R. St. J. MacDonald, Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, (Dordrecht, The Netherland, 
Kluwer Academic Publisher: 1994) 59
247 J. W. Salacuse (n.91 above) 58
248 ‘Hull Formula’ which was used by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, over the course 
of  Mexican  Expropriation.  Please  see  R.  Dolzer,  ‘New Foundations  of  the  Law of 
Expropriation of Alien Property’, 75 AJIL (1981) 558-559
249 A. K. Bjorklund& I. A. Laird and S. Ripinsky,  Investment Treaty law: Remedies  
International  Law  Emerging  Jurisprudence  of  Investment  Law:  Current  Issues  III 
(London: The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2009) 10 
250 Ibid
251 I. Brownlie, (n.12 above) 509
252 Article 4 of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803
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Moreover, it would not be unfair to claim that this is a breakthrough in terms of the 
support it affords to the protection of the sovereignty of developing states.
Furthermore,  the representatives  of  several  European countries and that  of the 
U.S.  representative,  equated  ‘appropriate’ compensation’ to  the  serving  of  ‘prompt, 
adequate and effective’ compensation.255 However, the perception of this concept held 
by their  counterparts  from developing states  differed vastly.  Developing states  were 
firmly of  the  opinion  that  compensation  should  be  in  accordance  with  the  national 
treatment principle satisfied by the standards of ‘appropriate compensation’.256 And thus 
an ideological battle between developing and developed states emerges, founded on the 
very differences that define them. On the one side, developing states wish to determine 
the measure of compensation by seeking recourse to their own legal systems to resolve 
legal  struggles  they engage in  with  western investors.  However,  on the other  hand, 
industrialised states with most control over the international economy seek protection 
from the international legislation they help define. Consequently, the debate continues 
on the compensation issue. Perhaps a national welcoming plan for investors may be the 
only solution, as developing states need to be able to attract capital. 
        Valuation methods of Investor compensation
The valuation methods are used in the calculation of investor compensation in 
cases  of  expropriation/nationalisation.257 There is  no doubt  that  every tribunal  has  a 
responsibility  to  determine  and  calculate  ‘the  quantum  of  damages,  whether  it  is 
applying a fair market value, full restitution, or any other standard to assess loss’.258 It is 
253 B. A. Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary , (The U.S, Scarecrow Press: 2005) 
148
254  Article 2 of CERDS states that ‘…nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership 
private property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State 
adopting  such  measures,  taking  into  account  its  relevant  laws  regulations  and  all 
circumstances that the State considers pertinent’.
255 The United States Representative at the UN supported the 1803 resolution asserted 
that ‘the requirements of Article 4 of ‘ appropriate compensation’ …in accordance with 
international law ‘ would be interpreted as meaning….. Prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation’.  Cited  in  E.  Helgeson,  Iran-U.S  Claims  Tribunal  Reports,  Vol.33 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1997) 243
256 B. A. Boczek (n.132 above) 148
257 J. W. Salacuse (n.91 above) 325
258  K. Yanaca-Small, Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide 
to the Key Issues, (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press: 2010) 562
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often said that ‘valuation is more art than science’.259 Perhaps one of the reasons for this 
saying is that ‘many diverse, seemingly scientific valuation methods can be applied in 
different  ways  to  arrive  at  different  result’.260 There  are  four  principle  methods  are 
applied by tribunals in determining valuation of the expropriated property. 
Book value method 
Book value refers to ‘the difference between a company’s assets and liabilities as 
recorded on its financial statements, or the amount at which the expropriated tangible 
assets  appears  on  the  balance  sheet  in  accordance  with  the  generally  accepted 
accounting principles’.261 The Book value method was frequently applied by investment 
tribunals in the petroleum nationalisations that emerged in the 1970s.262 Despite these 
historic  applications,  the  book  value  method  has  also  disadvantages.  According  to 
Rovine,  ‘The disadvantages  of  the  book value  method are  its  reliance  on historical 
figures that may not have any relevance in the valuation context.’263
Replacement value method
Another technique for measuring the value of tangible assets is the replacement 
value method. This method is ‘the amount it would have cost to replace the specific 
assets seized based upon the market conditions.’264 It should be borne in mind that the 
replacement  value method is  ‘available  only of  the asset  in  question is  replaceable, 
which  signifies  that  unique  business  opportunities  and  assets  with  unique  qualities 
cannot be valued using this method’.265
Liquidation value method
259 J. W. Salacuse (n.91 above) 325
260 Ibid
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This type of method refers to ‘the amounts at which individual assets comprising 
the enterprise or the entire assets of the enterprise could be sold under conditions of 
liquidation to a willing buyer less any liabilities which the enterprise has to meet.’266
Discounted cash flow method
Another commonly used method is the discounted cash flow method. This type of 
technique is an income based method of valuing an on-going enterprise or a long term 
contractual right, for instance to exploit natural resources.267 According to Sornarajah 
this type of valuation technique:
‘…requires the projection of the future receipts expected by the enterprise 
after deducting the cost associated with the making of the receipts. The World 
Bank Guidelines states that this is the method which should be applied where 
the company that is taken is a going concern. This introduces standards of 
compensation  through  the  back-door  and  makes  the  distinction  between 
lawful  and  unlawful  takings  meaningless.  To  the  extent  that  the  method 
requires future factors to be taken into account, those who seek its application 
must show that the taking involved was an unlawful taking’.268
4.    Rise of Resource Nationalism
In the historical background section, attempts were made to identify the driving 
forces which constitute direct taking, in the context respectively of the 20th century and 
in the new millennium. There is no doubt that the majority of direct expropriation cases 
arose, and continue to arise, as a consequence of ‘resource nationalism’. For this reason 
this  section  aims  to  examine  the  link  between  ‘resource  nationalism’ and  indirect 
expropriation,  with  relation  to  the  more  recent  trend  of  governments  interfering 
indirectly in investments made by foreign parties. In order to discover this link, the 
following  questions  need  to  be  addressed:  what  is  the  definition  of  ‘resource 
nationalism’? And, what form does the antagonistic behaviour of host states take? 
Resource  nationalism  can  be  defined  as  a  national  governments’  claim  of 
ownership rights over their natural resources within their own land, usually in ways that 
contradict liberal paradigms for safeguarding alien investments, and work against the 
interest of international energy investors.269 Resource nationalism is a notion that deems 
266 The  World  Bank  Guidelines  on  the  Treatment  of  Foreign  Direct  Investment, 
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natural  resources  to be the property of a  sovereign state  rather than of a  petroleum 
company or an individual who has property rights over an area.270  This view holds that 
the  asset  of  ‘natural  resources’ equates  with  “national  patrimony”  and consequently 
should be used for the benefit of the nation rather than for private gain’.271  The question 
of  how this  concept  leads  to  the  antagonistic  behaviour  of  host  states  is  the  other 
significant point requires further examination. 
According to Stevens, there are two components that drive resource nationalism to 
take  into  consideration:  the  first  component  is  that  of  limiting  the  control  of 
international investors’ business activities over natural resource, as they take too large a 
share of the cake. The second driver is the perception among ordinary nationals that 
they have a  significant  claim to the natural  resources  of their  territory and that  the 
benefit of those resources should be felt through the improvement of their economy. 
272As outlined in  the previous  section,  a  sovereign state  can rightfully expropriate  a 
foreign investor’s property and their assets as long as they meet certain expropriation 
criteria under international law. The driving forces behind resource nationalism lie in the 
economic conditions of the host state, its level of development and ideologies that may 
take hold among its political class. These factors can be summarised as follows:273
• Fast-growing populations whose social, educational and health needs are 
not being satisfied. 
•  Evolving politics.  A government that comes to power on a nationalist 
platform or that is more critical of foreign investment may be more likely to  
change the terms of foreign investment.
•  The need for jobs.
•  A lack of infrastructure and social services. 
•  Out-dated or inappropriate laws. 
•  A lack of transparency in the licence and concession award process. 
270 D. R. Mares, ‘Resource Nationalism and Energy Security in Latin America’, Baker 
Institute, Scholar For Latin American Energy Studies, James A. Baker III Institute for 
Public Policy, Rice University, Working Paper (2010), 6 available at 
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•  Exploitative contracts. Some foreign investors have taken advantage of 
political instability, corruption or a kleptocratic state to negotiate terms that 
are often opposed by the population or a new government. 
• High commodity prices and competition for a depleting supply of natural 
resources. 
While the bullet points above summarise the main drivers of resource nationalism 
which put pressure on states to enact a ‘taking’,274  it should be noted that the rise of oil 
prices in the sector is an equally powerful catalyst. What happens when oil prices rise? 
In such scenarios, the sovereign state seeks to impose new terms and conditions to the 
current contract or implements new regulations of energy investment projects or else 
they seek to maximise the profit.  It is clear that,  instead of taking the property,  the 
government attempts to interfere in the project by implementing new rules or regulating 
new tax  codes  or  changing the  contractual  terms  of  the  contract.  This,  in  practice, 
constitutes indirect expropriation.
Resource nationalism has become a more popular measure and consequently a 
more frequent occurrence in a significant number of countries.275 As mentioned in the 
previous  section,  the main factors  behind host  government  expropriation in  the 20th 
Century were rooted in socio-political conditions. Perhaps, the same elements are still 
the cause of the resurgence of resource nationalism in the 21st Century. In academic 
writing,  most  scholars  purport  to  believe  that  there  is  a  nexus  between  resource 
nationalism and high oil prices. To this end, it should be asked: have times changed? 
According to Yergin, the chairman of Cambridge Research Associates: ‘We have seen a 
return to a 1970s style of resource nationalism, riding along the crest of high prices.’276 
Similarly,  Leonardo Maugeri,  a senior executive for strategy at  Eni,  Italy's  chief oil 
company,  state  that  ‘It's  quite  natural  that  during  a  period  of  high  prices  that  the 
phenomenon  of  resource  nationalism returns.’277  Stevens  also  calls  attention  to  the 
nexus between high oil prices and resource nationalism. According to him: 
Because of this pervasive role of oil prices, the ‘resource nationalist’ cycle is 
self-feeding.  A period  of  ‘resource  nationalism’ inevitably  leads  to  less 
investment and a shortage of crude oil. This supports high prices encouraging 
274 Ibid
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further  ‘resource nationalism’ as  the obsolescing bargain kicks in  and  the 
need for  capital  and technology by the owner of  the resources  to expand 
capacity diminishes.278
From the perspective of sovereign states, it is admissible that their expropriation 
decision is lawful as a political expedient option, even if it is not the best solution, in a 
long-term investment project. Nevertheless, what is less acceptable is the technique and 
the approach taken to enforce the sovereign authority of states. It must be borne in mind 
that if the political expedient option is used by states as a last resort for the sake of  
improving their natural resources, the resurgence of resource nationalism could give rise 
to  disputes  between  states  and international  energy investment  companies  and may 
result  in  a  dramatic  and  very  costly  outcome for  those  states.  It  is  true  that,  as  a 
consequence of the rise in cases of indirect expropriation in recent years in the sector, 
resource  nationalism has  been identified  as  one  of  the  major  risks  for  international 
energy  investors  in  the  natural  resource  industry.279 Indirect  expropriation  will  be 
examined more thoroughly in the following chapter.
Before this chapter draws to a close, an assessment of the potential for survival 
resource nationalism has in the energy sector of the 21st Century should be attempted. 
According  to  Hoyos,  international  oil  companies’  executives  are  keen  to  forge 
concession agreements with developing states, in possession of rich natural resources, 
as they are aware that today’s power balance is unlikely to change in the immediate 
future.280 Similarly,  Christophe  de  Margerie,  chief  executive  of  Total  Petroleum 
Company agrees with this assessment of changes in the cycle and states that ‘… the new 
world  will  stay  even  if  the  price  of  oil  drops  a  bit.’281  Professor  Paul  Stevens’ 
assessment is not different to that of Margerie and Hoyos. According to Stevens:
Last  time,  when ‘resource nationalism’ dominated in the 1970s, the cycle 
took from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s to begin to work its way through.  
This time it could take longer given that the exogenous drivers of the cycle 
are  particularly  strong,  especially  the  disillusion  and  despair  of  the 
dispossessed in those countries which have the resources.282
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5.      A Comparison of Investment Environments in Azerbaijan and
Turkey
Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan is  one of the few Turkic countries that  officially welcomes private 
investors, conscious of the crucial role they can play in growth of the country economy. 
After gaining its independence in 1991, the country, in order to signal its willingness to 
collaborate  and cooperate,  signed a number of  multilateral  international  treaties and 
became a member of several key international organisations. For example, the country 
is currently a member of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID), the World Bank group (mainly at the IBRD, 
IFC and MIGA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). On the other hand, the 
country  is  not  yet  a  member  of  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  or  the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Notwithstanding 
this, since 1994, Azerbaijan has attracted a considerable amount of private investment 
into its territory through the Production sharing Agreement (the agreement popularly 
known  as  ‘the  contract  of  the  century’)  signed  with  nine  western  international  oil 
companies. 
The  involvement  of  international  oil  companies  will  inject  $7.4  billion  of 
investment into the country’s economy over the next three decades.283It should be noted 
that Azerbaijan is not the possessor of the largest oil reserves of all the former Soviet  
States in the Caspian region; however, of these, the country has been the most willing 
and the most successful in attracting foreign investors into its territory. According to the 
attraction  of  foreign  direct  investment  index,  designed  by  the  United  Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the country ranked third amongst 
the 140 countries assessed during the years between 1994 and 1996 and subsequently 
ranked eighth between 1998 and 2000.284
Over the past two decades Azerbaijan has witnessed substantial  economic and 
political  progress.  According to  the State  Statistical  Committee of  Azerbaijan,  GDP 
increased from $5.2 billion in 2000 to $63.4 billion in 2001 and GDP per capita reached 
$ 7,003 in 2011. 285  It is apparent that the long-term oil sector contracts signed in the 
period leading up to this had played their part in this economic boom. One interview 
respondent noted that ‘Azerbaijan’s ample natural hydrocarbon resource and attempts to 
283  N. Sagheb & M. Javadi, ‘Azerbaijan’s  Contract of the Century’, Azerbaijan 
International, Winter (1994) available at: 
<http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/24_folder/24_articles/24_aioc.html> 
February, 2013
284 United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD)  2002a, 
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provide a stable environment to petroleum investors increase its appeal. This stability is 
provided  by Azerbaijani  product-sharing  agreement  laws  (PSAs),  or  other  types  of 
HGAs, because 60-70% of the country’s economy depends on the hydrocarbon sector 
and  in  order  to  appeal  to  investors,  they  have  to  create  a  stable  environment.  The 
dependency seems to carry on for years.’286
The  country signed  a  total  of  32  production  sharing  agreements  (PSAs)  with 
western international oil companies between 1994 and 2013. As this type of contract 
includes contractual clauses, such as stabilisation and arbitration clauses, they are the 
contract of preference of the international oil companies operating in Azerbaijan. One 
interview  respondent  noted  that  ‘oil  companies  have  never  faced  expropriation  or 
nationalisation events in Azerbaijan. And their contracts have never been forced by the 
Azerbaijani authorities to renegotiate the terms and conditions of the oil contracts’.287 It 
is evident that the authorities in Azerbaijan are keenly aware of the importance of their 
relationships with these companies to the future prospects of their economy, and are 
therefore  compliant  in  avoiding the  renegotiation  of  contract  terms  and desist  from 
nationalising the investors’ projects. 
Despite this recent picture of stability in the Azerbaijani oil sector, the country 
presents challenges to other sectors which find themselves plagued with government 
bureaucracy, weak legal institutions, corruption, a lack of transparency in transactions, 
cronyism.  Such  debilitating  phenomena  remain  significant  obstacles  to  economic 
progress, hindering both domestic and private investment.288The high level of corruption 
is  the  singularly  most  prohibitive  impediment  to  the  attraction  of  investment  to 
Azerbaijan.  Corruption in Azerbaijan is by no means a new issue; its legacy can be 
traced back to the Soviet Union era. In 2004, the Azerbaijani government enacted the 
Anti-Corruption  Act  and  formed  a  state  commission  on  combating  corruption. 
Nevertheless, the government’s deployment of obstructive bureaucracy and the bribery 
inherent in government institutions often impede the applicability of this law. According 
to the Transparency Initiatives Corruption Index (2011), Azerbaijan ranked 134th  place 
out of 180 countries with a score of just 2.4.289 Corruption is rampant in the regulatory, 
tax  and  dispute  settlement  system.  This  issue  naturally  raises  questions  around  the 
reliability and transparency of governance in potential investors’ minds and is a strong 
disincentive against doing business in Azerbaijan. 
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Turkey
Turkey’s investment environment has undergone extensive restructuring since the 
1980s with the objective of creating a more liberal business environment. Economic 
reforms  during  the  1980s  assisted  the  country’s  global  economic  integration.  Alike 
Azerbaijan,  Turkey  is  also  party  to  a  number  of  international  conventions  and 
international organisations. For instance, the country is a member of the World Bank 
group, ICSID, the ECT and the IMF. However,  unlike Azerbaijan;  Turkey is  also a 
member of the WTO and the OECD. Turkey’s attempts at liberation and integration into 
the world economy continued well  into the 1990s.  For instance,  the Custom Union 
Agreement  made with the EU in 1995 allowed the freedom of movement of goods 
between  the  European  Custom Area  and  Turkey  free  of  any  restrictions  or  tariffs. 
Similarly, the agreement with the WTO in 1995 enabled the country to improve its trade 
policy and thereby achieve better  integration into the world economy.  Despite  these 
major developments, Turkey was one of the lowest receivers of FDI of all emerging 
countries during the 1990s as both economic and non-economic factors created such a 
chaotic investment environment in Turkey.
 The economic factors behind this were: i)  inefficient bureaucracy and a high 
level of corruption; ii) high cost of the entry and functioning procedures for foreign 
investors; iii) chronically high inflation and economic instability; iv) lack of inflation-
accounting and internationally acceptable accounting standards;  v) lack of intellectual 
property rights;  and vi)  insufficient  laws on FDI.290 The  non-economic  causes  were 
namely: i) political instability; ii) regional crises (for example the Iraq war in the Gulf 
region); iii) social unrest in south-east of the country and terrorist attacks. In view of 
this  unstable  investment  environment,  it  is  easy  to  entertain  the  possibility  that  a 
government may breach the property rights of investors not only in the energy sector but 
also in other industries in which foreign investors may be involved. Nevertheless, as one 
interview respondent noted: ‘no taking has ever happened in the energy or other sectors 
in Turkey, even though the country was confronted with economic, political challenges 
in the past.’291
Since  the  general  election  in  2002,  Turkey’s  economy  and  its  investment 
environment has changed significantly. The economic stability policy spearheaded by 
the Justice and Development Party enabled the country to deal with high inflation and 
the issues surrounding stability in a short timeframe. It goes without saying that the role 
of  the  FDI  law passed  in  2003  made  a  huge  contribution  to  the  transformation  of 
Turkey’s investment environment. The law aimed to ‘encourage FDIs in Turkey, protect 
foreign  investor’s  rights;  bring  investors  and  investment  in  line  with  international 
standards, establish a notification-based rather than approval-based system for FDIs and 
increase the volume of FDI through established policies.’292  According to UNCTAD, 
290  Y. Vural& M. Zortuk, ‘Foreign Investment as a Determining Factor in Turkey’s 
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the World Investment Report 2010, Turkey was the 32nd most attractive country for FDI 
in the world and the 15th most attractive FDI destination amongst emerging countries.293 
With the help of the recent economic upturn and regional energy projects, such as Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), and Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP)294 projects (expected to 
start  in  2014) between Azerbaijan and Turkey,  seems to make the country is  set  to 
become an absolute regional strategic power in the Caucasus. 
In terms of the issues foreign investors in Turkey may still face, compared with 
Azerbaijan, while bureaucracy can be similarly obstructive, corruption, while it exists, 
is less of a concern. According to the Transparency initiatives Corruption Index (2011), 
Turkey is ranked 56th place in the world and scores 4.4 points.295 Other impediments to 
international business relations include the slowness of the judicial system, weakness in 
corporate  governance,  the  unpredictability of  local-government  decision-making and 
frequent  changes in the legal and regulatory environment.296 The Turkish parliament 
modified the Law of Obligation and enacted a new Commercial Law in 2011. Through 
these  reforms,  Turkey  aspired  to  a  more  transparent,  equal,  fair  and  contemporary 
investment and business environment. 
One  interview  respondent  offered  a  general  comment  on  Turkey’s  appeal  to 
investors: ‘our country does not abound in oil and gas resources however; other sectors 
such  as  the  automotive  and  textile  industries  and,  agriculture  are  better  investment 
environments for foreign investors in Turkey.’297 Another respondent touched upon the 
hurdles that foreign investors face in Turkey: ‘bureaucracy and red tape were the major 
problems that private investors faced in the past. Of course that does not mean that we 
do not have these issues. They still exist but they have been become relatively minor 
over the course of the past decade.  In order to give the business environment the chance 
to  prosper,  conform  with  global  standards,  and  remove  bureaucratic  hurdles  the 
293 UNCTAD, The World Investment Report 2010 :Investing in a Low Carbon 
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on the implementation of the TANAP gas pipeline project on 26 June 2012. Through 
this pipeline project, both Azerbaijan and Turkey aim to game maker in the region.
295 Transparency of International (n.168 above)
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government formed the Coordination Council for the Improvement of the Investment 
Climate.’298
6.    Conclusion
The chapter conducted an exploratory analysis of the motivations for host states to 
interfere in  investment  projects.  The most  hazardous political  risks  for  international 
energy investors were also identified. The historical background of political risks in the 
energy industry  was  used  as  a  starting  point.  The  author  observed  that  the  energy 
industry witnessed a number of divergent risks, such as a high level of expropriation or 
nationalisation  and  confiscation  in  the  20th Century.   Admittedly,  political  risk  has 
always been a major hindrance to foreign investors in the energy sector and is likely to 
continue to be so for the foreseeable future. It may be part of the inherent nature of 
energy  projects  –  expropriation,  nationalisation  and  confiscation  are  all  risks  that 
foreign  investors  faced  during  the  life  span  of  their  projects  in  the  20 th Century. 
Although direct expropriation or nationalisation were frequent occurrences in the 20 th 
Century, nowadays, direct taking is no longer regarded as a major issue as there has 
been a more recent shift in host state activity in favour of indirect expropriation.
With regards to direct expropriation, it was found that, under international law, the 
expropriation notion is not an unlawful action per se.  There is no major obstacle to 
prevent  states  from expropriating local  or  foreign investors’ property as  long as the 
state’s actions meet certain conditions. These requirements are commonly referred to as: 
public  purpose,  non-discriminatory,  respecting  due  process  of  law  and  prompt  and 
adequate compensation.299 The conditions regulated under international customary law 
and the state’s own legal system is the main criteria for lawful expropriation. It should 
be borne in mind, that although expropriation is a legal right, such sovereign power 
should be used only as a last resort against alien investors’ property ownership. It has 
been mentioned above, if the property is expropriated by a sovereign power, and the 
taking does not meet the exact criteria as defined by international law, then the taking 
will  be deemed wrongful.   In addition,  resource nationalism was addressed and the 
ideological,  political  and  economic  factors  that  have  driven  the  rise  in  resource 
nationalism in recent years.  
The  chapter  went  on  to  examine  the  link  between  resource  nationalism  and 
indirect expropriation. It was found that that the rise of oil prices plays a significant role 
today as was the case in the past. As a result of high oil prices, governments interfere 
298 Interview no. 8 with Lecturer, 4 June, 2012
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either in the investment contract by changing its terms and conditions or implementing 
new regulations or changing the tax provisions for the sake of making more profit. This 
is referred to as indirect expropriation. Recent oil price rises along with political and 
economic factors have prompted a resurgence of resource nationalism in developing 
states. States, instead of taking property directly, more recently prefer to interfere in 
projects  indirectly.  It  is  currently  the  case  that  the  most  hazardous  political  risk  is 
indirect expropriation. The simple answer to why governments interfere in investment 
projects  is:  to maximise their  profit  and improve sustainable developments  for their 
country. While the methods of governments may sometimes be questionable; however, 
the  exploitative  mind-set  of  profit-driven  energy  companies  is  also  unsustainable. 
Perhaps, the solution is to promote fairer contract terms and a more even-handed system 
for the sharing of profit between the parties.
In the last section of this chapter, the investment environment of Azerbaijan and 
Turkey was also examined. It was found that both countries have their strengths and 
weaknesses  in  terms  of  their  ability  to  provide  a  secure  investment  environment. 
Azerbaijan is an oil dependent country and the Azerbaijani governments focus on this 
sector is to the detriment of its growth in other sectors. Force of contract negotiation, 
expropriation  or  nationalisation  has  never  emerged  in  Azerbaijan.  Based  on  this 
evidence, it can be concluded that the rise of oil and gas prices in recent years have not 
triggered resource nationalism in Azerbaijan. However, outside the oil sector, there are 
some major  problems which render  doing business  in  Azerbaijan problematic,  these 
include inefficient bureaucracy, a high level of corruption and a lack of transparency in 
legal and political processes. A private investor would be likely to face a debilitating 
combination  of  these  factors  over  the  course  of  their  business  project.  It  would  be 
advisable for the government, as part of its efforts to tackle these issues, to accelerate its 
membership of international organisations such as the WTO and the OECD. 
 The  situation  of  political  and economic  instability  endured  by Turkey in  the 
1990s seems to be a thing of the past. Single party governance during the 2000s has 
secured economic growth and continuity in its policies. As the country does not have 
rich natural resources, resource nationalism is not a consideration for Turkey. Similar to 
Azerbaijan, no expropriation or nationalisation actions against foreign investors have 
been  found  to  have  occurred  in  Turkey.  The  country’s  chief  weaknesses  lie  in  its 
overburdened judiciary system and its cumbersome bureaucracy.
In the next chapter, indirect expropriation phenomena will be analysed.
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     Chapter 3
       Indirect Expropriation
1.     Introduction
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the protection of a foreign investor’s 
property  ownership  against  direct  expropriation  or  nationalisation  has  long  been  a 
consideration for international corporations,  and, up until  the 1980s, was one of the 
most disruptive kinds of government interference in investment projects. From the start 
of the new millennium a shift occurred with the emergence of indirect expropriation 
soon becoming the single most significant threat to investment contracts in the energy 
sector as well as the most impactful form of intervention a state could set in motion.300 
This type of government  intervention may result  from measures  that a  host  country 
enacts  in  order  to gain greater  control  over commercial  activities  in  its  territory by 
adopting new regulations, even where such a regulation does not specifically target at an 
investment.301 In  contrast  with direct  expropriation  which  has  the  aim of  physically 
taking the private property, ‘indirect expropriation cases are those where, by means of 
administrative or legislative procedures, the state in question causes a unilateral change 
in contract conditions such that the investor is unable to recover the expected quasi 
rents302 of the business under the original contractual framework.’303
International tribunals and scholars in conventional literature have focused on the 
notion  of  direct  and  indirect  expropriation  in  their  decisions,  and  in  their  various 
publications. Although, there are numerous sources regarding this phenomena ‘… the 
doctrine and case law on expropriation in international law remain somewhat unsettled. 
Several factors may explain why this is so. These include the diversity of interest at 
play,  divergence  in  cultural,  economic  and  legal  concepts  of  property,  different 
understandings of the role of the state, and a general heterogeneity in state practice’.304 
Nevertheless, the question of what is the most hazardous political risk in the energy 
sector was answered in the previous chapter and it was found, through the analysis of 
300 R. Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?’,  11 N.Y.U. Environmental  
Law Journal (2002) 64-65
301 S. H. Nikiema,  ‘Indirect Expropriation’, Best Practices Working Paper Series, 
( Canada, International Institute for Sustainable Development Publication: 2012) 
1available at: <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/best_practice_indirect_expropriation.pdf> 
January, 2013
302 Quasi rent is defined as the investment expected cash flow that the stakeholder will 
not be able to recover if he/she abandons the operation. 
303M.  A.  Abdala&  P.  T.  Spiller,‘Damage  Valuation  of  Indirect  Expropriation  in 
International Arbitration Cases’, 14 Am. Revs. Int'l Arb. (2003) 449
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interview responses, a recent survey on expropriation and literature that, currently, the 
risk energy investors most widely regard with unease is indirect expropriation.
 In  light  of  these  findings,  this  chapter  explores  indirect  expropriation  and 
attempts to define exactly what constitutes indirect expropriation and what measures 
can be utilised by foreign investors to counteract the threat of indirect expropriation. 
The chapter also examines the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) of Azerbaijan and 
Turkey  and  conducts  a  comparative  analysis  of  whether  their  treaty  provisions  are 
current enough to define indirect expropriation.
1.1     An Overview of Indirect Expropriation
‘An indirect form of expropriation in which a government measure, although not 
on its face affecting a transfer of property, results in the foreign investor being deprived 
of its property or its benefits.’ 305 In other words, while indirect expropriation does not 
technically undermine the investment title of the alien investors it however considerably 
diminishes that foreign investor’s ability to run their business activities freely or reduces 
the  benefit  that  they  expect  to  obtain  from  the  investment.  When  does  indirect 
expropriation occur? Broadly, indirect expropriation occurs ‘through interference by a 
state in the use of that property or with the enjoyment of the benefits even where the 
property is not seized and the legal title to the property is not affected’306 what is the 
approach of BITS and MITs to indirect expropriation phenomena? In general, all BITs 
and MITs provide articles which refer to expropriation. 
Evidently,  The North American Free Trade Agreement  (NAFTA),  Article  1110 
supplies  that  ‘  no  party  may  directly  or  indirectly  nationalise  or  expropriate  an 
investment of an investor of another party in its territory or take a measure tantamount 
to  nationalisation  or  expropriation  of  such an  investment.’307 In  a  similar  way,  The 
Energy Charter Treaty under Article 13 precludes host states from taking any measures 
‘having  effect  equivalent  to  nationalisation  or  expropriation.’308 This  is  clearly  a 
reference to indirect expropriation. Further references can be found abundantly in BITs 
and  the  academic  literature.  In  academic  literature,  indirect  expropriation  is 
interchangeably  referred  to  as  ‘de  facto’,  under  the  guise  of,  ‘wealth  deprivation’, 
‘constructive’,  ‘regulatory’,  ‘consequential  or  creeping  expropriation’.  Modern  BITs 
304 L.  Fortier  & S.  L.  Drymer,  ‘Indirect  Expropriation in  the Law of  International 
Investment: I Know it When I See It’, ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 
19, no. 2 (2004) 293-294 
305 A. Newcombe& L. Paradell, Law and Practise of Investment Treaties: Standards of  
Treatment., (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2009), 323
306C. Yannaca – Small, ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate in 
International Investment Law’, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, (2004)  3-4  available at: 
<http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/33776546.pdf> 
January 2013
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generally ‘…refer  to direct  and indirect  expropriation and measures  ‘tantamount’ or 
‘equivalent’ to expropriation’. 
However, it  should be noted that investment treaties steer clear of providing a 
definition of what exactly indirect expropriation is. Instead of simply defining indirect 
expropriation, they prefer to employ the aforementioned terms as given to understand 
indirect expropriation.309 This begs the question as to how exactly the identification of 
indirect expropriation is to be made. The classification of host government measures 
ought to be determined via a case by case examination of the precise facts.310 It is true 
that in the Fieldman case, the NAFTA tribunal provided ‘that each determination under 
Article 1110 is necessarily fact specific.’ This case by case approach is also supported 
by  the  modern  BITs.  For  instance,  the  2004  Canada  BIT  model  stated  that  ‘The 
determination  of  whether  a  measure  or  series  of  measures  of  a  Party constitute  an 
indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based…’311
2.    Distinguishing between Direct and Indirect Expropriation
In the context of direct expropriation, the government measure aims to transfer the 
legal rights of an alien investor’s ownership to the host country or to the benefit of a 
third person by applying a sovereign law system.312 Thus, ‘the taking can be readily 
307 NAFTA agreements come into force, on the first of January in 1994, reprinted in 32 
ILM 289  and  605  (1993).   It  is  significant  to  cite  the  dispute  settlement  between 
investor and state under NAFTA Chapter 11. NAFTA Chapter 11 actions can be brought 
not only by investors party to the NAFTA agreement, but actions can also be brought by 
any company in one of the NAFTA countries. For instance, Sony, United States, as an 
alien investor could bring a chapter 11 case against the United States.  Cited in, G. C. 
Hufbauer  &  J.  J.  Schott,  NAFTA  Revisited:  Achievements  and  Challenges,  (U.S, 
Institute For International Economics: 2005) 206.
308 ECT is a significant instrument for the promotion of international cooperation in the 
energy industry. ECT was signed in December 1994 and entered into force on 16 April 
1998.  The Article 13 of the Agreement can be found from the official website of the 
organisation;  <http://www.encharter.org> January, 2013
309 J.W.  Salacuse,  The Law Of Investment  Treaties,  (New York,  Oxford University 
Press: 2009) 150
310 A. Reinnisch,  ‘the Legality of Expropriation’,  Chapter 11 in P.  Muchlinski& F. 
Ortino and C. Schreuer, The Oxford Hand Book of International Investment law, (New 
York, Oxford University Press: 2008) 438
311 Please see Canadian 2004 Model BIT, Annex B 13(1)
312 A.W.  Rovine,  Contemporary  Issues  in  International  Arbitration and Mediation, 
(The Netherland, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 2007)35; see also M. Sornarajah,  The 
International Law on Foreign Investment, (Cambridge: Grotius Publications: 1994) 282.
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discerned by examining the  lex situs313 of that property’.  314 However, in the case of 
indirect expropriation, the property rights of the investor are violated in a more subtle 
way than occurs in a case of direct expropriation. The significant divergence in indirect 
expropriation is that a host government measure may, in essence, have the same impact 
on  the  property  interests  of  the  international  investor,  as  a  direct  taking.315More 
importantly, even though the government measure does not dispute, alter or affect the 
legal title of the property, its revenue producing potential is dramatically reduced by the 
acts  attributable  to  the  host  state.316 In  other  words,  ‘the  state  measure  focuses  on 
creating a  negative impact  on the alien investor’s  property interests,  while  avoiding 
engaging in the more explicit act of physically taking the property’317. 
Moreover,  what  is  the  basic  foundation  of  the  investor’s  property interest?  A 
commercial interpretation of the property interests of an alien investor to compensation 
for expropriation (indirect)  is  upheld in some cases;  such as  Pope& Talbot and  SD 
Myers318and is also supported by scholars in legal literature. According to Wealde and 
Kolo ‘The key function of property is less the tangibility of ‘things’,  but rather the 
capability of the combination of rights in a  commercial  and corporative setting and 
under  a  regulatory regime  to earn  a  commercial  rate  of  return.’319After  providing a 
313Lex Situs means law of the place where the property is located. Please see B.A. 
Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, 2nd edn., ( New York, Oxford University 
Press: 1995) 526
314  J. Paulsson & Z. Douglas, Indirect Expropriation in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
in  N. Horn & S. Kroll,  Arbitrating Foreign Investment  Disputes,  (The Netherlands, 
Kluwer International Law: 2004) 151
315 A.W. Rovine, (n.13 above) 39
316 J. Paulsson & Z. Douglas (n.15 above)152; Please see also the tribunal’s standing in 
the case of  Compañía Del  Desarrollo De Santa Elena,  S.A.  VS.  Costa Rica,  Final 
Award (ICSID Case No.ARB/96/1, Feb. 17, 2000), 15  ICSID Revs. FILJ  (2000) 457, 
section 77, available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/santaelena_award.pdf> 
January 2013.  The tribunal asserted in this case that  ‘there is ample authority for the 
proposition that a property has been expropriated when the effect of the measures taken 
by the state has been to deprive the owner of title, possession or access to the benefit  
and economic use of his property' 
317 Interview no. 20 with Foreign Trade Expert, 26 November 2012
318  A. Kawharu, Property Rights and Sustainability:The Evolution of Property Rights  
to Meet Ecological Challenges,  edited D. Grinlinton and P. Taylor (The Netherland, 
MartinusNijhoff Publishers: 2011) 350
319 T. W. Waelde & A. Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and 
“Regulatory  Taking”  in  International  Law’,  International  and  Comparative  Law 
Quarterly 50 (2001) 835
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definition of the modern understanding of property, can it be asserted that any measures 
taken by a host state are subject to compensation claims?
According to a widely recognised international principle, ‘… A state is not liable 
for  economic  injury  which  is  a  consequence  of  bona  fide  ‘regulation’ within  the 
accepted police power of state.’320 The identification of host government acts of direct 
expropriation is reasonably straightforward, as compared to indirect taking. In addition, 
expropriation or nationalisation is normally performed on a given date and on the basis 
of an explicit national policy.321 However, the determination of indirect expropriation is 
more complex,  thus  a  host  state  act  cannot  easily be held  to  account.  Furthermore, 
indirect expropriations frequently are upheld ‘…under the guise of a policy in which the 
deprivation  of  the  owner’s  property  is  not  an  explicit  purpose,  and  they  do  not 
necessarily have a clear date when it can be said that the owners have been deprived of 
their title to the expropriated property.’322
As  mentioned  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  direct  expropriation  of  an  alien 
investor’s property can take various forms, ranging from the outright nationalisation of 
all economic sectors of an industry as a part of a host state’s economic policy to the  
specific taking of a private property under the terms of a legislative or administrative 
act.323 Indirect expropriation includes creeping and regulatory expropriation. It should 
be  noted  that  distinguishing  these  two forms  is  fraught  with  complication.324Unlike 
straightforward expropriation, indirect expropriation manifests itself through the impact 
of  laws  and  regulations  that  subject  the  alien  investor  to  discriminatory  taxes, 
legislation, impinge on control of business management and enforce the cancellation of 
licences and permits among other side effects.325
320Sedco Inc. vs. National Iranian Oil Co.,   Interlocutory Award 9 Iran-U.S Cl. Trib. 
Rep.248,275(1985); see also J.M. Wagner, ‘International Investment, Expropriation and 
Environmental Protection’, Golden Gate U.L. Rev 29(1999) 517
321 Please see, World Investment Report, FDI Policies for Development: National and 
International Perspectives, (New York, Geneva, United Nations Publication: 2003) 111, 
available at: <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//wir2003_en.pdf> January 2013
322 ibid
323 OECD,  Private  Sector Development  and in the Middle East  and North Africa:  
Supporting Investment Policy and Governance in Iraq, (OECD Publication: 2010) 67
324 M.  Sornarajah,  The  Pursuit  of  Nationalised  Property (The  Netherland,  Kluwer 
Academic Publishers:: 1986) 278–294 Cited in World Investment Report (n.22 above) 
111
325 R.  Schaffer,  F.  Agusti  and  B.  Earler,  International  Business  Law  and  its  
Environment, 7th edn, ( The U.S , South Western Cengage Learning: 2009) 611
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The measures taken by a host government should be considered with a fact-based 
determination as  to  ‘whether  the sovereign state  has engaged in a  taking or merely 
exercised its right to regulate industry’.326  The creeping and regulatory expropriations 
which  constitute  indirect  expropriation  are  subject  to  compensation  as  far  as 
comprehensive  literature  and  arbitral  awards  report.  However,  one  must  take  into 
account  that  the  right  to  compensation  for  indirect  expropriation  is  riddled  with 
paradox.327 In  general,  most  sovereign  states  avoid  paying  compensation  to  alien 
investors  for  the  impact  of  regulatory  alterations  ‘…  resulting  from  legislative, 
executive and judicial decisions, although such changes may cause losses as or more 
severe  than  outright  expropriation.’328 In  light  of  this  overview of  the  subject,  it  is 
opportune to discuss exactly what constitutes indirect expropriation.
3.     The Types of Host state Measures May Constitute Indirect 
Expropriation
The  question  of  which  measures  taken  by  a  host  state  constitute  indirect 
expropriation under international law is a complex one. The subject matter has not yet 
been given a definitive delineation either by international tribunals or legal scholars. A 
number of examples can be listed of the measures which may be taken by a host state 
over  the  course  of  an  investment  project,  however,  the  determination  of  which 
regulatory measure is non-compensable and which one is remains vague. It is true that 
not all state measures interfering with property are regarded to constitute expropriation 
under international law. 
With regard to state measures, Brownlie has asserted that ‘state measures, prima 
facie329 a  lawful  exercise  of  powers  of  governments,  may  affect  foreign  interest 
considerably without amounting to expropriation. Thus, foreign assets and their use may 
be subjected to taxation, trade restrictions involving licences and quotas or measures of 
devaluation. While special facts may alter the interpretation of cases, in principle, such 
measures are not unlawful and do not constitute expropriation.’330  By highlighting such 
examples, the author touches on the police power notion. Although the notion will be 
examined separately, it  is also worth mentioning briefly how it is addressed in legal 
discourse. 
326 Ibid
327 A. Newcombe, ‘Regulatory Expropriation, Investment Protection and International 
Law: When Is Government Regulation Expropriatory and When Compensation Should 
Be Paid?’ LLM Master Thesis, University of Toronto (1999) 8
328 Ibid.
329 The definition of prima facie is at first sight; as it seems at first.
330 I. Brownlie, Principle of Public International Law, 6th Edn. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 2003) 509
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Police power notion has been identified in several conventions and case law has 
recognised the criteria of non-compensable takings in the context of police power. For 
instance, the first protocol of The European Convention of Human Rights deemed the 
regulatory measures taken by governments as non-compensable. In fact, while Article 1 
of the convention states that: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of its possessions. No one should be deprived of his possessions except in 
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by the law and by the 
general  principles  of  international  law.’  It  also goes  on to  state  that  the  preceding 
provisions shall not, however, in any case impair  the right of a state to enforce such  
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general  
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties’ (Italic 
added).331 In the light of the above given quotation it is fair to conclude that Article 1 of 
the protocol, specifically references the police power notion.
  Similarly, the  Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of 
States  for  Injuries  to  Aliens  provides  that:  ‘An  uncompensated  taking  of  an  alien 
property or deprivation of the use or enjoyment of the property of an alien which results 
from the execution of laws; from a general change in the value of currency; from the 
action of  the competent  authorities of  the State  in  the maintenance of public  order, 
health, morality; or from the valid exercise of belligerent rights or otherwise incidental 
to the normal operation of the laws of the State shall not be considered wrongful’.332 The 
given provision has also found a place in the Saluka Investment case. 
The  arbitral  panel  said  that  the  above  quoted  passage  in  the  Harvard  Draft 
Convention is subject to four important exceptions:  
(a)  It  is  not  a  clear  and  discriminatory violation  of  the  law of  the  State 
concerned;
(b) It is not the result of a violation of any provision of Articles 6 to 8 [of the  
Draft Convention];
(c)  It  is  not  an  unreasonable  departure  from  the  principles  of  justice 
recognised by the principal legal systems of the world;
(d) It is not an abuse of the powers specified in this paragraph for the purpose 
of depriving an alien of his property333
331 Please see the First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Paris, (March 20, 1952), cited in Human Rights Review 
2012, available at: 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/humanrights/hrr_firstprotocol.pdf
> February 2013
332Saluka Investment BV (Netherlands). vs. The Czech Republic ( A partial Award) of 2 
March 2006, para, 256 available at: <http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?
pag_id=1149> December 2012 
333 Ibid, para, 257
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The tribunal proceeded to conclude that ‘these exceptions do not,  in any way, 
weaken the principle that certain takings or deprivations are non-compensable. They 
merely remind the legislator or, indeed, the adjudicator, that the so-called ‘police power 
exception’ is  not  absolute’.334 Moreover,  the  1967  OECD Draft  Convention  on  the 
Protection of Foreign Property also recognises the police power notion in the following 
statement: ‘…measures taken in the pursuit of a State’s ‘political, social or economic 
ends’ do  not  constitute  compensable  expropriation.’335 As  previously  mentioned,  a 
similar contribution was also provided in the United States Third Restatement of The 
Law of Foreign Relations.336
State measures are not exhaustive, a number of state measures can be exemplified, 
however, in practice the following measures are the most frequently applied by host 
governments: excessive or discriminatory taxation,337 interference of contract rights,338 
interference with management rights339 revocations of licence or denial of government 
permits.340
3.1   Excessive or discriminatory taxation
334 Ibid, para, 258
335 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, (12 October 1967), 
71 ILM 117
336 Restatement of Third of Foreign Relations Law of United States vol.  1 (1987), 
section  712  comment  (g).  According  to  Restatement  of  Third  of  Foreign  Relations 
Law’s section 712‘A state is not responsible loss of property or for other economic 
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, 
or other action of the kind that is common accepted as within the police power of states,  
if it is not discriminatory…’ 
337  Please  see  the  case  of  Revere  Copper  and  Brass  Inc.  VS.  Overseas  Private  
Investment Corporation, 24 August 1978, 56 ILR 268
338 Please  see  CME  Czech  Republic  BV  VS.  Czech  Republic (Partial  Award)  13 
September 2001 
339 Please see  Starrett Housing Corp. vs. Iran, 19 Dec. 1983, 4 Iran-US CTR 122: 
Tippetts, Abbett, MacCarty, Stratton vs. TAMS-AFFAConsulting Engineers of Iran, 22 
June 1984, 6 Iran-IS CTR 219; PSEG Global, Inc. et al vs. Republic of Turkey (ICSID 
Case No: ARB/02/5), (2007), Award 19 January 2007
340 See Goetz and Others vs. Republic of Burundi, 2 September 1998, 6 ICSID Reports 
5, Middle East Cement  Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. vs. Arab Republic of Egypt, 12 
April 2002, 7 ICSID Reports 178; Metalclad Corporation vs. United Mexican States, 30 
August 2000, ICSID Reports 209
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Host states may use their power to impose taxes as a means to limit and curtail the 
business activities of alien investors within their territory. To this end, it can be said that 
the freedom to regulate tax is a sovereign right and cannot be subject to any limitation 
or restriction. Indeed, there is no rule or restriction imposed or recommended on this 
measure  by  international  law341.  However,  ‘while  taxation  is  onerous,  it  may  be  a 
legitimate means of raising public revenue, it is possible for taxes to be so high that they 
are confiscatory and thereby constitute expropriation.’342 Disproportionate tax increases 
or  discriminative  or  abusive  taxation  in  the  petroleum  industry  are  not  new 
phenomena.343 Furthermore,  excessive  or  repetitive  tax  measures  are  instruments 
frequently  applied  by  a  variety  of  state  authorities,  with  government  conspiracy,344 
‘under cover of what appears on the surface, and at first sight, to formally be the proper 
application of tax audit, tax assessment, and tax collection procedures.’345
The Yukos case346 is a good example of this practice; however, it is also the most 
dramatic case to have occurred in recent years. In the Yukos case, the Russian Federal 
Government required the tax authorities to carry out a re-assessment of the tax returns 
from the Yukos Company, which is privately owned. After the re-assessment, penalties 
and interest charges amounting to 100% of total sales were imposed on the company by 
the Russian tax authorities and were collected over a three year period. As a result of 
these penalties and charges, the company was economically and legally crippled and fell 
victim  to  bankruptcy.  Numerous  claims  were  brought  by  the  shareholders  of  the 
company,  through  the  Energy  Charter  Treaty  (ECT)  dispute  settlement  process; 
however, the case is still pending.347  As mentioned above, this is not the first example 
of an excessive tax regime to be recorded, when the ICSID agenda is examined, it will  
be evident that there are several cases relevant to this subject.348
341 M.  Sornarajah.,   The  International  Law  on  Foreign  Investment,  3rd edn, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 405
342 J. W. Salacuse (n.10 above) 301
343 T.  Waelde,  ‘International  Law  of  Foreign  Investment:  Towards  Regulation  by 
Multilateral Treaties’ CEPMLP Research Paper CP1/2000, University of Dundee, 19.
344 M.  Sornarajah,  International  Law  on  Foreign  Direct  Investment,  2nd edn. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2004)393
345 M. Sornarajah (n. 45 above) 342
346Yukos  Universal  Limited  (Isle  of  Man)  vs.  The  Russian  Federation, PCA Case 
No AA 227, UNCITRAL
347  For further information  about the Yukos case, please see also P. D. Cameron, 
International Energy Investment Law: The Pursuit of Stability, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press : 2010) 189
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Furthermore, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, oil and gas prices have 
soared dramatically over recent years. The increase of price in the petroleum industry 
spurred petroleum producing states on to introduce new taxes for the petroleum sector 
or increase pre-existing tax rates. In the interests of obtaining a larger share of the cake, 
or as a result of resource nationalism, some host states in Latin America have frequently 
indulged in tax-hiking measures. The Venezuelan Hydrocarbons Law349 best illustrates 
this tactic.  
The  late  president  of  Venezuela,  Hugo  Chavez,  announced  radical  new 
government measures with regard to hydrocarbon law and imposed a new tax regime 
specifically directed at the petroleum industry.350 The government measures were served 
as an ultimatum to western petroleum companies i.e. ‘pay up or get out’. In accordance 
with the new tax regime all alien oil and gas companies had to pay ‘income tax at rate of 
50% instead of the previous “preferential rate” of 34%.’351 There is no doubt that the 
sudden  enforcement  of  such tax  reforms  had a  major  impact  on  international  alien 
petroleum companies in Venezuela.
3.2     Interference in contract rights
Governments can take action for reasons of public policy; however such reasons 
should not alter or adversely affect the contractual rights of investors. In other words, a 
state measure should not prevent an alien investor from benefitting from the contractual 
arrangements  they  originally  entered  into.352 As  mentioned  in  the  previous  chapter, 
international  customary  law  protects  an  alien  investor’s  contractual  rights  against 
348 Please see the following cases regarding taxation; Revere Copper and Brass Inc. vs.  
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 24 August 1978, 56 ILR 268 ; Sedco, Inc. vs.  
National Iranian Oil Co., Interlocutory Award 9 Iran-US C1. Trib. Rep. (1985); Philips 
Petroleum Co., Iran vs. Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 Iran-US C1. Trib.Rep.79
349Decreto  con  Fuerza  de  Ley  Organica  de  Hidracarburos  (Decree  with  Force  of 
Organic Law of Hydrocarbons), Decree No. 1,510, 2 Nov., 2001, Official Gazette No. 
37, 323 
350Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, ‘Venezuela: Proposed Measures Against Oil and 
Gas Investors’, (May 2005) 1 also available at: 
<http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/Venezuela%20-
%20proposed%20measures%20against%20oil%20and%20gas%20investors.pdf> 
March 2013
351 Ibid.
352 S. Ripinskyi& K. Williams, ‘Damages in International Investment Law’ , (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008) 9
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expropriation.  Similarly,  investment  treaties  include  expropriation  provisions  which 
protect  alien  investors’  contractual  rights  against  any  type  of  expropriation. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that investment treaties, must be examined on a case by 
case basis to determine whether the investment treaty embodies contract rights under the 
treaty’s definition of investment.353  As mentioned above, the violation of a contract may 
lead to the loss of the contractual  rights  of an investor  and deprive him/her  of any 
benefit  issuing from the investment.  To this  end,  a significant  question ought  to  be 
asked: does every violation of contract amount to indirect expropriation? This is not the 
case, even if contractual rights are breached354. There are various tribunal decisions that 
prove that not every instance of state interference in contractual rights is deemed to 
amount  to  indirect  expropriation.  For  instance,  in  the  NAFTA  case  of  Waste 
Management  Inc.  vs.  United  Mexican States,  the  tribunal  distinguished between the 
cautious expropriation of a right under a contract and non-compliance by the state with 
its contractual commitments:
The mere non-performance of contractual  obligations is not to be equated 
with a taking of property, nor (unless accompanied by the other elements) is 
it  tantamount  to  expropriation.  Any private  party  can  fail  to  perform its 
contracts,  whereas  nationalization  and  expropriation  are  inherently  a 
governmental act.355
A comparable  decision  was  upheld  by  the  tribunal  in  the  ICSID  case  of 
Parkerings-Compagniet As vs. Lithuania. On consideration of this case a cumulative 
condition is required by the tribunal in order to deem that the contractual rights are 
expropriated by the state interference. These cumulative conditions are as follows
First, a breach of an agreement will amount to an expropriation only if the 
State acted not only in its capacity of party to the agreement, but also in its 
capacity  of  sovereign  authority,  that  is  to  say  using  its  sovereign  power. 
Second, a breach of contract,  of there should be one is,  itself,  not always 
sufficient to amount to an indirect expropriation within the meaning of the 
BIT. An investor faced with a breach of an agreement by the State counter-
party should, as a general  rule,  sue that party in the appropriate forum to 
remedy  the  breach.  Third,  the  breach  of  the  Agreement,  in  case  the 
termination of the agreement, must give rise to a substantial decrease of the 
value of the investment.356
As Parkerings-Compagniet had not met the conditions required by the tribunal, 
the company’s claim regarding the expropriation of contractual rights was rejected.
353  Ibid
354 J. W. Salacuse (n.10 above) 304
355Waste Management Inc. vs. United Mexican States (Waste Management II)  ICSID 
Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3 NAFTA Award 30 April, 2004 
356Parkerings-Compagniet  As  vs.  Lithuania,  ICSID  Case  No  ARB/05/08   Award 
September (2007) paras 443-456
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3.3    Interference with management rights
The exercise of management control over an investment is a significant right of an 
alien investor. If an alien investor’s actual control over its own management is removed, 
thereby  causing  disruption  to  its  commercial  activities  due  to  governmental 
intervention, then this unlawful state interference can be deemed indirect expropriation. 
When can such a situation emerge and in what way does such a government action 
affect the investor?  As mentioned above, this governmental action eliminates the actual 
management control of the investor ‘…by either physically and/or legally impeding the 
investor to continue his or her management tasks or by replacing the investor-controlled 
management by government appointed-management.’357  The direct effects this can have 
include temporary losses in business revenues, potential delays to scheduled projects 
and a number of other knock-on effects to business planning, staff morale and so on not 
to mention the taking of an international company. How can this occur? For instance, a 
host government may arrest or deport the alien investor or other persons who are in 
charge of the business activities of the company. 
The  Biloune vs. Ghana case illustrates this point. Mr Biloune, a Syrian national 
established  a  company of  which  he  was  a  60% shareholder.  The  company held  an 
agreement  with  their  Ghanaian  partners  to  build  a  hotel  resort  complex.  After  a 
substantial part of its construction had been completed, business activities were halted 
and the construction demolished by decision of the government authorities. Afterwards, 
Mr Biloune was arrested and expelled from the country. This was a clear-cut case of 
expropriation. The Tribunal stated that:
The conjunction of the stop work order, the demolition, the summons,  the 
arrest, the detention, the requirement of filing assets declaration forms, and 
the deportation of Mr Biloune without possibility of re-entry had the effect of 
causing the irreparable cessation of work on the project. Given the central 
role  of  Mr  Biloune  in  promoting,  financing  and  managing  MDCL,  his 
expulsion from the country  effectively prevented MDCL from pursuing the 
project. In the view of the Tribunal, such prevention of MDLC from pursuing 
its approved the project would  constitute constructive expropriation (italic  
added)  of  MDCL’s  contractual  rights  in  the  project  and,  accordingly,  the 
expropriation of  the  value  of  Mr Biloune’s  interest  in  MDCL,  unless  the 
respondents can establish by persuasive evidence sufficient justifications for 
these events. 358
357 A.  Reinnisch,  (n.11above)  453;  see  also  M.  Sornarajah  (n.42  above)  400;  J.W. 
Salacuse (n.10 above) 304 
358Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd.  vs.  Ghana Investments  Centre and the  
Government  of  Ghana,  UNCITRAL  ad  hoc  Tribunal,  Award  on  Jurisdiction  and 
Liability, 27 October 1989, 95 ILR183, 209 ( italic added)
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   As there was no strong evidence found to support the Government of Ghana’s 
actions, the tribunal concluded its statement with the following words: ‘the Government 
of  Ghana,  by  its  act  and  omission,  culminating  with  Mr  Biloune’s  deportation, 
constructively expropriated MDCL’s assets, and Mr Biloune’s interest therein.’
3.4    Revocations of licence or denial of government permits
The  cancellation  of  permits  and  licences  of  foreign  investors  is  regarded  as 
regulatory taking. If such a regulatory taking is made without due process of law, which 
is one of the main criteria of lawful taking, then this taking becomes discriminatory and 
could amount to a compensable taking. Indirect expropriation and, generally speaking, 
granting  licences  and  permits  to  foreign  investors  are  privileges  that  arise  from an 
agreement. If an alien investor’s licence or permits are cancelled, one can categorically 
affirm that the said alien investors’ business activities will be unfavourably affected. It is 
worth mentioning here that  generally,  modern investment  treaties provide protection 
against a cancellation of licences and permits.359The Goetz case best illustrates the issue 
of the cancellation of licences or permits. In the  Goetz case, Goetz’s free zone status 
was cancelled by Burundi, without any formal taking of property. The ICSID tribunal 
held that ‘the government’s action fell within the concept of measures having the effect 
of  being  similar  to  expropriation,  i.e.,  they  constituted  a  direct  expropriation’360. 
Although the award, decision and the confines of international arbitral tribunals will be 
analysed in detail and their contribution to answering the question of what constitutes 
indirect expropriation will be discussed in the following sections; however, it would be 
appropriate to mention briefly the environmentally motivated cancellation of licences 
and permits. 
         The revocation of licences on environmental grounds is a growing occurrence. In 
order to protect the environment, sovereign states prefer to cancel investor’s licences or 
permits. Although such revocation of licences finalise the foreign investment, they are 
not usually held to be a compensable taking.361 In the case,  Murphyores Ltd vs. The 
Commonwealth,362 a concession right was provided by the Australian government to two 
American companies for sand-mining on Fraser Island, close to the Great Barrier Reef. 
Shortly after the start of the operation, an environmental study was conducted in the 
area  which  found that  sand mining jeopardised  the  ecological  balance  of  the  Great 
Barrier  Reef  and  recommended  that  all  operations  should  urgently  be  halted.  The 
Australian government revoked all the licences it had previously granted and terminated 
all sand mining activities. In the ensuing case, the Australian High court ruled that the 
actions  of  the  Australian  government  did  not  constitute  a  compensable  taking;  and 
consequently any related compensation claims were rejected.
359 For instance, US 2004 BIT model.
360Goetz vs. Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3 at 26
361 M. Sornarajah (n.42 above) 403
362See Murphyores Ltd vs. The Commonwealth (1976) 16 CLR 1
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An issue that  causes  great  concern among alien investors  is  the possibility of 
facing unexpected regulatory or administrative actions with the aim of environmental 
protection after the contract is signed.363  At this point two significant factors should be 
evaluated. First, whether the new environmental regulations in the administrative law 
system have discriminatory intent, or are designed to attain other ends other than those 
they purport to.364 It is also necessary to pose the question: can the host state cancel the 
licences  and  permits  of  alien  investors  on  environmental  grounds?  According  to 
Sornarajah ‘the cancellation is usually a punitive measure for not abiding by the purpose 
behind the regulation or conditions to which the licence is subject.’365
What then is the real purpose of host governments in such cases? Perhaps, the 
actual purpose is to force the investor out and give them no other option but to sell the 
investment to the host state. If this is the case, the actions of the host state are unlawful;  
this  deliberate  regulatory  action  ‘…constitutes  indirect  expropriation  and  requires 
compensation…’ 366 The second possibility is that the administrative system of the host 
state imposes new environmental regulations in order to protect the environment and/or 
the health  of its  citizens and,  in order to do so,  resorts  to revoking the licence and 
permits  of  investor.  Can  a  regulatory  action  of  this  kind  be  deemed  indirect 
expropriation?  The simple answer is ‘no’, a measure thus motivated would be classed 
as  legitimate  police  power  regulation.  In  the  Sedco case  the  international  tribunal 
asserted that it is ‘an accepted principle of international law that a State is not liable for 
economic injury which is a consequence of  bona fide ‘regulation’ within the accepted 
police power of states.’367
4.     Criteria for Distinction between Legitimate Regulation (Non-
Compensable Regulation) and Indirect Expropriation
In section three,  it  was  stated that  while  some state  measures  may amount  to 
indirect expropriation and therefore warrant the payment of compensation is due, other 
types of state interference may not constitute indirect expropriation, as they are simply 
examples of the host state exercising its sovereign right to regulate. This prompts the 
question:   in  what  respects  can  legitimate  regulation  be  distinguished from indirect 
expropriation? Unfortunately this question is at the heart of an unresolved issue on the 
363 G.  Verhoosel,  ‘Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  Legal  Constrains  on  Domestic 
Environmental Policies: Striking a Reasonable Balance between Stability and Change’, 
Law &Pol’y Int’1 Bus. 29 (1998):451-478
364 For  instance,  governments  may  impose  some  restrictions  on  investors  or 
cancellations of licence and permits of investors make them to sell the investment.
365 M. Sornarajah (n.42 above) 402
366 J.M. Wagner, (n. 21 above) 418
367Sedco Inc. v National Iranian Oil Co.,  Interlocutory Award 9 Iran-U.S Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 248 , 275 (1985)
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agenda  of  international  investment  law.  More  importantly,  although  international 
investment tribunals and legal scholars are not necessarily at loggerheads, they have 
nonetheless  failed  to  provide  ‘…a  definitive  test  establishing  when  measures 
attributable to the host state breach the dividing line between legitimate regulation and 
compensable  indirect  expropriation.’368 As  mentioned  above,  making  an  exact 
distinction is not always straightforward, as there is no formula available to determine 
the boundaries between legitimate regulation and indirect expropriation.369 This is due to 
the fact that host government measures are broad in scope and do not neatly fit into 
contractual formulae370. 
The case of  Generation Ukraine,  Inc.  vs. Ukraine exemplifies the difficulty in 
distinguishing between non-compensable regulation and indirect expropriation:
Predictability is one of the most important objectives of any legal system. It  
would be  useful  if  it  were absolutely clear  in  advance whether  particular 
events  fall  within  the  definition  of  an  “indirect”  expropriation.  It  would 
enhance  the  sentiment  of  respect  for  legitimate  expectations  if  it  were 
perfectly obvious  why,  in  the  context  of  a  particular  decision;  an  arbitral 
tribunal found that a governmental action or inaction crossed the line that 
defines acts amounting to an indirect expropriation. But there is no checklist, 
no mechanical test to achieve that purpose. The decisive considerations vary 
from case to case, depending not only on the specific facts of a grievance but 
also on the way the evidence is presented, and the legal bases pleaded. The 
outcome is a judgment, i.e. the product of discernment, and not the printout 
of a computer programme.371
Over the years, many scholars and arbitral tribunals have attempted to provide a 
watertight definition for the sort of interference that may be said to constitute indirect 
expropriation.  Professor  Christie  furnished perhaps  the  most  articulate  description. 
According to the author:
it is evident that the question of what kind of interference short of outright 
expropriation  constitutes  a  ‘taking’  under  international  law  presents  a 
situation where the common law method of case by case development is pre-
368 Z.A.  Al  Qurashi,  ‘  Investment  Protection  under  International  Petroleum 
Agreements: an Analysis of Pertinent Arbitral Jurisprudence’ , PhD Thesis, University 
of Dundee (2004) 145-146
369 J. Paulsson & Z. Douglas (n.15 above) 145
370 J. Paulsson & Z. Douglas (n.15 above) 146
371Generation  Ukraine,  Inc.  vs.  Ukraine,  ICSID Case  No  ARB/00/9,  Award of  16 
September 2003, ILM 44 (2005): 404, para. 20.29
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eminent  the  best  method,  in  fact  probably   the  only  method,  of  legal 
developments.372
 In  order  to  draw an  accurate  division  between  legitimate  non-compensable 
regulations and indirect expropriation requiring compensation, arbitral tribunals have 
thus far distinguished the two phenomena with reference to the following criteria: i) 
the degree of interference with the alien investor’s property right ii) the purpose and 
context of the state measure,  iii)  the legitimate expectation of the investor and iv) 
proportionality. 
4.1    The Degree of Interference with Investor’s Property Rights
The approach which entails an assessment of the degree of interference with an 
investor’s  property  rights  is  commonly  consulted  by  arbitral  tribunals  and  legal 
academic literature. This has become known as ‘sole effect’ doctrine. The determining 
element  of  whether  an  indirect  expropriation  has  taken  place,  according  to  this 
assessment, is solely as a result of the effect of the governmental regulatory measure 
on the investment373. More fundamentally,  sole effect doctrine disregards the purpose 
of the government’s regulatory measure – the main consideration of this doctrine is the 
severity of the economic impact of the measures on the investment and the duration of 
host government control374.
4.1.1 Severe economic impact and loss of effective control
When the outcomes of international tribunals are compared, it can be surmised 
that  they  generally  treat  the  severity  of  the  economic  impact  incurred  by  a  host 
governmental regulatory action as an imperative principle in determining whether the 
measure taken by the government constitutes an indirect expropriation and is subject to 
compensation or not. International tribunals have frequently rejected the compensation 
demands of investors, as the measure taken by the host state was not substantial and/or 
did not deprive investors all or most of the economic benefits that they expect from the 
investment375. The CMS vs. Argentina tribunal is a good case in point. CMS, a US based 
372 G.C. Christie, ‘What constitutes a Taking of property Under International Law?’, 
Brit. Y.B. Int.1 L. 38 (1962) 307-338
373 M.  Solanes  &  A.  Jouravlev,  Revisiting  Privatization,  Foreign  investment, 
International  Arbitration,  and  Water,(Santiago,  Chile,  United  Nations:  2007)  60 
available  at:  <http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/0/32120/lcl2827e.pdf>  February, 
2013
374 P.  D.  Cameron   (n.  48  above)  223;  see  also  M.  Erkan,  International  Energy 
Investment Law,  Stability through Contractual Clauses, (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer 
Law International: 2011)8 7; J. W. Salacuse (n.10 above) 308
375 C.  Yannaca-Small,  (n.7 above)  55;  see  also UNCTAD, Taking Property,  Series 
issues on International Investment Agreements (New York and Geneva, United Nations: 
2000) 36; See also;  Metalclad Corp. vs. United Mexican States, (ICSID Additionally 
Facility Case No. ARB (AF)/9701, 30 August, 2000, para. 13
95
transmission company, claimed that the Argentinian government’s decision to suspend a 
tariff adjustment formula for gas transportation for the duration of an economic crisis in 
the country, constituted an indirect expropriation. 
After consideration of the investor’s claim, the tribunal affirmed that ‘the essential 
question  is  to  establish  whether  the  enjoyment  of  the  property has  been effectively 
neutralised’ as ‘ the standard… where indirect expropriation has been contended is that 
of substantial deprivation’.376 In this case, even though the tribunal recognised that the 
measure taken by the government provoked a dispute which impacted on the company’s 
business operations, the tribunal decreed that there was no substantial deprivation and 
hence the expropriation provision of Argentina-US BIT was not violated by Argentinean 
government.  The  tribunal  also  underlined  that  ‘the  investor  is  in  control  of  the 
investment; the government does not manage the day-to-day operations of the company; 
and the investor has full ownership and control of the investment’.377
Conversely, in the Starrett Housing Corp. vs. Iran case,the expropriation claim 
was based on the appointment of Iranian managers to an American housing project. 
The tribunal found that an indirect expropriation occurred through the appointment of 
an Iranian manager to the company operation. The tribunal held that ‘it is recognised 
by international law that measures taken by a state can interfere with property rights to 
such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to 
have been expropriated, even though the state does not purport to have expropriated 
them and the legal title to the property formally remains with the original owner.’378
Furthermore, in the Tippetts vs. TAMS-AFFA case, the Tippetts had established a 
partnership with an Iranian company before the advent of revolution in the country. In 
the wake of the revolution, the Iranian government appointed a new Iranian manager 
to  the partnership.  In  this  case,  the  tribunal  did not  regard the appointment  of  an 
Iranian manager per se as an expropriation. However, the tribunal regarded the actions 
of the manager to constitute an expropriation. The tribunal held that:
While  assumption  of  control  over  property  by  a  government  does  not 
automatically and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been 
taken by the government,  thus requiring compensation under international 
law, such a conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that  the 
owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that 
this deprivation is not merely ephemeral…379
376CMS Gas  Transmission  Company  vs.  The  Argentina  Republic,  ICSID  Case  no. 
ARB/01/8 Award (12 May, 2005) 262
377 Ibid at 263
378Starrett  Housing  Corp  vs.  Iran,  Interlocutory Award  No  ITL 32-24-1,  (Dec  19, 
1983), reprinted in 4 Iran-US CTR 122 at 154
379Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v TAMS-AFFA, Award No 141-7- 2 June 29, 
1984, reprinted in 6 Iran-US CTR 219
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A similar approach was taken by the tribunal in the case of Metalclad Corp. vs.  
United Mexican States.  Metalclad is an American waste disposal company which had 
acquired land for the development and operation of hazardous waste landfill in Mexico. 
In the said case, the Metalclad Company fulfilled all of the legal requirements defined 
by environmental  and planning  regulations  and the  project  construction  permit  was 
granted  by the  federal  government  of  Mexico.  Nevertheless,  although  the  Mexican 
federal government initially agreed to grant the permit, the municipality of Guadalcazar 
successively  overturned  this  decision.   Under  the  NAFTA Agreement,  the  severe 
economic  impact  and loss  effective  control  criteria  placed the  state’s  actions  in  the 
category of expropriation defined by article 1110.  The tribunal referenced this article in 
its award and stated that ‘… incidental interference with the use of the property which 
has  the  effect  of  depriving  the  owner  in  whole  or  significant  part,  of  the  use  or 
reasonably to be expected economic benefit of property even if not necessary to the 
obvious benefit of the state…’380 In delivering its final decision, the tribunal stated that 
the host government action deprived the company’s ability to use its property for its 
own purpose, the evidence of this deprivation sufficed to determine that expropriation 
had taken place.381
Also handled by NAFTA tribunals was the Pope & Talbot vs. Canada case, Pope 
& Talbot  is an American investor with a Canadian subsidiary that manufactured and 
exported softwood lumber from mills  in British Columbia to the United States. The 
investor claimed that Canada’s export control regime breached NAFTA Article 1110. 
The company went on to assert that the export control regime was a measure tantamount 
to expropriation because its effect deprived the investor of its ability to sell products in 
its traditional and natural market in the US. Canada refuted these assertions, and in its 
defence claimed that the implemented regulation was non-discriminatory and was an 
expression of  the  state’s  police  power and therefore  non-compensable.  The tribunal 
found that although the implementation of an export control regime did impact on the 
profits  of  Pope & Talbot,  the investor  was still  technically able  to  sell  its  products 
abroad at a profit because sales abroad were not completely prohibited as a result of the 
regulatory measure of the state.  In relation to  the Canadian contention,  the tribunal 
stated that: ‘… mere interference is not expropriation; rather, a significant degree of 
deprivation of  fundamental  rights  of  ownership is  required.’382 The  panel  concluded 
‘that  the  degree  of  interference  with  the  investment’s  operations  due  to  the  Export 
Control Regime did not rise to the level of expropriation (creeping or otherwise)’.383
380Metalclad Corp. vs. United Mexican States, (ICSID Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB (AF)/97/1), 30 August 2000, para 103
381 P. D. Cameroon  (n.48 above) 224; see also M. Erkan (n.75 above) 90 
382Pope & Talbot, Inc. vs. government of Canada, interim Award (26 June 2000) at 
para 96
383Ibid, para. 102
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Similar  elements  or  the lack thereof,  came into  play in  Marvin Roy Feldman 
Karpa (Feldman)  vs.  United Mexican States case384 in which the tribunal rejected a 
claim of indirect expropriation.  Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa,   is a US national who 
lodged a claim on behalf of the CEMSA, which is a registered alien trading company 
and  exporter  of  cigarettes  from  Mexico.  When  Mexico  subsequently  withdrew  its 
attractive tax rebate,  Feldman claimed that he was ‘no longer able to engage in his 
business  of  purchasing  Mexican  cigarettes  and  exporting  them,  and  has  thus  been 
deprived  completely  and  permanently  and  potential  economic  benefits  from  that 
particular activity’.385 As an owner of the trading company, Fieldman claimed that this 
action  of  the  Mexican  government  constituted  indirect  expropriation  and  violated 
Article 1110 of NAFTA. The tribunal found that expropriation did not occur because 
‘the  regulatory  action  has  not  deprived  the  Claimant  of  control  of  his  company, 
interfered directly in the internal operations of the company or displaced the Claimant 
as  the  controlling  shareholder…Thus,  this  tribunal  believes  there  has  been  no 
taking...’386
In  Occidental  Exploration  and  Production  Co.  (OEPC)  vs.  The  Republic  of  
Ecuador,387 Occidental claimed that the host country’s refusal to refund to Occidental 
the value added tax, to which it was entitled under Ecuadorian law, constituted indirect 
expropriation of its investment. The tribunal investigated this claim and concluded that 
there  had  been  no  indirect  expropriation.  The  tribunal  cited  the  precedent  of  the 
Metalclad  case  to  assert  that  the  measure  in  question  did  not  constitute  indirect 
expropriation since ‘the criterion of ‘substantial deprivation’ as not fulfilled, since in 
fact  there has  been no deprivation of  the use of the investment,  let  alone measures 
affecting a significant part of the investment.’388
There are a number of such cases in the archives of NAFTA and ICSID tribunals. 
One that is particularly worthy of note is the first case which is based on an indirect 
expropriation  claim  under  the  Energy  Charter  Treaty.  In  the  Nykomb  Synergetics  
Technology  AB  vs.  Latvia  case,389Nykomb  claimed  that  the  non-payment  of  double 
384Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa (CEMSA) vs. United Mexican States of Mexico (2002), 
ICSID Case No ARB (AF) 99/1, Award, IIC 157 (2002) 
385Ibid para 109
386Ibid, para. 152
387Occidental Exploration &Production Co. vs. The Republic of Ecuador, Final Award, 
LCIA Case No UN3467 of 1 July 2004, 43 ILM 1248 (2004)
388 Ibid, para 89
389Nykomb Synergetics Technology AB vs. Latvia, Award, SCC Case No 118/2001, IIC 
182 (2003), 16 December 2003.
98
tariffs  constituted  an indirect  expropriation.  The ECT tribunal  found that  regulatory 
takings may amount to expropriation or its equivalent ‘the decisive factor for an action 
to be deemed as crossing the line drawing the borderline towards expropriation must 
primarily be the degree of possession taking or control over the enterprise the disputed 
measures entail’.390 The tribunal found that in the existing case ‘there is no possession 
taking of Windau or its assets, no interference with the shareholders’ rights or with the 
management’s  control  over  and  running  of  the  enterprise  –  apart  from  ordinary 
regulatory provisions laid down in the production license the off-take agreement, etc.’391
4.1.2 Duration of Host Government Control
The section above sought to assess the scope of interference with property rights 
by posing the following questions: how much of the property is affected by the state 
measure? How much is the value of investment diminished in the light of tribunals’ 
decisions? The duration of the measure taken by the host state is another significant 
benchmark. This is crucial because the measure simply tests whether the regulations had 
a severe enough economic impact on the investor’s property rights but this may have 
been  a  relatively  short-lived  problem.392  Some  arbitral  tribunals  have  taken  into 
consideration the length of time for which the host  state exerted influence over the 
investor’s property.  In the S. D. Myers vs. Canada case, the NAFTA tribunal stated that 
‘an expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to 
make  use  of  its  economic  rights,  although  it  may  be  that,  in  some  contexts  and 
circumstances,  it  would  be  appropriate  to  view  a  deprivation  as  amounting  to  an 
expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary’.393 In the present case, the NAFTA 
tribunal disregarded the expropriation claim made regarding a temporary export ban on 
hazardous waste for disposal, as the duration of the state measure was eighteen months. 
The tribunal decreed that this was insufficient to constitute indirect expropriation. 
A parallel can be found in the case of  BG Group vs. Argentina394 The tribunal 
adjudicating in this case also came to the conclusion that no expropriation had occurred 
as the measure taken by the Republic of Argentina would not have had a permanent 
impact upon BG, and also because no substantial  deprivation was endured by BG’s 
shareholdings.395
390Ibid para 33.
391 Ibid
392 In doctrine, Professor Christie touched upon the importance of time factor in his 
article. Please see G. C. Christie (n.73 above ) 331
393S. D. Myers Inc. vs. Government of Canada, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, 40 
ILM (2001) 1408, para. 283
394BG Group Plc. vs. the Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Final Award, 
IIC 321 (2007), 24 December 2007.
395 Ibid, paras 270-271
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4.2   The Purpose Test 
The second test utilised by tribunals to determine whether indirect expropriation 
has  occurred  or  not  is  the  ‘character  of  governmental  measure’,  also  known as  the 
‘purpose approach’. ‘Proponents of this theory consider the governmental measure as a 
challenge  to  the  investor  in  a  contextual  framework that  allows,  indeed  requires,  a 
weighing and balancing of factors including the purpose as well as the effect of the 
measure.’396 In a broad sense, if the intention of a government is legitimate in that it is 
made  for  a  public  purpose  such  as  public  health,  safety,  morals  or  environmental 
protection, the measure is normally deemed a police power exercise which merits no 
compensation.397 It should be borne in mind that if governmental measures are imposed 
for public benefit, this cannot amount to indirect expropriation, unless the government 
demonstrates clear intent to deprive the alien investor. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the second chapter, while states may limit their 
sovereign  rights  by  signing  up  to  international  agreements  and  contracts;  these 
limitations should not be regarded as all-encompassing as sovereign states do retain 
their  policing  power  to  adopt  measures  to  regulate  their  economic,  financial, 
environment, human rights and other relevant interests for the public benefit.  With 
regard to the police power notion, it is fair to say that host governments are free to 
exercise their  powers  to  restrict  international  investors’ property rights  without  the 
payment of compensation in pursuance of a legitimate purpose. To this end, could it be 
claimed that such regulatory measures taken by the host state are to the detriment of 
foreign investors in realising the profit expected from their investment? The answer is 
not straightforward, because while international law recognises the police power of a 
state,  due  to  its  sovereignty,  ‘foreign  investment  law  recognises  the  concept  of 
regulatory expropriation.’398 The  implications  of  this  grey area  continue  to  present 
challenges in host government and investor relationships and for those who attempt to 
legislate and uphold the law. 
Much  attention  has  been  given  to  this  tension  in  international  tribunals  and 
several attempts have been made in tribunals to settle disputes by claiming regulatory 
expropriation.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  finding  evidence  and proving  a  state’s 
discriminatory intention is no mean feat.399 The  Sea-Land case400 best illustrates this 
difficulty. In this case, the tribunal set out the standards by which the government’s 
396 L. Fortier and S. L. Drymer (n.5 above)313; P. D. Cameron (n.48  above) 227; C. 
Yannaca-Small, (n. 7 above) 64
397 G.C. Christie (n. 93 above) 338 see also P. D. Cameroon (n.48 above) 227
398  S.P. Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy  and Principle, 2nd 
edn ( US and Canada, Hart Publishing: 2012) 157
399 P. D. Cameroon (n.48 above) 227
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actions would be judged as follows: ‘a finding of an expropriation would require, at  
very  least,  that  the  Tribunal  be  satisfied  that  there  was  deliberate  governmental  
interference with the conduct of  Sea Lands’ operations, the effect  of  which was to  
deprive  Sea-Land  of  the  use  and  benefit  of  its  investment’.401 (Italic  added).  The 
tribunal ruled no expropriation had occurred in this case.402
The purpose test was also applied in the context of NAFTA jurisprudence in the 
S. D Myers vs. Canada case403 ‘but in conjunction with an effects test’.404 S. D. Myers 
is a US hazardous waste disposal company which operated a PCB waste treatment 
service  in  Ohio.  The  Canadian  Ministry  of  the  Environment  had  banned  the 
commercial export of waste from a synthetic chemical compound of PCB under its 
Environmental Protection Act. The company claimed that the Canadian ban amounted 
to expropriation because the ban deprived the company of business opportunities and 
violated NAFTA Article 1110. The Canadian government contended that the ban was a 
measure taken in the interests of the environment. The NAFTA UNCITRAL tribunal 
accepted  that  ‘international  law makes  it  appropriate  for  tribunals  to  examine  the 
purpose and effects  of governmental measures’;  however,  ‘it  must look at  the real 
interests involved and the purpose and effects of the government measure.’405 (Italic 
added).
 A similar verdict was reached by the ICSID tribunal in the Olguin vs. Paraguay 
case.  The  tribunal  stated  that  ‘expropriation  therefore  requires  a  teleological  driven 
action  for  occur  it  to  occur;  omissions,  however  egregious  they  may  be,  are  not 
sufficient for it to occur; omissions; however egregious they may be are not sufficient 
for it to take place’.406 Taking into consideration the latter two cases, it is apparent that 
the tribunals accepted the purpose approach by referring to the purpose and effect of the 
government measure. Notably, although these last two cases can be good examples of 
the purpose approach, there are also some counter examples of tribunals with regard to 
this test. For instance, in  the Philips Petroleum Co. Iran vs. Islamic Republic of Iran 
case, the tribunal stated that ‘a government’s liability to compensate for expropriation of 
400Sea-Land Sevs. Inc. vs. Iran, 6 Iran-US CI. Trib. Rep. 149 (1984), 166.
401 Ibid
402 ibid
403S. D. Myers. Inc. vs. Government of Canada, Partial award of 13 November 2000, 
40 ILM 1408 (2001) para.285 
404 P. D. Cameroon (n.48) 227
405S.D Myers. Inc. vs. Government of Canada (n.104 above) paras 281, 285
406Olguinvs.Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No.Arb/98/5 26 Jul. 2001, para 84
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alien property does not depend on proof that the expropriation was intentional’407. A 
comparable decision was reached in the Metalclad vs. Mexico panel, where the tribunal 
asserted that there is no need to decide or regard the motivation or intention of the 
adaptation of the Ecological Degree.408
4.3    Legitimate Expectations of Investor
The investor’s reasonable and legitimate expectations test is the other significant 
criteria which tribunals evaluate. The aim of this test is to ascertain whether or not an 
investor’s legitimate expectation has been adversely affected. It should be borne in mind 
that  the  indirect  expropriation  claim ‘must  be  objectively reasonable  and not  based 
entirely  upon  the  investor’s  subjective  expectations.’409 More  importantly,  it  is  the 
responsibility of the investor, to provide evidence that ‘his/her investment was based on 
a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime.’410 It has been 
asserted  that  this  doctrine  is  commonly  linked  with  fair  and  equitable  treatment 
standards; nevertheless, it plays a significant role in determining the law applicable to 
indirect expropriation.411 It goes without saying that each alien investor expects to attain 
specific economic benefits from the investment they made. Generally speaking, most 
governments in today’s business world actively invite investors and create expectations 
by  introducing  new  laws  or  announcing  new  welcoming  programmes.  Such 
announcements and favourable laws may be the major driving factors in an investor’s 
decision to pursue a venture in a host country. The following cases under NAFTA and 
ICSID  best  illustrate  how  tribunals  regard  the  legitimate  expectation  criteria  when 
assessing alleged indirect expropriation. 
As  mentioned  above,  in  the  Metalclad case,  the  company  had  met  all  the 
necessary requirements  and the project  construction permit  had been granted by the 
Mexican federal  government.  Naturally,  the  company had counted on the  guarantee 
given to it before the project commenced. As a result,  the tribunal  held that ‘these 
measures, taken together with the representations of the Mexican federal government, 
on which Metalclad relied, and the absence of a timely, orderly or substantive basis for 
407Philips Petroleum Co. vs. Islamic Republic of Iran (n.49 above)
408Metalclad Corp. vs. United Mexican States, (ICSID Additional Facility Case No. 
ARB (AF)/97/1), 30 August 2000, para 111
409 C. Yannaca-Small, (n.7 above) 68
410 Ibid
411 P. D. Cameroon (n.48 above) 226; See also A. Reinisch (n.11) 448
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the denial by the municipality of the local construction permit, amount to an indirect 
expropriation.’412.
The tribunal delivered a similar verdict in the TECMED case.413  In this case, the 
Spanish  company  Tecnicas  was  required  to  renew  its  licence  in  order  to  continue 
operating in the landfill; however, the Mexican State agency refused the licence renewal 
request  of  the  investor.  The  ICSID  tribunal  found  that  the  measures  taken  by  the 
Mexican state agency amounted to expropriation and held that ‘even before the claimant 
had made its investment, it was widely known that the investor expected its investments 
in the landfill to be long term and that it took this into account to estimate the time and 
business  required  to  recover  such  investment  and  obtain  expected  return…such 
expectations should be considered legitimate…’414
In  the  Methanex  Corp  vs.  United  States  of  America  case,415 the  tribunal’s 
approach exhibited key differences to the  TECMED case. In that case, the Claimant 
alleged that the ban levied by the Californian government on the sale and use of the 
gasoline  additive  methyl-tertiary  butyl  ether  (MTBE)  had  been  tantamount  to  an 
expropriation. Therefore the loss of the company needed to be compensated. In its 
defence  the  US  asserted  that  the  prohibition  of  the  MTBE  was  necessary  and 
justifiable because the substance in question can contaminate drinking water, thereby 
categorising  their  claim as  motivated  by public  purpose.  The tribunal  rejected  the 
investor’s claim and provided instructive statements in the context of the legitimate 
expectation  of  investors.  In  this  regard,  the  tribunal  held  that  with  reference  to 
international law, non-discriminatory measures were taken by the host state for the 
public purpose that did not constitute expropriation as long as specific commitments 
were  provided  by  the  state  ‘to  the  then  putative  foreign  investor  contemplating 
investment that the government would refrain from such regulation’.416 It is apparent 
that the tribunal did not concentrate on, in the first instance, whether an expropriation 
had taken place, it instead focused its attention on determining whether the measure 
taken by the Californian government was for  public purpose and could therefore be 
deemed legitimate. 
4.4    The Proportionality Test
412Metalclad (n.109 above), para 107
413Tecnicas  Medioambentales  TECMED SA vs.  The  United  Mexican  States,  ICSID 
Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3,(2004) ( TECMED Hereinafter)
414 Ibid para 150
415Methanex Corporation vs. United States of America, Final Award on Jurisdictions 
and Merits, 2 August 2005.
416Methanex, Part IV Chapter D, para 7  
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Another significant test is the proportionality of the measures taken by the host 
government.  In  determining  whether  a  host  government’s  measure  constitutes  an 
indirect expropriation, tribunals have also examined whether the measure taken by the 
government  is  reasonably  proportional  to  the  purpose  the  government  seeks  to 
attain.417The focus  of  this  analysis  is  the  impact  of  the measure taken against  alien 
investors versus the impact on host state nationals.418 As was stated by the tribunal in the 
TECMED case, there had to be ‘a reasonable relationship of the proportionality between 
the charge or levy imposed on the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realised by 
any expropriatory measure’.419
Moreover, the proportionality test is frequently referred to in the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In  James and Others vs. The United  
Kingdom,  the court  stated that: ‘Not only must a measure depriving a person of his 
property pursue, on the facts as well  as in principle,  a legitimate aim ‘in the public 
interest,’ but there must also be a reasonable relationship of the proportionality between  
the means employed and the aim sought to be realised… [t]he requisite balance will not 
be found if the person concerned that a measure must be both appropriate for achieving 
its  aim  and  not  disproportionate  thereto.’420 (Italic  added).  Even  though  the 
proportionality test is applied most frequently in the context of ECHR, the investment 
arbitral tribunals have also applied the test in determination of indirect expropriation, 
such as the TECMED case and more recently the Azurix case.421
5.    Sole effect versus Police Power
Throughout  section  four,  selected case  studies  have served to  illustrate  how a 
number of arbitral tribunals have adopted differing approaches to distinguish between 
non-compensable regulatory measures and indirect expropriation. Taking into account 
this overview it is fair to state that not one of the principles applied clearly prevailed 
over the others and it can be concluded that is difficult to predict what an investment 
tribunal’s approach will be from one case to the next. It can be claimed that having no 
precise criteria at hand creates an uncertain atmosphere in international investment law. 
This  uncertainty  is  ‘…not  only  a  problem  for  the  investment  or  state  involved 
arbitration, but that also undermines the legitimacy of investment law as a whole, as it 
417 J. W. Salacuse (n.10 above) 313
418 Ibid
419TECMED (n. 114 above) para 122
420James and Others vs. The United Kingdom Case (21 February 1986) Series A No. 
98, para 50
421Azurix  Corp.  vs.  Argentine  Republic,  (ICSID  Case  No.Arb/01/12),  Annulment 
Proceeding, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee, Sept. 1, 2009
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remains  unclear  what  rights investment  law grants  to  foreign investors and to  what 
degree it interferes with the sovereignty of states to regulate their economic order’422.
What can be asserted with conviction is that, generally speaking, the sole effect 
test  and  the  purpose  approach  are  more  frequently  applied  than  any  of  the  other 
available methods in tribunals and for this reason an important question needs to be 
addressed regarding these two approaches: should investment tribunals concentrate on 
merely the sole effects of the measure taken by the host state or they ought they to focus 
on police power doctrine?
According to Dolzer,  the effect of the host state measure ought to be the sole 
criterion423 and little weight should be given to the purpose of the state in establishing 
the measure,424  Conversely, Al-Qurashi argues that sole effect doctrine should not be 
the  unique  approach  and exclusive  criteria  applied  by tribunals.425  In  other  words, 
investment tribunals should not pay less attention to or single out  the police power 
approach,  because  focusing  on  one  specific  principle  may  lead  tribunals  to  more 
frequently reach verdicts that disadvantage the host state. Naturally, in the long term, 
any  measures  taken  by  the  host  state  could  be  seen  as  a  threat  for  investors  and 
interpreted as having an impact on an alien investor’s property rights. For this reason, 
before investing in a foreign country, investors should be aware of the risks that arise 
from regulatory change which may affect their business operations or property rights.426
Generally speaking, it is clear that tribunals aim to reach conclusions regarding 
the discussion of whether the state measure constitutes indirect expropriation and the 
host government is liable to pay compensation as a consequence of bona fide domestic 
regulation. What has been found in this section is that there is inconsistency between 
these  two approaches.  Perhaps the  fairest  approach from the  point  of  view of  both 
parties is to give due consideration of both doctrines in determining whether the actions 
amount to indirect expropriation. 
6.    Bilateral Investment Treaties of Azerbaijan and Turkey and their 
treaty provisions concerning indirect expropriation
422 M. Perkams, The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law-
Searching for Light in the Dark, Chapter 4 in S. W. Schill, International Investment Law 
and Comparative Public Law, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2010) 111
423 R.  Dolzer ( n.1 above) 64 ; A. Reinisch, (n.11 above) 405
424 J.W. Salacuse (n.10 above) 316
425 Z. A. Al-Qurashi,  ‘Indirect  Expropriation in the Field of Petroleum’,  Journal of  
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The  Bilateral  Investment  Treaty  (BIT)  is  one  of  the  most  significant  tools  to 
attract foreign direct investment in a developed or developing country. Each developed 
state  regards  the  BIT as  a  catalyst  for  economic  growth  and  development  of  their 
countries.  In addition to  their  attempts to attract investors into their  territories,  they 
commit to providing a favourable investment environment to investors from their own 
country.  In  that  respect,  it  can  be  stated  that  through BITs,  industrialized  countries 
obtain  legal  promises  or  indeed  protections  for  domestic  investors  based  on 
international  law.  Unlike  national  domestic  laws  on  FDI,  that  can  also  suggest 
safeguards and encouragements to alien investors but are liable to change with a change 
of government, no state can unilaterally modify international law or provisions exist 
under BITs.427 The first BIT to be signed was between Pakistan and Germany on 25 
November, 1959. Since 1959, 2,800 BITs have been concluded around the world.428
The life span of such treaties can be ten to twenty years, with continuing coverage 
normally for 20 years after the termination on investment agreements made whilst they 
are in force.429 Despite the fact that 2,800 BITs to date have been entered into between 
many diverse states, the safeguards and guarantees they include are more or less similar. 
They  are  designed  to  cover  the  following  five  elements:  1)  protection  from 
expropriation without compensation; 2) most favoured nation provisions; 3) national 
treatment provisions; 4) fair and equitable treatment; 5) methods of dispute settlement. 
However,  save  a  few  exceptions,  the  vast  majority  of  BITs  do  not  define  indirect 
expropriation  even  though  it  is  possible  that  state  actions  may  constitute  indirect 
expropriation.  It  could  be  concluded  that  rather  than  depending  on  tribunals  to 
determine whether or not a state action constitutes indirect expropriation, it might be 
more appropriate and help avoid future deliberation if states determined in their BITs 
what possible state action may be classed as indirect expropriation as well as providing 
a clear definition of indirect expropriation. 
The following sub-sections examine the BIT models of Azerbaijan and Turkey to 
investigate whether their BITs provisions define indirect expropriation or illustrate what 
possible state actions may cause indirect expropriation.
Azerbaijan
Since 1991, Azerbaijan has enacted a significant number of laws and initiatives 
designed to facilitate foreign investment in its territory.  To become part of a global 
economy,  participate  in  international  organisations’ activities  and  sign  international 
agreements have been the goals Azerbaijani governments aspired to. Azerbaijan signed 
its first raft of BITs with a number of developed and developing countries during 1990s. 
By 1999, the country had signed 17 BITs with its neighbours and major trading partners 
outside  the  Caucasus  region  that  included  some  OECD  countries,  such  as  Turkey, 
427 S. P. Subedi (n. 99 above) 81-82
428World Investment Report (2011)100 available at:
<http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.  pdf  >April 2013
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Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Between 1999 and 2013, the country has 
concluded 28 more BITs, with some EU member states as well as other non-EU states 
such as Egypt, Qatar and Israel. In total, Azerbaijan has concluded 45 BITS. The main 
objective  of  these  agreements  was  to  supply fair,  foreseeable,  transparent  and  non-
discriminatory principles for foreign investors in its territory. The general characteristic 
of  Azerbaijan’s  BITs  was  stated  by interview respondents.  Most  of  the  respondents 
emphasised that Azeri BITs treat both national and foreign investors equally.430 They 
also provide unrestricted transfer of profits, dividends and royalties, compensation in 
the event of expropriation or nationalisation, exemptions from performance standards 
and application of international arbitration should a dispute arise.431
Notably, all Azeri BITs include an expropriation clause and specifically address 
‘direct and indirect’ expropriation phenomena. For instance, the Azerbaijan-Finland BIT 
(2003) addresses this in Article 6 of the treaty: 
Investments by investors of a Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party shall not be expropriated, nationalised or subjected to any 
other measures having the effect, either directly or indirectly, equivalent to 
expropriation or nationalisation (hereinafter referred to as  “expropriation”) 
except for a public interest, on a non-discriminatory basis, under due process 
of law and against prompt, adequate and effective compensation.432
 It is clear that this expropriation clause explicitly recognises the existence of both 
direct  and  indirect  expropriation.  However  the  article  does  not  define  exactly  what 
single or combination of actions may be deemed indirect expropriation or exactly which 
outcomes may constitute an indirect expropriation.  As stated above, traditional BITs do 
not  proffer  a  definition  for  the  possible  state  actions  that  may  constitute  indirect 
expropriation. Moreover, it should also be noted that since 1994, (the first BIT entered 
into with Turkey), to the present, no indirect expropriation case has emerged against 
Azerbaijan. In addition to BITs, Azerbaijan has also signed a number of agreements in 
parallel to prevent double taxation.433 Azerbaijan’s concluded BITs include provisions 
consistent with Azerbaijani foreign investment law (1992). During the examination, it 
was realised that the law on foreign investment provides investment security through 
national treatment provisions and free transfer of funds (after payment of taxes), which 
in  harmony  with  the  BITs  signed  by  Azerbaijan.  It  is  to  be  recommended  that 
430 Interview no 16 with Lawyer 21 November ,2012; Interview no 17 with Lawyer 22 
November, 2012; Interview no 20 (n.18 above) 26 November ,2012
431  Interview no 19 with Lecturer, 23 November 2012
432  Article 6 of Azeri-Finland BIT (2003) available at: 
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/finland_azerbaijan.pdf>August 2013
433 Azerbaijan has signed to prevent double taxation treaties with 38 countries. For 
further detail, please see the list of the countries, available at: 
<http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/dtt_Azerbaijan.PDF> August 2013
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Azerbaijan  continues  to  enter  into  more  BITs  to  further  accelerate  the  flow  of 
investment into its territory.
         Turkey
The main goal  for Turkey when entering into BITs is  to increase the flow of 
capital  and  technology  into  its  territory,  and  provide  safeguards  to  international 
investors within the framework of the legal system.434 In order to attain the most liberal 
FDI regime possible, Turkey has entered into BITs with 82 countries since 1962. The 
first BIT was signed with Germany and was followed by a BIT with the US in 1986. 
While 74 BITs have so far been approved by the Turkish Parliament, the remainder are 
yet  to  enter  into force.  The defining  feature of  the  Turkish BIT model  is  their  key 
provisions’ compatibility with international investment protection standards, such as: (i) 
application of national treatment; (ii) most favoured national treatment to alien investor; 
(iii) guarantee of free transfer of profits; (iv) the terms and conditions of expropriations; 
(v) compensation for losses; (vi) provisions for international arbitrations. It should be 
noted that like Azerbaijan, the Turkish BIT model also specifically addresses direct and 
indirect expropriation. For instance, according to  Article 3 (1) of Yemen-Turkey BIT 
(2011): 
Investments  shall  not  be  expropriated,  nationalized  or  subject,  directly or 
indirectly,  to measures of similar effects except for a public purpose, in a 
non-discriminatory manner, upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation, and in accordance with due process of law and the general 
principles of treatment provided for in Article II of this Agreement.435
Similar to the Azerbaijani BIT model, the above-given Turkish BIT’s provision 
specifically  references  the  phenomenon  of  indirect  expropriation.  However  both 
countries BITs do not identify what indirect expropriation is or name the possible state 
actions that may constitute indirect expropriation.  The China-India BIT model436 could 
serves  as  useful  future  reference  for  Turkey  and  Azerbaijan  in  this  respect  as  it 
434 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, available at: 
<http://www.economy.govs.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=tradeagreements&bolum=bilateral> 
August 2013
435  Article 3(1), Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and The Republic of 
Yemen Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, available 
at: UNCTAD’s official website; Please see ( n. 128 above)
436  Please see Section III (Article 5) of Protocol to the Agreement between the 
Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Promotion and Protection of 
Investments.
‘With  regard  to  the  interpretation  of  expropriation  under  Article  5,  the  Contracting 
Parties confirm their shared understanding that:
 1.  A  measure  of  expropriation  includes,  apart  from  direct  expropriation  or 
nationalization through formal transfer of title or outright seizure, a measure or series of 
measures taken intentionally by a Party to create a situation whereby the investment of 
an investor  may be rendered substantially unproductive  and incapable  of  yielding a 
return without a formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
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successfully defines indirect expropriation phenomena and references the state actions 
that can be deemed to constitute indirect expropriation.
It is worth noting that before current Turkish FDI Law No. 4875 was enacted in 
2003, the country used the Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital No. 6224 
until 2003.  According to one interview respondent who works as a lecturer:
Despite the fact that the old FDI law provided some guarantees 
to foreign investors, no provisions were made for expropriation. 
For this reason, BITs signed before new laws were passed were 
not in compliance with the provisions of old FDI law. However, 
on  the  adoption  of  new  FDI,  this  problem  was  dealt  with 
because the new law regulates against expropriation. It can be 
affirmed with confidence that the provisions of new law and the 
clauses  exist  in  BITs  are  in  harmony and  comply  with  each 
other.437
During the last decade, Turkey has accelerated the number of BITs it has entered 
into with not only developed countries but also developing states from different regions, 
such  as  Afghanistan,  Jordon,  Yemen,  Thailand  and  the  Philippines.  Entering  into 
bilateral  relationships  with  developed  and  developing  countries,  demonstrates  the 
Republic of Turkey’s efforts to develop its economy as well as improve its political 
relationships. In order to boost its BITs, the country has also entered into a number of 
supplementary agreements with several countries in parallel to its BITs. For example, in 
order to prevent double taxation, Turkey has signed double taxation prevention treaties 
with 76 countries. The benefit of these agreements is that tax paid in one of the two 
countries can be offset against tax payable in the other; thus preventing double taxation. 
2.  The determination of whether a measure or a series of measures of a  Party in a 
specific situation, constitute measures as outlined in paragraph 1 above requires a case 
by case, fact based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
i. the economic impact of the measure or a series of measures,  although the fact that a 
measure or series of measures by a Party  has an adverse effect on the economic value 
of  an  investment,   standing  alone,  does  not  establish  that  expropriation  or 
nationalization, has occurred; 
ii. The extent to which the measures are discriminatory either in cope or in application 
with respect to a Party or an investor or an enterprise;
iii.  The  extent  to  which  the  measures  or  series  of  measures  interfere  with  distinct, 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations;
iv. The character and intent of the measures or series of measures, whether they are for 
bona  fide  public  interest  purposes  or  not  and  whether  there  is  a  reasonable  nexus 
between them and the intention on to expropriate.
3. Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory measures adopted by a 
Contracting Party in pursuit of public interest, including measures pursuant to awards of 
general application rendered by judicial bodies do not constitute indirect expropriation 
or nationalization.’ The agreement is available at: 
<http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/India_China.pdf>  August 2013
437 Interview no 8 with Lecturer. 4 June 2012 and 8 November 2012
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Besides, in order to foster greater freedom of movement for its expatriates, Turkey has 
also signed social security agreements with 22 countries.
Unlike Azerbaijan, Turkey has had an indirect expropriation claim lodged against 
it. As a result of the growing demand for electricity, the country decided to liberalise its 
energy  sector  during  the  1980s.  According  to  this  policy,  Turkey  allowed  private 
companies to establish facilities for the generation of electricity that they could then sell 
to  the government,  and also offered incentives  to  the companies  including Treasury 
Guarantees.  In  1994,  PSEG,438 a  US  based  company,  signed  a  Concession  and 
Implementation Contract with the government of Turkey for the establishment of a coal 
fire power plant and an adjacent coal mine. Subsequently, a dispute arose between the 
parties as to whether the Concession Contract included a final agreement of key terms 
and what those terms were. In the meanwhile, the legal frame work of the agreement 
also  underwent  a  change  with  the  enactment  of  Law  No.  4828  in  2001,  which 
eliminated  the  possibility  of  the  Claimants  obtaining  a  Treasury  Guarantee  for  the 
project (the corresponding legal provisions were annulled by the Turkish Supreme Court 
in 2002). According to the claimant all these events, viewed in conjunction, reflected 
Turkey’s intent to damage the Claimant’s investment. The Tribunal found that Turkey 
was in violation of the fair and equitable treatment obligation but dismissed all other 
claims. In determining the compensation payable, the Tribunal rejected the ‘fair market 
value’ standard because no expropriation had been found and because there was no 
damage to productive assets.
7.     Tools for Mitigating Indirect Expropriation Risk
As proposed in the first chapter of this study, rather than concentrating on all the 
mechanisms or forms of protection which can be deployed by an alien investor against 
political  risks,  the  study  turns  its  focus  to  stabilisation  technique.  Although  the 
following chapter specifically focuses on stabilisation clauses per se, it is also worth 
briefly mentioning stabilisation clauses along with other legal instruments used in the 
management of indirect expropriation risk. There are a range of devices available to the 
host state for it to utilise against alien investors: states may introduce new laws and 
regulations which terminate or change the condition of a previously agreed contract. 
More dramatically, the state may use its sovereign powers to unlawfully expropriate the 
alien  investor’s  property directly  or  indirectly  as  well  as  the  property rights  of  the 
foreign investor. In order to defend themselves from such violations by the state, there 
are also some mechanisms available to alien investors to protect them against those 
measures taken by the host state that affect their business operations. The stabilisation 
clauses inserted in a host government contract are one way of managing risk.439 In the 
interests of gaining practical insights from a range of perspectives to add breadth and 
depth  to  the  discussion  the  question  of  which  mechanisms  can  be  used  by foreign 
investors against indirect expropriation risks was posed to the interview participants.
438PSEG Global (n.40 above)
439 P. D. Cameron, ‘Stabilisation in Investment Contracts and Changes of Rules in Host 
Countries: Tools for Oil & Gas Investors’, AIPN, FINAL REPORT, 5th July (2006) 9
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The respondents considered the question from divergent perspectives. One of the 
respondents  stated  that  ‘energy  investments  are  based  on  profit,  efficiency  and 
sustainability just  like  any other  type  of  investment.  Therefore,  in  order  to  be in  a 
favourable  position  in  the  contract  and  protect  the  investment  against  indirect 
expropriation, foreign investors may require stabilisation clauses from host states’440.  If 
it is the case that inserting a stabilisation clause plays an effective role in reducing risk, 
how the balance of power can be managed between an investor and a sovereign state is 
an issue worthy of attention. A solution was forwarded by another interviewee who is a 
lawyer in the field of energy investment. According to this interviewee ‘a fairly drafted 
contract that includes a stabilisation clause as well  as the use of modern models of 
investment treaties can give assurance against indirect expropriation risk… most states 
already supply guarantees against unlawful expropriation through their national laws, 
but energy investors still may not wish to rely merely on these protections’. 441
As a  result,  the  stabilisation  clause  appears  to  be  one  of  the  most  significant 
mechanisms,  albeit  deployed  in  combination  with  other  legal  securities,  to  mitigate 
indirect expropriation risk in international investment contracts. From the perspective of 
the  investor,  inserting  such  clauses  in  an  investment  contract  has  the  benefit  of 
safeguarding their rights, however, accepting such clauses and agreeing to them in long 
term investment contracts may serve as a disincentive for host governments in as much 
as it attempts to limit the use of its police power. 
8.     Conclusion
A significant proportion of chapter three was devoted to examining documented 
examples  of  indirect  expropriation  phenomena.  It  has  been  acknowledged  that  the 
definition  of  indirect  expropriation  is  a  conundrum  in  the  sphere  of  international 
investment law. Modern investment treaties go some way to resolving that conundrum. 
As  previously  mentioned,  while  traditional  treaties  do  not  provide  a  definition  of 
indirect  expropriation,  some  modern  investment  treaties  make  mention  of  indirect 
expropriation under the definition of investment. This kind of definition of investment 
covers not only tangible assets but also takes into account the intangible rights of the 
investors.  The interpretation  that  can  be  made of  this  fact  is  that  the  expropriation 
clauses in the BITs ‘may not only protect physical property, such as land and buildings, 
but also intangible forms of property, such as contractual rights, intellectual property 
rights, and government business concession.’442
Furthermore,  there  are  various  state  measures,  as  described  above  that  may 
constitute  indirect  expropriation,  such as  an excessive or  discriminatory tax regime, 
interference with the management rights of the investor, interference with contractual 
440 Interview no. 3Anonymity Guaranteed, 14 May 2012
441 Interview no.7 with Lawyer,  6 June  2012
442 J. W. Salacuse, The Three Laws of International Investment: National, Contractual 
and  Interventional  Frameworks  for  Foreign  Capital,   1st edn.,  (Oxford,  Oxford 
University Press: 2013) 394
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rights, revocation of licence and denial of permits. These are all typical examples of 
indirect expropriation. It should, however, also be noted that, more recently, measures 
related  to  environmental  or  human  rights  issues  have  also  been  used  by  states  as 
justification for interference in the energy sector. Regardless of the differences between 
any given type of state intervention and the reasons behind the indirect taking, the fact is 
that the alien investor’s return on investment may be significantly reduced by these 
forms of state intervention. In an effort to find a resolution to these issues, investment 
arbitral tribunals have turned their focus to the problem and, as a result of this have 
created  invaluable  guidance  on  the  issues  arising  from  indirect  expropriation. 
Nonetheless, the impact of the state measure on the profit that investors expect is not 
always considered by the investment tribunals, in particular in the case of regulatory 
taking. In other words, the question of distinguishing non-compensable regulatory state 
measures and indirect expropriation is, as of yet, an unresolved one and continues to act 
as a major obstacle in international law. As outlined previously, there are several tests 
which are applied by arbitral tribunals. From an examination of   case law, it became 
evident that the classification of government measures depends on the specific facts and 
circumstances of each case. The tests applied by the tribunals concentrate on the severe 
economic  impact  on  the  investment,  the  legitimate  expectation  of  the  investor,  the 
character of the government measure, i.e. the purpose and context of the measure and 
proportionality criteria. It should also be noted that these tests are not exact formulas 
that are consistently applied by tribunals. From examples of case law, the only common 
conclusion that can be drawn regarding regulatory taking is that the state’s regulatory 
activity should not be unlawful and must be fair and proportional. There are two main 
doctrines  perhaps  most  frequently  employed  in  the  determination  of  whether  a 
government measure constitutes an indirect expropriation or not. These are sole effect 
doctrine and police power doctrine. 
 There is no definite evidence that investment tribunals more frequently apply a 
particular approach. In other words, no one doctrine has been favoured over others in 
case law. What can be said is that perhaps sole effect doctrine tends to come down on 
the side of the investor. It could be suggested that during the determination process, 
tribunals ought to consider not only sole effect doctrine as it suggests a bias in favour of 
investors, but that police power doctrine should also be regarded, as this understanding 
is  based  on  the  state’s  right  to  regulate.  Perhaps  this  combination  of  doctrines 
constitutes  the  fairest  approach,  removing  the  uncertainty  around  the  question  of 
distinguishing non-compensable regulatory measure and indirect expropriation. It must 
be taken into account that, as is always the case in law, law systems can be subject to 
revision, and indeed can be altered by a state at any time if it adopts various regulatory 
measures. It is fair to assume that the adoption or revision of an existing legal system is 
more frequent  in  developing states  than would be the norm in developed countries. 
However, in order not to leave themselves exposed to the effects of such changes, alien 
investors should be conscious that those changes may occur at  any time and that is 
advisable for them to seek specific guarantees to protect their investments.
The Bilateral Investment Treaties of Azerbaijan and Turkey were also examined 
during this chapter. It was found that both countries have entered into a number of BITs 
with different countries. It is to be recommended that Azerbaijan extend its bilateral 
treaty investment treaty relations with a large number of states in order to attract more 
investors  into  its  territory.  In  this  respect,  Turkey  is  comparatively  much  more 
established. Moreover, the provisions regarding expropriation in both countries’ BITs 
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are not descriptive in defining indirect expropriation and what measures may or may not 
constitute indirect expropriation. It is true that most BITs do not adequately address this; 
however, if Azerbaijan and Turkey follow the some existing modern BIT model, such as 
that of China-India or other similar treaties which explicitly define indirect phenomena, 
they would thereby improve their prospects for attracting capital into their economies. 
Generally  speaking,  if  countries  around  the  world  inserted  an  explicit  and 
comprehensive definition of the term indirect expropriation, rather than simply alluding 
to it in their BITs, this would be of great assistance to tribunals in determining what 
state action may/may not constitute indirect expropriation.
As  a  political  risk  manager,  stabilisation  clauses  represent  one  of  the  best 
guarantees of all those contractually available in the petroleum industry. The following 
chapter will lend its focus to the stabilisation clause in detail. 
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     Chapter 4
 Stabilisation Clauses: A Shield of Investment Agreements against Risks
1.     Introduction
The insertion of stabilisation clauses in international investment agreements is the 
contractual feature most frequently required by foreign investors in their quest to obtain 
a stable investment environment. The motivation behind this lies in the scale and scope 
of the investment and the complex nature of economic development agreements. Over 
the course of an energy investment relationship an investor may sink billions of pounds 
into the venture meanwhile, as evidenced in chapter three, the host country has a high 
degree of control over the fate of the investment made within its territory. The inclusion 
of stabilisation clauses is intended to guard the investment against the damage incurred 
by unilateral changes to, or termination of, energy investment contracts at any point in 
the course of the project.443 In other words, by agreeing to such clauses the host state 
reassures the foreign private investor that certain aspects of its laws will be ‘frozen’ and 
the  contractual  arrangement  will  not  be  altered  or  terminated  by  the  legislative  or 
administrative  activities  of  the  host  government  during  the  life  span of  the  project. 
Although  stabilisation  clauses  would  appear  to  grant  some  guarantees  to  foreign 
investors, it is important to test this assumption by posing the questions: to what extent 
are  stabilisation  clauses  effective  in  protecting  investments  or  conversely,  in 
contradiction  of  their  intended  guardianship,  do  they  instead  disenfranchise  the 
sovereign rights of the host state? And do Stabilisation Provisions constitute a threat for 
Environment and Human rights issues? 
Successively, the typology, and the validity of stabilisation clauses under domestic 
and international law will be examined and their efficacy evaluated. This chapter also 
analyses the decisions of arbitral investment tribunals with regard to issues of validity. 
Such an analysis will contribute to an understanding of the legal and functional value of 
stabilisation  clauses  and  an  assessment  of  their  effectiveness  in  protecting  foreign 
investors’ business in energy investment projects. The notion of ‘state sovereignty’ will 
443 Please generally see: T. Waelde & G. Ndi, ‘Stabilizing International Investment 
Commitments:  International  Law Versus  Contract  Interpretation’,  Tex.  Int'l  L.  J.  31 
(1996); P. D. Cameron,  International Energy Investment Law:  The pursuit of Stability 
(Oxford: Oxford  University Press, 2010) 68; see also P. D. Cameron, ‘Stabilisation  in 
Investment Contracts and Changes of Rules in Host Countries: Tools for Oil & Gas 
Investors’, AIPN Research Paper Final Report 2006: A. Al-Faruque, ‘The Rationale and 
Instrumentalities for Stability in Long-Term State Contracts: The context for Petroleum 
Contracts’ ,  The Journal  of  World Investment  & Trade 7,  no.1 (2006) 85;  A.  F.  M. 
Manirruzzaman, ‘The Pursuit of stability in International Energy Investment Contracts: 
A Critical Appraisal of the Emerging Trends’ , Journal of World Energy Investment Law 
& Business 1. No. 2 (2008) 121, 156; see also A. F. M Manirruzzaman, ‘Stabilisation of 
Investment Contracts and Change of Rules by Host States: Tools for O & G Investors’ 
AIPN  Research  Paper  First  Draft,  (2005-2006)  4;  M.  Erkan,  International  Energy 
Investment Law: Stability Through Contractual Clauses (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2010) 101
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be another key area of focus in this chapter. The criticisms made by the NGO and the 
legal documents issued by the project consortium to the BTC project agreements will 
also be examined in this chapter. The host government agreements that determined this 
project’s terms, conditions as well as the context of drafts are controversial and had a 
significant  impact  on  the  participating  countries’ ability  to  exercise  their  sovereign 
powers. 
2.   General Implications of Stabilisation Clauses
In  doctrine,  several  commentators  have  sought  to  offer  definitions  for  this 
contractual article. According to Brownlie, ‘the term ‘stabilisation clause’ relates to any 
clause contained in an agreement between a government and a foreign legal entity by 
which a government party undertakes neither to annul the agreement nor to modify its 
terms, either by legislation or by administrative measures.’444 A similar description has 
been  provided  by Bernardini.  According  to  this  author,  stabilisation  clauses  are  an 
attempt to defend an alien investor by ‘restricting the legislative or administrative power 
of the State, as sovereign in its country and legislator in its own legal system, to amend 
the contractual regulation or even to annul the agreement’.445 In the case of Amoco Int’l  
Fin.  Corporation  vs.  Government  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  a  definition  was 
provided by the tribunal. The tribunal defined stabilisation clauses as ‘contract language 
which freezes the provision of a national system of law of chosen as the law of the 
contracts of any future alterations of this system’.446
 In light of the above given definitions, the purpose of stabilisation clauses should 
be explored. According to Sornarajah, ‘the aim of the stabilisation clause was to ensure 
that future changes in the legislation of the host state did not vary the terms of the 
contract on the basis  of which entry was made’.447 The author goes on to state that 
inclusion  of  such  clauses  in  an  investment  contract  provide  immunity  to  an  alien 
investor from a wide range of potential threats to their interests, for instance, ‘taxation, 
environmental controls and other regulations as well as to prevent the destruction of the 
contract  itself  before  the  contract  expires.’448 Furthermore,  in  Cotula’s  words,  the 
purpose  of  the  stabilisation  clause  is  to  ‘stabilise  the  terms  and  conditions  of  an 
444 I.  Brownlie,  Principles  of  Public  International  Law,  6th edn  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 526
445P. Bernardini, ‘Stabilization and Adaptation in Oil and Gas Investments’, Journal of  
World Energy Law & Business, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2008) 100
446Amoco Int’l Fin. Corporation vs. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,  16 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 239 (1987)
447 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd edn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) 281
448 M. Sornarajah, (n.5 above) 282
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investment  project,  thereby  contributing  to  manage  non-commercial  (that  is  fiscal, 
regulatory) risk.’449
 In  a  similar  vein,  according  to  Professor  Cameron,  in  international  energy 
contracts,  the  term  stabilisation  applies  to  all  of  the  mechanisms,  contractual  or 
otherwise, designed to protect, during the life span of the contract, the benefit of certain 
economic and legal conditions which host states and foreign investors considered to be 
suitable at the time they were agreed.450 The question of why alien private investors seek 
to freeze the contractual terms and conditions and the law of host states by inserting 
such clauses during the life span of the contract is also explained by Sornarajah:
The foreign cooperation stood at a disadvantage in any agreement it made 
with the host state, as the host state had the legislative power to alter the 
impact on the contract of any event that took place within its territory or to 
affect any contractual right or right to property that was located within its 
territory. Such a power flowed from its sovereignty. It was in the interest of 
foreign corporation to naturalise this power.451
What  can  be understood from the  above given definitions  is  that  stabilisation 
clauses satisfy alien investors’ expectations and provide a wide range of protections 
from discriminatory changes which may adversely affect the terms and conditions of 
energy investment contracts. In synthesis, it can be concluded that inserting stabilisation 
clauses  in  an investment  contract  creates  a  shield  for  international  investors  against 
government interference. With regard to this issue, an interview participant who works 
as a lawyer in the area of international investment law, stated that ‘inserting stabilisation 
clauses in an energy investment contract can go a long way in ensuring the fairness of 
such contracts  to  investors  and in  limiting  the  potential  for  the  misinterpretation  of 
terms subsequent to the signing of the contract.’452
It  is  clear  that  the  interview  participant’s  perception  of  the  functioning  of 
stabilisation contracts correlates with the principle upon which stabilisation clauses are 
founded. However, it should also not be disregarded that although the main purpose of a 
stabilisation clause is  to  deter  the application of subsequent alterations of host state 
legislation to the contract; stabilisation clauses may go as far as to discourage the host 
state from adopting new laws or reforming its legal system at all. How and where this 
affects environmental or human rights are the issues yet to be tackled in this chapter. 
449L. Cotula, ‘Regulatory Takings, stabilisation Clause and Sustainable Development, 
Session  2.2:  The  policy  framework  for  investment:  the  social  and  environmental 
dimensions’, OECD Global Forum on  International Investment 27-28March (2008)5
,available  at:  <http://www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40311122.pdf>  March 
2013
450  P. D. Cameron, The pursuit of Stability (n.1 above) 70
451 M. Sornarahaj, ( n.5 above) 281
452 Interview no.10 with Lawyer,  5 November 2012
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The following sub-section examines the types of stabilisation clauses with regard 
to the different types of contracts that may exist between a host state and an investor.
3.     Typologies of Stabilisation Clauses
The stabilisation clauses that may be inserted into investment contracts may be 
categorised  into  four  significant  types.  The  first  type  of  stabilisation  clause  is  the 
freezing  clause.  This  clause is  designed to  insulate  alien  investors  from subsequent 
unilateral  host  governmental  actions  during  the  life  span  of  the  agreement.453 Such 
clauses  are  intended  to  ‘fix’ or  ‘freeze’ the  governing  law of  the  contract  between 
parties, the fiscal regime and other available indispensable investment conditions.454This 
‘fixing’ or ‘freezing’ of the law is applicable to the contract once the contract is made 
and is applied throughout the life span of the project.455 Notably, this clause creates one 
of the following two scenarios, either: the state accepts that any changes to legislation 
enacted after the date of the contract will not apply to the contract, or where there is a 
discrepancy between the provisions of the contract and any new legislation – any new 
legislation inconsistent with the clause will not apply to the contract.456
This type of stabilisation clauses has also been called a ‘stabilisation clause in 
stricto sensu’. This is a more immoderate version which attempts to impose a definitive 
check on the legislative power of the host countries. A more thorough comprehension of 
the workings of the stabilisation clause in  stricto sensu,  can be attained through the 
provision of an example. The concession agreement between the State of Iran and the 
Anglo  Iranian  Oil  Company,  in  1933  provided  that:  ‘The  concession  shall  not  be 
annulled by the Government of and the terms therein contained shall  not be altered 
either  by  the  general  or  special  legislation  in  the  future  or  by  the  administrative 
measures or any other acts whatever of the executive authorities’.457
453 A.  Sheppard  & A.  Crockett,  Are  Stabilisation  Clauses  a  Threat  to  Sustainable 
Development? Chapter 14 in M. C. C. Segger, & A. Newcombe and M. W. Gehring, 
Sustainable Development in International in International Investment law ( The Hague: 
Kluwer, 2010) 336
454 T. W. Waelde & G. Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment (n.1 above) 260 
455 A. Al-Faruque. ‘ Validity and Efficacy of Stabilisation Clauses: Legal Protection vs. 
Functional Value’, Journal of International Arbitration 23, no.4 (2006): 317, 319
456 D. Clinch & J. Watson, ‘Stabilisation Clause Issues and Trends’  Herbert Smith LLP 
2010, available at:
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c5976193-1acd-4082-b9e7-
87c0414b5328> March 2013
457  Anglo-Iranian Oil  Co. Case,  ICJ Pleading, (1952) 86 cited in Z. A. Alqurashi,  
‘International Oil and Gas Arbitration’,  OGEL, Journal of Oil, Gas and Energy Law  
Intelligence Vol.  3,  (2005),  181-182.  (Hereinafter,  Z.  A.  Alqurashi,  ‘Oil  and  Gas 
Arbitration’)
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Another type of stabilisation clause is often referred to as the intangibility clause. 
In the context of this type of clause, the government may not modify or abrogate the 
contract unless both parties achieve mutual consent. In other words, the host states are 
not allowed to alter the contract without first obtaining the consent of the investor. This 
type of clause freezes the contract between the parties, but not the law of the host state 
in a dispute.  It  is  noteworthy,  that  this  type of clause does not include any explicit 
waiver of legislative sovereignty rather it aims to preclude unilateral modification of the 
contract by the host country.458 In this regard it is worth supplying some illustrative 
examples of the intangibility clause. Article 33 of the concession agreement between the 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi and three Japanese companies provided as follows: ‘The mutual 
consent  of  the  Ruler  and  the  companies  shall  be  required  to  annul  or  modify  the 
provisions of this agreement.’459 Another notable example of an intangibility clause can 
be found in an oil contract between the Government of Qatar and Holcar Oil Company. 
Article  33  of  this  oil  is  a  textbook  example  of  this  type  of  stabilisation  clause.  It  
provides that: ‘without prejudice to the Government’s prerogative of sovereign powers 
the mutual consent of the Parties hereto shall be required to annul, amend or modify the 
provisions of this Agreement.’460
 In  light  of  the  latter  two  examples,  it  is  apparent  that  the  intangible  clause 
requires mutual consent of the parties in order to modify the terms and conditions of the 
agreement. When the nature of the intangibility clause is considered, requirement for 
consent from the parties seems fair and consensual; otherwise the contract would be 
altered at any time by the host state. More importantly, the main differences between the 
two types of clauses described thus far, is that while the stabilisation clause in  stricto  
sensu aims to protect the investor from any host government legislative activities which 
may affect the contract, the latter clause protects investors and prevents host states from 
acting as a unique authority to modify the contract, by requiring mutual consent. 
The third type of stabilisation clauses are hybrid clauses. This type of stabilisation 
clause takes its place in the category of stabilisation clauses which can be regarded as 
‘traditional’. Stabilisation clauses in stricto sensu and intangibility clauses are the main 
components of hybrids. An exemplary case study of how such clauses can be found in 
458 A.  Al-Faruque,  ‘Stability  in  Petroleum  Contracts:  Rhetoric  and  Reality’,  PhD 
Thesis, University of Dundee (2005) 108
459 Article 33 of The Concession Agreement between the  Ruler of Abu Dhabi and  
Maruzen Oil Co. Ltd.; Daikyo Oil Co. Ltd. And Nippon Mining Co. Ltd., 6 December 
1967, Selected Documents of the International Petroleum Industry, 1967, p. 137 cited in 
Z. A. Alqurashi, ‘Oil and Gas Arbitration’ (n.15 above) 181
460Exploration and Product Sharing Agreement between the Government of Qatar and 
Holcar  Oil  Co.,  1  Jan.  1976,  Art.,  33,  Selected  Documents  of  the  International 
Petroleum Industry, 1967, 249, cited in M. Erkan (n.1 above) 105
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combination in a concession agreement is the agreement between Libyan Am. Oil. Co 
and the Libyan Arab Republic. The contract provided that: 
1) The Government of Libya, the Commission and the appropriate 
provincial authorities will take all steps necessary to ensure that the Company 
enjoys all the rights conferred by this Concession shall not be altered except 
by mutual consent of the parties.
2) This  Concession shall  throughout the period of  its  validity be 
constructed in accordance with the Petroleum Law and the Regulations in 
force on the date of execution of the Agreement of Amendment by which this 
[paragraph]  (2)  was  incorporated  in  to  this  Concession  Agreement.  Any 
amendments to or repeal of such regulations shall not affect the contractual 
rights of the Company without consent461.
 Stabilisation  clauses  in  stricto  sensu,  intangibility  and  hybrid  clauses  are  all 
forms  of  freezing  clause  which  are,  in  turn,  categorised  as  traditional  types  of 
stabilisation clause. Generally speaking, the purpose of traditional stabilisation clauses 
is to negate the applicability of a law or fiscal regime. In other words, these traditional 
stabilisation  clauses  are  intended  to  neutralise  the  power  of  a  host  country  by 
safeguarding  an  agreement  from  alteration  or  threat  by  any  subsequent  legislative 
activities undertaken by the host state without first achieving mutual consent. Reference 
to the UN resolution on the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
helps  demonstrate  the  inconsistency with  internationally  sanctioned  principles  these 
types of clauses can represent. 
The resolution regards sovereignty as a unique and inalienable right of the state 
and asserts the free will of states to exercise their power over their natural resources and 
stipulates that such power cannot be restricted by a contract. When juxtaposed with the 
freezing effect traditional stabilisation clauses exert over the applicable law and fiscal 
regime of the contracting state there is an obvious conflict. This contradiction presents 
questions about the validity and efficacy of stabilisation clauses which will be explored 
in more detail in the following section; following an assessment of the second category 
of stabilisation clauses.
Another  type  of  stabilisation  clause  provides  that  the  agreement  between  the 
parties  shall  be  performed  consistently  with  ‘good  will’ or  in  ‘good  faith’,  hence 
precluding unilateral alteration or termination.462 What this means is that the host state 
should avoid unilaterally altering or terminating the contract by using its legislative and 
executive power.463 Furthermore, these type of clauses may be seen ‘…in either a broad 
form or a narrow form that stabilises only limited aspects of the contract, such as the 
461Liamco v. Libya, 62 I.L.R, 170 
462 C. T. Curtis, ‘the Legal Security of Economic Development Agreements’,  Harv.  
Int’l  L.  J.  29  (1998)347;  M.T.  B.  Coale,  ‘Stabilization  Clauses  in  International 
Petroleum Transactions’, Denv. J. Int’l L. &Pol’y 30 (2002) 223; M. Erkan (n.1 above) 
106
463 M. Erkan (n.1 above) 106
119
applicable  tax  regime.464Another  genre  of  stabilisation  clauses  is  the  economic 
equilibrium  clause  which  can  be  categorised  in  modern  stabilisation  clauses.  The 
purpose of this type of clause is to restore economic balance between the host state and 
investor through the application of the renegotiation mechanism.465 Such clauses are 
often  called  interchangeably:  economic  equilibrium  clause,  economic  stabilisation 
clause or balancing clauses.466 An accurate definition of these clauses was provided in 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Agreement:
Economic Equilibrium means the economic value to the Project Participants 
of  the  relative  balance  established  under  the  Project  Agreements  at  the 
applicable  date  between  the  rights,  interests,  exemptions,  privileges, 
protections and other similar benefits provided or granted to such Person and 
concomitant  burdens,  costs,  obligations,  restrictions,  conditions  and 
limitations agreed to be borne by such Person.467
It is fair to say that the main difference between freezing clauses and economic 
equilibrium clauses is the latter’s aim to stabilise the economic return of the investor 
rather  than  stabilise  the  legal  or  fiscal  structure.  In  this  type  of  clause,  the  state  is 
allowed  to  make  changes  and  introduce  new  laws  that  may  have  an  impact  the 
project.468 However, in this scenario, the host government and foreign investor agree on 
the  economic  benefit  the  investor  may  expect  from  the  project  and  pledge  their 
willingness to renegotiate the contract to safeguard the investor’s economic position; 
otherwise  the  host  government  will  be  bound  to  pay  compensation  to  the  foreign 
investor.   In  other  words,  the  economic  equilibrium  clauses  provides  that  ‘if  any 
government action adversely affects the economics of the project for the companies, 
then the terms of the agreement will be readjusted to keep the companies in the same 
financial position as provided by the contract on the date it was signed.’469In contractual 
464 S.M. Schwebel,  Justice in International Law: Selected Writings of Judge Stephen  
M. Schwebel, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1994)  401-415 
465 T. Waelde & G. Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment (n.1 above), 266
466 Please see, P.D Cameron, Tools for Oil & Gas Investors (n.1 above) 74 also see A. 
Al  Faruque  (n.16  above)  100.  It  should  be  noted  that  in  order  to  avoid  any 
terminological  ambiguity,  the  ‘stabilisation  clauses’ in  this  work  cover  all  forms  of 
stabilisation clauses. 
467  Generally see the BTC agreements, Appendix 1 of the Georgian HGA; Appendix 1 
of the Turkish HGA and Appendix 1 of the Azeri HGA
468  According to Shemberg, these Exemptions are not specifically emphasised in the 
contract.  A. Shemberg,  ‘Stabilisation Clause and Human Rights:  A Research Project 
Conducted  for  IFC and  the  United  Nations  Special  Representative  to  the  Secretary 
General on Business and Human Rights’IFC/SRSG Research Paper, 11 May,(2009)Vii.
469 R. D. Bishop, ‘ International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development 
of Lex Petrolea’ , YCA 23 (1998)  1161
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practice, traditional freezing and economic equilibrium clauses are frequently applied 
simultaneously470 within the same contract as well as separately.471 
There is no doubt that when the freezing type is used on its own, it can be every 
effective. Nevertheless, when these two clauses are employed in unison the economic 
equilibrium provision ‘lays  down the outcome of the host state’s breach of promise 
contained freezing clause that it makes to the contracting partner.’472 According to some 
legal scholars, economic equilibrium clauses can be divided into the following three 
categories:473 1) Stipulated economic balancing. 2) Non-specified economic balancing. 
3)  Negotiated  economic  balancing.  Stipulated  economic  balancing  decrees  that  the 
adjustment  made  can  be  automatic  or  achieved  in  the  manner  provided  for  in  the 
agreement.474 
The Model Offshore Production Sharing Agreement of Pakistan best illustrates 
this category:
(a) The  Government  undertakes  to  uphold  the  fiscal  stability  of  this 
Agreement  and  specifically  guarantees  that  the  payments  to  Government 
stipulated in Articles 6.6, 6.9, 9.1, 9.6, XIII, XXIV shall not be amended or 
changed with respect  to  the application  of  this  Agreement.(b)  Where  any 
agency or authority of the Government imposes any tax, cess, fee, duty, levy, 
or other ancillary payment in addition to the guaranteed payments in Article 
31.1(a)  as  required  by  the  laws  of  Pakistan  other  than  those  concerning 
health,  safety  and  environmental  and  related  matters  of  public  interest, 
Government Holdings shall consult with Contractor on appropriate measures 
in order to compensate Contractor for such unfavourable impacts caused by 
such  amendments.  After  having  quantified  the  unfavourable  impacts,  the 
470 A. Shemberg, (n.26 above)19-20
471 A.  F.  M.  Manirruzzaman,  ‘International  Energy  Contracts  and  Cross-Border 
Pipeline  Projects:  Stabilisation,  Renegotiation  and  Economic  Balancing  in  Changed 
Circumstances’, OGEL, Journal of Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence Vol.4-Issue 4 
November (2006) 1
472  Ibid
473 F.  C. Alexander,  ‘The Three Pillars of Security of Investment Under PSCs and 
Other Host Government Contract’, Ch.7 of Institute for Energy Law of the Centre for 
American  and  International  Law’s  54th Annual  Institute  on  Oil  and  Gas  Law 
(publication 640, Release 54), Lexis Nexis Mathew Bender, February 2003, 7.1,7.19; 
See  also  P.D  Cameron,  Tools  for  Oil  &  Gas  Investors (n.1  above)  31;  A.  F.  M. 
Manirruzzaman, International  Energy  Contracts  and Cross-Border  Pipeline  Projects 
( n. 29 above) 1; M. Erkan, (n.1 above) 204
474 F. C. Alexander (n. 31 above) 7.19; P. D. Cameron, Tools for Oil & Gas Investors 
(n.1 above) 31; A. F. M. Manirruzzaman, International Energy Contracts and Cross-
Border Pipeline Projects ( n.29 above) 1; M. Erkan, (n.1 above) 204
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Government Holdings share of Profit Oil and Profit Gas shall be adjusted in 
such a manner that the overall fiscal balance is maintained.475
According  to  Manirruzzaman,  ‘in  stipulated  Economic  Balancing  provisions 
various prescriptions for affecting the balance are stipulated.’476 To this end, it can be 
said that in the above given agreement ‘the Pakistani Model Contract stipulates for the 
adjustment of the government holdings share of the profit oil and profit gas.’477In the 
case of non-specified economic balancing, there is no need to supply in the agreement 
for the manner of such adjustments or to stipulate that it ought to be the result of mutual 
agreement of the contracting parties.478 The Azerbaijan PSA of 1998 offers a practical 
example:
[In] the event that any Governmental Authority invokes any present or future 
law,  treaty,  intergovernmental  agreement,  decree  or  administrative  order 
which contravenes the provision of this agreement or adversely or positively 
affects  the  rights  or  interests  of  Contractor  hereunder,  including,  but  not 
limited  to,  any  changes  in  tax  legislation,  regulations,  or  administrative 
practice, or jurisdictional changes pertaining to the Contract Area, the terms 
of this Agreement shall be adjusted to re-establish the economic equilibrium 
of the Parties, and if the rights or interests of Contractor have been adversely 
affected, then SOCAR [The National Company] shall indemnify Contractor 
(and  its  assignees)  for  any  disbenefit,  deterioration  in  economic 
circumstances, loss or damages that ensure therefrom.479.
With regard to the above cited contract, Cameron asserts that ‘the role of SOCAR 
in the contract underlines an important point. In a number of cases the host country’s 
NOC will play a central role in the operation of fiscal stabilisation. It may provide for 
adjustment by paying any additional taxes out of its share of profit petroleum or royalty 
under a PSA or it may reimburse the IOC directly out of general revenues. Under a rate  
of return system, the NOC could pay from its share of royalty and/or excess profits 
tax.’480
475 [Undated] Art. XXXI cited in A. F. M. Manirruzzaman, (n.29 above) 4, for further 
details please see footnote n. 8 of the author’s article.
476 A.F.M. Manirruzzaman, International Energy Contracts and Cross-Border Pipeline  
Project ( n. 29 above) 6
477 Ibid
478 F.C. Alexander (n.31 above) 7.19; P. D. Cameron,  Tools for Oil & Gas Investors 
(n.1 above)31; A. F. M. Manirruzzaman, International Energy Contracts and Cross-
Border Pipeline Projects ( n. 29 above) 2; M. Erkan, (n.1 above) 204
479 The Azerbaijan Union Texas/Commonwealth Production Sharing Agreement, 1998, 
Art 22(2), cited in M. Erkan(n.1 above) 205
480 P. D. Cameron, Tools for Oil & Gas Investors (n.1 above)36; M. Erkan, (n.1 above) 
204
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As  a  third  category,  negotiated  economic  balancing  offers  the  opportunity  to 
contracting  parties  to  meet  and  discuss  how amendments  ought  to  be  made  to  the 
contract in the event of host state intervention which has the potential to adversely affect 
the  original  equilibrium of  the  contract.481 The  following  serve  as  examples  of  the 
practical  application  of  the  negotiated  economic  balancing  type  of  economic 
equilibrium clauses. 
Article 17.1 of the Vietnam Model Product Sharing Contracts of 2004:
If  after  the  effective  date,  existing  laws  and  regulations  are  amended  or 
annulled new laws and regulation are introduced in Vietnam,…in any case 
adversely affecting the economic rights or benefits expected by the contractor 
from this ,.. the parties shall meet and consult promptly with each other and  
make such changes to this contract as  are necessary both to maintain the 
Contractor’s rights, benefits and interests hereunder and to ensure that any 
revenues  or  incomes  or  profits,…  derived  or  to  be  derived  under  this 
contract…  shall  not  in  any  way  be  diminished  as  a  result  of  such 
changes…482 (emphasis added)
The Egyptian concession agreement 2002, which includes the following provisions: 
In  case  of  changes  in  existing legislation or  regulations  applicable  to  the 
conduct of Exploration, Development and production of Petroleum, which 
take  place  after  the  Effective  Date,  and  which  significantly  affect  the 
economic  interest of this Agreement to the detriment of or which imposes on 
CONTRACTOR an  obligation  to  remit  to  the  A.R.E.  (Arab  Republic  of 
Egypt)  the  proceeds  from  sales  of  CONTRACTOR’s  Petroleum, 
CONTRACTOR shall notify EGPC (the NOC) of the subject legislative or 
regulatory  measure.  In  such  case,  the  Parties  shall  negotiate  possible  
modifications to this Agreement designed to restore the economic balance  
thereof which existed on the Effective Date.  The Parties shall use their best 
efforts to agree on amendments to this Agreement within ninety (90) days 
from aforesaid notice. These amendments to this Agreement shall not in any 
event diminish or increase the rights or obligations of CONTRACTOR as 
these were  agreed on the Effective Date.   Failing agreement  between the 
Parties during the period referred to above in this Article XIX, the dispute 
may  be  submitted  to  arbitration,  as  provided  in  Article  XXIV  of  this 
Agreement.’483(Emphasis added)
481 F. C. Alexander (n. 31 above ) 7.19; P. D. Cameron, Tools for Oil & Gas Investors 
(n.1 above) 31; A. F. M. Manirruzzaman, International Energy Contracts and Cross-
Border Pipeline Projects ( n. 29 above) 2; M. Erkan, (n.1 above) 205
482 Article 17.1 of the Vietnam Model Product Sharing Contracts of 2004, cited in A. 
Faruque (n.16 above) 100
483  Concession  Agreement  of  2002  for  Petroleum  Exploration  and  Exploitation 
between Egypt & Egypt General Petroleum Corporations & Dover Investments Limited 
(East WadiAraba Area Gulf of Suez) Barrows Company Inc., cited in P. D. Cameron, 
Tools  for  Oil  & Gas Investors (n.1 above)  31-32;  See also  A.F.M. Manirruzzaman, 
International Energy Contracts and Cross-Border Pipeline Projects ( n. 29 above) 4; 
M. Erkan(n.1 above) 206
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An additional example of the negotiated economic balancing category can be found in 
the Qatar Model of Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement, 1994: 
Whereas the financial position of the Contractor has been based, under the 
agreement, on the laws and regulations in force at the Effective Date, it is 
agreed  that,  if  any  future  law,  decree  or  regulation  affects  Contractor’s 
financial position, and in particular if the customs duties exceed . . . percent 
during the term of the Agreement, both Parties shall enter into negotiations, 
in  good  faith,  in  order  to  reach  an  equitable  solution  that  maintains  the 
economic equilibrium of this Agreement. Failing to reach agreement on such 
equitable solution, the matter may be referred by either Party to arbitration 
pursuant to Article 31.484
The use of a stabilisation clause by contracting parties as a method of economic 
balancing is in frequent use not only in petroleum production sharing contracts but also 
in  cross-border  pipeline  projects.  The  BTC Agreement  also  contained  an  economic 
equilibrium provision no less typical than the previously cited examples: 
The State Authorities are to take all actions available to them to restore the 
Economic Equilibrium established under the Project Agreements if and to the 
extent the Economic Equilibrium is disrupted or negatively affected, directly 
or indirectly, as a result of any change (whether the change is specific to the  
Project or of general application) in host government’s law (including Taxes, 
health, safety and the environment), including changes resulting from:
• The amendment, repeal, withdrawal, termination or expiration of the host 
government’s law;
• The enactment, promulgation or issues of the host government’s law;
• The interpretation or application of the host government’s law(whether by 
courts, the executive or legislative authorities, or administrative or regulatory 
bodies);
• The decision, policies or other similar actions of judicial bodies, Tribunals 
and courts, the State Authorities;
• Jurisdictional alterations; and
• The failure or refusal of judicial bodies, Tribunals and courts, and/ or the 
State  Authorities  to  take  action,  exercise  authority  or  enforce  the  host 
government’s law (a ‘ change in law’) 
The  foregoing  obligation[s]  of  the  State  Authorities  to  take  all  actions 
available to restore the Economic Equilibrium are to include the obligation to 
take all appropriate measures to resolve promptly by whatever means may be 
necessary, including by way of exemption, legislation, decree and/or other 
authoritative acts, any conflict or anomaly between any Project Agreement 
and the host government’s law.485
484 Article 34.12 Equilibrium of the Agreement, Borrows Company Basic Oil Laws 
and Concession Contracts, Middle East, Supplement 124 (1994) 1 cited in P. Bernardini 
(n.3 above), 110;  See also M. Erkan (n.1 above) 206
485 Article 7.2 (x) of The Georgian HGA; Article 21.2 of The Turkish HGA; Article 
20.2 of The Azeri HGA
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  Undoubtedly,  economic  equilibrium  clauses  are  more  convenient  than  the 
freezing clause type of stabilisation clauses in terms of their ease of application and 
functionality. In order to better understand their special character, a comparison should 
be made in this respect. Traditional stabilisation clauses are designed to protect alien 
investors by freezing the legal situation in the host state on the point of signing the 
contract. Due to their function of freezing the legal regime in the host state, such clauses 
constitute  a  challenge  to  the  principle  of  state  sovereignty.486 Conversely,  economic 
balancing clauses do not pose such a threat to the principle of state sovereignty and 
instead provide a flexible and dynamic contractual framework for the parties over the 
course  of  the  investment  project  in  case  the  host  country  changes  the  economic 
conditions by sovereign act.487
In recent years,  the use of economic equilibrium clauses in energy investment 
contracts has surged in popularity worldwide488 ‘mainly because of their flexibility and 
versatility.’489 Key to this popularity is the fact that while this type of clause does not 
strip  the  host  state  of  its  legislative  freedoms  it  still  allows  the  investor  room for 
manoeuvre.  From the  perspective  of  the host  government  the state  can  maintain its 
sovereign  power  over  natural  resources  and  can  adopt  new  laws  to  improve  its 
sustainable development goals.  For international investors,  the application of such a 
clause  can  provide  protection  and  prospects  than  freezing  clauses.  Professor 
Manurizzaman explains why the use of economic equilibrium clause has taken root. 
According to the author:
The  reason  for  the  increasing  tendency  of  International  Oil  Companies 
(IOCs) to favour economic balancing provision lies  in the fact  that  if  the 
State’s  unilateral  acts  adversely affect  the  contract  the  available  remedies 
could be more favourable under the freezing clauses. Thus the breach of a 
freezing clause itself may result in only lump sum damages which could be  
far  below what  the IOC would consider  would be necessary to   ‘keep it  
whole’,  whereas  in  economic  balancing  clauses  the  provision  for 
‘Government Pays’, ‘Government indemnifies’ is design to ‘ keep whole’ the 
IOC on an on-going basis.490
486 Please see the validity issue of traditional stabilisation clauses in the section 4 of 
this chapter. 
487K. B. Berger, ‘Renegotiation and adaptation of International Investment Contracts: 
The Role of the Contract Drafters and Arbitrators’,  Vand. J. Transnat’I. L. 36(2003) 
1360-1361 ; M. Erkan (n.1 above) 208
488 P.D Cameron, Tools for Oil & Gas Investors (n.1 above) 31
489 L. Cotulo, Investment Contracts through development Lens, in   E. Blanco & J. 
Razzaque, Natural Resources and the Green Economy: Re-defining the Challenges for  
People, States and Corporations, (Leiden: MatinusNijhoff Publisher, 2012) 31.
490  A. F. M Manirruzzaman, A Critical Appraisal of Emerging Trends, (n.1 above) 126
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It  should  not  be  disregarded  that  in  the  event  of  unilateral  action  by  the  host 
government, the parties of the investment contract are under obligation to renegotiate in 
good faith for the sake of re-establishing the original economic balance.491
This discussion would be incomplete without mention of the functionality of such 
clauses. According to Nwente, economic equilibrium clauses play a significant role in 
the contract because they ‘reconcile the needs of the government and the investor by 
ensuring stability and flexibility through the adaptation of the petroleum contract to a 
change in circumstance, while at the same time maintaining the economic equilibrium 
of the project.’492 Setting aside the flexible and dynamic nature of economic equilibrium 
clauses, it is important to ascertain whether those clauses are effective enough in every 
possible  circumstance.  According  to  Nwente,  economic  equilibrium clauses  are  not 
efficient enough at dealing with changes in circumstances brought about by unexpected 
events  outside  a  change  in  law  or  regulations,  for  instance  marginal  discovery  or 
fluctuations in price.493 For this reason, equilibrium clauses ought to distinguish external 
events from the events that arise from state action.494
The next section examines the legal value and function of stabilisation clauses in 
the energy investment agreements.
4.      Legal Importance and Functional Value of Stabilisation Clauses
Throughout section three the main concepts and arguments around the validity 
and effectiveness of stabilisation clauses were discussed with the benefit of scholarly 
opinion, case law and the view of interview participants in this study.  Furthermore, 
‘questions concerning state responsibility for measures affecting contractual rights of an 
alien (individual or corporation) depend primarily on the law governing the particular 
contractual relationship between state and alien.’495 It is true that stabilisation clauses in 
an investment  contract  freeze the content  of the applicable law,  because when alien 
investors negotiate with a host state, the foreign investor often feels the need to protect 
itself from the legislative power of its contractual partner.496 For that reason, this section 
491 Ibid
492 B.  Nwete,  ‘  To  what  Extent  Can  Renegotiation  Clauses  Achieve  Stability  and 
Flexibility in Petroleum Development Contracts’ I.E.L.T.R. (2006) 56
493 B. Nwete (n.50 above)59
494 M. Erkan (n.1 above) 208
495 F.  V.  G.  Amador,  ‘State  Responsibility  in  Case  of  Stabilization  Clauses’,  2  J.  
Transnat’l L. &Pol’y23 (1993) 23
496E.Gaillard& J. Savage,  Fauchard Gaillard Goldman On International Commercial  
Arbitration, (The Hague, The Kluwer International, 1999) 795
126
will  also  point  out  the  validity  and  effectiveness  of  stabilisation  clauses  under  the 
applicable law.
4.1    Validity of Stabilisation Clauses 
There is no obstacle to a host state entering into a contractual relationship which 
contains stabilisation provision as long as the clause complies with its constitutional and 
legislative requirements.497  Stabilisation clauses may be regarded as a valid provision in 
a contract if the contract is legitimately signed by a host state or a state-owned company. 
However, in some cases a problem may occur if the contract is not signed properly by 
the  contracting  state  itself.498 According  to  Waelde,  a  state,  that  grants  contractual 
guarantees in the absence of legal authority, may result in ultravires:
Contractual  drafting  techniques  cannot  modify  and  expand  the  powers 
existing under constitutional and other law for government and legislature to 
make commitments not to exercise their sovereignty and legislative rights. 
No argument can be advanced by a foreign investor that he had a legitimate 
expectation  in  the  validity  of  such  clauses  negotiated  in  the  face  of 
questionable legal validity to the extent that he can easily (applying due legal 
diligence  )  ascertain  their  invalidity  under  their  national  law  .  Clauses 
negotiated under the shadow of ultravires and constitutional invalidity cannot 
generate valid rights simply by appearance or legitimate reliance on the state 
agency’s contracting powers.499
For  this  reason,  the  validity,  or  the  extent  of  validity,  of  stabilisation  clauses 
should be deemed in the context of the specific circumstances of each case.500Taking 
into account the considerations outlined above, it is opportune to examine an important 
court  decision.  In  the SPP Ltd vs.  Egypt case,501 a  joint  venture project  was signed 
between the state authorities and the foreign investor. Technically, the state authorities 
entered into the contract on behalf of the host state. The tribunal held that the host state 
was not the signatory party of this contract, because the officials and agents signed the 
contract on behalf of the minister and host state. Thus, the state was not responsible for 
the unauthorised or ultravires acts of its officials and agents. Somewhat controversially, 
the reason the court gave for deeming the act of the host government officials to be 
497W. Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements: 2nd 
Revised and Enlarged Edition (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995) 221
498 Ibid
499 T. Waelde & G. Ndi Stabilizing International Investment (n.1 above) 242
500A.  F.  Manirruzzaman,  ‘National  Laws  providing  Stability  of  International 
Investment Contracts: A Comparative Perspective’,  Journal of World Investment and  
Trade,  1-9  (2007)  7  (Hereinafter,  A.  F.  Manirruzzaman,  National  Laws  providing 
Stability)
501SSP Ltd vs. Egypt (1983) 22 ILM 752
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ultravires was that the government agents and officials in question lacked the authority 
to commit to such contractual obligations on behalf of the state.502 El-Kosheri and Riad 
support this argument: ‘the legality of the stabilization clauses can only be established 
on the basis of a public law rule which authorizes the contracting governmental party to 
include  such clauses  in  the development  agreement  and to  be bound thereby’.503 In 
summary, it can be said that stabilisation clauses inserted in a contract would not be 
regarded as valid unless agreed to and signed by an authority explicitly invested with 
the authority to do so.
Before  examining  the  validity  of  stabilisation  clauses  under  national  and 
international law, it is significant to mention the relationship between applicable law 
and  stabilisation  clauses.  An  interaction  exists  between  applicable  law  clauses  and 
stabilisation clauses since they both modify the law governing the contract, albeit in 
different ways.504 There is no doubt that international law principles are, by definition, 
those that which will be applied by an arbitrator in the context of investor-state disputes 
or  agreements,  unless  the  parties  of  the  contract  or  agreement  have  specifically 
determined the applicable law in the agreement in the case that such a disagreement 
should arise.505 Thus, it has been suggested that stabilisation clauses in addenda to an 
investment agreement governed by domestic law will lack the validity of stabilisation 
clauses.506 It should be noted that this issue is not a paradox, because parties are able to 
agree on a specific law to govern the contract, by a choice of law clause which indicates 
that international law is applicable to the agreement. 
To  this  end,  it  can  be  said  that  determination  of  the  applicable  law  of  an  energy 
investment contract is of significant importance to both the alien investor and the host 
state.  While host states would often prefer their  national law to apply to the energy 
investment  contract,  it  is  in  the  interests  of  the  alien  investor  that  the  legal  order 
imposed  is  the  one  that  is  best  able  to  provide  a  stable  and  predictable  legal 
environment.507
502 M. Erkan, (n.1 above) 109
503  A. El Kosheri & T. Riad, ‘The Law Governing a New Generation of Petroleum 
Contracts’,  ICSID Rev. 1(1986): 259, 266; see also W. Peter, (n.55 above ) 222; M. 
Erkan (n.1 above), 109
504 A.  Al-Faruque,  ‘Typologies,  Efficacy  and  Political  Economy  of  Stabilisation 
Clauses: A Critical Appraisal’, OGEL, Journal of Oil and Gas Energy Law Intelligence 
Vol.  4,  Issue  5  November  (2007)  33,  available  at: 
<www.gasandoil.com/ogel/>December 2010
505 E. Witten, ‘Arbitration of Venezuelan Oil Contracts: A Losing Strategy?’4Tex. J.  
Oil, Gas & Energy L.  (2009) 55, 64
506 F.V. G. Amador, (n.53 above), 48-49
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Naturally, each party in such a situation would seek to convince the other to adopt 
the  law which  offers  them the  most  security  and confidence.  Therefore,  reaching a 
consensus on the applicable law between parties is often no mean feat and relies on the 
bargaining power and negotiating skills of each party. This competing interest in the 
choice of law can be a cause of disputes between contracting parties, however, it should 
be  taken  into  consideration  that  when  conflict  arises  with  regard  to  choosing  the 
applicable  law,  both  parties  may choose  ‘a  combined solution of  domestic  law and 
international rules’.508 In fact, the legal validity and effectiveness of stabilisation clauses 
included in investment contracts or agreements is a complex issue.509 The difficulty has 
been  explained  by  Waelde  and  Ndi  as  ‘…one  of  the  most  complex  issues  in 
international  economic  law  in  view  of  the  fact  that  standards  of  arguments  from 
international law (state responsibility, law of treaties) of national law, of conflict of law, 
both international and national conflict  of laws and possibly of an ‘international  lex  
mercatori’ come  together  and  can  be  arguably  applied.’510 Thus  the  following  sub-
sections examine the issue of the validity of stabilisation clauses under national and 
international laws.
 4.1.1 The Validity of Stabilisation Clauses under Domestic Law
Historically,  most  disputes  arose  from  concession  contracts  governed  by  the 
national law of the contracting state.511 Nevertheless, more recently,  a new approach 
known  as  ‘internationalised’ contract  has  taken  root.  Since  it  includes  stabilisation 
clauses, it cannot be subject to the domestic law of the contracting state.512 Nevertheless, 
it should not be forgotten that even if the contract between the parties is governed by 
international  law,  this  will  not  provide  full  guarantees  of  stability  for  the  contract 
because the sovereign right to intervene in a contract when significant interests are at 
stake is recognised in international law.513 To this end, it can be said that if the contract 
507 R.  Dolzer  &  C.  Schreur,  Principles  of  International  Investment  Law,  2nd edn. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 81
508  F.  N.  Botchway,  Natural  Resource  Investment  and  Africa’s  Development, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2011) 124
509 T. Waelde & G. Ndi, Stabilising International Investment (n.1 above) 238
510 Ibid.
511M. T. B. Coale, (n.20 above) 223.  It is note worth that according to recent survey 
there are a number of petroleum contracts governed by the host state’s law. Please see 
M. Erkan (n.1 above) 110.
512M.  E.  Dickstein,  ‘Revitalizing  the  International  Law  Governing  Concession 
Agreements’, 6 Int’l Tax & Bus. Law, (1988) 54
513 A. Faruque, (n.13 above)334 ;  C. Greenwood, State Contracts in International Law: 
The Libyan Oil Arbitrations, Brit. Y. B. Int’l L. 63 (1982) 53
129
between the parties is governed exclusively by the domestic law of the contracting state, 
‘constitutional and legal constraints on the contractual capacity of that state may have 
significant legal implications for the validity and enforcement stabilisation clause’514 In 
addition,  it  is  worth  noting  that  many  countries  have  established  significant  legal 
principles that ‘have the effect of invalidating a stabilisation clause and making it of no 
legal effect.’515
The established principle which invalidates stabilisation clauses in national law is 
that the executive organ or parliament of the state may not be constrained or prevented 
by a contract from performing functions vital to its existence.516 This legal principle is 
adopted in English Common Law and is applicable in many states which have adopted 
the common law system as part of their internal law. The establishment of this principle 
was in the Apmhitre vs. The King: ‘It is not competent for the government to fetter the 
execution  of  an  action,  which  must  necessarily  be  determined  by the  needs  of  the 
community when the question arises. It cannot by contract, hamper its freedom of action 
in maters which concern the welfare of the State’517 and is  also applicable in  many 
common law states. It is fair to assume that if the contract is subject to the national law 
of the contracting state which is, in turn, governed by common law, the courts of such 
countries will deem a stabilisation clause to be invalid.518
It should be noted that the insertion of a stabilisation clause in an agreement is not 
necessarily the best way to provide stability for host states because such stability can 
also be bestowed upon investors through legislative enactments.519 At first  glance,  it 
514 A. Faruque (n.13 above) 333
515 A. D. Nwokolo, ‘ Is There a Legal and Functional Value For Stabilisation Clause 
inInternational Petroleum Agreements?’ available at: 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/car/html/car8_article27.pdf>May. 2011
516 T. Waelde & G. Ndi, Stabilising International Investment (n.1 above) 238; see also 
A.  F.  M.  Maniruzzaman,  ‘State  Contracts  with  Aliens:  the  Question  of  Unilateral 
Change  by the  State  in  Contemporary  International  Law’,  Journal  of  International  
Arbitration 9,no.4 (1992)141
517RaderiakiebolagetAmpitritev.The King[1921] 3 K.B. 500, 5003-504
518 T. W. Waelde & G. Ndi, Fiscal Regime Stability and Issues of State Sovereignty in  
Taxation of  Mineral  Enterprises, J.  Otto edn.,  (London:  Graham and Trot-man Ltd, 
1995) 76 (Hereinafter, W.Waelde & G. Ndi, Fiscal Regime)
519 The petroleum industry has witnessed a significant number of developing states’ 
specific  laws or  provisions  which support  stability under  their  national  law system. 
Generally speaking, they made provisions for stability for hydrocarbon laws or specific 
codes in order to attract alien investors into their countries. For instance, Timor-Leste, 
Papua  New Guinea,  Peru,  Panama,  Ivory  Coast,  Bolivia,  Venezuela,  Columbia  and 
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could be assumed that if  the domestic law of the host state recognises international 
agreements with stabilisation clauses, the clause is valid under the law of that state. 
Nevertheless, even if the state authorises stabilisation clauses inserted in international 
agreements, such statutory guarantees can be revoked or altered on the basis of public 
need  and  in  the  exercise  of  the  host  state’s  power  of  sovereignty.520 According  to 
Waelde:  ‘the legislator  can take what  he has given;  in  other  worlds,  nothing would 
prevent  the  national  legislature  to  retroactively  cancel  and  revoke  rights  awarded, 
subject possibly,  to constitutional and other legal consequences, e.g. the duty to pay 
compensation under national law.’521
As discussed above, a stabilisation clause protects the contract from legislative or 
regulatory changes. However, the question of how such changes made by the legislative 
power in the interpretation of the same provision would be evaluated is unclear.522 In 
some  cases,  such  changes  made  by the  legislating  power,  may indeed  have  effects 
similar to the enactment of a new provision.523 The recent case of  Duke Energy vs.  
Peru524 neatly illustrates the relationship between a stabilisation clause and a change in 
the  interpretation  of  domestic  tax  law.  In  this  case,  the  claimant  asserted  that  the 
Peruvian Government had imposed a tax assessment which breached the guarantee of 
stability that was provided in a Legal Stability Agreement. According to the tribunal’s 
view, the continuity of the existing provisions not only covered a change of specific 
laws or  regulations,  but  it  also  encompassed changes  in  interpretation.  The tribunal 
finally  held  that  the  Peruvian  government  was  liable  for  its  breach  of  the  tax 
stabilisation to which it had previously agreed. 
Consequently,  the  legal  status  of  stabilisation  clauses  is  commonly  rendered 
invalid by most domestic law systems. If a guarantee of stability is regarded as valid 
under national law, their continuity is determined by the legislature of the host state.525 
As previously mentioned, the security stabilisation clauses offer may be granted by the 
Kazakhstan  are  good  examples  of  countries  which  provide  stability  and  enable 
stabilisation provisions under their legal system. The information is also available in A. 
F. Manirruzzaman, National Laws providing Stability (n. 58 above)1
520 T. Waelde & G. Ndi Stabilising International Investment (n.1 above) 239 
521 ibid
522 J. E. Vinuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 342.
523 ibid
524 Duke Energy International Peru Investments No 1 Ltd vs. Peru ICSID Case No 
ARB/03/28, Final Award, 25 July 2008
525T. Waelde & G. Ndi (n.1 above) 239.
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host state to the investor under their internal law. However, it should be borne in mind 
that although the stabilisation clause is granted by the host government, as some authors 
have pointed out, the rules of the game may always change after the match started.526 
For  instance,  host  states  may  subsequently  invalidate  the  stabilisation  clause  with 
retroactive effect.527 When such a situation occurs under domestic or international law, 
the protection of property rights against direct and indirect expropriation would become 
an imminent priority.528
In light of this discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that most developing states 
which grant concession agreements seek to govern the contract in accordance with their 
national law system. Even if the host state’s governmental action does not breach the 
contract  and  complies  with  domestic  law,  the  government  may  wield  the  greater 
authority of its sovereignty against contract terms no longer in its interests to honour 
and may change the contract with or perhaps without compensation to alien investors. It 
goes without saying that knowledge of this fact boosts the host state’s confidence when 
a  dispute  arises  between  the  parties.  Contrary  to  the  wishes  of  the  host  state, 
international energy investors may seek to internationalise the agreement and convince 
the host government that international law should be the governing law of the contract. 
In these circumstances, the typical behaviour of petroleum investors is to err on the side 
of caution by doing whatever necessary to ensure that should a dispute arise, potential 
misinterpretation of stabilisation clauses in national courts  by local judges that may 
render  the  clause  invalid  are  avoided.  Another  reason  why  investors  wish  to 
internationalise the contract is that if a dispute arises between the contracting parties, a 
private investor may want to defend its case under the dispute resolution mechanisms of 
international law with a selected independent arbitrator in an unbiased environment. 
4.1.2 The Validity of Stabilisation Clauses under International Law
Undoubtedly, international law is able to offer a high degree of protection to both 
the  host  state  and  a  private  investor  when  conflict  arises  between  the  parties. 
Nevertheless, such protection may not be benefitted from by either of the parties unless 
it  is  selected as the governing law of  the agreement.529 Thus,  private  investors  may 
attempt to control the effects of host state legislation to some degree by insisting that the 
state accepts that not only the host state’s domestic law should be applicable but also the 
general  principles  of  international  law.530 In  this  respect,  by  providing  proper 
recognition to a state’s interest in applying its own domestic law, such a choice fetters 
526 A. Shapira& M. Tabory, New Political Entities in Public and Private International  
Law,With  Special  Reference  to  Palestinian  Entity,  (The  Hague:  Kluwer  Law 
International, 1999) 315
527 T. Waelde & G. Ndi Stabilising International Investment (n.1 above) 239
528 Ibid 
529 J.  Crawford  &  W.  Johnson,  ‘Arbitrating  with  Foreign  States  and  Their 
Instrumentalities’,  Int’l  Fin.  L.  Rev.  5  (1986)  11,  12  cited  in  T.  Waelde  & G.  Ndi 
Stabilising International Investment (n.1 above) 241.
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the state’s ability to modify or enforce the law arbitrarily, to the detriment of the private 
investor.531 In  their  quest  to  achieve  a  better  level  of  protection,  private  investors 
frequently seek to internationalise the agreement. In that respect, there is a need to argue 
whether the insertion of a stabilisation clause in a host government contract is valid 
under international law when international law is selected as the governing law of the 
contract and where international investment tribunals stand regarding this question.
As  far  as  the  validity  of  stabilisation  clauses  under  international  law  are 
concerned, two significant concepts exist: the doctrine of sanctity of contracts (pacta 
sunt  servanda)  and  the  principle  of  the  state’s  permanent  sovereignty  over  natural 
wealth and resources.532  Three divergent views have surfaced in discussions regarding 
the validity of stabilisation clauses under international law; however, no dominant view 
has emerged as prevalent to settle the issue. Notwithstanding the facts that a significant 
number of arbitral practices have taken place and a prescriptive approach to the validity 
issue of stabilisation clauses under international law has been drafted.
4.1.2.1 The theory of Internationalised Contracts
The theory of the internationalisation of contracts poses some of the most difficult 
questions that bear relation to both public and private international law.533 The theory 
suggests  that  no  matter  whether  the  parties  decide  which  law governs  the  contract; 
international law may override their choice and is automatically applied in the event of a 
dispute.534  In  other  words,  the  rights  and obligations  of  the  contracting  parties  are 
governed in accordance with international law rules. One school of legal scholars has 
articulated the opinion that the principle recommending the choice of international law 
as the governing law of the contract is to render applicable specific international norms, 
in particular the doctrine of the sanctity of contract (pacta sunt servanda).535
The foundation of this view is that any unilateral breach of contract, including 
stabilisation  clauses  made  by  the  host  state  under  the  contract  directly  holds  the 
contracting responsible under international law.536 Therefore, the contractual rights of 
530 M. L. Moses, The principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 63
531 A.  Redfern  &  M.  Hunter,  Law  and  Practice  of  International  Commercial  
Arbitration, (Bath: Sweet & Maxwell: 2004)92 cited in  M. L. Moses (n.88 above) 63
532 T. W. Waelde (n. 83 above) 31
533 A. F. M. Manirruzzaman, State Contracts with Aliens (n.74 above) 309
534 Ibid
535T. Waelde & G. Ndi Stabilising International Investment (n.1 above) 239.
536 A. D. Nwokolo( n.73 above), 11 ; For the further discussion on this view see also L. 
T.  Kissam&  E.K.  Leach,  ‘Sovereign  Expropriation  of  Property  and  abrogation  of 
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investors cannot be unfavourably affected by the unilateral action of the host state. In 
order to avoid any unilateral modification ‘investors and his counsel should attempt to 
internationalise the contract.’537 To this end, it can be said that the internationalisation of 
contracts is a method to ‘deny effect’ to unilateral changes made by states, the legal 
justification  being  the  ‘unrestricted  application  of  the  principle  of  pacta  sunt  
servanda.538The  pacta sunt servanda principle was articulated by Professor Wehberg, 
who stated ‘the principle is valid exactly in the same manner, whether it is in respect of 
contracts  between  states  or  in  respect  of  contracts  between  states  and  private 
companies.’539
It is apparent that according to supporters of this view, international law is the 
rightful governing law of the contract and that stabilisation clauses have a binding effect 
and are valid under international law. They imply that any unilateral actions made by 
host  states  which  violate  contractual  obligations  should  be  regarded  as  unlawful, 
deeming this to be in accordance with the ruling of international law. The view of the 
second group of scholars differs from the first group of writers, as the second group of 
commentators believe that internationalising contracts is in conflict with the principle of 
permanent sovereignty.
4.1.2.2 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources Norm 
Some legal scholars hold the view that stabilisation clauses with the intended aim 
of freezing the applicable law are invalid under international law because the state has 
the right to modify or abrogate the contract entered into with a foreign investor.540 This 
second  group  of  writers’ view  is  rooted  in  the  principle  of  the  state’s  permanent 
sovereignty  under  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  and  in  the  following 
Concession Contracts’   Fordham Law Review28 (1959) 177-178, and C. Greenwood 
(n.71 above), 61; K. Carlston, ‘Concession Contracts and Nationalization’, Am.  J. Int’l  
L. 52 (1958) 260,260.
537 E.  Paasivirta,  ‘Internationalisation  and  Stabilization  of  Contracts  Versus  State 
Sovereignty’,  60 BYIL  (1989) 315, 317
538  D.  Suratgar,  ‘Considerations  affecting  Choice  of  Law  Clauses  in  Contracts 
Between Governments and Foreign Nationals’, Indian Journal of International Law, 2 
(1962), 273, 302
539  H. Wehberg, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda’, American Journal of International Law, 53 
(1959),775,786 
540 M. Sornarajah, ‘International Contract Law?’, J. World Trade L. 15 (1981) 187,189 
cited  in  T.  J.  Pate,   ‘Evaluating  Stabilization  Clauses  in  Venezuela's  Strategic 
Association Agreements for Heavy-Crude Extraction in the Orinoco Belt: The Return of 
a  Forgotten  Contractual  Risk  Reduction  Mechanism  for  the  Petroleum  Industry’, 
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,Vol 40, No. 2 (2009) 351 ; see also T. 
W.Waelde &  Ndi Stabilising International Investment (n.1 above) 244
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pronouncement:  ‘The description of  this  sovereignty as  permanent  signifies  that  the 
territorial  State  never  loses  its  legal  capacity to  change the status  or  the method of 
exploitation of those resources, regardless of any arrangement that have been made.’541 
The crux of the matter,  in this  view is that by being a part  of an agreement which 
includes stabilisation provisions, this creates binding obligations on states;  therefore, 
they  cannot  waive  their  sovereign  rights  under  the  principle  of  permanent 
sovereignty.542In other words: ‘Indeed a State is able to bind itself towards another State 
to exercise its sovereign power to legislate insofar as this would lead to a violation of 
duties which it has established by agreement of an international character. But this does 
not entail the consequences that a state can by a contract with an individual or with a 
company limited by shares bind itself  to abstain from a full  exercise of its  right to 
legislate.’543
This  view  holds  that  stabilisation  clauses  are  invalid  under  international  law 
because such clauses cannot prevent a state from exercising its sovereign power for the 
public good. As mentioned in the second chapter, the exercise of such power may be 
relevant to human rights, environmental protection or any other issues which could be 
considered vital to the interests of the state and the protection of its citizens and natural 
environment. The principle of the State’s permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and 
resources is a Juscogens norm; therefore no derogation is allowed.544 As the constitution 
is hierarchically the highest law in a state; it therefore may not be possible to say that a  
state  cannot  bind  itself  by  a  contract  made  with  an  alien  investor  and  restrain  its 
legislative  power.545 In  other  words,  the  legislature  cannot  be  bound  by  its  own 
preceding legislation and always possesses the right to change it.546 On the topic of 
permanent sovereignty of states over their natural resources and wealth, divergent views 
exist which have been the subject of animated debate by scholars. Before setting out 
these views, the effects of the resolutions of the UN on natural wealth and resources and 
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) of states on the binding 
force of host government contract should be reviewed. 
541  E. Jiminez de Arechaga, ‘State Responsibility of Nationalisation of Foreign Owned 
Property’, N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. &Pol. (1978) 179-180 
542 T. W. Waelde &  Ndi Stabilising International Investment, (n.1 above) 244
543 M. Wolff, Some Observations on the Autonomy of Contracting parties in Conflict 
of Laws, in:  Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol. 35 (1949) 143-150 cited in E. 
Paasivirta (n.95 above) 319 
544 I. Brownlie, (n.2 above) 489. 
545 M. Sornarahaj, ( n.10 above) 282
546 ibid
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As mentioned in the second chapter, the principle of the permanent sovereignty of 
states over natural resources in their territory was formally recognised and documented 
by the UN General Assembly Resolution, 1803.547 Article (1) of the resolution declares 
that  ‘[t]he  right  of  peoples  and nations  to  permanent  sovereignty over  their  natural 
wealth and resources must be exercised in interest  of their  national development…’ 
what is understood from this article is that states are free to exercise extraction of their  
natural resources and free to sell them to second or third parties. Furthermore, Article 4 
of the resolution bestows upon states the right to nationalise, expropriate or requisition 
property as long as such activities are done for a public purposes, security or national 
interest  and prompt and adequate compensation is paid. Article (8) of the resolution 
clearly declares that ‘[international]  investment agreement  freely entered into by,  or  
between,  sovereign  States  shall  be  observed  in  good  faith;  States  and  international 
organisations shall strictly and conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and 
nations over their natural wealth and resources…’ 548. (Italic added). To this end it can 
be said that the principle of permanent sovereignty does not affect the binding power of 
host government contracts made with private investors 
Moreover, CERDS was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974 and it also 
embraces the principle of permanent sovereignty. While Article (1) states that ‘[e]very 
State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its 
political…systems  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  its  people,  without  outside 
interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever,’549 the Article (2)550  specifically 
addresses  nationalisation  and  references  the  principle  of  permanent  sovereignty  of 
states.
547 Article 1 of the Resolution 1803
548 Article 4 of the Resolution 1803
549 Article 8 of the Resolution 1803
550General assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 29 UN GAOR Supp. (No.31) 50, UN 
Doc. A/ 9631 (1974), Article 2  asserts that :
    1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including 
possession,  use  and  disposal,  over  all  its  wealth,  natural  resources  and  economic 
activities. 
    2. Each State has the right: 
        (a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national 
jurisdiction  in  accordance  with  its  laws  and  regulations  and  in  conformity  with  its 
national objectives and priorities.  No  State  shall  be compelled to  grant preferential 
treatment to foreign investment; 
        (b) To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within its 
national jurisdiction  and take measures to ensure that such activities comply with its 
laws,  rules  and  regulations  and   conform  with  its  economic  and  social  policies. 
Transnational  corporations  shall  not intervene in  the internal  affairs  of  a  host  State. 
Every State should, with full regard for its sovereign rights, cooperate  with other States 
in the exercise of the right set forth in this subparagraph; 
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Taking into consideration the relevant articles of Resolution 1803 and CERDS, it 
can be stated that the principle of permanent sovereignty is one of the most significant 
in  international  law.  With  regards  to  the  question  posed above,  several  views  have 
emerged. According to El-Sheikhe, the contractual agreement between state and private 
investor cannot be regarded as an alienation of a state’s sovereignty, however, but as a 
partial and temporary exercise of sovereignty.551 According to Peter, UN resolutions on 
the principle  of  permanent  sovereignty of  states  over  their  natural  resources  do not 
prevent a contracting state from binding itself by stabilisation provisions.552 However, 
according to Sornarajah, when the principle of the permanent sovereignty of states is 
regarded,  stabilisation  clauses  should  be  deemed  as  invalid  under  international  law 
because the acceptance of such principles puts ‘…a constitutional limitation on the state 
in international law to deal with its natural resources.’553Erkan criticises Sornarajah’s 
view and argues  that  perhaps  it  would be extreme to regard stabilisation clauses as 
invalid.554
4.1.2.3 Moderate Opinion
The third group of commentators recognise the validity of stabilisation clauses 
under international law and their significance in international agreements; however they 
express doubt regarding the capacity of such clauses to provide absolute protection to 
private  investors.555  According  to  some  authors,  stabilisation  clauses  inserted  in 
economic  development  agreements  or  investment  contracts  bind  and  constrain  host 
governments for a long period of time and are contrary to the principle of permanent 
sovereignty; ‘however, a stabilisation clause limited in time, area and scope, aimed at 
maintaining unchanged certain material terms and the fiscal regime for a reasonable 
        (c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which 
case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, 
taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State 
considers pertinent.  In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to  a 
controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by 
its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other 
peaceful  means  be  sought  on  the  basis  of  the  sovereign  equality  of  States  and  in 
accordance with the principle of free choice of means.
551 A. El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi  
Arabia, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 334.
552 W. Peter (n.55 above) 222
553 M. Sornarajah, ‘The Myth of International Contract Law’, Journal of World Trade  
Law 15 (1981): 210 cited in M. Erkan (n.1 above) 120
554 ibid
555 T. W. Waelde & Ndi Stabilising International Investment (n.1 above) 244-245
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period, is not incompatible with the principle of permanent sovereignty.’556 To this end, 
it can be said that a guarantee given for a specific period of time against nationalisation 
would be one of the ways of providing guarantees.557 It is the commentators’ belief that 
the freezing function of  stabilisation clauses  is  only the  tip  of  the  iceberg.558 When 
interpreting the validity of stabilisation clauses,  the whole range of conditions to in 
existence  globally need  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  Such  conditions  can  be  the 
economic  and  social  environments,  political  factors  or  the  historical  relationship 
between the parties.559
The  doctrinal  writings  referenced  above  demonstrate  that  there  is  continuing 
controversy among legal scholars regarding the validity of stabilisation clauses under 
international  law.  No  dominant  view  seems  to  have  prevailed  as  yet.  Although 
consensus  has  not  been  reached  amongst  academic  writers  on  the  validity  issue,  a 
considerable amount of arbitral awards have been granted in this respect. Therefore, the 
following  section  will  merely  concentrate  on  the  response  of  arbitral  tribunals  to 
challenges to the validity of stabilisation clauses. 
   4.1.2.4 Arbitral Awards Concerning Validity of Stabilisation Clauses
The validity of stabilisation clauses and their relationship to the principle of the 
permanent sovereignty of host states have been the subject of a significant number of 
arbitration  cases  in  the  petroleum  industry.  The  most  frequently  referred  arbitral 
decision  is  the  case  of Texas  Overseas  Petroleum Co.  /  California  Asiatic  Oil  Co.  
Libyan Arab Republic.560 Texaco and Calasiatic are two American petroleum companies 
which were both granted fourteen oil concessions from the Royal Libyan Government 
between the years of 1955 and 1968.561 In 1973, following the advent of a revolution in 
Libya, the new revolutionary government, in a dramatic move, nationalised 51% shares 
556  P.  De Waart& P.  Peters  and E.  Denters,  International  Law and Development, 
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands:  Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988) 81
557 A. Redfern, ‘The Arbitration Between the Government of Kuwait and AMINOIL’ 
58 BYIL (1985) 100 cited in Z.A. Alqurashi, Oil and Gas Arbitration (n.15 above) 216 ; 
see also  E. Paasivirta (n.95 above) 337
558 R.  Higgins,‘Legal  Preconditions  for  Foreign  Investment’,  IBA-SERL Seminar 
Proceeding, Mathew Bender, New York (1986) 233-235 ; See also  E. Paasivirta (n.95 
above) 338 ; T. W.Waelde &  Ndi Stabilising International Investment (n.1 above) 245
559 Ibid 
560Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. / Californian Asiatic Co. vs. Libyan Arab Republic, 
17 ILM. 1 (Int'l Arb. Trib. 1977)
561 C. Greenwood (n.71 above) 29.
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of  these  two  companies’ interest  in  the  concession.562 When  Texaco  and  Calasiatic 
started the arbitration proceeding as the nature of concession agreements require, 49% 
of the companies’ interests were also nationalised by the same revolutionary Libyan 
government.563
Furthermore, the new revolutionary government did not respond to the companies’ 
request to submit arbitration; however when the companies under clause 28 (3) asked 
the President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to appoint a sole arbitrator,564 the 
new  Libyan  government  objected  on  the  grounds  that  the  dispute  that  had  arisen 
between the parties could not be the subject of arbitration as the nationalisation measure 
taken by the government was an expression of its sovereignty.565Professor René-Jean 
Dupuy who was the sole arbitrator in the given case, examined the whole issue in detail 
and  cited  a  number  of  reasons  why compensation  should  be  paid  to  TOPCO.  The 
arbitrator first rejected the claim of the Libyan government and stated that a concession 
agreement is not an administrative contract.566 Professor Dupuy then started to examine 
the validity and binding effect of stabilisation clauses. Before proceeding to examine the 
arbitrator’s decisions with regard to this subject, it is relevant to cite article 16 of the 
concession  agreement.  In  this  case,  the  concession  agreement  between  the  parties 
contained a stabilisation clause in the Article 16: 
1. The Government of Libya will take all the steps necessary to ensure that 
the  Company  enjoys  all  the  rights  conferred  by  this  Concession.  The 
contractual rights expressly created by this concession shall not be altered 
except by mutual consent of the parties.2. This Concession shall throughout 
the period of its validity be construed in accordance with the Petroleum Law 
and the Regulations in force on the date of execution of the agreement of 
amendment  by  which  this  paragraph  (2)  was  incorporated  into  this 
concession agreement. Any amendment to or repeal of such Regulations shall 
not affect the contractual rights of the Company without its consent.567
Taking  into  consideration  the  above  given  provision,  the  arbitrator  found that 
Clause 16 did not, in principle,  impair the sovereignty of the Libyan state,  since its 
entire sovereign legislative and regulatory powers are preserved and such power can 
only  be  exercised  with  respect  to  citizens  or  aliens  with  whom  the  state  has  not 
562 Ibid
563Texaco, vs. Libyan Arab Republic (TOPCO) award, 53 I.L.R, 389 (1977)
564R. B. Von Mehren& P.  N.  Kourides, ‘International Arbitrations between States and 
Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases’,75  Amt. J. Int.l. 476 (July 
1981) 489, cited in M. T. B. Coale (n.20 above) 233
565 Ibid
566 Ibid
567 53 ILM 3, 4 (1973- 74)
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undertaken contractual obligations.568 Professor Dupuy went on to assert that the Libyan 
state,  through  the  exercise  of  its  sovereignty  had  undertaken  obligations  under  an 
agreement governed by international law.569 In this respect, the arbitrator held that: ‘The 
recognition by international law of the right to nationalize is not sufficient grounds to 
empower a State to disregard its commitments, because the same law also recognizes 
the  power  of  a  State  to  commit  itself  internationally,  particularly  by  accepting  the 
inclusion of stabilization clauses in a contract entered into with a private party.’570
           The arbitrator, Dupuy, based on the above given reasoning, recognised the 
validity of stabilisation clauses with the following words:
Thus, in respect of the international law of contracts, nationalization cannot 
prevail  over  an  internationalized  contract,  containing stabilization  clauses, 
entered into between a State and a foreign private company. The situation 
could be different only if one were to conclude that the exercise by a State of 
its right to nationalize places that State on a level outside of and superior to 
the contract and also to the international legal order itself, and constitutes an 
act of government which is beyond the scope of any judicial redress or any 
criticism571.
In light of the arbitrator’s assessments, it can be said that two significant points 
emerged in the TOPCO arbitration. Firstly, the arbitrator internationalised the contract 
between the parties and he interpreted the stabilisation clauses as a basis to do so. In 
other  words,  the  arbitrator  of  the  present  case  held  that  when  the  contract  is 
internationalised, the contracting parties act as equals and the host state is responsible 
for the guarantees that have been provided to the private investor.572 Secondly, Professor 
Dupuy asserted that stabilisation clauses are fully valid and effective as long as the 
parties concerned have freely entered into them. From the perspective of the arbitrator, 
it is beyond question that sovereign states may adopt or modify their laws. However, it 
should be noted that newly adopted laws or changes do not have the power to overturn 
freely agreed obligations under an international agreement. For this reason, when the 
host state agrees to stabilisation provisions, it makes a binding legal commitment not to 
exercise its sovereign power over the course of the investment project. In the case of 
any changes or the adoption of new laws drafted by the host government, such unilateral 
actions  would  be regarded invalid  under  international  law and the  contracting  state 
would be in breach of the stabilisation clauses. 
568 17. I.L.M.1, 24-25 (1978)
56917 ILM 3, 24 para. 71 (1978)
57017 ILM 3, 24-5 para. 71 (1978)
571 17.I.L.M. 3, 25, para.73 (1978)
572 C. Greenwood (n.71 above) 29.
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Significantly, the decision given by the arbitrator was severely criticised by some 
authors  who  believe  that  the  arbitrator’s  ‘interpretation  is  too  rigid  and  provides 
unlimited guarantees to private investors.573 It  is an accepted fact that the petroleum 
sector is fragile and requires some stability; however considering the length of a typical 
energy investment project, they assert that it would be naive not to expect any unilateral 
actions  from host  states.  The validity  of  stabilisation  provisions  was also  examined 
extensively by the international tribunal in the case of Government of State of Kuwait  
vs. the American Independent Oil  Company  (AMINOIL)574.  In this  case,  the ruler of 
Kuwait granted a sixty-year oil  concession to American company AMINOIL for the 
exploration and exploitation of petroleum starting in 1948. The agreement between the 
parties included a stabilisation provision that read as follows: 
The Sheikh shall not by general or special legislation or by administrative 
measures  or  by any  other  act  whatever  annuls  this  Agreement  except  as 
provided  in  Article  1.  No  alteration  shall  be  made  in  the  terms  of  this  
Agreement by either the Sheikh or the Company except in the event of the 
Sheikh and the Company jointly agreeing that it is desirable in the interest of  
both  parties  to  make  certain  alteration,  deletion  or  addition  to  this 
agreement.575
In 1961, a supplemental agreement modified the concession agreement between 
the parties that was signed in 1948 and provided additional financial benefit to the host 
state and also contained a renegotiation clause. In 1974, the OPEC countries adopted the 
‘Abu Dhabi formula’, which triggered the increase of tax regime576 applicable to the 
agreement. Naturally, the company did not wish to accept the changes to its existing tax 
regime. Finally, in 1977, the government of Kuwait promulgated the Decree Law No. 
124 which terminated the concession agreement between the parties577. Thereafter the 
government of Kuwait  acted unilaterally and nationalised the company’s assets. The 
AMINOIL Company instituted  ad hoc arbitration and claimed that the government of 
Kuwait’s unilateral action breached the stabilisation provision of the agreement inserted 
in 1948.578
573 Z. A. Al-qurashi (n.15 above) 209
574American Independent Oil Company vs. Kuwait Award, 24 March, 1982 21 ILM 976 
(1982), hereinafter AMINOIL.
575 AMINOIL 21 ILM, 976, 1020, para. 88 (1982).
576  T.  Begic,  The  Applicable  Law in  International  Investment  Disputes,  (Utrecht, 
Eleven International Publishing, 2005)87
577 AMINOIL 21 ILM, 998
578 T. Begic (n.134 above) 87
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Discussion around the validity of stabilisation clauses become the most significant 
issue in this case. A number of arguments were put forward by the contractually linked 
parties. On the one hand, AMINOIL argued that the concession agreement between the 
parties  was  terminated  wrongfully  because  the  contract  contained  a  stabilisation 
clause.579 The company asserted that the nationalisation act of Kuwait was a violation of 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda under international law; therefore this unilateral act 
of the host state was an unlawful expropriation. On the other hand, the Government of 
Kuwait defended itself against these claims by alleging that the clauses which had been 
inserted  in  the  agreement  had  a  colonial  character  and  particularly  imposed  upon 
Kuwait, despite the fact that the country was still under the protection of the British.580
Another  argument  set  forth  by the Kuwaiti  government  was that  ‘stabilisation 
clauses – initially valid and effective – were annulled by the emergence of a subsequent 
factor in the shape either of the Kuwait Constitution of 1962, or of a public international 
law rule of jus cogens forming part of the law of Kuwait.’581 The tribunal rejected these 
arguments and held that there is no rule under international law that prevents states from 
undertaking to proceed to nationalisation during a limited period of time.582
Moreover, the tribunal also examined the question of whether stabilisation clauses 
are able to prohibit nationalisation. In this respect, the tribunal stated that ‘no doubt 
contractual limitations on the State’s right to nationalize are legislatively possible, but 
what that would involve would be a particularly serious undertaking which would have 
to be expressly stipulated for, and be within the regulations governing the conclusion of 
State contracts; and it is to be expected that it should cover only a relatively limited 
period.’583 In light of the tribunal’s response to this question, it should be noted that the 
tribunal  did not  consider  that  the nationalisation was unlawful  because ‘the case of 
nationalisation is certainly not expressly provided against by the stabilisation clauses of 
the concession’.584The tribunal also added that even if the stabilisation clauses originally 
sought  to  prohibit  nationalisation  they had ceased to  do so due to  the fact  that  the 
character of the concession agreement had changed and stabilisation clauses had lost 
579 G. Delaume, ‘Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: The Myth 
of the Lex Mercatoria’, 63  Tul. L. Rev. 575, 606 (1989) Cited in M.T.B. Coale (n.71 
above) 236
580 S.K.B. Asante, ‘Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transnational Investment 
Process’, Int’l & Comp. L. Q.28(1979) 401, 403
581 AMINOIL 21 ILM, 976, 1021 para. 90(2) (1982).
582AMINOIL 21 ILM, 976, 1021-22, para.90(2) (1982).
583 21 ILM, 976, 1023 para.94-95
584  ibid
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their previous possessive absolute character.585  Consequently, the tribunal reached the 
conclusion that the takeover of the AMINOIL enterprise was not inconsistent with the 
concession contract, provided that the nationalisation did not possess any confiscatory 
character.586.
What makes this decision significant is that several key questions were answered 
by the tribunal. The existence of stabilisation clauses under the concession agreement 
between the contracting parties made tribunals consider the nationalisation right of a 
host state where a stabilisation clause had been applied.  The tribunal recognised the 
validity  of  stabilisation  clauses  in  principle;  however  the  tribunal  disregarded  the 
prohibition against changing the agreement in any way except in the event of mutual 
consent.587  Furthermore, the tribunal expressed that stabilisation clauses should cover 
only a ‘relatively limited period’. To this end, the approximate length of ‘a relatively 
limited  period  of  time’ needs  to  be  ascertained.   When  the  concession  agreement 
between the parties is considered, the contract in question was signed almost thirty years 
previously.  It  would have been useful for the tribunal  to suggest parameters  for the 
timeframes – they instead referred to this in quite general terms.588
Another historical but significant oil industry arbitration case is Aramco vs. Saudi 
Arabia.589Aramco  is  an  American  petroleum  company  which  had  been  granted 
permission, by the Saudi government, to extract and transport petrol from Saudi Arabia 
to other countries. Aramco complained that the Saudi Government had also entered into 
an agreement with the Saudi Arabian Maritime Tankers Ltd., which was headed up by 
the well-known Greek businessman, Aristotle Onassis and enjoyed, over thirty years, 
the right to transport all the extracted petrol from Saudi Arabia590. Aramco claimed that 
585  The tribunal said that: ‘The concession had … changed its character and become 
one  of  those  contracts  in  regard  to  which,  in  most  legal  systems,  the  sate  while 
remaining bound to respect the contractual equilibrium enjoys special  advantages…. 
The tribunal wishes however to stress here that the case is not of a fundamental change 
of circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) within the meaning of Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is not a case of a change involving a departure 
from a contract, but of change in the nature of the contract itself, brought about by time,  
and the acquiescence of the parties’ at 21 ILM, 976, 1024 para. 98-101( 1982)
586 AMINOIL 21 ILM, 976, 1024 para. 102 ( 1982)
587 T. Begic (n.134 above) 87
588 Z.A. Al Qurashi (n.15 above) 217 
589Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) 27 I.L.R. 117 
(1958)
590  M.  R.  Samartano,  International  Arbitration  Law and  Practice,  2nd edn   (The 
Hague: Kluwer International Law, 2001) 160 
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an oil  concession agreement was signed between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
Aramco in the year of 1933; therefore, the right to extract the oil and its transfer belong 
to Aramco.591 This conflict  led the contracting parties  to arbitration in  1955. As the 
concession agreement  between the parties included stabilisation clauses,  the tribunal 
examined  the  clauses  and  held  that  ‘[b]y  reason  of  its  very  sovereignty  within  its 
territorial domain the State possesses the legal powers to grant rights by which it forbids 
itself to withdraw before the end of the concession…’592. In 1958, the tribunal reached a 
verdict, ruling in favour of Aramco, and asserted that the government of Saudi Arabia is 
bound by the concession agreement with Aramco and that the subsequent agreement 
with Onassis’s company had violated that agreement593. The tribunal also recognised the 
validity of stabilisation clauses under international law. 
It should be noted that there are a number of arbitral decisions with regard to the 
validity issue of stabilisation clauses. In most cases, the tribunals provided appreciable 
details  and  good  reasoning  when  they  refer  to  validity  of  such  clauses  under 
international law. However, in the British Petroleum Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd  
vs. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic594case, the arbitrator did not refer to 
stabilisation clauses  in  his  judgement.  This  case was the first  of a  series  of  Libyan 
nationalisation  cases.  The  stabilisation  clauses  were  contained  in  Article  16  of  the 
concession agreement. The arbitrator of the present case determined that an agreement 
was a contractual relationship belonging to the category of administrative contracts and 
that by virtue of the stabilisation clause, Libya had limited its ‘freedom to change or 
terminate the concession by unilateral act unless it could be shown that the changes was 
truly in the public interest.’595 In his decision, the arbitrator did not make reference to 
the stabilisation clause existing in Article 16. Therefore, this case does not represent a 
legitimate example of the validity issues surrounding stabilisation clauses.
The most recent arbitration involving the Libyan nationalisation case series was 
the Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. the Government of the Libyan Arab  
Republic case596.  The  sole  arbitrator  in  the  present  case  found that  the  stabilisation 
591 P. D. Cameron The Pursuit of stability, (n.1 above) 109
592  27 I.L.R. 117, 168 (1958)
593 P. D. Cameron The Pursuit of stability, (n.1 above) 110
594British Petroleum Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd v. Government of the Libyan  
Arab Republic 53 I.L.R. 297 (1973-1974) 53
595 R. C. A. White,  ‘Expropriation of the Libyan Oil Concessions-Two Conflicting 
International Arbitrations’, 30 Int’l & Comp. L.Q.1 (1981) 11, cited in M. T. B. Coale 
(n.71 above) 234.
596Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. the Government of the Libyan Arab  
Republic, Award of 12 April 1977, 62 I.L.R. 140, (1977); 20 I.L.M.1 (1977).
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clause inserted in Article 16 ‘justified not only by the said Libyan petroleum legislation, 
but also by the general principle of the sanctity of contracts recognised also in municipal 
and  international  law’.597  The  arbitrator  went  on  to  compare  the  consistency  of 
stabilisation  clause  with  the  principle  of  non-retroactivity  of  laws,  which  denies 
retrospective  effects  to  a  new  legislation  and  asserts  the  respect  of  vested  rights 
(droitsacquis) acquired under a previous legislation’.598 Afterwards, he mentioned that 
‘the rights of a state to nationalise its wealth and national resources is sovereign, subject 
to  the  obligation  of  indemnification  for  premature  termination  of  concession 
agreements’.599  During  the  examination  of  LIAMCO’s  concession  agreements,  the 
arbitrator found that these concession agreements were valid and binding; therefore, 
they could not be validly terminated unless there was ‘mutual consent of the contraction 
parties, in compliance with the said principle of the sanctity of contracts and particularly 
with the explicit terms of Clause 16 of the Agreements’.600  The award, however, was 
not  in  harmony  with  the  opinions  of  the  arbitrator  regarding  the  validity  of  the 
stabilisation clause601.  Therefore,  it  is  difficult  to  assess  how the stabilisation clause 
influenced the award in this case602. 
          Interview Participants’ views
 In order to gain a practical understanding of the tension that can exist between the 
sovereignty of  a  state  and the  inclusion  of  stabilisation  clauses  in  host  government 
contracts, the researcher conducted several interviews. The participants selected were: a 
director of a state owned company, a lecturer in international business and a lawyer 
(also an employee of the state owned company). During the course of the interviews, the 
vast majority of the participants emphasised the point that the insertion of stabilisation 
clauses  in  energy  investment  contracts  plays  a  significant  role  in  managing  and 
mitigating political risk. As previously mentioned, while some authors in conventional 
literature believe that the inclusion of such clauses may suppress the sovereign rights of 
host states, others hold the opposite view. Taking this into account, the researcher asked 
the following question: to what extent are stabilisation clauses effective in protecting 
investors’ investments, or whether, in contradiction of their intended guardianship, do 
they instead disenfranchise the sovereign rights of host states?
597 LIAMCO 20 ILM 31 (1977)
598 LIAMCO 20 ILM 61 (1977)
599 ibid
600 LIAMCO, 62 I.L.R. 62
601 M. T. B. Coale (n.71 above) 234
602 F. V. Garcia. Amador, (n. 53 above) 44
145
While  all  of  the  participants  agreed  how effective  stabilisation  clauses  are  in 
political risk management, they did not agree on the question of whether the inclusion 
of stabilisation clauses disenfranchise the sovereign rights of host states or not. One of 
the interviewee stated that ‘…there is no doubt that stabilisation clauses protect foreign 
investors’ investment rights and profits against major political risks over the course of 
the  project.  Nevertheless,  this  protection  or  exemption  should  not  be  regarded as  a 
capitulation offered to foreign investors or to foreign countries that disfranchise the 
sovereignty of the host state’ 603(italic added)
 The participant quoted a Turkish proverb to illustrate his point: ‘in Turkish we 
call  this  concept  ‘balancing  the  scales’ (italic  added)604.  By this,  the  respondent  is 
referring to the importance of balance and measure, because if the weight is left off the 
scale, the measure will be off balance and justice will be skewed. The same respondent 
also  emphasises  that  ‘petroleum  agreements  are  long  term  projects,  after  the 
contractually agreed period all petroleum resources and rights automatically revert to 
the host  state.  Thus,  breaching investment  contracts  by claiming that  a  stabilisation 
clause is a way of capitulating and disenfranchising the sovereign rights of host states 
puts an extra burden on the country and disadvantages future generations.’605 With these 
words  the  respondent  underlines  the  importance  of  contractual  commitment.  This 
wording is known as the pacta sunt servanda principle.  Cameron echoes the words of 
the Turkish proverb in asserting that ‘a state has the sovereign power to unilaterally 
revise its relationship with the foreign investor, the result of a stabilisation mechanism 
which applies to such unilateral action is that the host government would have to pay 
lump sum damages.’606
Contrary to the view of the previous participant, another interviewee states that 
stability  and  the  balance  of  benefits  are  two  significant  phenomena  for  energy 
investment  projects.  The respondent  goes on further  and emphasises  that  ‘…to give  
something without expectation is the philosophy of god’ (italic added)607. The point he is 
making is that if a host state is in a weak bargaining position and keen on encouraging 
foreign investors, the state must provide certain exemptions to investors and put them 
on the bargaining table. To this end, it can be assumed that in the event of finding itself 
in a weak bargaining position, the host state is more likely to agree to a stabilisation 
clause. Another participant underlined that ‘providing exemptions may contravene the 
sovereign rights of a host state; however, acceptance of such clauses may be a necessary 
evil to secure the contribution of a foreign investor.’608 With regard to the latter two 
viewpoints, it can be emphasised that the bargaining position of host states is not static; 
603  Interview no. 1, Anonymity Guaranteed 8 May 2012
604  Ibid 
605  Ibid
606  P. D. Cameron , The Pursuit of Stability (n.1 above) 89
607  Interview no.7 with Lawyer-6 June 2012
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this position is constantly in flux according to the social and political conditions of the 
time. As outlined in the second chapter, when petroleum prices are unstable or on the 
rise, due to political, social or economic factors, it would be challenging to persuade a 
host state to agree to a stabilisation clause. Another interview respondent touched upon 
whether inclusion of stabilisation clauses disenfranchises a state’s sovereignty or not. 
According to this interview respondent:
Technically speaking, stabilisation clauses are powerless against state 
sovereignty because each nation has the right to change their fiscal 
system to maximise their economic interest from oil and gas related 
projects  or  enact  new  laws  with  the  purpose  of  improving  their 
domestic laws. The issue lies in how stabilisation provisions work in 
practice. My view is that the economic needs of developing states and 
political pressure made by the home nations of investors inhibit host 
states from using the powers appertaining to them as a sovereign state 
during energy investment projects.609
Echoing  this  view,  another  respondent  noted  that  ‘the  structure  and  scope  of 
stabilisation  clauses  vary  from  one  country  to  another.  Geographical,  political  and 
economic factors are the main drivers that shape the content and context of stabilisation 
clauses. Nevertheless, no matter what types of stability provisions are included in an 
agreement these clauses cannot truly overrule the sovereign, legislative and regulatory 
powers of states.610
4.2 Efficacy of Stabilisation Clauses
4.2.1 Doctrinal Assessments
The functional value and efficacy of stabilisation clauses in host governmental 
contracts has been the subject of some debate in conventional literature. Some authors 
believe that  there is  no point  in expecting a  functional  protection from stabilisation 
clauses because international law prohibits arbitrary and unlawful intervention by a state 
in  an international  agreement.611 The  reasoning behind this  view is  that  there  is  no 
hindrance  to  the  state  from  taking  unilateral  action,  such  as  expropriating  or 
nationalising the assets of an investor, as long as such actions are made lawfully, by 
meeting certain conditions decreed by international law. 
Another  group  of  commentators  oppose  the  previous  view  and  argue  that 
stabilisation clauses serve as a secondary protection mechanism; despite the fact that 
international law bestows protection upon investors against arbitrary and unilateral state 
608  Interview no. 8 with lecturer 4 June 2012 and 8 November 2012
609  Interview no 19 with Lecturer, 23 November 2012
610  Interview no 18 with Lawyer,  21 November 2012
611 T. W. Waelde &  Ndi Stabilising International Investment (n.1 above) 238
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intervention.  According  to  the  supporters  of  this  view,  the  function  of  stabilisation 
clauses is to provide alien investors extra protection against any ‘prima facie lawful 
grounds  which  international  law  recognises  for  affecting  changes  to  the  concluded 
agreement.’612 Similarly,  according  to  Peter,  the  stabilisation  technique  has  been 
regarded  as  ‘a  strict  yardstick  for  contract  performance  with  its  corresponding 
counterpart of legal consequences for breach of contract.’613
The third view to be found in literature is that the inclusion of stabilisation clauses 
in an investment agreement has a financial function, particularly in the event of their 
violation. The foundation of this view is that even if a stabilisation clause is deemed not 
to have any effect on the host states right to unilaterally change the terms and conditions 
of the previously agreed agreement, the violation would provide the private investor a 
special right to compensation as a result of the  inclusion of the stabilisation clause.614 It 
is important to emphasise that the amount of compensation would be higher than those 
of  other  contractual  violations  should  stabilisation  provisions  be  excluded.615 Such 
compensation would cover prospective gains, or lost profits (lucrum cessans).616
5.    Do Stabilisation Provisions constitute a threat to Environmental 
protection and Human rights?
In recent years, the petroleum industry has witnessed new concerns in the areas of 
environmental  protection  and  human  rights.  It  has  been  vehemently  argued  that 
stabilisation provisions in a contract can have a ‘chilling effect’ on law reform in a host 
state, particularly in the field of human rights617 and environmental protection.618 The 
foundation of this argument is that stabilisation clauses demotivate or discourage host 
states from introducing new laws focussing on environmental and social policy. A recent 
empirical study in this area found that ‘contracts from non-OECD countries are more 
likely than those from OECD countries to insulate the investor from new social and 
environmental laws or to provide compensation to the investor for compliance with new 
612 A. D. Nwokolo (n.73 above) 14
613 W. Peter,(n.55 above) 226.
614 ibid
615 ibid
616 Ibid
617 For further reading, see  A. Shemberg (n.26 above)
618 L.  Cotula,  ‘Reconciling  Regulatory  Stability  and  Evolution  of  Environmental 
Standards in Investment Contracts: Towards a Rethinking of Stabilisation Clauses’, in S. 
Leader  &  D.  Ong,  Global  Project  Finance,  Human  Rights  and  Sustainable  
Development,( Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2011) 162
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social  and environmental  laws.’619 As  previously mentioned,  theoretically,  sovereign 
states are free to exercise their sovereignty by regulating domestic issues such as the 
environment,  tax,  human  rights,  health  and  safety  and  all  other  areas  under  the 
jurisdiction of police power. In this respect, it is vital to discuss whether the inclusion of 
stabilisation  commitments  forces  the  host  state  to  relinquish  international  treaty 
obligations  in  the  area  of  human  rights  or  environmental  issues,  and  whether  such 
regulatory measures taken by host states violate stabilisation commitments.
It is inevitable that such a lucrative industry with the potential to have significant 
impact  on  local  and  regional  environmental,  social  and  economic  concerns  is  so 
exposed to criticism.  In other words, considering cases in which a stabilisation clause 
has been applied, ‘it is unsurprising that they have been subjected to scrutiny by persons 
and organisations concerned with promoting sustainable development.’620 This criticism 
is founded on the fact that the adoption of such clauses has the potential to have a grave 
impact on the contracting state’s legislative power, administrative acts, and the judicial 
decisions of its independent courts. It is, therefore, difficult for a host state to regulate 
significant issues in the interest of its citizens.621 In doctrine, some authors argue that 
traditional stabilisation clauses are inflexible and that they have a restrictive effect on 
host state policy.622 Therefore, they assert, the scope of stabilisation clauses should be 
limited to non-fiscal areas, such as environmental, human rights.623 According to Leader, 
‘host-state regulation to promote the full realisation of human rights is outside the scope 
of the stabilisation clause.’624  What is meant by the words of the author is that state 
sovereignty  is  limited  by  the  international  obligation  to  realise  fundamental  human 
rights.625
In the  Texaco case, the arbitrator held that host states may forgo their sovereign 
rights during the life span of the investment agreement, should a definitive event such as 
nationalisation occur. However, as far as international treaty obligations are concerned, 
host states do not have the prerogative to refuse to take the measures that international 
619 A. Shemberg (n.26 above) v
620 A. Shepperd& A. Crocket, (n.11 above) 338
621 A. F. M. Manirruzzaman, A Critical Appraisal of the Emerging Trends (n.1 above) 
156
622 A. F. M. Manirruzzaman, A Critical Appraisal of the Emerging Trends (n.1 above) 
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623 L. Cotula (n.176 above) 163
624  Ibid
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law obliges.626 In other words, state sovereignty is limited by international obligations 
regarding the  areas  of  human rights  and environmental  concerns.  It  is  true  that  the 
general tendency in the petroleum industry is not to insert strict stabilisation provisions 
in the contract and exclude non-fiscal areas.627
For the latter question, it can be said that there is nothing to hinder a sovereign 
state  from exercising  its  sovereign  rights  for  public  good  or  in  the  public  interest. 
Nevertheless,  ‘the  functional  value  of  stabilisation  clauses  cannot  be  discounted.’628 
Furthermore, since stabilisation clauses do not distinguish between compensable taking 
or indirect expropriation and non-compensable regulation, legal proceedings would be 
inevitable to settle this matter in the event that any such measure were taken by a host  
state. A solution to this problem has been suggested in conventional academic literature 
by several authors. According to Sheppard & Crocket, ‘…stabilisation clauses are often 
narrower in scope than many critics assert, or fear’.629 The authors believe that ‘those 
criticism and fears  can  be assuaged – and the  legitimate  concerns  of  investors  and 
lenders that the host government does not denude the project of economic value by 
changing the rules can be addressed – by appropriate drafting and the incorporation of 
the  international  law  norms  of  fair  and  equitable  treatment  and  legitimate 
expectation.’630 Cotula  also  states  that,  ‘best  contractual  practice  clearly  defines  the 
scope of stabilisation clauses to ensure that social and environmental matters are not 
stabilised.  This  can  be  done  not  only  by  wording  the  clause  around  arbitrary, 
discriminatory  or  similar  treatment,  but  also  explicitly  stating  that  public  purpose 
measures are outside the scope of the clause.’631
 Recent state practice supplies good guidance in this matter. For instance, the 2004 
US Model BIT contains the following provision: ‘Except in rare circumstances, non-
discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect 
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and environment, do 
not constitute indirect expropriation.’632 In the same vein, Article 12 of the Draft of the 
Norway  Model  BIT  (2008)  contains  the  following  provision:  ‘Nothing  in  this 
626 The environmental matters Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development 13 June 1992, 31 ILM 874 ( 1992)
627 However, it should also be noted that Shemberg’s recent research demonstrates that 
freezing clauses are still in use to some extent particularly in mining sector. Please see 
A. Shemberg (n. 26 above) 6-7.
628 A. F. M. Manirruzzaman, A Critical Appraisal of the Emerging Trends (n.1 above) 
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631 L. CotulaInvestment Contracts through development Lens (n.47 above), 33.
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Agreement  shall  be  constructed  to  prevent  a  Part  from  adopting  maintaining  or 
enforcing  any measure  otherwise consistent  with the  Agreement  that  it  considers  to 
ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety or 
environmental concerns.’633
BITs offer good guidance by furnishing specific terms for these highly sensitive 
areas. Similarly, if environmental and human rights and other public interests of a host 
state were provided for in the contracts and singled out from the scope of stabilisation 
commitments,  then  the  action  of  the  host  state  would  not  amount  to  indirect 
expropriation  and  could  not  be  claimed  by  an  investor  to  be  in  violation  of  the 
stabilisation clause.
6.     The BTC Pipeline Project (I): Reactions to the Project
The  BTC pipeline  project  has  been  subject  to  the  criticism of  public  interest 
groups who see the legal framework of the HGA as placing the interests of the BTC 
consortium over human rights, the environment and state sovereignty. One of the claims 
made by these groups was that Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey had agreed to exempt 
the BTC pipeline project  from the rule  of local  laws, except  for  obligations  arising 
under  the  Constitution,  and  to  surrender  their  right  to  impose  more  stringent 
environmental  and  social  laws  over  the  forty  to  sixty  year  term  of  the  project.634 
According to Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), this undertaking facilitates the 
transfer of the financial  burden of the investor to the government if  the host states’ 
governments ‘instituted more stringent legislative standards that impacted the project’. 
635
The economic equilibrium form of stabilisation clauses in the HGAs were also 
subject to NGOs’ criticism. The public interest groups claimed that the BTC consortium 
contract  was  unlawful  on  the  grounds  that  it  would  hinder  host  governments  from 
delaying project execution should any environmental  or social  (for example,  health) 
concerns arise, except in the case of national emergency.636 This constraint prevents the 
632 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 2004, Annex B Expropriation 
Section (b) available at:    <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf> 
April 2013
633 It should be noted that due the disagreement on the Norway BIT Model, it did not  
come into existence.
634  Article 7.2 (x) and 9 (iii) HGA Azerbaijan; Article 7.2 (x) and 9.1(iii) of Georgian 
HGA and Turkish HGA Article 7.2 (x) and 10.1 (iii)
635 USAID,  Multilateral  Development  Bank  Assistance  Proposals:  Likely  to  have 
adverse impacts on the Environment, Natural Resources, Public Health and Indigenous 
Peoples, (September 2002-October 2004) 29, available at:
<http://www.bakuceyhan.org.uk/USAID_MDB_report_Sept02-Oct04.pdf>July, 2013
636 Ibid; see also  Azeri HGA, Article 5.2 (iii)
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host state from honouring its international obligations with regards to human rights and 
the  environment,  moreover,  it  actually  penalises  the  host  government  with  heavy 
compensation for doing so.637 This effectively inhibits national development during the 
term of the project that may constitute an improvement in standards of living in that 
host state.  638Another concern voiced by NGOs, relates to the privileged status of IGA 
and HGAs. This establishes the IGA and each HGA as the prevailing legal regime under 
international law and the laws of each of the three countries, overriding all conflicting 
domestic law, present and future, thereby rendering ineffectual the constitution. Under 
the ‘frozen and extremely weakened regulatory environment, the governments are thus 
less  able  to  respond  to  new  environmental  and  other  threats  or  to  evolving 
understanding of risk’.639  For instance in the case of Georgia, the HGA was invoked to 
override the Georgian National Water Act in areas where such an override was required 
in order to grant the pipeline right-of-way.640  
Furthermore,  the  project  agreements  also  overrode  key  provisions  in  Turkish 
Expropriation Law which require the price for expropriated property to be negotiated: 
instead,  it  was  compulsorily purchased,  under  the emergency law normally invoked 
only in times of national disaster or war, under the terms of the agreements.641 BP has 
countered that  the exemptions  it  obtained were nothing out  of the ordinary and are 
common to the other concession agreements. The Company states: The creation of a 
prevailing legal framework is not unusual and has been used by extractive projects even 
in nations with highly developed legal systems, such as Chile, Canada and Australia.’ 
BP defensively attested that ‘The prevailing Legal Regime is designed to supplement 
the existing framework, rather than replace existing laws and regulations.’642
637  Amnesty  International,  Human  Rights  on  the  line:  the  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
Pipeline Project, May, 2003 (London, Amnesty International Publication: 2003) 13-16 
available  at:  <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_14538.pdf>May, 
2013
638 Ibid 
639 N. Hildyards& G. Muttitt,  ‘Turbo charging Investor Sovereignty: Investment 
Agreements and Corporate Colonialism’, available at: 
<http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/HGAPSA.pdf> 
July, 2013
640 USAID, Multilateral Development Bank Assistant Proposals, ( September, 2002- 
October, 2004) 28 available at: 
<http://www.bakuceyhan.org.uk/USAID_MDB_report_Sept02-Oct04.pdf>July, 2013
641 N. Hildyards & G. Muttitt, (n.197 above)
642BP,  Response  to  NCP Request  Filed  by  Friends  of  the  Earth  against  Project,  
unpublished, March (2004) 9 cited in N. Hildyards& G. Muttitt, (n.197 above)
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6.1  Joint  Statement,  the  Security  Protocol  and  the  BTC  Human  Rights 
Undertaking
As a response to the criticisms about the potential impact of the BTC agreements’ 
legal framework on the autonomy and policy making discretion of the host states,643 the 
project  sponsors  published  several  legal  documents:  Joint  Statement,  the  Security  
Protocol and the BTC Human Rights Undertaking.  A joint statement delivered in May 
2003, addressed the standards (environmental, health, safety and social) which would 
govern project implementation.644 These standards serve as a baseline for the assessment 
of changes in law and a ceiling for the limitation of the effects of future legislation.645 
This  was  executed  by  interpretation  of  the  IGA which  ‘commits  each  state  to  the 
application of environmental standards that are no less stringent than those generally 
applied within member states of the European Union from to time. The HGA and other 
BTC Agreements give effect to this commitment, and provide a dynamic benchmark 
that will evolve as EU standards evolve.’646
In July 2003, the protocol relating to the Provisions of Security for the East-West 
Energy Corridor (Security Protocol) was published to establish the manner in which the 
host  governments  of  the  three  signatory  states  propose  to  meet  their  security 
commitments under the HGAs.647 Furthermore, in September 2003, the BTC Company 
produced another legal document, the BTC Human Rights Undertaking (HRU), which 
is a legally binding unilateral deed under English Law. The undertaking modified the 
terms  of  the  stabilisation  clauses,  excluding  previously  agreed  clauses  from  being 
applied to legal changes in the area of human rights, health, safety, and the environment. 
What it means is that the project consortium acquiesces not to assert claims that are 
inconsistent with host countries’ regulations, provided that this is: 
‘reasonably  required  by  international  labour  and  human  rights  treaties  to 
which the  relevant  Host  Government  is  a  party from time to time [or]… 
required in the public interest in accordance with domestic law in the relevant 
project state from time to time, provided that such domestic law is not more 
643A. Dufey, and R. Kazimova, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Project: Implications of PF in S. 
Leader  and  D.  Ong,  Global  Project  Finance  ,  Human  Rights  and  Sustainable  
Development, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 382
644 P. D. Cameron, The Pursuit of Stability (n.1 above) 404-405
645 Ibid
646 Joint Statement, para 7, available at: <http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/Joint
%20Statement.pdf> August, 2013
647  A. Dufey, and R. Kazimova (n.201 above) 382
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stringent than the highest of European Union standards as referred to in the 
Project  Agreements,  including  relevant  EU  directives  (EU  Standards),… 
those World Bank Group standards referred to in the Project Agreements, and 
standards under applicable international labor and human rights treaties.’648
Through  this  undertaking,  the  BTC  Company  also  agrees  not  to  seek 
compensation under the economic equilibrium clause ‘in connection with… any action 
or inaction by the relevant Host Government that is reasonably required to fulfil the 
obligations  of  the  Host  Government  under  any international  treaty on human rights 
(including the European Convention on Human Rights), labour, or HSE in force in the 
relevant Project State from time to time to which such Project States in then a party.’649
The  BTC  Company  hereby  provided  guarantees  that  it  would  not  apply  the 
compensation clauses in the IGA and HGAs if one the host states involved in the project 
legislated in the interests of human rights, environment, health and safety. From that 
perspective,  it  might  be  said  that  the  Human  Rights  Undertaking  represented  a 
breakthrough and was an innovative work, commissioned by the BTC Company as an 
overt demonstration of their  sensitivity towards Human Rights issues. As this action 
resulted in a restriction of the reach of the stabilisation clause in the BTC agreements, 
host  states  were  thereby  rendered  freer  to  legislate.  However,  the  scope  of  the 
stabilisation  clause  in  HGAs is  still  considered  a  murky issue  by project  investors. 
Distinguishing between legitimate regulations and compensable regulatory actions of 
states remains challenging.  However,  the solution seems to lie  in the referencing of 
bilateral international treaties as a benchmark to define whether a host state measure 
falls  within  the  exception  delineated  by  this  Human  Rights  Undertaking.  Bilateral 
investment treaties do not address the distinction between legitimate regulations and 
compensable  regulatory  actions.  Arguably,  previous  attempts  made  by  international 
arbitral  tribunals  in  distinguishing  compensable  from  non-compensable  regulatory 
actions of host states may help by providing a frame of reference to define whether a 
host  state’s  regulatory  measure  may  fall  within  the  exception  established  by  BTC 
undertaking.  
7.     Conclusion
Most  host  government  contacts  contain  stabilisation  clauses  against 
discriminatory changes  which may adversely affect  the terms and conditions  of  the 
contract from the perspective of the host state.  When these clauses are inserted in a 
contract  they reduce political  risk for the investor  and preserve the fiscal  regime,650 
thus, they are the most preferred risk management method by investors in the energy 
648Human Rights Undertaking, Section 2. (a)  available at: 
<http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/Human%20Rights%20Undertaking.pdf> August, 2013
649 Ibid, Section 2 (d)
650 J.  N.  N.  Emeka,  ‘Anchoring  Stabilisation  Clause  in  International  Petroleum 
Contracts’, 42 Int’I Law (2008) 1317
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industry.651In  addition,  the  validity  of  stabilisation  clauses  was  assessed  during  this 
chapter.  If  domestic  law  is  chosen  by  the  parties  to  govern  the  contract,  then 
stabilisation clauses may be exposed to the constitutional and legal restrictions of the 
host country when the host state makes legislative changes and modifies the governing 
law. In other words, a right bestowed upon the investor by the state can be taken away at 
any time by sovereign authority.   On the other hand, in order to limit the effects of  
potentially damaging host government legislation, foreign investors may obligate the 
host country to agree that the contract should be governed by international law as well 
as domestic law.652
 In such a case, a validly entered into stabilisation clauses may legitimately fetter 
the host state’s ability to modify or unilaterally change the contract or to nationalise 
assets.653 It is apparent that this view of stabilisation clauses challenges the principle of 
the permanent sovereignty of states. In addition, well-established norms of International 
law and a UN resolution recognises that a host country has full control and power to 
regulate its natural resources.654This means that stabilisation clauses are not the unique 
defence against nationalisation actions of a government. It is true that in the case of 
AMINOIL, the tribunal held that a stabilisation clause does not forbid a host state from 
nationalising the property, but it protects against confiscation. To this end it can be said 
that there is no power that may hinder a host state from exercising its public interest, as 
this right is founded in a state’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, these clauses should not be 
regarded  as  impotent  and  without  legal  effect.  They  are  binding  and  enforceable, 
because  the  insertion  of  such clauses  raises  the  legitimate  expectation  of  a  foreign 
investor. As the legitimate expectation of investors is linked with stabilisation clauses, 
the violation of stabilisation clauses damages the legitimate expectation of an investor 
which may in turn seek to be compensated by the host state.655
Although stabilisation clauses have been subject to criticism, largely regarding 
whether  they  are  valid  under  national  and  international  law,  such  clauses  are  still 
regarded as  an  essential  risk management  technique against  sovereign  risks  such as 
‘nationalisation, expropriation, or the obsolescence bargain in which the host state can 
use changes in circumstances to improve new requirements on investors.’656 However, 
contemporary practice in the area of stabilisation clauses has moved from the traditional 
freezing genre of the stabilisation clause to a hybrid combination mechanism combining 
651 T. Waelde & G. Ndi, (n.1 above) 234,
652 M. L. Moses (n.88 above) 63
653 Z. A. Alqurashi (n.15 above)235
654 T. Waelde & G. Ndi, (n.1 above) 261
655 Z. A. Alqurashi (n.15 above)234
656 A. Shemberg, (n.26 above) vii.
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stabilisation  with  renegotiation  provisions.  This  combination  is  called  economic 
equilibrium clauses. The components of economic stabilisation clauses are versatility 
and stability.657 As evidenced during the examination of economic equilibrium clauses, 
these clauses ‘while indeed showing a willingness of the parties to change, can, at the 
same time represent a very effective means of stabilising the contract.’658 It is irrefutable 
that economic equilibrium clauses are highly effective in reducing indirect expropriation 
risk and the unilateral change of contractual terms.
Stabilisation clauses  inserted in  investment  contracts  cannot  fetter  a  host  state 
from engaging in legislative activities in the areas of environmental and human rights. 
As examined in the Texaco case, sovereign states may forgo their sovereign rights and 
fetter themselves, for instance, they can promise not to nationalise the foreign investor’s 
property. However, it should never be forgotten that a state cannot make promises to 
foreign investors regarding the non-assignable and inalienable rights which derive from 
international treaty obligations. When drafting contracts, the best solution is to limit the 
scope of  stabilisation  clauses  to  matters  which  do not  impact  on human rights  and 
environmental  concerns.659 Recent  BITs  prove  that  state  measures  related  to 
environmental and human rights cannot amount to indirect expropriation, so cannot be 
claimed to be a violation of stabilisation provisions.
Reactions to the BTC project agreements were also explored during this chapter. 
Following vociferous criticism from several NOGs, the BTC project consortium was 
forced to back-track and subsequently issued several legal documents to redefine its 
position. Through the Human Rights Undertaking, the BTC Company declared that the 
consortium will  not  require  compensation if  Azerbaijan,  Georgia or  Turkey were to 
adopt new laws designed to protect human rights, the environment, and in the interests 
of health and safety. Though it may seem that this undertaking narrowed the scope of 
the stabilisation clause, to date, there has been no attempt made by the signatory states 
to adopt new laws in the area of human rights and environment to put this hypothesis to  
the  test.  More  importantly,  the  human  rights  undertaking  issued  by BP,  was  just  a 
unilaterally executed deed poll. Strictly speaking it is not a legal contract as it applies to 
only one party. In the BTC case, the deed poll only binds the consortium. In this regard, 
it could be said to have the status of a documented promise. Debatably, if human rights 
and environmental exceptions (defined areas in BTC undertaking) were annexed to each 
HGA and agreed by each state, this may have constituted the fairest and perhaps the 
most favourable solution for both parties. It should, however, be noted that a measure 
taken by a signatory state can always be subject to a dispute. 
After  examining the stabilisation clauses,  the following next  two chapters will 
analyse the driving force(s) influence host states to agree to insert such clauses in their 
host  governmental  contracts.  While  chapter  5  merely  focusing  on  external  matters, 
657M.  Erkan  (n.1  above)  220,  in  the  author’s  book,  the  elements  of  economic 
equilibrium clauses are called ‘flexibility and stability’.
658 W. Peter, (n.55 above) 241
659 L. Cotula (n.176 above) 162
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chapter six will examine internal reasons which have forced Azerbaijan and Turkey to 
accept stability provisions in the HGAs of the BTC project. 
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  Chapter 5
   Lenders, Political Risk Insurers and Credit Rating Agencies
1.  Introduction
Project finance is a financing for a project arranged in such a way that financial 
lenders count merely on the assets and cash flow of the project for interest and loan 
repayment.660 Project finance has been one of the most popular funding models for the 
oil and gas industry for decades. There are a number of equity investors involved in 
project  financing  including  sponsors,  commercial  banks  and other  financial  lending 
institutions. Although project finance is the most common financing model in large-
scale oil and gas projects, it is not suitable for all investment scenarios. More fragile 
business  environments,  unpredictable  government  behaviour  and  other  political  risk 
phenomena can render the financing of an international energy project challenging. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether credit rating agencies, project 
finance  lenders  and  political  risk  insurers  play  an  active  role  in  ensuring  that 
stabilisation clauses are inserted in energy contract agreements. It should be noted that 
chapter five does not aim to analyse project financing from every perspective or in all 
its guises, as this would be beyond the scope of this research. However, the chapter will 
touch upon the definition project finance and why project finance is used. This chapter 
will  go  on  to  assert  that  there  is  a  link  between  rating  agencies,  risk  insurers  and 
financial  institutions  and  that  this  triumvirate  effectively  facilitate  the  ability  of  an 
investor to back host states into a corner in order to make them agree to stabilisation 
clauses. Therefore, each of these entities will be examined in turn in terms of how they 
work and what requirements they impose in the context of an investment scenario. 
After setting the scene by presenting these key players and the role they play in 
international investment projects and how this facilitates the inclusion of stabilisation 
clauses, the BTC pipeline project will  be used as a case study. Examining the legal 
framework of the BTC agreement provides a real-life investment scenario where an 
assessment can be made of whether external factors had an influential role on investors 
and host states in the inclusion of stabilisation clause in a host government contract. 
1.1     Project Finance Defined
There  is  not,  in  fact,  one  universally  accepted  definition  of  project  finance 
amongst  scholars  or  practitioners.  It  is  possible  that  the  reason  for  this  lies  in  the 
dynamic and continuously changing nature of project finance. According to Nevitt and 
Fabozzi,  the term project  finance refers  to a  method of ‘a  financing of  a  particular 
economic unit  in  which a  lender  is  satisfied to  look initially to  the cash flows and 
earnings of that economic unit as the source of funds from which a loan will be repaid 
660 A. C. Inkpen & M. H. Moffett, The Global Oil and Gas Industry: Management,  
Strategy, and Finance, ( Tulsa, Oklahoma: Penn Well Corporation: 2011) 286
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and to the assets of the economic unit as collateral for the loan’.661 What is referred to as 
the economic unit in this definition is a legally and financially free business corporation. 
In addition, the definition also indicates that the repayment of the loan is principally 
dependent on the cash flow generated by the economic unit.662  Another definition for 
project finance is provided by Easty. According to the author, ‘project finance involves 
the creation of a legal and economically independent project company financed with 
non-recourse debt (and equity from one or more corporate sponsors) for the purpose of 
financing a single purpose, capital asset usually with a limited life.’663Merna and Owen 
define project finance as: 
Each project is supported by its own financial package and secured solely on 
that project facility. Projects are viewed as being their own discrete entities  
and legally separated from their founding sponsors. As each project exists in 
its own right, SPV’s are formulated. Banks lend to SPV’s on a non or limited  
recourse basis, which means that loans are fully dependent on the revenue 
streams generated by the SPV’ and that the assets of the SPV are used as 
collateral. Hence although there may be a number of sponsors forming the 
SPV, the lenders have no claim to any of the assets other than the project 
itself.664
The following subsection describes the participants of project finance.
1.2    Who are the main Project Finance Participants?
Generally speaking, there is no one unique project finance model that is applicable 
to all industries. In other words, as project financing has a complex structure, not all 
projects follow the same financing method. The following figure best illustrates which 
types of projects are originated primarily by a host government and which by private 
sponsors can generally be made on sector by sector basis.665
Table 10 Breakdown of Key Project Originators
661 P. K. Nevitt & F. J. Fabozzi, Project Financing, 7th end (England, Euro-money 
Institutional Investor PLC: 2000) 1
662 A. Merna & Y. Chu and F. F. Al-Thani,  Project Finance in Construction: A 
Structured Guide to Assessment, (Oxford, Willey Blackwell: 2010) 11
663 B. C. Easty,  Modern Project Finance, ( USA, John Wiley & Sons, Inc: 2004) cited 
in A. Merna & Y. Chu and F. F.Al-Thani, (n.3 above) 12
664 A. Merna and G. Owen,  Understanding the Private Finance Initiative-The New  
Dynamics of Project Finance (Hong Kong, Asia Law and Practice, 1998) cited in T. 
Merna & F. F. Al-Thani, Corporate Risk Management 2nd edn. (England, John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd: 2008) 111
665 J. Dewar, International Project Finance: Law and Practice ( Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 2011) 23
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Project Sector Likely Project Originator
Ports Government
Rails Government
Roads/tunnels/bridges Government
Hospitals Government
Schools Government
Water/waste Government
Power Government/Private Sponsor
Leisure amenities Government/Private Sponsor
Oil and Gas Private Sponsor
LNG Private Sponsor
Mining Private Sponsor
Petrochemical Private Sponsor
Telecoms/satellites Private Sponsor
Source666: John Dewar
When the classic model of project finance is considered, in oil and gas pipeline 
projects the following participants involve: a parent company or a group of companies 
in a consortium (project sponsors), special  purpose vehicle (SPV), host government, 
financial  institutions  (multilateral,  regional  development  banks,  bilateral,  and 
commercial banks). 
Project  Company: A Project  Company  is  a  core  legal  entity  that  will  own, 
develop,  construct,  operate  and  maintain  a  single  project.  The  project  company  is 
generally regarded as a special purpose vehicle (SPV). In other words, the SPV is ‘a 
legally  and  economically  independent  project  company  financed  with  non-limited 
recourse debt for the purpose of financing a single purpose, capital asset usually with a 
limited life’.667 A sponsor company sets up a SPV for the sole purpose of achieving the 
limited goals of construction and operation of a particular pipeline, dam, hydroelectric 
etc. projects in a host country. Therefore, they are subject to the laws of that country 
‘unless  appropriate  commission  can  be  so  that  key  government  officials  can  grant 
666 Ibid
667 A. Merna & Y. Chu and F. F. Al-Thani, (n.3 above) 14
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exceptions  to  the  project’.668 Furthermore,  depending  on  the  sponsor  companies  in 
question, an SPV can be seen in different ways. If the project involves more than one 
sponsor, a state corporate entity, partnership construction trust,  or a contractual joint 
venture may be formed. According to Smith and Walter, the existence of more than one 
sponsor may be necessitated by the following factors669:
• The oil or gas resource is jointly owned
• The  government  of  the  country  where  the  project  is  located 
mandates joint venture with local interests
• The  size  of  the  project  is  so  massive  that  it  yields  greater 
economies of scale than several smaller units
• The capabilities of the sponsors are complementary
• The project obviously exceeds the technical, human, or financial 
resources of a single company
• There is a clear need for risk sharing
        The role of SPVs, sovereign ceiling and collateralisation
The principal purpose of the SPV is to maximize project income levels. 670 In 
addition to this, some scholars have drawn attention to the reasons why setting up a SPV 
is considered necessary in an investment scenario. According to Norton, ‘setting up a 
SPV is to afford reassurance (or ‘ring-fencing’) to investors, enabling cash flows to be 
de-linked from the credit of the originator/seller. The SPV will receive foreign earnings 
paid into an account in its name rather than that of the originator; after interest payments 
have been made to investors the balance will be ‘passed through’ to the originator’.671 
According to  Paoli,  ‘the  reason for  forming a SPV is  that  it  can  in  certain  limited 
circumstances enable the originator to ‘pierce the sovereign ceiling’, meaning that it is 
able to raise capital at a lower cost than can the government of the country where it 
exists’.672 All things considered, SPVs are basically ‘robot companies in that they have 
668 A. Fight, Introduction to Project Finance, (Oxford, Elsevier: 2008) 12
669 R. C. Smith & I. Walter,  Global Banking, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997) 61
670S.  Leader  &  D.  Ong,  Global  Project  Finance,  Human  Rights  and  Sustainable  
Development, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2011) 115
671 S. D. Norton, ‘Securitisation in the Extractive Industries: Stakeholder Sensitivities, 
Environmental  Protection  and  the  Cost  of  Capital’,  Issue  53,  Greenleaf  Publishing 
(November, 2007) 62
672 B. De Paoli, ‘Costs of Sovereign Default’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 46.3 
(2006): 297-308 cited in S. D. Norton (n. 12 above) 62
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no workers, make no substantive economic decisions, have no physical location, and 
cannot  go  bankrupt’.673 Generally  speaking,  collateralisation  refers  to  a  property or 
other  assets  that  a  borrower  offers  a  financial  institution  to  protect  a  loan.  If  the 
borrower cannot make the payment of the assured loan, then the lender can seize the 
collateral  to recover its  injuries.  Norton emphasises that the SPV established by the 
project  sponsors  is  a  shell  corporation  and  emphasises  the  necessity  of  SPV 
collateralization. According to the author:
The  originator  may  sometimes  retain  the  first  loss  tranche  under  the 
securitization,  having  the  same  economic  effect  as  collateralisation,  but 
without constituting a guarantee within the strict legal sense. Collateralisation 
may be required to compensate for risks accruing to the issue. Without such 
collateralisation the greater the level of perceived risk, the lower the rating 
assigned to the issue by the bond rating agencies,  Standard & Poor’s and 
Moody’s, Fitch and DBRS and the higher the rate of interest that must be 
paid by the originator.674
Sponsor Company:  The project sponsor is the entity that takes an active role in 
managing the project. As the owner of the SPV, the project sponsor can be a parent 
company, group of companies (consortium), or a subsidiary of another company that 
initiates  a  project.675 The  project  sponsor  supplies  management,  operational  and 
technical knowledge and experience to a particular project. The project sponsor may be 
required to provide some guarantees to cover certain liabilities or undertake the risks of 
the project.676 Furthermore, no project can be maintained without the absence of Project 
Company. 
Host Governments: A host government is the government of the state in which 
an investment  project  is  executed.  There is  no doubt that  the role played by a host 
government is significant in project financing. For example the political motivation and 
sustained political support of a host government are indispensable to project financing. 
In order to demonstrate this willingness, host governments enter into agreement with 
sponsors, ‘providing guarantees and the security of project facilities as well as financial 
and other assurance’.677  The host government’s role and lenders’ assessment criteria 
will be discussed in detail in the section devoted to the assessment of project risk in host 
countries. 
673G. B. Gorton and N. S.  Souleles,  ‘Special  Purpose Vehicles and Securitization’, 
Chapter 12 in M. Carey and R. M. Stulz, The Risks of Financial Institutions, National  
Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report, University of Chicago Press (2007) 
550
674 S.  D. Norton, (n. 12 above) 63
675 A. Slivker,  ‘What is Project Finance and How does it work?’,  The University of 
Iowa centre for International Finance and Development (April,  2011) 5 available at: 
<http://ebook.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/uicifd-ebook/what-project-finance-and-how-does-it-
work-0> May, 2013
676 A. Fight (n.9 above) 
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Financial Institutions: There are numerous financial institutions that have some 
involvement  in  project  finance  transactions.  Furthermore,  there  is  an  even  greater 
variety  of  capital  support  structures  that  a  financial  organisation  can  provide  for  a 
project. Most projects around the world, particularly in developing states, are financed 
through some mixture of multilateral banks, export credit agencies and other financial 
agencies (bilateral agencies or commercial banks). These organisations were set up to 
supply financing for governmental and private sector transactions in developing states 
where the political risks are high and often serve to inhibit financial institutions from 
providing loans. Yet, in spite of the importance of direct funding provided by official 
agencies, their most crucial role is that their capability in diminishing the political risks 
for  private-sector  lenders  and  thereby  to  attract  them  to  contribute  in  financing 
developing country projects. 678
2.   The Main Financial Institutions in Project Financing
2.1. Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are international institutions established 
by  international  agreement  between  multiple  countries  whose  aim  is  to  promote 
investment development among all its member nations by providing loans and grants.679 
These development goals concentrate on, primarily, the economic and social benefits to 
be had through investment as well as supplementary issues such as the protection of the 
environment  and  sustainability.680 Project  loans  include  large  infrastructure  projects, 
such as pipeline construction in energy investment projects, highways, power plants, 
port facilities as well as social projects. Multilateral banks operate both globally and 
regionally. The World Bank Group is the principal globally active, multilateral body that 
provides loans and grants to private sector financing through its affiliates International 
Finance  Corporation  (IFC)  and  Political  Risk  Insurance  through  the  Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 
677 T.  Sorell,  ‘Project  Financing  in  Developing  Countries,  New  Corporate  Social 
Responsibility, Human Rights, and Multinationals’, Essex Human Rights Review Vol.5 , 
No 1. (1 July, 2008) 2
678 B. Sheppard, ‘The Role of Multilateral Banks and ECAs’, in R. Morrison, The 
principle of Project Finance  (England,  Gower Publisher: 2012) 81
679 For instance, Article 1 (section 1) of the Agreement Establishing the Inter-American 
Development Bank, as stated: ‘the purpose of the Bank shall be to contribute to the 
acceleration  of  the  process  of  economic  and  social  development  of  the  regional 
developing  member  countries,  individually  and  collectively.’  Available  at: 
<http://www.iadb.org/leg/documents/pdf/convenio-eng.pdf> May 2013
680 J. Dewar, (n.6 above) 218
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For the most part, other multilateral development agencies are more often regional 
in scope. Some examples of these are:  European Investment Bank (EIB), European 
Bank for  Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),  the African Development Bank 
(AfDB),  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank  and  the  Asian  Development  Bank 
(ADB). MDBs are also providers of policy based loans. Traditionally, this type of loan 
is granted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and which requires the typically 
developing  countries  who  wish  to  borrow  to  implement  specified  economic  and 
financial  policies.  The purpose  of  this  international  organisation  is  ‘to  foster  global 
monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote 
high employment, sustain economic growth and reduce poverty around the world’.681 
Despite  the  fact  the  organisation  states  as  one  of  its  key  aims  the  creation  of  a 
permanently strong economic environment, the IMF does not involve itself directly in 
the financing of investment projects. In the interests of economy, the following section 
examines only briefly the players in global finance actors under the World Bank Group. 
Other regional institutions will be provided in a list format.
2.1.1 World Bank Group
The World Bank Group is a term which encompasses the following institutions: 
the  International  Development  Association  (IDA),  the  International  Financial 
Corporation  (IFC),  the  Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee  Agency  (MIGA)  and  the 
International  Centre  for Settlement  of Disputes (ICSID).  The International  Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the World Bank are used interchangeably 
in literature, but are more widely known as the World Bank which was set up on 27 
December  1945.Notably,  since  its  establishment,  the  World  Bank  has  pursued  this 
objective in several ways.682The following bullet points demonstrate the main objectives 
of the World Bank:
• To assist in the development of member countries by facilitating 
the investment of capital for productive purposes; 
• To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or 
participation in loans and other investments made by private investors; 
• To promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade 
and the maintenance of equilibrium in balance of payments by encouraging 
international investment for the development of the productive resources of 
members, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and 
conditions of labour in their territories;
• To  conduct  its  operations  with  due  regard  to  the  effect  of 
international investment on business conditions in the territories of members 
and, in the immediate post-war years, to assist in bringing about a smooth 
transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy.683
681 Please see Official  Website of International Monetary Fund (IFM), available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm> May 2013
682 I. F. I. Shihata, ‘The Settlement of Disputes  Regarding Foreign Investment: The 
Role of The world Bank, With Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA’,1  Am. U.J.  
Int’l L. &Pol’y 97 (1986) 1 
683Article  (1)  of  Agreement  of  the  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development, July 22, 1944 available at: <http://web.worldbank.org/> May 2013
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With this outline of the main purposes and objectives of the World Bank in mind, 
it is significant to examine examples of the Bank’s specific role in oil and gas related 
projects.  The  World  Bank  requires  a  governmental  guarantee  of  repayment  of  its 
loans.684 For this reason, the bank’s financial assistance is not directly extended to the 
private financing of a project. Therefore, its loans are provided to host governments. It 
should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  Bank’s  involvement  in  an  oil  and  gas  project 
encourages  private  sector  involvement  in  large-scale  oil  and  gas  projects.685 For 
instance, the World Bank’s involvement could provide extra security to the other lenders 
or international investors who participates the project.  The World Bank’s guarantees 
cover risks arising from non-performance contractual obligations or  force majeure.686 
Furthermore,  the  Bank  can  extend  guarantees  against  political  risks,  such  as 
expropriation,  nationalisation,  foreign  currency  transfer,  etc.  More  significantly,  the 
World Bank’s policy effect or closeness to the host government assists to facilitate legal 
and administrative preparation of package.687
The International Development Agency (IDA)
The International Development Agency (IDA) was established in 1960. It aims to 
reduce poverty by providing subsidised credits (loan) and grants, technical assistance, 
and policy advice to the less developed countries.688 The organisation has 172 member 
states which contribute financially every three years.689 IDA membership is available 
684 S. Sinclair, World Bank Guarantees for Oil and Gas Projects’, in The World Bank,  
Natural Gas: Private Sector Participation and Market, (Washington, The World Bank 
Publications: 1999) 87
685 H. Razavi, ‘Oil and Gas Financing by the World Bank’, Energy Policy vol.23 No.11 
(1995) 1001
686 H. Razavi, Financing Energy Projects in Emerging Economies, (Tulsa, Oklahoma, 
Penn-Well Books: 1996) 35-36. The term  Force majeure means ‘superior force’ has 
developed into an international doctrine.  In project financing, transaction documents 
ought to contain clauses which specify the events that excuse performance and the legal 
consequences of each event. These events commonly in force majeure clauses and refer 
specific risks. For instance, war, strikes, lockout, expropriation, requisition, confiscation 
or nationalisation, changes in law etc. cited in P. K. Nevitt& F. J. Fabozzi, (n.2 above) 
25
687 H. Razavi ( n.27 above) 35-36
688  Low or less income countries, are the states with annual per capita income $1,025 
or less. Please see World Bank’s income group assessment (n.24 above)
689 IDA official website, what is IDA, available at: 
<http://www.worldbank.org/ida/what-is-ida.html >May 2013
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only to countries who are also members of the World Bank. While IBRD targets middle 
income690 countries  and  assesses  their  creditworthiness,  IDA does  not  consider  the 
creditworthiness of states. Since, the IDA does not borrow funds on the credit markets; 
the organisation does  not  adopt  interest  rates  on its  barrowing charges,  as  does  the 
IBRD.691 The IDA is regarded to be the soft lending window of the World Bank, while  
IBRD is considered to be the hard lending window.692
International Financial Corporation (IFC)
The  International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC)  is  a  member  of  the  World  Bank 
Group, focused exclusively on promotion of private sector investment in developing 
countries. The institution was established in Washington in 1956 and currently has 184 
member countries around the world.693 The objective of the IFC is not merely to support 
private projects that it is involved in but also to attract foreign investment and finance. 
In  contrast  to  the  Word Bank,  which supplies  capital  to  host  governments,  the IFC 
provides loan to private companies and will not accept repayment from the government 
of  host  state.694 In  addition,  unlike  the  World  Bank,  which  provides  guarantees  to 
investors to stimulate the economy of its client country, the IFC does not provide direct 
guarantees against political risks protection to its B loan syndicate banks. Furthermore, 
the IFC has two different types of loans, A and B. While the former is financed through 
the IFC’s own funds, the latter is financed by external funds. The type B Loan offers  
commercial  banks and other  financial  institutions the opportunity to take part  in  an 
investment project financed by the IFC. These loans play a key role in IFC’s effort to 
mobilize cross-border funding for private sector investment in developing states.695 The 
IFC’s direct support is significantly improved through its  syndication of commercial 
banks loans. According to Ochieze, ‘a syndicate of banks should be chosen from as 
wide a range of countries as possible, to discourage the host government from taking 
690 According to World Bank’s income group assessment, Middle income countries, are 
the states with per capita income $1,026 - $4,035 a year, available at: 
<http://data.worldbank.org/>May 2013
691 S. L. Hoffman, The Law and Business of International Project Finance, 3rd edn 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2008) 260
692  W. R. Cline & N. P. Sargen, ‘Performance Criteria and Multilateral Aid 
Allocation’, World Development  Vol.3, Issue 6, June (1975)383-391
693 For further information please see <http://www1.ifc.org/>May 2013 
694 H. Razavi ,(n.27 above) 44
695 International Finance Corporation, Partnering with IFC Syndication: access, 
cooperation and risk mitigation, available at:<http://www1.ifc.org/>May 2013
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action  to  expropriate  or  otherwise  interfere  with  the  project  and thus  jeopardise  its 
economic relations with these countries.’696
The IFC enjoys special privileges: ‘the institution is exempt from payments from 
local taxes; its loan has never been rescheduled for political risks; it has accessed for 
high policy maker and so on.’697 When it syndicates the loan, the IFC is the lender of 
record and brings commercial banks under its own ‘umbrella’. Hence, the commercial 
bank  loans  treated  in  the  same  way  as  the  IFC’s  loan.698 Indeed,  the  IFC  takes 
responsibility for administrating the loans and collecting payments from borrower.699 
IFC  also  takes  the  responsibility  for  appraising  the  project  and  coordinating  the 
preparation  of  legal  and  contractual  package.  With  the  IFC  taking  all  the  lead 
responsibilities, commercial banks find it more convenient and secure to participate in 
financing projects in developing countries.700
  Multinational Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
 MIGA is  another  member  institution  of  the  World  Bank  Group.  MIGA has 
headquarters in Washington DC and operates as an independent international institution 
with ‘full juridical personality’701 under the umbrella of international law and domestic 
laws  of  its  member  countries.702 It  was  established  in  1988  and  currently  has  179 
member states. In June of the same year, MIGA defined its Operational Regulations.703 
696C. Ochieze, Lender Liability: ‘To what extent can a lender protect itself?’, CELMP 
Annual Review, Feb 2007 available at:<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/>January 2011
697 H. Razavi (n.27 above) 44
698M. H. Bouchet& E. Clark and B. Groslambert, Country Risk Assessment: Guide to  
Global Investment Strategy,( England, John Wiley & Sons Ltd: 2003) 203
699 H. Razavi,(n.27 above) 44
700 Ibid
701 MIGA  Convention,  Article  1.  Convention  Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee 
Agency,  opened signature 11 October,  1985,  24 I.L.M. 1985 (entered into force 12 
April, 1988)
702 J. W. Salacuse, The Three Laws of International Investment: National, Contractual,  
and International Frameworks for Foreign Capital, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
2013) 266
703 Operational Regulations of the Multilateral Guarantee Investment Agency, June 22, 
1988 (As amended by the Board of Directors  2012) 1227 available at: 
<http://www.miga.org/documents/Operations-Regulations.pdf> May 2013
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These serve to set out the main principles ‘as to the nature and type of political risk 
guarantees that MIGA may issue, the eligible investors and investments that may obtain 
such guarantees, and the basic terms and conditions that must be included in MIGA 
guarantee contracts.’704 The objective of the organisation is to promote and encourage 
private investment in emerging economies. In order to fulfil its mission, the organisation 
provides investment guarantees against political risks to alien investors and lenders.705 
The  political  insurance  scheme  covers  five  non-commercial  areas:  a)  currency 
inconvertibility and transfer restriction; b) expropriation; c) war; civil disturbances; d) 
breach  of  contract  violation  through  host  government’s  intervention;  and  e)  non-
honouring of state financial obligations product.  As noted previously,  as well as the 
World  Bank Group there are  a  host  of  other  multilateral  organisations  with a  more 
regional scope. A full list of these is provided below.  
Table 11 List of other Multilateral Development Institutions
Name of the Institution
Abbrev
iation
African Development Bank AFDB
African Development Fund ADF
Andean Development Corporation CAF
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa BADEA
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development AFESD
Arab Investment and 
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation
DHAMAN
Arab Monetary Fund AMF
Arab Organisation for Agricultural Development AOAD
Asian Development Bank ADB
Caribbean Development bank CDB
Central American Bank for Economic Integration CABEI
Central African States Development Bank CASDB
East African Development Bank EADB
European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development
EBRD
European Interment Bank EIB
European Investment Fund EIF
Financial Fund for the Development River
Plate Bain
FONPLATA
704 J. W. Salacuse,  (n.43. above) 266
705 MIGA’s  official  website  <http://www.miga.org/investmentguarantees/index.cfm> 
May 2013
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Fund for Co-operation, Compensation And Development (Economic 
Community of West  African States)
ECOWAS 
Fund
International Fund for Agricultural Development IFAD
Islamic Development bank IsDB
Nordic Development Fund NDF
Nordic Investment Fund NIF
OPEC Fund for International Development OPEC
Saudi Fund for Development SFD
United Nations African Institute for 
Economic Development and Planning
IDEP
West African Development Bank BOAD
Source: Compiled by Author
2.2    Export Credit Agencies (ECAs)
Nowadays, almost every industrialised state has at least one official export credit 
agency. However, many well developed countries around the world may boast of two 
agencies: one for finance and one for guarantees and insurance.706 ECAs and Investment 
Insurance Agencies (IIA) are mutually referred to as ECAs, they provide government 
backed  loans  guarantees  and  insurance  to  support  corporations  seeking  business 
opportunities in less developed states and emerging markets.  ECAs typically supply 
short-term trade financing, medium-term financing for capital goods, and insurance or 
guarantees  against  political  risk  for  export  transaction  and long-term investments.707 
Such insurance or guarantees may cover either or both commercial and political risk. 
For instance, if the SPV, established in the host state, imports installations or equipment 
which are  indispensible  to  construct  and run the  project,  most  ECAs are willing to 
provide political risk coverage, total coverage or direct loans to exporting companies 
operating in their home country.708 It should be noted that all major ECAs as well as 
MIGA and other private insurers are members of the Berne Union (International Union 
706E. D. Gianturko, Export Credit Agencies: The unsung Giants of International Trade  
and Finance, (USA, Greenwood Press: 2001) 63
707 B. Sheppard (n.19 above) 82
708 S. Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice: Designing, Structuring and 
Financing Private and Public Projects, 2nd edn. ( California,  Academic Press: 2012) 
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of Credit and Investment Insurers). The main role and purpose of the Berne Union, is to: 
‘work  to  facilitate  cross-border  trade  by  helping  exporters  mitigate  risks  through 
promoting internationally acceptable principles of export  credit  financing, strengthen 
the global financial structure, and facilitate foreign investments.’709 The following table 
demonstrates the most significant ECAs in the project finance market and their country 
of origin. The table also includes brief information about these ECAs.
       Table 12 List of Major ECAs Operating Today with Their Home County
Country  Institution Abbreviation
Canada Export Development Canada: 
Providers,  principally  of  export  financing  and  insurance 
support.
EDC
China Export-Import  Bank  of  China:  A  bank  which  has  the 
primary mission of promoting foreign trade and investment. 
The  Institution’s  commercial  activity  is  to  fund  mainly 
export credit infrastructure projects such as pipelines roads, 
and railways.
China 
Eximbank
Finland Finn Vera: The institution provides guarantees to the buyer 
or  the  borrower  (commercial),  or  to  the  buyer’s  or 
borrower’s country (political risk).
FinnVera
France CompagnieFrancaised’Assurance  pour  le  Commerce 
Exterieur:   The  organisation  provides  commercial  and 
political risk insurance.
COFACE
Germany KfW IPEX-Bank:  A government-owned institution  which 
operates more like a commercial bank than an Export Credit 
Agency.710
IPEX
Italy SACE:  an  entity  which  operates  like  an  insurance  and 
financial institution and supports Italian companies’ export 
and internationalisation activities.
SACE
Japan Japan Bank for  International  Cooperation:  JBIC provides 
export  financing as  well  as  financial  assistance  including 
concessionary long-term, low interest funds needed for the 
efforts of developing states.711
JBIC
Japan Nippon  Export  and  Investment  Insurance:  the  institution 
provides insurance against commercial and political risk.
NEXI
Korea Export-Import Bank of Korea: provides bilateral loans. KEXIM
709 J. K. Jackson, The Bern Union: ‘An Overview, Congressional Research Service 
Report’  ,  (April  2013)2  available  at:,<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22319.pdf> 
May 2013
710 For  further  information  see the  official  website  of  the  institution.  Available  at: 
<https://www.kfw-ipex-bank.de/Internationale-Finanzierung/KfW-IPEX-Bank/  >   May 
2013 ; see also J. Dewar,(n.6 above) 215
711 For further reading see S.L. Hoffman (n.32 above) 272
170
Korea Korea  Export  and  Insurance  Corporation:  As  an  export 
credit  insurance  agency,  it  provides  insurance  against 
commercial and political risks.
KEIC
Norway Garanti-Institutet for Eksportkreditt: An organisation which 
supplies loan guarantees to support export financing.
GEIK
UK Export Credits Guarantee Departments: In the UK, export 
financing  is  supplied  by  the  commercial  lenders.  The 
organisation  guarantees  payment  to  a  UK  financial 
institution  to  support  UK  goods  and  services,  assuring 
exporters against payment risks resulting from commercial 
and political risks.
ECGD
US Export-Import  Bank  of  the  United  States:  As  an 
independent  legal entity,  US Eximbank has three guiding 
principles; support US exports through financing, achieve a 
reasonable  guarantee  of  repayment  and  provide  financial 
support.712
US 
Eximbank
Source: Compiled by Author
 2.3   Bilateral Agencies
Bilateral Agencies are the third type of official agencies that play an active part in 
project  finance  transaction.  Most  bilateral  institutions  were  established  to  promote 
international economic development through loans, guarantees, equity investments and 
in some cases political risk insurance. According to Shepard, Bilateral agencies are a 
more heterogeneous group than MDBs or ECAs because they cannot be restricted to a 
single category.713  For instance, the US finance development institution known as the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is broadly known for its political risk 
insurance  programme  which  offers  cover  against  certain  political  risks,  including 
inconvertibility,  expropriation,  and  political  violence.  In  addition  to  its  political 
insurance  programme,  the  organisation  also  provides  project  finance  on  a  limited 
recourse basis for private investment projects through direct loans and loan guarantees. 
The borrower must be either a wholly owned US company or a joint venture in which 
the US sponsor firm is a participant. The following table catalogues the most important 
bilateral agencies playing a key role in the project finance market.
Table 13 Bilateral Agencies that are the most important for the project finance 
market. 
Institution Abbreviation Country
Promotion et de Participation Pour la Coopération
Economiques
PROPARCO France
712 Ibid
713 B. Sheppard (n.19 above) 82
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KfWBankengruppe
(Originally Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaubau)
KfW Germany
DeuttscheInvestition-und Entwicklungsgesellschaft
(a subsidiary of Kfw)
DEG Germany
NederlandseFinancierings-Maatschappij
voorOntwikkelingsladen
 FMO Netherlands
Commonwealth Development Corporation CDC UK
Overseas Private Investment Corporation OPIC USA
United States Agency for International Aid USAID USA
Source714: B. Shepherd
2.4 Commercial Banks
Commercial  banks  are  the  other  most  significant  players  in  project  finance 
transactions.  A loan  may be  granted  through the  domestic  commercial  bank  of  the 
country where the project is to be undertaken or else through international commercial 
banks.  Obtaining  a  grant  from  a  domestic  bank  may  be  advantageous  for  project 
sponsors because of the bank’s knowledge of local law and ‘customs as well as the 
ability to offer loans in the local currency.’715 It should, however, be noted that some 
developing  countries’ domestic  bank  markets  may  not  be  sufficiently  developed  to 
provide  the  capital  required  for  a  long-term investment  project.716 Furthermore,  the 
attractiveness  of  commercial  banks  for  investors  in  project  finance  is  perhaps  the 
flexible terms they offer on the repayment of loan that they may offer to investors. A 
loan granted by an international commercial bank usually has a specific period within 
which it is repayable in accordance with a pre-range reimbursement schedule. 
Notably, this specific term loan includes flexibility ‘as to when repayments will 
begin, when the loan will be repaid, in equal or variable payments over time and the 
frequency of interest payments in order to align the project’s projected revenue streams 
and operating costs with the borrower’s repayment obligations’.717  In the energy sector, 
the  participation  of  international  commercial  banks  consists  in  their  provision  of 
syndicated loans. As mentioned above, IFC and some MDBs have a sizeable remit in 
putting together syndicated loans for developing countries. According to Razavi, the 
IFC’s participation offers international commercial banks convenience and reassurance 
714 Ibid
715 D. Nordstrom & S. Dickens and M. Brown & K. Stirling, ‘Multisource Project 
Financing’,  chapter 4 in R. Morrison, The Principle of Project Finance, (England, 
Gower Publishing Limitted:2012) 40
716 Ibid
717 Ibid 
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as  follows:  1)  The  IFC  handles  all  the  technical  and  legal  matters  including  risk 
mitigation measures; 2) ensures that a default on repayment to any of the participating 
banks will be viewed as a default on the entire syndicated loan and thereby, a default on 
repayment of the IFC loan; and 3) is responsible for administration of the syndicated 
loan and all matters related to the disbursement and repayment of the loans.718
        Basel III, Capital Adequacy and Risk
As outlined above, financial institutions play a key role in financing national and 
international  investment  projects.  It  would  seem that  their  influence  over  a  state’s 
economy in this respect to be taken for granted. Nevertheless, despite their influential 
role  in  an  energy-producing  nations’ economy,  the  banking  industry  is  inherently 
unstable and its structure has been historically sensitive to economic change. Generally 
speaking, the crisis in the banking industry can be divided into three timelines in the 
20thCentury. The first major financial crisis, the Great Depression was a feature of the 
1930s. Thereafter, the saving and loan crisis occurred in the banking sector during the 
1980s and 1990s and the final and perhaps the most dramatic of contemporary financial 
crises broke in 2007. Capital adequacy has always been the most vitally important pillar 
of  international  banking  regulation.  Capital  adequacy  can  be  defined  as  ‘the  legal 
requirement that a financial institution (such as a bank) should have enough capital to 
meet all its obligations and fund the services it offers.’719 As will be discussed below, all 
the  Basel  accords  adopted  by  Basel  committee  have  strived  to  establish  a  mutual 
international regime for the regulation of banks ‘by drawing up a series of minimum 
standards  for  the  assessment  of  the  amount  of  capital  adequacy  that  banks  should 
hold.’720
In the mid-1970s, the ten groups of countries’ central banks established the Basel 
Committee to facilitate consistent cooperation among countries and improve the quality 
of banking supervision throughout the world. By the late 1980s, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision developed ‘a risk based capital adequacy standard that would 
lead  to  international  convergence  of  supervisory  regulations  governing  the  capital 
adequacy of international active banks’.721 The adoption of the Basel I accord by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision established the first international applicable 
set of regulatory capital adequacy standards to offer built-in stability to the international 
banking system. It was adopted by a number of bank regulators around the world.722 In 
2004, banking regulators in the United States and other countries produced a version II 
718 H. Razavi,(n.27 above) 98
719 J.O. E. Clark, Dictionary of International Banking and Finance Terms, (Canterbury, 
Financial World Publishing: 2001) 61
720 K. Young, ‘The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’ in T. Hale & D. Held, 
Handbook of Transnational Governance (Cambridge, Polity Press: 2011) 40
721H. V. Greuning & S. B. Bratanovic, ‘Analyzing Banking Risk: A Framework for  
Assessing Corporate Governance and Risk Management’, 3rd Edn.  (Washington D. C, 
The World Bank: 2009) 123
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of the Basel accord because ‘it had become clear to regulators that the methods used to 
calculate the requirements in Basel I were not sufficiently sensitive in measuring the 
risk exposures. It was also clear that the regulatory capital needed in the increasingly 
complex  and  dynamic  banking  system  could  not  be  determined  accurately  and 
consistently under the Basel I framework’.723  Basel II proposed a three pillar approach. 
The first pillar covers minimum capital requirements, the second pillar the supervisory 
review of capital adequacy and the third pillar market discipline.724 Nevertheless, the 
banking sector found itself exposed to high levels of risk once more in the financial 
crisis of 2007. This prompted the committee to develop a third iteration of the accord to 
address weaknesses retrospectively identified in the Basel II accord. 
Basel III is a consultative document entitled, ‘Strengthening the Resilience of the  
Banking Sector’ which was first  published in 2009, by the Basel Committee.725 The 
main objective of the Basel III accord is to amend the liquidity and capital adequacy 
minimum ratios proposed under Basel II.  The new liquidity and capital adequacy ratios 
proposed in the current version of the accord aim to future-proof banking organisations 
against such crippling crises. 
Basel III aims to establish appropriate levels of liquidity for financial institutions 
and provide assurances of solvency through bank level regulation, ‘which will help raise 
the resilience of individual banking institutions to periods of stress’ and address system 
-wide risk.726 Under Basel III, the minimum requirement for capital adequacy would be 
raised from of 2% (under the Basel II) of banks’ net assets to 4.5%. This constitutes a 
concerted attempt  to  improve the  capital  adequacy and liquidity of  commercial  and 
investment banks. The following bullet points clearly demonstrate how the Basel III 
proposals sought to strengthen the regulatory regime applied to banks: 
722 B. P. Delahaye, Basel III : ‘Capital Adequacy and Liquidity after the Financial  
Crisis’, Harvard Law School LLM thesis (2011)3
723 W. W. Eubanks, Status of the Basel III Capital Adequacy Accord, CRS Report for  
Congress, 28 October (2010) 1
724T. Koffer, Basel III-Implications for Banks’ Capital Structure: What Happens with 
hybrid capital instrument?, ( Hamburg, Anchor Academic Publishing: 2013) 4
725 Bank for International Settlement, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
Consultative Document, strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector  available 
at: <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf> March, 2014
726 Basel III: A global regulatory for more resilient banks and banking system; Banks 
for International Settlement; Revised June, 2011, available at: 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf> March, 2014
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• Enhancing the quality and quantity of capital.
• Strengthening capital requirements for counterparty credit risk (and in 
CRD III for market risk) resulting in higher Pillar I requirements for both.
• Introducing a leverage ratio as a backstop to risk-based capital.
• Introducing two new capital buffers: one on capital conservation and one 
as a countercyclical capital buffer.
• Implementing an enhanced liquidity regime through the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio and Liquidity Coverage Ratio.727
3. The role of lenders in the inclusion of Stabilisation Clauses
As touched upon in the introduction, the political and social stability of a host 
state is undoubtedly the most significant concern for investors and lenders. No matter 
within which jurisdiction the project is located,  the laws and regulations of the host 
country have the potential to affect every aspect of the Project Company’s activities.728 
The project sponsor who seeks financial aid for a specific investment project prepares a 
project finance proposal and submits it  to the lender.  The lender  conducts a  project 
analysis in an attempt to comprehend the general scope of the project, rationale and the 
purpose of the investment project in order to ensure that the project proposal is sound 
and worth participating in.
 From the information provided by the project analysis, the lender can identify and 
assess potential risks that can be managed or avoided. Indeed, it is well-known that risk 
of some degree is unavoidable and there will always be the potential for an unforeseen 
risk to arise during the course of an investment project. Nevertheless, project finance 
lenders assess the legal and business environment of a host country with the information 
available  to  them before  committing  to  capital  investment  in  a  specific  project.  An 
Account Manager in a private insurance company interviewed, furnished the following 
explanation:
The financing of a project will be based on its financial performance 
and risks. The financial performance and strength of the project will 
be  evaluated  using  certain  measures  such  as  debt  coverage  ratio 
(sponsors’ ability to meet their debt payments); the Rate of Return on 
equity (ROR typically between 15% and 20%); expected cash flows, 
costs and revenues of the project, etc. A financial model will typically 
be produced to assess the project. Lenders will then assess the political 
risk,  foreign  exchange,  regulation,  industry,  customers/suppliers, 
etc.729
According  to  an  interview  participant  who  works  as  a  senior  expert  at 
international pipeline projects in Turkey: 
727 The Basel Accord and Capital Requirement Directive (CRD), available at: 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/international/basel> March , 2014
728 J. Dewar, (n.6 above) 7
729 Interview no. 13  with an Account Manager, 5 December, 2012
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In  the  Nabucco  gas  pipeline  project,  the  five  shareholders  of  the 
Nabucco  international  project  company  (BOTAS,  Turkey;  BEH, 
Bulgaria;  FGSA,  Hungary;  OMV,  Austria  and  Transgaz,  Romania) 
initially  considered  three  countries,  Iran,  Iraq  and  Azerbaijan.  The 
main lenders IFC and EIB and EBRD found that Iran posed too great 
a degree of risk, because of the constant threat of the government’s 
provocative  behaviour.  For  Iraq,  the  lenders  consideration  was  no 
more  favourable  than  Iran,  due  to  the  on-going  war  and  political 
uncertainties in the region. Therefore they ended up deciding to invest 
in Azerbaijan, as the country had relative legal and political stability 
and provided an attractive business environment for investors.730
While legal issues are one of the potential problem areas that lenders will take into 
account, there are, nevertheless, other significant factors to take into consideration that 
may be technical or environmental in nature. The following section explores these non-
commercial considerations.
Host  government  Policy:  There  is  no  doubt  that,  in  the  interests  of  the 
sustainability of the project, the lender will wish to have made a thorough assessment of 
the following: the interest/or intention of the host country regarding the project, the host 
state’s investment policy and the long term viability of host government policy. Host 
government  policy must  be  deemed  to  be  in  harmony with  the  interests  of  project 
sustainability and the host state will be expected to clearly state its intentions in a way 
that is not easily open to misinterpretation or misunderstanding. Most importantly of all, 
host state policy must be stable, and supported by immutable sources of law. From the 
lenders perspective, this requirement is easily understandable, as naturally a lender will 
wish to have a clear agreement on in exactly what circumstance ‘the project company 
will bear the risk of the host country government, changing policy and interfering with 
the  success  of  the  project’.731One  interviewee  emphasised  that  the  inclusion  of 
stabilisation clauses can be initiated by either party. He stated that:
Many of  the  investment  agreements  models  or  governments  future 
policy in specified areas, (for example oil and gas) are negotiated or 
decided  by the  World  Bank’s  reform program in  a  less  developed 
countries.  For  this  reason,  inclusion  of  stabilisation  provisions 
integrated in the contract is not the sole decision of investors, it may 
be part of the mutual policy agreement between theWorld Bank group 
and host state. 732
730 Interview no   2  Anonymity Guaranteed , 9 May 2012
731 J. Delmon , Private Sector Investment in Infrastructure: Project Finance, PPP 
Projects and Risks, 2nd edn ( The Netherland, Walters Kluwer: 2009) 136
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Permitting: Operation of an investment project necessitates the authorisation of a 
wide range of permits and consents to the project company. Such permits and approvals 
need to be in place in order for the project sponsor to develop, construct, start up and 
operate the project. In the absence of these permits and approvals ‘the project would be 
unfinanceabe  because  it  would  exist  in  a  state  of  uncertainty,  subject  to  potential 
unacceptable changes’.733 The project finance lender will monitor whether the permit is 
issued and the consents have been given or will be given in the ordinary course without 
undue expense, delay or conditionally.734
Nationalisation  and  Expropriation:  A  sovereign  state  has  the  right  to 
expropriate or nationalise private property registered or located within its boundaries 
unless  just  and timely compensation  is  provided  by a  host  government  to  an  alien 
investor.735 According to an interview respondent: 
Implementation  of  specific  legislations  creates  a  secure  investment 
environment and trusted guarantees. Lenders wish to be reassured that 
if  direct  or  indirect  expropriation  or  nationalisation  does  occur,  a 
substantial  sum  will  be  offered  in  compensation  to  the  project 
company. Therefore, both lenders and investors are motivated to look 
for these conditions.736
Change in law:  It is a fact that the repayment of loans granted for a specific 
project may span decades. During this repayment period, a project may be exposed to 
risks in the form of changes in law, as a result of government change or a change in 
political regime.  According to Delmon, ‘one of the most significant risks posed by a 
change in law is the modification of performance requirements, including output and 
environmental requirements during the concession period, increasing the cost of output 
and potentially having a negative impact on productivity.  Such changes may have a 
substantial impact on the profitability of the project.’737 As this kind of change may pose 
a threat to the economic health of the project, most host states, particularly developing 
countries,  agree  to  freeze  the  application  of  laws  to  the  project  company  through 
stabilisation clauses. If any changes are made by the government in violation of such 
732 Interview  no 8 with Lecturer, 4 June, 2012 and  8 November, 2012
733 S. L. Hoffman (n.32 above) 375
734 J. Dewar, (n.6 above) 10
735 I. Browlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th edn (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press: 1990) 123. For further information about expropriation or 
nationalisation, please see chapter 2 of this work.
736 Interview no. 4 Anonymity Guaranteed , 14 May, 2012 
737 J. Delmon (n.72 above) 136
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stabilisation  clause,  compensation  must  be  paid  to  the  investor.  Another  interview 
participant  gave  a  similar  response  to  the  previous  interviewee.  According  to  the 
respondent:
…No  lender  will  want  to  bear  the  change  in  law  risk  in  any 
circumstance, only an investor would bear the risk of a change in law. 
I  do not  know of  any lenders  who would  confirm any investment 
project that contains high risk and low profit expectations. In any case, 
they  are  reluctant  to  grant  funds  for  an  investment  project  where 
change  in  law  is  likely  in  the  absence  of  stabilisation  clauses  for 
currencies’ volatility, expropriation, tax changes, etc...738
Another interview participant put it this way:
Lenders,  insurers,  investors  are  all  members  of  a  royal  family but 
lenders are king. This interest group, especially lenders will seek to 
discourage host states from introducing new laws or new regulations 
that  will  affect  or  raise  the  project  costs  and  they  have  a  huge 
influence on host states and investors. In order to secure investments, 
host states agree to stabilisation clauses proposed by sponsors in an 
investment contract that render them liable to bear any costs arising 
from  any  changes  in  law  that  have  an  economic  impact  on  the 
investment project.739
Environmental and Social Considerations: Environmental and social issues are 
the other significant concerns that lenders take into account before investing capital in a 
specific project, for the simple reason that these can also have a direct impact on the 
loan repayment. This means that if the environmental and social risk of a project is high, 
lenders  may  not  leap  at  the  prospect  of  financing  the  project.  Consequently, 
environmental and social risk assessments are required by lenders for almost all energy 
investment  projects.  In  fact,  ‘the  lenders  will,  more  often  than  not,  want  a  very 
comprehensive assessment to be concluded before any attempt is made to appraise the 
project.’740 The question of what lenders require of a project company for projects that 
are deemed to be exposed to high environmental or social risk is answered by Dewar. 
According to the author, project finance lenders will generally:
…require as a minimum, the project company to undertake to comply with 
all environmental and social laws and regulations binding it. The lenders will 
also  likely  require  the  development  of,  and  compliance  with,  an  agreed 
environmental and social risk management plan. This is both to insulate the 
738 Interview  no. 15 Anonymity Guaranteed, 25 November, 2012
739 Interview no. 13  ( above 70 ) 
740 O. Joe, Can Environmental &Social Impact Assessment Enhance The Ability of 
Energy Projects to Secure Funding?  CEPMLP Working Paper, available at: 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/car/html/CAR10_ARTICLE12.PDF>May, 2013
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project  company, and the lenders,  from legal risk but also to preserve the 
lenders’ reputation as responsible parties.741
4.     Political Risk Insurance Providers
Traditionally,  the risk that  international  investors  faced over  the course  of  the 
project was divided into the following two categories by business analysts: commercial 
risk and political risk. Commercial risk includes more regular economic activity such as 
‘fluctuations  in  commodity  price,  the  failure  of  a  new  technology  to  perform  as 
expected, or the advent of a new competing product that makes the investor’s product 
obsolete’.742 Political risk cover provides for political risk that emerges due to a host 
country’s adverse action or inaction. The concept of political risk includes, for instance, 
currency  convertibility  and  transfer  restriction,  expropriation,  civil  unrest,  war  and 
terrorism, breach of contract and non-honouring of sovereign financial obligations. 
Accordingly,  political  risk  insurance  is  a  contractual  agreement  between  an 
investor  and an insurer  to  compensate  the investor’s  financial  loss  continued to  the 
investment  by  reason  of  the  host  country’s  adverse  action  or  inaction,  such  as 
expropriation or war and terrorism. The Political  risk insurance that emerged in  the 
aftermath  of  the  Second  World  War  was  developed  primarily  by  governments  and 
governmental agencies in capital exporting countries to motivate their entrepreneurs to 
invest in foreign countries around the world. Most of the OECD member states as well 
as non-member countries of this organisation have national agencies that supply their 
domestic firms with export credit and political risk insurance. The national political risk 
insurance providers comprise of national (ECAs) and investment insurance entities and 
which focus on cross-border investment. The following section addresses political risk 
insurance through government agencies. 
4.1    National Political Risk Insurance Providers
Several  capital  exporting  countries  have  formed  government  corporations  that 
have  in  turn become global  providers  of  political  risk  insurance.  OPIC,  founded in 
1971,  is  a  prime  example.  This  organisation’s  primary  goal  was  to  stimulate  US 
investment into developing countries, through the provision of political risk insurance 
and project finance.743  According to OPIC’s 2011 annual report,  in its 40 years the 
agency  has  supported  almost  $200  billon  of  investment  across  in  excess  of  4000 
projects  in  developing  states,  located  in  a  variety  of  different  regions  around  the 
world.744  OPIC provides the following services:
741 J. Dewar, (n.6 above) 13
742 J. W. Salacuse,  (n.43. above) 245
743 A.  Van de  Putte  & D.  F.  Gates  and K.  Holder,  ‘Political  risk  insurance  as  an 
instrument  to  reduce  oil  and  gas  investment  risk  and  manage  investment  returns’, 
Journal of World Energy Law and Business, Vol.5, No.4 (2012) 291
744Overseas Private Investment Corporation, ‘Annual Report (2011): Investing with 
Impact for 40 Years’. Washington (2011)4, available at: 
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1) Project finance in the form of direct loans and loan 
guarantees;
2) Insurance  against  a  broad  range  of  political  risks, 
including  expropriation  (including  creeping  expropriation), 
nationalisation,  revolution,  currency  inconvertibility  and 
political violence, terrorism; and
3) Pre-investment  services,  including  investment 
missions to key markets;745
4) Losses  caused  by  material  changes  in  project 
agreements unilaterally imposed by the host state.746
Several other developed countries also have their own export credit agencies with 
similar insurance programmes to OPIC, and also actively promote investment abroad. 
These  include  Japan’s  Bank  for  International  Cooperation,  Germany’s  Hermes 
Kreditversicherung-AG, France’s CompagnieFrancaised’Assurance pour le Commerce 
Extérieur, and Export Development Corporation of Canada. In parallel to these export 
credit  agencies,  MIGA also  provides  insurance  to  international  investors.  However, 
what differentiates MIGA from these national export credit agencies is that MIGA is an 
internationally based investment insurance company. 
4.2    Private Political Risk Insurance
 Political  risk insurance is  also provided through private insurance companies. 
The largest  private  political  risk  insurer  in  the  US is  called  American  International 
Group (AIG).  Other  significant  political  risk insurers  in  the  private  market  include: 
Lloyd’s  of  London,  Aon,  Sovereign  Risk  Insurance  Ltd,  Zurich  Emerging  Market 
Solution,  and  Export  Insurance  Company.  In  particular,  they  provide  political  risk 
insurance  coverage  against  currency  inconvertibility  and  transfer  restriction; 
confiscation,  expropriation,  nationalisation;  political  violence;  default  on  obligations 
such as loans, arbitral claims, and contracts. Over recent years, the insurance market has 
grown rapidly due to a mushrooming of the number of private insurers offering political 
risk  coverage.  These  private  insurers’ entrance  to  the  market  has  created  a  highly 
competitive  environment  with  national  insurance  providers  and private  corporations 
vying to offer coverage for the most attractive investment projects.  
In an attempt to understand the relative importance of political risk insurance and 
host governmental guarantees in practice to lenders and foreign investors, interviewees 
were asked to give their estimation of this. The vast majority of interviewees responded 
<http://www.opic.gov/sites/default/files/051912-annualreport-FINAL.pdf>May, 2013
745 H. Himberg, ‘The view from the Overseas private Investment Corporation (OPIC)’, 
Energy Policy, vol.23 No. 11, (1995) 978
746 M.  Kantor  &  M.  D.  Nolan  and  K.  P.  Sauvant,  Reports  of  Overseas  Private  
Investment Corporation Determinations, Vol.1 (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2011) 
xxi.
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that political risk insurance is a sine qua non requirement on top of host government 
guarantees where risky energy projects are concerned. However, one interviewee, who 
works for a private insurance company in London, expounded upon this as follows:  
In  the  case  of  an  investment  project  in  an  emerging  market  or 
politically volatile country, political risk insurance is perhaps the most 
important  requirement  for  multinational  enterprises,  and  more 
specifically  lenders.  I  think  lenders  and  companies  believe  that 
through  insurance  the  political  risk  can  be  efficiently  mitigated. 
Lenders  particularly  focus  on  political  risk  insurance  in  their  due 
diligence.747
Another  interview  participant  also  explained  why  political  risk  insurance  is 
indispensable to lenders. According to the respondent ‘Lenders will definitely require 
political  risk  insurance  from  a  sponsor  company  to  protect  their  loan’s  timely 
repayment.  If  certain  elements  are  not  covered,  they  would  not  grant  a  loan  to  a 
project.748
4.3    Risk Premium Calculation
The concept of risk premium calculation is a ‘function that takes as an argument a 
risk and returns the premium that should be charged for it’.749In today’s political risk 
insurance  market  every risk  insurance  providers  applies  a  different  methodology in 
determining and calculating the risk premium. The question is which method they use 
and how they calculate  risk premium?  It  goes  without  saying that  political  risk is 
dynamic but also a complex issue. For this reason it is difficult to fit every type of  
political risk in a specific and fixed premium. According to Rolfoni and Paciotti, ‘some 
of  PRI  providers  simply  use  the  OECD  categories  apply  a  fixed  premium  rate 
depending on the risk category. Some other political risk insurers have a flat premium 
rate, relying on the existence of a BIT agreement and not reflecting the actual level of 
risk faced by the guarantee holder’.  750 Technically, political risk insurers establish an 
essential  scoring  system and categorise every country in  terms  of  political  risk and 
allocate a premium rate to every risk group.751 In the calculation of the risk premium, a 
cap and floor is assigned in terms of basis points for every scoring752. It should be noted 
that ‘within every premium range the final rate can be increased or decreased according 
747  Interview  no 14, Anonymity Guaranteed, 8 December, 2012
748  Interview no. 13  (n. 70 above)
749  A. Tsanakas & E.Desli, Measurement and Pricing of Risk in Insurance Markets, 
Risk Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 6, (2005) 1654
750 R. Rolfini & S. Paciotti, Political Risk Insurance : A technical Approach, SACE 
Working Paper N. 14, ( November 2010) 21
751 Ibid
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to variables such as:  a) type of investment b) size of the investment c) tenor of the 
investment d) exposure and level of portfolio concentration in the host country’.753
5.     The Role of Political Risk Insurance Providers in the Inclusion of 
Stabilisation Clauses
To attract  foreign  investors,  most  states,  particularly developing countries,  are 
willing to accept stabilisation clauses when they enter into a contractual relationship 
with a project sponsor (investor). Furthermore, there is no hindrance inherent in such a 
clause to states exercising their sovereignty or protecting public interest by passing new 
laws  and  regulations  during  the  project.  For  this  reason,  political  risk  insurance 
providers will not insure losses incurred by investors as a result of such changes, as 
these sovereign rights are recognised under international law. Jenney notes that political 
risk insurers have always been intended to cover unlawful regulatory takings of host 
state,  but  not  legitimate  takings.754  In  some  cases,  particularly  in  the  context  of 
expropriation claims: ‘ it may be necessary to make use of contractual dispute resolution 
mechanisms to benefit from insurance protection due to the requirement that covered 
investors take all reasonable measures to prevent expropriation action.’755 According to 
Hoffman,  political  risk insurers may provide cover  against  the risk that  stabilisation 
clauses are rejected or revoked, via arbitral award default coverage.756
Similarly, Jenney suggests that political risk insurers:
...could provide arbitral award default coverage of contractual stabilisation 
clauses. For political risk insurers, international arbitration also serves to sort 
out  the  political  actions  of  the  host  government  from  its  legitimate 
contractual claims. Arbitral panels can sort out fact-specific questions with 
respect  to  regulation,  including in  connection with investment  agreements 
containing stabilisation clauses  protecting against  the effects  of  regulatory 
changes.757
752 Ibid
753 Ibid
754 F.  E.  Jenney,  ‘A Sword in  a  Stone:  Problems (and a  Few Proposed Solutions) 
Regarding Political Risk Insurance Coverage of Regulatory Takings’ in T. H. Moran, & 
G. T. West and K. Martin, Political Risk Management: Needs of the Present Challenges  
for the Future, (Washington, the World Bank Group: 2008) 178-179
755 J. Dewar, (n.6 above) 97
756 S. L. Hoffman (n.32 above) 70
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 It should be noted that arbitral award default coverage of stabilisation clauses is 
designed  to  protect  the  insured  benefits  of  an  agreement  containing  international 
arbitration mechanisms.758 If the arbitral court’s decision favours the investor, the failure 
of the contracting state to make the awarded payments will trigger the insurance cover 
concerned.759  In other words, a political risk insurer who pays an expropriation claim 
must in turn lodge a corresponding claim against the host government to recover its 
debt.760
This means that if the contract contains stabilisation clauses and the government 
goes  ahead  with  a  change  of  law  and  neglects  to  pay compensation,  political  risk 
insurers may foot the bill initially, but will make sure that the government ultimately 
pays  for  its  unlawful  actions.761  By  seeking  reimbursement,  political  risk  insurers 
simply aim to balance their books, but some attention should be given to what compels 
host governments to pay their dues. An examination of the legal standing of public or 
private  insurance  companies  in  reimbursement  claims  and  the  extent  of  insurers 
influence on arbitration panels will contribute to a better understanding of this. 
Subrogation rights: Subrogation is a doctrine that ‘when one has been compelled 
to pay a debt which should have been paid by another, he is entitled to a cession of all 
the remedies which the creditor possessed against that other.’762 The subrogation right is 
stated explicitly in insurance policy wording but, even if this right is not mentioned in 
the  policy,  it  is,  in  any event,  applicable.763 This  right  derives  from the  indemnity 
doctrine  and refers  to  the right  of  an  insurer,  who has  paid the loss,  to  pursue the 
wrongdoer on behalf of the insured party.764  As this right provides an opportunity for 
insurers to reimburse the capital that they have paid to investors as a result of their loss. 
The question remains that, if the host government makes changes in law for the sake of 
757 F. E. Jenney, (n. 95 above) 113
758  R. Kazimova, ‘Insurance as a Risk Management Tool: A Mitigating or Aggravating 
Factor?’  Chapter 9 in S. Leader and D. Ong, ( n. 11 above) 259
759 R. Kazimova (n.99 above) 260
760 F. E. Jenney, (n.95 above) 182
761 R. Kazimova, (n.99 above) 260
762 H. N. Sheldon, Law of Subrogation, (Washington D.C, Beard Books: 2000) 10
763 P. Handy  & B. Mccarthy,  ‘Subrogation Principles and Practice’,  The chartered 
Institute of Loss Adjusters, (September, 2010) 1, available at: <http://www.cila.co.uk> 
May 2013
764 R. Kazimova (n.99 above) 260
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public interest,  will  the government still  have to pay compensation to insurer?  The 
question was answered in Kazimova’s work. According to the author ‘What started as a 
good intention, though, turned out not to be so good, as what insurers, being shielded by 
subrogation  rights,  effectively  did  was  introduce  incentives  for  themselves  to 
compensate easily for losses of investors even when host governments initiate changes 
in  law for  a  public  purpose’.765This  shows that  in  any case,  political  risk insurance 
providers can have a direct negative impact on a host government. Foreign investors 
who are concerned about political risk in a host country can purchase insurance through 
public and private organisations. It is insurance agencies in the public sector who wield 
the  most  power  over  host  governments  via  their  influence  in  investment  insurance 
decisions at arbitral tribunals.766  One interview respondent noted that:
No national political risk insurance provider wants its investors to be 
exposed to unlawful regulatory changes in law in a foreign country. 
Their  insurance  policy  often  covers  violations  to  stabilisation 
provisions  in  the  contract.  While  these  insurers  are  acting  in  the 
capacity  of  insurance  providers  to  international  investors,  they  are 
endowed with no small influence over the host state. This inhibits the 
host country from reforming or altering its law even if such changes 
would be in the public interest.767
Taking  into  account  the  respondent’s  opinion  above,  the  decision  in  Enron 
Corporation and Ponderosa Assets vs. Argentina768 investment arbitration serves as a 
good point of reference as to how OPIC insurance coverage and determinations have 
affected  investor  state  disputes.  In  Enron,  the  investor  relied  on  a  prior  claims 
determination  made  by  OPIC  establishing  that  an  expropriation  has  occurred.769 
Nevertheless, the Enron arbitral tribunal rejected the OPIC determination as influential 
authority on the question of whether an expropriation had taken place, noting that the 
OPIC determination ‘responds to a different kind of procedure and context that cannot 
influence or be taken into account in this arbitration.’770  While the investment tribunal 
declined the investor’s claim in this  case,  the Enron tribunal;  however,  decided that 
765 R. Kazimova (n.99 above) 261
766  M. Kantor & M. D. Nolan and K. P. Sauvant (n. 87 above) xxiii
767 Interview  no. 14 (n.88 above)
768Enron Corporation and Ponderosa vs. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3 
(2007); see also Generation Ukraine, Inc. vs. Ukraine, Award, ICSID Case No 
ARB/00/9 (2003)
769Enron Corporation and Ponderosa v Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3 
(2007)  at  235; see also M. Kantor & M.D. Nolan and K. P. Sauvant (n.87 above) xxiii
770Enron Corporation and Ponderosa  vs. Argentina,  at  247
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Argentina  had  violated  its  treaty  obligations  to  supply  Enron  fair  and  equitable 
treatment. 771
ECAs  support  their  own  nationals  by  providing  finance  and  political  risk 
insurance when they invest in a foreign country. The major issue is that whenever the 
host state takes administrative measures, the claim is carried by the investor to a dispute 
settlement process before a determination is made about whether the actions of the host 
government breach stabilisation clauses or not. The claims made by investors are often 
accepted political  risk insurers and compensation is  paid to them. Admittedly,  in an 
environment  where such bias  exists,  objectivity about  the rightfulness of  a  claim is 
difficult to achieve.
6.     Credit Rating Agencies
Several Credit  Rating Agencies (CRAs) including Standard & Poor’s  (S&P’s), 
Moody’s  and  Fitch  play  a  significant  role  in  financial  markets.  They  analyse  and 
evaluate the default risk of lending to corporate and sovereign borrowers.772  Conducting 
assessments  of  debt  ratings  is  traditionally  within  the  scope  of  the  rating  agencies. 
‘Credit  ratings  are  carried  out  for  debt  issues  and take  into  account  the  borrower’s 
default risk, the nature of the debt obligation, the protection that the issue affords of the 
debt  obligation,  the  projection  that  the  issue  affords,  and  its  relative  position  in 
bankruptcy.’773
 Furthermore, ratings are also available for project specific financing. Rating for a 
specific  project  financing is  relatively new but  is  a  rapidly growing area.774 Project 
ratings are provided by the rating agencies with the aim of assessing and expressing as a 
value the level of certainty with which the project finance lenders can expect to obtain 
timely  reimbursement  of  principle  and payment  of  interest,  in  accordance  with  the 
project terms.775 This type of rating mainly concentrates on the capability of financing 
entity, whether a developer or special purpose vehicle, can make timely repayment of 
principle and interest to bondholders.776 Previously, rating agencies delivered their own 
771Enron Corporation and Ponderosa  vs. Argentina,  at  268
772 M. Elkhoury, ‘Credit Rating Agencies and Their Potential Impact on Developing 
Countries’, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Discussion Paper, 
No. 186 (January, 2008) 1
773 H. Razavi, (n.27 above) 104-105
774 Ibid
775 S. Thompson, ‘Credit rating and project finance default: An important risk 
management instrument’, Public Infrastructure Bulletin Vol.1:Iss.8, Article 10. (2012) 
2, available at: <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/pib/vol1/iss8/10> May, 2013; see also 
S. L. Hoffman,  (n. 32 above) 432
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opinion on the debt rating for a specific project, in doing so they took into consideration 
the factors summarised in the following section. 
a) Sovereign Risk Analysis: In the sovereign risk analysis, the main consideration 
is usually the stability of the foreign currency of the state where the project will be 
executed.  The Government of a host state can pose a number of risks to an international 
project. For instance, ‘it could restrict the project’s ability to meet its debt obligations by 
way of currency restrictions; it could interfere with project operations; and, in extreme 
cases, even nationalise the project’.777
b) Currency Risk Analysis: In this type of analysis, agencies concentrate on the 
potential for currency depreciation, as this is particularly indispensable in a project that 
cannot adjust revenues to offset exchange rate changes.778
c) Political Risk Analysis:  The laws and regulations, of the country where the 
project will be undertaken are also investigated as part of the credit rating process.779 It 
goes without saying that a stable legal system is a powerful argument in proving to 
project creditors that a host country is willing and able to provide a stable and secure 
environment for a project. 
d) Legal (Contract) Risk Analysis: The legal structure of the project itself is a key 
area  of  focus  for  a  rating  agency  during  the  assessment  process.  According  to 
Thompson, ‘structural features that are often assessed in this regard include, but are not 
limited to:  the choice of law of the contract documents,  and thus legal  jurisdiction, 
documentation risk and international credit arrangement.’780
As  mentioned  above,  credit  sovereign  rating  is  an  activity  owned  by  rating 
agencies. The main users of country sovereign risk rating are international investors, 
and more precisely financial institutions. Broadly speaking, they consider: ‘the overall 
economy of a country, which includes the balance of payments, foreign debt, foreign 
investment, public and private investment, and foreign currency reserve, development 
of financial markets and capital market transparency, political stability’.781 During the 
776  ibid
777 ‘Standard & Poor’s Rating Direct: Updated Project Finance Summary Debt Rating 
Criteria’, September (2007) 14 available at: 
<http://www.maalot.co.il/publications/MT20120529105458.pdf>May, 2013
778 ibid
779 ibid
780 S. Thompson (n.116 above) 2
781 T. Siddaiah, Financial Services, (New Delhi, Pearson: 2011) 258
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determination process, rating agencies apply both qualitative and quantitative methods 
to  understand  the  economic  and  political  dynamics  of  the  country.782 For  instance, 
whether  the  state  has  a  high,  low or  middling  income and how stable  the  political 
institutions in that country are, on the whole, when all of the political and economic 
components of the assessment are taken into consideration. Consequently, it can be said 
that sovereign credit rating assists investors, particularly, foreign institutional investors 
and those proposing foreign direct investment, to gain a comprehensive oversight as 
well  as  gaining  specific  insights  into  the  financial,  legal  and political  structure  and 
wellbeing of the country it is contemplating committing its investment to. Perhaps even 
more crucially, it can aid an investor to foresee, mitigate or avoid risks inherent in the 
financial, legal and political makeup of the potential recipient of its investment and the 
project proposed.
In sovereign credit rating, two types of risk are assessed by the agencies: country 
risk and  sovereign risk. While country risk is a risk triggered by actions in a specific 
country,  that  are  to  some  extent  within  the  control  of  the  government  concerned, 
sovereign  risk  is  the  risk  of  providing  a  loan  specifically  to  the  government  of  a  
particular state.783 It is worth noting that the two risks often have strong correlations and 
hence, they may be referenced interchangeably.784 Sovereign rating is an opportunity for 
many developing states to attract foreign investors to their countries and to demonstrate 
attractive  qualities  such  as  the  transparency  of  their  financial  system  and  how 
accountable  their  political  institutions  are  the country is  accountable.  Therefore,  the 
notes  provided  by  these  agencies  (S&P’s,  Moody’s  and  Fitch  etc.)  have  a  direct 
influence on the flow of foreign investment to these countries. 
7.     The Role of Credit Rating Providers in inclusion of Stabilisation 
Clause
Taking the information provided above into account, it can generally be stated that 
credit rating agencies assessments are available for large corporations (companies) or 
for  a  specific  project  financing.  The  ratings  are  also  available  for  countries  to 
demonstrate their ability and keenness to service their debts. Notably, as the purpose of 
this  section  is  to  determine  the  role  of  credit  rating  agencies  in  the  inclusion  of 
stabilisation  clauses,  the  question  of  whether  credit  rating  agencies  notations  or 
assessments  are  effective  in  the  inclusion  of  such  clauses  was  posed  to  interview 
participants. The vast majority of interviewees agreed that the notations are based on 
general  assumptions  and  assessments  for  companies  or  countries  when  they  rate  a 
project debt; therefore, the notations of agencies play a persuasive and influential role 
on the decision of lenders to provide funds to the project and also play a definitive role 
in  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  investment  contract.  Of  the  interested  parties 
interviewed, the following participants’ views went furthest in explaining the role rating 
782 M. Frenkel& A. Karmann, Sovereign Risk and Financial Crises, (Heidelberg, 
Springer: 2004) 91
783 T. Siddaiah, (n.122 above) 258
784 ibid
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agencies play in the inclusion of stabilisation clauses, as well as the significance of their 
assessments for developing countries.
One respondent who works in a commercial bank in Istanbul stated:
Banks generally have a ‘Risk team’ producing reports on countries, 
companies, using sources from Fitch, S&P, and Moody’s and generate 
their  own view for a project.  Therefore,  the assessment made by a 
rating agency for a specific project, transforms the ‘unknown’ to the 
‘known’ and may have a positive effect on a bank’s willingness to 
provide a loan to that project.785
The second respondent’s views tallied with the previous interviewee in terms of 
his  view  of  the  significance  of  the  ratings;  however  he  stressed  the  limitations  of 
country risk assessments to predict the future: 
Their  (rating  agencies’)  assessments  of  a  specific  project  have  a 
significant  influence  on lenders.  However,  that  does  not  mean that 
rating agencies have the ability to provide guarantees to lenders that a 
host government will always be loyal and adhere to its stabilisation 
commitments  when  political  and  economic  or  even  social 
circumstances are  in  flux.  In  my experience,  these assessments  are 
taken  into  account  along  with  other  considerations  to  inform  a 
judgement call regarding the risks implicit in an investment project.786
(Emphasises added)
8.     Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project (II)
This  pipeline  project  demonstrates  the  unique  policies  of  landlocked  energy 
exporters, the quest for exporters to choose appropriate transit countries, and the nexus 
of political and economic interests in the establishment of major multiple-state energy 
export projects.787 The BTC’s crude oil pipelines traverse three sovereign states; this 
necessitates a complex legal framework and extensive coordination. Nevertheless the 
project  constitutes  the  single  largest  FDI  in  each  of  its  signatory  countries.788 A 
breakdown  of  the  stakeholders  and  their  interests  in  this  project  is  helpful  to  a 
comprehension of the scale and reach of this project.  
785 Interview no. 12 with Senior Assistant Specialist at Commercial Loan Division, 9 
January, 2013
786Interview no. 9 with Account manager 25 June, 2012 and 2 January, 2013
787 B. Shaffer, Energy Politics, (Pennsylvania, University of  Pennsylvania Publishing: 
2009) 54
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Table 14   Owner and Sponsor Groups of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project
Company Country Percentage of Ownership
British Petroleum (BP) United Kingdom 30.10
SOCAR Azerbaijan 25.00
Unocal Ltd. United States 8.90
Statoil Norway 8.71
TPAO Turkey 6.53
ENI Italy 5.00
Total France 5.00
Itochu Japan 3.40
Inpex Japan 2.50
ConocoPhillips United States 2.50
Hess Corporation789 United States 2.36
Source790: Chevron
8.1  Interest of Stakeholders in BTC Project
British Petroleum (BP):This Company is the owner and largest shareholder with 
30.10% interest in the project. The role of the company in the project is to take crude oil 
from  a  landlocked  area  in  the  Caspian  Sea  in  Central  Asia  and  transfer  it  to  the 
Mediterranean. As well as having the biggest share in the project, it’s fair to say that BP 
is the most powerful company involved in the project. Perhaps, the project would not 
have been run easily without consortium and without the financial aid of international 
organisations. ‘If BP were running the BTC project alone, it would largely use its own 
funds and rely upon relatively minor participation by the financial institutions, solely for 
the  purpose of  reducing political  risks  and to  ensure  an  extra  dimension of  expert, 
external monitoring.’791
788 D. Blatchford, ‘Environmental and Social Aspects of the Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan 
Pipeline’, chapter 7 in  S. Frederick Starr & S. E. Cornell,  Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan 
Pipeline: Oil Window to West, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies  
Program (2005) 119 available at: <www.silkroadstudies.org>June, 2013
789 It should be noted that as a shareholder of the project, Amerada Hess announced 
September 7, 2012 that the company sold its stake to ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL), Indian 
state owned company. For further detail, please see, Oil and Gas Online Journal, 
<http://www.ogj.com/articles/2012/09/hess-to-sell-interests-in-acg-fields-btc-line-to-
ongc-for-1-billion.html>June, 2013
790 Chevron Official Website, available at: 
<http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/05252005_presidentsofazerbaij
angeorgiaandturkeyinauguratebtc.news> June, 2013
791‘ The–Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: A Briefing for BP Staff ’, BP February 4, 
available at:<http://www.bakuceyhan.org.uk/correspondence/bp_handout.pdf  >    June, 
2013
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 IFC and Other Stakeholders: Financing cross-border pipeline projects is not a 
straightforward  undertaking  as  each  participant  naturally  has  different  interests  and 
expectations from the transaction. According to Dufey and Kazimova, ‘The complexity 
of risk allocation linked to project finance implies that developing countries rarely have 
an unlimited ability to accept allocation of risk, so they have secure their positions with 
credible  assets  and/or  payment  guarantees  from other  parties.’792 In  cross  boundary 
projects of this scale it is necessary to involve multilateral financial institutions such as 
the  IFC  and  ECAs.793 Since  the  advent  of  the  financial  crisis,  the  role  played  by 
financial institutions has become even more fundamental.794 Financing projects without 
consortium participation,  support  from financial  institutions,  and  support  from well 
developed  countries  (for  instance  the  US)  would  be  complex  to  say  the  least  and 
perhaps even impossible. Approximately 30% of the costs of the BTC project are being 
granted by equity contributions.795 The remaining 70% were funded by third parties, 
including multilateral  development  banks,  ECAs, political  risk insurers from several 
countries as well as a syndicate of fifteen commercial banks.796
In  the  late  1990s,  commercial  studies,  and  diplomatic  initiatives,  were  set  in 
motion to attempt to uncover the energy transportation challenges and difficulties of the 
Caspian region.797 British Petrol (BP) and its partners formed a working group to assess 
export routes for the extracted crude oil from the Azeri-Chriag-Gunesli field under the 
Caspian  Sea.  Based  on  their  findings,  the  working  group  concluded  that  carrying 
Caspian  crude  oil  by  pipeline  would  be  the  most  economically  efficient  way  of 
transporting oil from the Caspian region to Europe and the United States. IlhamShaban, 
an oil analyst stated that ‘the pipeline is of strategic importance not only to Azerbaijan, 
but  to  the  other  new independent  states  as  well.  This  is  a  reliable  route  to  world 
markets.’798
792Dufey A., and Kazimova, R., ‘Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Project: Implications of Project 
Finance’, Chapter 12 in S. Leader and D. Ong, Gobal,( n.11 above) 373
793 S.L Hoffman, (n.32 above) 256
794 Thomson Reuters,  ‘ Back in the Funding Mix: Multilaterals Report, 2009’, Project  
Finance International, cited in  A. Dufey, and R. Kazimova (n.133 above) 373
795 BP Press in Baku, ‘BTC signs Project Finance Agreements’, Press release, 3rd 
February, 2004, available at: 
<http://www.winne.com/news/2004/february/btc_signs_project.php>June, 2013
796 Ibid
797 J. Elkind, ‘Economic Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline’, Chapter 3 
in  S. Frederick Starr & S.E. Cornell (n. above 129) 119
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An intergovernmental  agreement  was signed between Azerbaijan,  Georgia and 
Turkey, in Istanbul, in November, 1999 to legitimise the international scope of the BTC 
pipeline project. In October, 2000, BP and its BTC partner companies also committed to 
Host Government Agreements with these three states. In July 2001, the investment bank 
Lazard  Brothers,  incorporated  in  the  UK,  was  selected  by  BP to  advise  the  most 
convenient financing structure for the BTC project. The BP also assigned an American 
law firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, to deal with the legal side of the financing structure. In 
August 2002, the BTC sponsor groups signed the required agreements in London to 
officially form the BTC Company. As the project costs amounted to billions of dollars, 
the BTC Company approached a wide range of financial  institutions to seek capital 
loans. 
In December 2002, BP announced that finding a loan for the project might be 
delayed by at least six months due to on-going negotiations with lenders, as a number of 
concerns had been voiced of both a social  and environmental nature as well  as the 
expression of some doubt regarding the validity of the predicted economic returns of the 
project.  In 2003, the BTC project consortium officially approached the IFC and the 
EBRD with the hope of thereby obtaining the sought for project loan.   The loan in 
question was approved in the same year after a series of complex talks and negotiations. 
Financing agreements were finally signed by the IFC, the EBRD and the BTC lender 
group on February 3rd, 2004.799  One interviewee stated that ‘the involvement of both the 
IFC and the EBRD in the same project was a major milestone for the whole financial 
picture of the BTC project, because their participation provided the sought for guarantee 
against political and economic risk’.800Another interview participant noted that:
the  involvement  of  the  EBRD  in  the  BTC  project  was  hugely 
beneficial from the perspective of that project in that it established a 
legitimate structure for the project in terms of environmental, social 
and good governance concerns, but I should underline that from the 
perspective of the EBRD the project also represented a potential first 
step towards establishing further energy projects in Caspian region in 
the future.801
Another  respondent  stated  that  ‘Azerbaijan,  Turkey  and  Georgia  are  frequent 
recipients of technical, social and financial support provided by the World Bank. Funds 
were supplied via the World Bank’s affiliate, the IFC. The role of the IFC in the project 
was defined as  that  of  ‘the guardian of  stability’ in  the context  of  the BTC project 
798IlhamShabani, BBC News, ‘Caspian Pipeline Dream Becomes Reality’,17 
September, 2002 available at:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2263611.stm> 
June, 2013
799 For further information, please see official website of BP, available at: 
<http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=2016340> July 
2013
800  Interview no 20 with Foreign Trade Expert, 26 November, 2012
801 Interview no 19 with Lecturer, 23 November, 2012
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consortium and of the 15 commercial banks involved’.802 Another interviewee stated 
that ‘the IFC oversees the drafting of project contracts and actively recommends clauses 
intended to safeguard the stability of the project agreement in order to ensure the return 
of the funds lent by them.’803  This last point demonstrates the influential role the IFC 
has in the establishment of a legal framework for such agreements. This role will be 
explored further in the section dedicated to the legal framework of BTC agreements.
The financing package agreed and signed by the  parties  includes  208 finance 
documents,  with  over  17,000  signatures  from  78  different  parties.  In  addition,  it 
represents a major milestone in the establishment of financing arrangements for this 
major cross-boundary pipeline project. The BTC major pipeline project was financed 
according  to  protocols  of  project  finance  structure.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  term 
‘project  finance’ is  used  to  refer  to  a  non-recourse  or  limited  recourse  financing 
structure,  in  which  debt,  equity  and  credit  enhancement  are  combined  for  the 
construction  and  operation  of  the  refinancing  of  a  particular  facility  in  a  capital-
intensive industry in which  lenders base credit appraisals on the projected revenues 
from the operations of the facility, rather than the general assets or the credit of the 
sponsor of the facility,  and rely on the assets of the facility,  including any revenue-
producing contracts and other cash flow generated by the facility, as collateral for the 
debt.804 Taking this into consideration, the financing methods applied in the BTC project 
conform to the limited-recourse project finance model. Dufey, and R. Kazimova explain 
that: 
For sponsor guarantees to fall away, a number of specifications had to be 
met, one of which was pipeline operations. This relates to evidence that the 
BTC Co. could operate the pipeline to the planned capacity for a period of 
time, i.e., that the company could reach peak capacity. This extended further 
to  whether  the  pipeline  was  complying  with  environmental  and  social 
standards, and that there were no material breaches of BTC Co. obligations. 
This  was  dealt  with  through  environmental  and  social  audits  by  lenders’ 
consultants, which took place in May and June 2007, and the certification 
was completed after dealing with various issues that arose from that process 
in September of the year. Until then the lenders had recourse to the sponsors’ 
assets. Thereafter, the loan became non-recourse.805
Azerbaijan 
802 Interview no  6, Anonymity Guaranteed 14 May, 2012
803 Interview no  2 ( above 71)
804 S. L. Hoffman, ‘A Practical Guide to Transactional Project Finance: Basic 
Concepts, Risk Identification, and Contractual Considerations’, The Business Lawyer, 
Vol. 45, No.1 (1989) 181 
805Dufey A., and Kazimova, R.,( n.133 above)  375-376
 ‘Thereafter, the loan became non-recourse’ this quotation belongs to one of the 
respondents who was participated the authors’ interviews.
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As an oil producing country with a relatively small economy, the main objective 
of  Azerbaijan was to  be in  a  position  to  sell  its  oil  reserves  to  the  Western world. 
Broadly speaking, the overarching significance of the BTC project for Azerbaijan is its 
potential to ‘decrease its dependence on Russia in terms of export routes for oil and gas 
as well as to build new economic political and security links with Turkey, Azerbaijan’s 
ally, and subsequently with Western Europe.’806 This sentence is supported by President 
Alivey’s words in his opening ceremony speech. The president said ‘I do not doubt that 
the BTC will be of use both to Azerbaijan and our neighbours. This pipeline will, first of 
all,  help  solve  economic  and  social  problems,  but  the  role  of  the  pipeline  in 
strengthening peace and security in the region is also not small’.807 Moreover, via this 
project the country expects to benefit from oil revenues over a 20 year period from the 
resources of the Azeri-Chirag-Gunesli offshore oilfield. 
With  SOCAR’s  25%  stake  in  BTC  Co,  the  Azeri  government  bears  direct 
responsibility for ensuring the successive construction and operation of the pipeline; 
however, since its share in overall project cost responsibilities is 30%, Azerbaijan does 
not bear the full cost burden of the project alone.808 The downside of this arrangement is 
that there is a limitation to the extent to which it can exercise sovereign control over the 
project.809  Although this may at first appear to be detrimental to the interests of the 
country  almost  all  the  interview  participants  were  of  the  conviction  that  territorial 
integrity was of key significance to Azerbaijan as an objective of the BTC project set 
aside from any economic gains to be had. Indeed, one respondent went so far as to 
assert that:
The  country’s  on-going  territorial  dispute  with  Armenia  over  the 
Nagorno-Karabkh region doubled the significance of the BTC project 
and  was  a  key  reason  for  the  enthusiastic  support  of  the  Azeri 
government at that time. This was because the profit gained from the 
project would be spent to improve the county’s military might so that 
the  country  could  reclaim  the  land  of  Nagorno-Karabkh  from 
Armenia.810
The respondents view is supported by a citation from the President of Azerbaijan 
himself who somewhat dramatically equated the successful realisation of the project for 
Azerbaijan to diplomatic doom for his rival country ‘If we succeed with this project, the 
806 S. E. Cornell & F. Ismailzade, (n. above 129) 63
807  M. Tran, ‘Caspian Oil Pipeline Opens’,  Wednesday, 2005, The Guardian, available 
at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2005/may/25/oilandpetrol.news1> July, 2013
808 E.  J.  Omonbude,  Pipelines  and  The  Role  of  the  Transit  Country:  Economics,  
Challenges and Solutions, (England, Palgrave Macmillan: 2013) 73
809 Ibid
810  Interview no. 20 ( n. 141 above)
193
Armenians will find themselves in complete isolation, and this will further darken their 
already bleak future.’811
Georgia
Despite  being  a  country  bereft  of  significant  mineral  resource,  its  opportune 
geographical  location  rendered  Georgia  a  beneficiary of  the  economic  and  political 
gains to be had from the BTC pipeline project.  The government of Georgia adopted the 
BTC project as a country strategy with the stated goal of elevating the living standards 
of its people and thereby raising them from widespread poverty while from a strategic 
political perspective, improved relations with the United States and the protection this 
might afford from Russian threat was also a highly attractive by-product of Georgia’s 
involvement  in  this  project.  In  the  same  opening  ceremony,  echoing  the  words  of 
Aliyev,  President  MikheilSaarkashvili  described  the  BTC project  as  a  ‘geopolitical 
victory’  for  Caspian  Basin  countries.  He  was  alluding  to  the  fact  that  securing 
independent energy export sources would allow both Georgia and Azerbaijan to more 
effectively  defend  themselves  against  geopolitical  pressure  previously  aggressively 
asserted by Russia.812
Furthermore, Georgia is expected to receive US$ 62.55 million in transit fees,813 to 
reflect its status as a transit country in the BTC project. As a transit country, Georgia is 
not a BTC Co. contributor, and there is no evidence of Georgian influence in the rest of 
the financial package prepared for BTC project.814  Moreover, since the country does not 
financially subsidise the construction, operation, or maintenance of the BTC pipeline 
project, Georgia has an advantage in terms of obsolescing bargain. Since, it is the only 
country that can grant the right of passage of the pipeline through Turkey. Naturally, this 
endowed  the  country  with  a  strong  bargaining  position  from which  to  re-negotiate 
transit fees on an annual basis to their advantage.   
Turkey
Turkey participated in the project through its state-owned oil company, Turkiye 
Petrolleri Anonim Ortakligi (TPAO). The aforesaid company is an equity participant of 
BTC Co. While Turkey has the role of transit company in common with Georgia, unlike 
811 The conversation between Brad Sherman and President Ilham Aliyev can be found 
in: Sherman Joins Amendment to Block Funds For Railroad Route Bypassing Armenia, 
available at: <http://bradsherman.house.gov/2006/06/pr-060614a.html.shtml  >   June, 
2013
812 T. Babali, Implications of The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Oil Pipeline Project, 
(Winter, 2005) 46, available at:  <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/TuncayBabali.pdf  >   June, 2013
813 V.  Papava,  ‘The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan’ Pipeline:  Implications  for  Georgia,  in  S. 
Frederick Starr & S. E. Cornell, (n.129 above) 87
814 E. J .Omonbude (n.149 above) 74
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the latter  country,  Turkey bears some of  the costs  of  the project  and subsidises the 
construction, operation, and maintenance of the pipeline. Turkey is expected to receive 
approximately US$200 million in transit fees rent per year in the initial years of the 
project, with the possibility of this rising to a projected US$290 million per year from 
year 17 to year 40.815 The BTC project has also had the added advantage of reducing oil 
tanker traffic on the Bosphorus, thereby providing greater ecological security to the city 
of Istanbul and the surrounding area.  Turkey placed more emphasis on the strategic 
importance of its participation in the project than any of the other participants. In fact, 
the direct economic benefit of the project was not even a topic of discussion during the 
initial  negotiations between the parties.816 An interview respondent shed light on the 
benefits Turkey stood to gain as follows: ‘The BTC project did not provide any great 
benefit, in an economic sense, to Turkey. The strategic common interests, security and 
know-how, and reducing oil demand from Russia were the main benefits that Turkey 
obtained  from  the  BTC  agreement.  With  the  BTC  project,  we  strengthened  our 
connections to the West and created a market for Azerbaijani oil and gas.’817
8.2    Equator Principles and the BTC Project
Equator Principles (EPs) is a ‘risk management framework, adopted by financial 
institutions, for determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in 
investment  projects  and  is  primarily  aimed  to  supply  a  minimum standard  for  due 
diligence to support responsible risk decision making’.818 In other words, the EPs are 
simply  a  ‘set  of  voluntary  rules  aimed  at  the  development  of  socially  responsible 
projects that reflect sound environmental management practice’819. In 2003, a group of 
ten large international institutions developed the EPs as a response to the criticism of 
NGOs regarding the human rights negligence and environmentally damages alleged to 
have  been  incurred  during  the  course  of  international  projects  operating  during  the 
1990s. Seventy-nine financial institutions have adopted the EPs to date.820
815 K. Hristova, BTC Pipeline: Background Guide , (April, 2009) 4, available at: 
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/org/model-un/fcmun/fcmun09/bg/btc.pdf> July, 2013
816 Z.  Baran,  The  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  Pipeline:  Implications  for  Turkey,  in   S. 
Frederick Starr& S. E. Cornell, (n.129 above) 103
817 Interview no.5 Anonymity Guaranteed , 11 May, 2012
818Please see: <http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep> 
February, 2014
819 C.  Girardone  &  S.  Snaith,  Project  Finance  Investment  and  Political  Risk:  an 
empirical investigation, in S. Leader & D. Ong, ( n.11 above) 115
820Please see ( n.159 above)
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The BTC project was the first major opportunity to test the Equator principles as 
before this major crude oil pipeline project could go ahead of sensitive environmental 
and social  matters  were in  need of  resolution.  According to  the EP’s  preamble,  the 
projects  are  categorised  as  A,  B  and  C  (respectively,  high,  medium  and  low 
environmental  and  social  risk).821 The  $3.6  billion  BTC project  was  the  first  to  be 
classed as an ‘A’ category EP. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the EPs in managing 
the  risks  identified  came  under  fire  from  several  NGOs  who  reported  numerous 
breaches of the EPs. It was generally felt that the BTC project sponsors were not sincere 
in their support of the EP application. According to Muttitt: 
The Equator Principals can be used in two ways – to exclude financing of 
projects which fail to meet certain minimum standards, and set markers for 
improving projects’ standards.  In  the BTC case,  the banks failed on both 
counts. One of the most disturbing breaches of the Equator Principles by the 
project was in the project sponsors’ decision not to apply the World Bank’s 
safeguard policy on Indigenous Peoples. That policy requires publication of a 
specific plan to ensure that ethnic minorities are not adversely affected by a 
project, and compliance with the policy is a clear requirement of the Equator 
Principles.  The impact  of  this  failure is  perhaps most  startling in  Turkey.  
There the BTC pipeline will be guarded by notorious Gendarmerie which has 
been repeatedly criticised by the Council of Europe and the European Court 
of Human Rights, and has been associated with displacement and destruction 
of villas, torture, and ‘disappearance’ especially against Kurdish people.822
 8.3   Legal Framework of the BTC Agreements
The  BTC  oil  pipeline  project  is  subject  to  a  bespoke  legal  regime  that  was 
established between the BP Company and the three host  states,  namely,  Azerbaijan, 
Georgia  and  Turkey.  The  overreaching  legal  framework  is  based  on  an 
intergovernmental  agreement  (IGA).   Three  Host  Government  Agreements  (HGAs) 
were also annexed to the IGA, one between each host state and the BTC Company. In 
practice, this meant that versions of the IGA were ratified and adopted in each host 
state’s parliament and consequently became legally binding under international law and 
controlling  domestic  law  in  Azerbaijan,  Georgia  and  Turkey.  Another  key  legal 
document  to  become  subject  to  BTC  Agreements  is  the  Lump  Sum  Turnkey 
Agreement.823 LSTA is a contractual agreement in which a fixed price is agreed for the 
implementation of a project or part of a project.824 Through this agreement, the risk and 
821ibid
822G. Muttitt, Disaster in the Pipeline: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan ( May, 2004) 2 
available at:  <http://www.carbonweb.org/documents/disaster.pdf> 27 February, 2014
823 Please  see,  <http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/BTC/Eng/agmt5/agmt5.PDF>  July, 
2013
824 F. K. Crundwell, Finance for Engineers: Evaluation and Funding of Capital  
Projects, (London, Springer: 2008) 14
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responsibilities for the construction of the project are transferred to the constructor. As a 
state  owned petroleum Pipeline Company,  BOTAS defined LST agreement  with the 
BTC Co,  contained in  appendix  2 of  the  Turkish  HGA.  This  agreement  effectively 
transfers  the  risk  and  responsibilities  for  the  construction  of  the  project  to  the 
constructor. In two signatory states, Azerbaijan and Georgia, BTC Company and BP, as 
an operator, directly supervise and control all aspects of the pipeline construction. In 
Turkey,  BOTAS,  the  Turkish  state  owned  pipeline  Construction  Company  was  the 
manager of the construction and operation of the pipeline. 
8.3.1.  Intergovernmental Agreements (IGA)
 The overarching objective of the IGA in the context of the BTC Pipeline Project 
is  ‘to  give  the  project’s  legal  and commercial  terms  the  support  and framework of 
international law’ to ‘ensure principles of freedom of transit of petroleum.’825 The IGA 
is a treaty subject to public international law ‘through which the host states formally 
agree to ensure the safety and security of project personnel,  facilities, assets, and in 
transit petroleum.’826 In practice, the IGA serves as an umbrella legal document for the 
BTC pipeline project, with the goal of providing a prevailing regime for the pipeline 
project within each contracting state’s domestic law. The following bullet points set out 
the key terms of the IGA between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey:
• A commitment from each signatory state to present the IGA, the HGAs and the 
other related documents to its national parliament for ratification/or adoption in order to 
make it effective under its Constitution and render it the prevailing legal regime in its 
state;827
• A general assurance from each host state to support and encourage the pipeline 
project,  including:  guaranteeing  freedom  of  petroleum  transit,  guaranteeing  the 
performance by state entities of certain project contracts828 and granting exclusive land 
rights to the project;829
• A commitment from each host government to provide security for the pipeline;830
825 IGA Agreement  among the  Azerbaijan  Republic,  Georgia  and The Republic  of 
Turkey, is available at: (n.179 above) website. 
826 A.  Dufey,  ‘Project  Finance,  Sustainable  Development  and Human Rights,  Case 
Study  1:  The  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  (BTC)  Pipeline’,  International  Institute  for 
Environmental and Development, Environmental Economics Programme,(April 2009) 
15; see also A. Dufey, and R. Kazimova (n.133 above) 379
827 IGA, Article II(1) 
828 IGA,  Article II (4) (ii) and (iii)
829 IGA, Article II (4) (iv)
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• General commitment from each state to cooperate and coordinate each other’s 
activities,  and work with the  project  consortium to formulate  and establish uniform 
technical  services,  health  and safety standards  and environmental  safeguards for the 
project;831
• Confirmation that the only taxes imposed on the project would be those set out 
in the HGAs and an agreement on how to allocate taxable profits between the project 
states;832
• A statement that the project was not intended to or required to operate in the 
service of the public interest in each state’s territory and agreements in whole or part, as 
a concession contract or a special administrative contract granting a concession. 833
The first five bullet points demonstrate that in order to enable ‘freedom of transit 
pipeline’, the signatory states assured the consortium that they would restrict their future 
regulatory developments, expediting the expropriation of land spanned by the pipeline, 
and that  they would  indemnify the  project  consortium from the  liability for  human 
rights violation, resulting from pipeline security measures. Furthermore, the last bullet 
point asserts that the BTC mega project will not be used for the public purpose of the 
signatory states and that project agreements annexed to the IGA could not be deemed as 
concession  contracts.  This  last  point  is  of  note  and  somewhat  controversial,  as  if 
Azerbaijan, Georgia or Turkey decided to expropriate a land for the consortium, the 
expropriation  would  need  to  be  justified  by  public  purpose.  However,  the  clause 
explicitly illustrates that the project is not intended to operate in the service of public 
interest in the host states. By definition, this would mean that due to the absence of 
public purpose, any expropriation activity by the countries would technically be illegal. 
  George Goolsby, the head lawyer for the US Baker Botts law firm working on 
the BTC project,  explained the legal tactics of the consortium members’ lawyers as 
follows,  ‘the  foreign  companies  want  confidence… Without  having  to  amend  local 
laws, we went above or around them by using a treaty.’834 In fact, as a result of the 
strategy described by George Goolsby, if any dispute were to arise between the states in 
the future, the consortium would automatically be granted the protection of international 
law.  In  other  words,  rather  than  relying  merely  on  HGAs,  the  lawyers  created  a 
protective  regime  designed  to  safeguard  the  BTC  consortium’s  interests  in  any 
830 IGA, Article V (1)
831 IGA, Article IV 
832 IGA, Article V
833 IGA, Article II (8)
834 Quoted in D. Eviatar, ‘Wild-Cat Lawyering’, American Lawyer 4. November, 2002 
cited in  A. F.  M. Manirruzzaman, ‘International  Energy Contracts  and Cross-Border 
Pipeline  Projects:  Stabilisation,  Renegotiation  and  Economic  Balancing  in  Changed 
Circumstances’, OGEL, Journal of Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence Vol.4-Issue 4 
November (2006) 10
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circumstance they could foresee. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the view of an 
interview respondent: ‘the framework of the IGA and HGA was crafted by company 
lawyers; however, the part played by the IFC, the EBRD, commercial capital providers 
and export credit agencies was instrumental, especially in the development stage of this 
legal regime.’835  Another respondent noted that ‘oil companies and financial institutions 
require so-called stability, transparency and a strong legal system; however in reality, 
such an environment is against the interests of investing capitalists. In BTC agreements, 
the consortium’s transnational lawyers designed the legal documents, but we will never 
know what was negotiated behind closed doors between financiers and investors and 
government representatives.’836
In order to better comprehend why the consortium imposed an IGA on host states, 
the  Doe  vs.  Unocal837 case  should  be  referenced.  Over  the  past  decade,  various 
communities and indigenous people have brought legal actions to US federal and state 
courts  against  international  petroleum  companies  ‘for  inter  alia,  environmental 
pollution and their alleged role in authorising, and sometimes funding, commissions of 
human rights abuse along pipeline corridors including forced labor, rape and murder in 
the course of forced labor,  genocide,  and extrajudicial  killing.’838 While drafting the 
legal framework for the BTC IGA and other related agreements, the lawyers took into 
account the outcomes of the, Doe vs. Unocal lawsuit. This case caused some alarm for 
the BTC consortium. In the Unocal case, ‘A Burmese villager plaintiff had claimed that 
Unocal was ‘secondarily liable for forced relocation,  forced labor,  rape,  torture,  and 
murder endured by his community at the hands of security forces along the company’s 
Yandana natural gas pipeline.’839
In  December  2004,  after  eight  years  of  litigation,  Unocal  agreed to  settle  the 
claims in a Californian state court.840 The BTC consortium must have taken this legal 
action into account, and in order not to face the same operational and political risk as 
Unocal,  the  BTC  consortium  excluded  itself  from  any  liability  arising  from  the 
operation of the pipeline. As Waters clearly states, ‘Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 
warrant to each other that they are not subject to any domestic or international legal 
obligation which would conflict with the pipeline project and so human rights will come 
835 Interview no 3 with Lawyer 14 May, 2012
836 Interview no 2   (n. 71 above)
837Doe vs. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937, (9th Cir. 2002)
838 A. S. Reyes,  Protecting the Freedom of Transit of Petroleum: Transnational 
Lawyers making (up) International Law in Caspian, Berkley J. Int’l Law, Art.3, Vol.24 
(2006) 849-850
839 ibid
840 Ibid
199
out the loser under the ‘no conflict’ warranty of the IGA.’841 If the BTC agreements 
‘enforced  could  effectively  indemnify  the  involved  oil  companies  from  future 
judgments against them for pipeline-related human rights violations’.842
8.3.2 Host Government Agreements (HGAs)
HGAs are regarded as a private law contracts, as they are signed between a private 
investor and a host state. In practice, such agreements can provide excessive control to 
international  oil  and  gas  companies  over  the  domestic  law  of  host  countries.  As 
mentioned  previously,  if  a  host  state’s  regulatory  and  legislative  changes  have  a 
negative impact  on investor  activities  and their  expected  resultant  revenues,  foreign 
investors  can  legitimately  claim  compensation  for  the  losses  and  inconveniences 
incurred. Traditionally, concession agreements are subject to the domestic law of the 
host country. In contrast, ‘the HGAs for the BTC pipeline have been drawn up under 
(and  therefore  rest  within)  the  framework  of  what  is  in  effect  an  international 
investment treaty. The companies therefore claim that HGAs automatically assume the 
status of international public law while simultaneously remaining private contracts.’843 
In this respect, it can be said that treaty status has been apportioned to HGAs in the 
context  of  the  BTC project  and  HGAs’ provisions  are  deemed  to  prevail  over  the 
domestic  law  of  three  sovereign  states.  In  other  words,  BP  lawyers  successfully 
managed  to  internationalise  concession  contracts  and  endow  the  company  with  a 
privileged status in the three countries in which it was operating.  
EBRD noted that ‘in general; a treaty takes precedence over inconsistent domestic 
law, even subsequent domestic law.’  844  one respondent noted that ‘in the countries 
where there is not a well-established legal system a stabilisation clause is a must. For 
example, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS), 
during the early to mid-1990s, the countries were not yet in possession of a sound legal 
system and the atmosphere of instability in their politics and economies were the main 
concerns that prompted transnational oil companies’ countries to include stabilisation 
clauses in their investment contracts.’845
841 C. P.M. Waters, ‘Who Should Regulate the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline?’, 
Georgetown International Law Review 16 (2004) 404
842 A. S. Reyes,  (n.179 above) 850 
843 N. Hildyards& G. Muttitt,  ‘Turbo-Charging Investor Sovereignty: Investment 
Agreements and Corporate Colonialism’, (2006) 46-47 available at: 
<http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/HGAPSA.pdf> 
July 2013
844 B. Carpenter & W. Labedi,  ‘Striking a balance: Intergovernmental and host 
government agreements in the  context of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project’, 
LIT  Online, EBRD, 2004,<www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/OL04e.pdf> August, 2013
845 Interview no 1 Anonymity Guaranteed, 8 May, 2012
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Taking the facts above into account, it is evident that any failure, on the part of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia or Turkey to maintain their pre-existing ‘economic equilibrium’, 
would  render  them  liable  to  pay  compensation  to  the  project  consortium.   Such 
economic equilibrium clauses ‘boost the investor’s confidence and ensure that the long-
term investment will yield the expected results, by shielding the contract from some of 
the many risks associated with the investment.’846  In summary, it can be concluded that 
a sovereign state is still within its rights to make changes in its law, fiscal regime or take 
other  host  governmental  measures  and  the  insertion  of  such  a  clause  does  not 
necessarily immunise an international oil company from any such change.847 However, 
it ‘guarantees the investor compensatory benefit, should such change or act affect the 
economies or financial premises of the project.’848
However, stabilisation in the form of economic equilibrium clauses in the HGAs 
of the BTC project, illustrate that the intended cover as well as the related effects of 
such a clause are much wider than they should be.849 What it is meant by this is that if a 
host state directly or indirectly jeopardises the economic equilibrium of an investment 
project,  they have to pay compensation to the project consortium as a result  of any 
changes, ‘including measures having their original in international treaties to which the 
host state [host states] is a party and measures aimed at improvements in environmental 
and social protection, [except when the intervention is justified by imminent, material 
threats to health, safety and environment].’850
In light of this fact, it can be asserted that the economic equilibrium stabilisation 
clause effectively relegates the international treaty obligations designed to protect the 
environment and human rights to measures only applicable in extreme circumstances. 
Nevertheless, all three host states accepted contractual terms in which such an economic 
equilibrium clause in the form of stabilisation will have effect for the next 40 to 60 
years with the proviso that  this  duration can be further extended by the consortium 
twice, for a ten year period each.  
846B. O. N. Nwete; ‘To What Extent Can Stabilisation Clauses Mitigate the Investor's 
Risks in a Production Sharing Contract?’  Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence (OGEL), 
Vol.3 (March, 2005) 118
847  A. S. Reyes (n.179 above) 857
848B. O. N. Nwete (n. 187 above)118
849 A.S. Reyes (n.179 above) 858
850 For instance see Turkish HGA 5.2 (ii), Azeri HGA 5.2 (iii); for further reading see 
HGA Amnesty  International, Human Rights on The Line: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
Pipeline Project (2003) 10, available at: 
<http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_14538.pdf> May, 2013
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Several interview respondents noted that BP and the other member oil companies 
dictated to their lawyers the exact terms and conditions of the arrangement they sought 
to achieve, as successfully obtaining investment loans and insurance from the World 
Bank group and EBRD and the  other  ECAs depended on them future-proofing  the 
stability  of  the  investment  environment.  Other  group  respondents  mentioned  that 
designing  strong  stabilisation  commitments  was  the  chief  work  of  project  lawyers. 
Nevertheless, the World Bank group, the EBRD, the European Union and the United 
States have also used their policy-making powers on host states during the construction 
of the legal architecture that provide the framework for their complex and clause-rich 
agreements.
9.     Conclusion
In the course of this chapter, the role of lenders, political risk insurance providers 
and credit rating agencies in project financing regarding the inclusion of stabilisation 
clauses was examined. As a case study, this chapter lent particular attention to the BTC 
pipeline project.
The  motivation  for  investors  to  include  stabilisation  clauses  derives  from  a 
multitude  of  considerations.  On contemplating  the  provision  of  a  loan to  a  specific 
project, all the circumstances which may affect or delay the repayment of credit are 
taken into account. Change of law, the introduction of new regulations, expropriation or 
nationalisation, currency volatility, changes in tax regime and all manner of political 
risks all have the potential to endanger an investment. 
In the face of political risks, the inclusion of stabilisation clauses have become a 
sine qua non requirement for investors applying for substantial loans to fund projects of 
the scale of trans-national pipeline projects. The lenders, in turn, require that these risks 
be managed and mitigated  to  secure the  prospect  of  repayment.  Furthermore,  while 
lenders may appear to be backstage players, not directly involved in the project, it has 
been revealed that from behind the scenes this party is highly influential and that the 
requirement for a host state to commit to not introduce new laws that may affect the 
sustainability and cost of the project often derives from this source.  
The critical  importance of insurers in an investment  project  is  self-evident,  as 
neither investors nor lenders would ever consider committing to a project without cover 
to protect the loan from political risk. Furthermore, in order to shield their clients from 
political risk, insurers provide arbitral award default coverage of stabilisation clauses. 
This coverage provides insurance cover to the investor in the event that the host state 
fails to make a compensation payment triggered by the violation of a stabilisation clause 
incurred by a change in law.  It was also found that national insurance agencies hold 
subrogation rights against host states, enabling pressure from another third party to be 
applied to the host state. Insurers are free to apply pressure to the host state to make 
compensation payments to their  clients even before an arbitral  tribunal’s  decision is 
reached. In cases where a host government caves into this pressure, this may appear to 
be an admission of guilt and thereby prejudice the arbitrator and, it can be argued the 
outcome. 
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The final external factor examined was credit rating agencies and their role in the 
inclusion of stabilisation clauses. Rating agencies assess and evaluate the risk of lending 
to  sovereign  countries  and  international  corporations.  Ratings  are  also  available  for 
specific project financing. These agencies take into account a number of project-related 
areas such as sovereign risk analysis, currency risk analysis, political risk, and contract 
risk analysis in the assessment they make. What was discovered through the knowledge 
contribution of interview participants is that the notations of agencies are based on very 
comprehensive considerations, the results of which heavily influence lenders’ decisions 
about  whether  to  participate  in  a  project.  Although  the  terms  and  conditions  are 
established by project investors, rating agencies’ assessments also play a part in defining 
the legal framework of the agreements.  Rating agencies will  take into consideration 
whether a stabilisation clause is  included in the agreement in their  contract analysis 
assessment,  and  this  will  invariably  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  results  and  the 
ensuing impression made on the investor. However, it  is beyond the scope of rating 
agencies  to  actually  guarantee  lenders  that  the  host  government  will  adhere  to 
stabilisation commitments in the contract,  as political  and economic conditions may 
always  be  subject  to  change  in  that  country.  For  this  reason,  all  aspects  of  the 
assessment should be closely examined by lenders when they make overall country risk 
assessment. 
The BTC pipeline project was chosen as a case study as its scale and complexity 
provide a wealth of material for analysis. The interview respondents furnished a rich 
tapestry of insights into the motivational factors for the participating states’ involvement 
from each of their perspectives. It was observed that each signatory state’s interests and 
bargaining positions have their unique points. In the case of Azerbaijan, the project is 
regarded as critical to territorial integrity and economic improvement. Azerbaijan saw 
the economic benefits to be gained from involvement in the project as a means to invest 
in their military might and thereby gain power over the NagorgoKarabkh region. In the 
case of Georgia, the BTC project was to serve as a catalyst for economic growth and the 
improvement of living standards in the country. The project was also seen as a strategic 
means for gaining political protection from their Russian neighbours. Georgia held a 
strong bargaining position as the only country able to a secure pipeline transit in the 
region should a dispute arise between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, from the 
perspective of Turkey, the improvement of strategic relations with diplomatic partners in 
the EU and the US outweighed the economic benefits to be had. 
The analysis demonstrated the multifaceted nature of the agreements forged for a 
complex mega project of this kind. Through the IGA, the consortium aimed to establish 
a prevailing legal regime for the pipeline in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey’s national 
law. Although the main purpose of this was supposed to be to grant the pipeline freedom 
of transit, unfortunately the signatory states ultimately assigned their sovereign rights to 
the  consortium  in  their  territories.  The  IGA restricted  the  states’ future  regulatory 
activities,  accelerated  expropriation  activities  deemed  without  public  purpose,  and 
indemnified the consortium from the responsibility for human rights violation. It was 
also observed that Unocal constituted an alarming case for the BTC Company. Indeed, 
the case established a precedent for the BTC Company; who briefed their lawyers to 
craft an impervious legal regime to indemnify the consortium against any case against 
them rooted in a violation of human rights.  
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Also  discussed  were  the  HGAs  annexed  to  the  IGA.  It  is  a  well-established 
principle that HGAs are private law contracts and subject to a host country’s domestic 
law.  However,  in  the  BTC  project,  the  lawyers’ internationalised  these  agreements 
thereby enabling them to prevail over each country’s domestic law. This may be taken 
as  evidence  that  the  consortium wished to  circumvent  the  judicial  courts  and legal 
systems of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. However, the main purpose of this work is 
to find out whether external factors played a role in imposing stabilisation clauses or 
not.  It  was  found  that  the  stabilisation  clause  was  inserted  by  the  lawyers  of  the 
consortium. Although lawyers  designed the legal  documents,  in  doing so they were 
merely executing the wishes of their client. For the consortium, the insertion of strict 
stabilisation clauses was used to convince the World Bank group, the EBRD and the 
other ECAs to provide loans and insurance for the BTC project. The EU, US, the World 
Bank and the EBRD also used their policy power on host states during the creation of 
legal agreements.
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Chapter 6
Political  Structures and Foreign Direct Investment Laws in 
Azerbaijan and Turkey
1.     Introduction
 The  attraction  of  foreign  capital  through  foreign  investment  is  a  major 
undertaking for host states.  In  the petroleum sector,  cheap labour,  large oil  and gas 
reserves and a welcoming investment environment are all considered basic criteria by 
alien  investors.  In  addition,  foreign  investors  will  also  seek  legal,  fiscal  and 
constitutional guarantees that their  property and contractual rights are well protected 
over the course of their investment activities. The interaction between domestic law and 
international rules is at the centre of the legal regulations of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI)851 In fact this interaction has motivated many developing states to revise their 
legal regulations on FDI.  
The governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey have both secured political stability 
and established an appealing investment environment via adjustments to their domestic 
law, as well as signing up to bilateral and multilateral international investment treaties 
over the past decade. Turkey has liberalised its previously restrictive foreign investment 
policy to give encouragement to international investors. In fact, Turkey went as far as to 
adopt a new law pertaining to FDI in 2003. The implementation of this new legislation 
sought  to  address  the  need  to  have  a  well-established  FDI  Law amenable  to  alien 
investors that would be more compatible with global requirements, as well as reflecting 
the  changing  role  of  Turkey  in  the  Caspian  and  Middle  East  Region.  Since  the 
establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan, its legal authorities have been active in 
passing various laws with regard to foreign direct investment, most significantly: the 
Law on the Protection of Investments (1992), the Law on Investment Activity (1995), 
the Law on the Privatization of State Property (2000), and the Law on International 
Arbitration  (2000).  These  laws  have  provided  foreign  investors  with  currency 
convertibility,  guarantees regarding the stability of the legal framework,  the right  to 
repatriate funds and free access to international arbitration. 
As previously mentioned, both countries, along with Georgia, are signatory parties 
of the BTC agreements. The rigid legal framework of the agreements, as explored in the 
previous chapter, is often detrimental to the interests of the host country. While it is 
reasonable to expect that these countries need to legislate and regulate in the interests of 
safeguarding foreign investment in order to attract it in the first place, why they went as 
far as to give consent to potentially debilitating stabilisation clauses in their HGAs in 
the BTC agreement is still in question. The purpose of this chapter is to discover the 
internal factors that persuaded Azerbaijan and Turkey to accept stabilisation clauses in 
their investment contracts.
851 A.A.  Fatouros,  ‘Towards  and  International  Agreement  on  Foreign  Direct 
Investment’ 10 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal (1995) 191- 192 
205
Attention will be given to the specific guarantees available to foreign investors in 
Azerbaijani and Turkish Foreign Investment Laws and the legal status of international 
agreements in their national law systems. In addition, the respective countries’ political 
regimes will be analysed and compared. This chapter will seek to answer the following 
questions:  How are  the  divergent  political  regimes  effective  in  promoting  FDI  and 
giving  consent  to  stabilisation  clauses  in  Azerbaijani  and  Turkish  host  government 
contracts?  What  reason(s)  has/have  caused  Azerbaijan  and  Turkey  to  agree  to 
contractual stability in the BTC host governmental agreements?
2.     Azerbaijan
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, most former soviet states have been anxious to 
become  a  part  of  the  global  economy  while  still  maintaining  their  new  status  as 
sovereign  states.  Among the  CIS countries,  Azerbaijan’s  performance  was  the  most 
appreciable in terms of attracting FDI into its country, particularly in the oil sector. ‘The 
long awaited production from offshore fields developed by the Azerbaijan International 
Oil  Consortium  (AIOC),  completion  of  the  major  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  (BTC)  and 
South Caucasus (Shah Deniz) oil and gas pipelines and global demand for oil and gas, 
have all exercised a significant influence on the Azerbaijani economy in recent years.’852 
As referenced in this chapter’s introduction, a series of laws regarding the protection of 
foreign investment have been put in place in Azerbaijan. For instance, the Law on the 
Protection of Investments (1992) includes significant safeguards for private investors. In 
the same vein are the Investment Activity Law (1995), the Privatisation Law, the second 
Privatisation  Program  and  the  Law  on  International  Arbitration  (2000).  These  are 
sufficient examples to demonstrate the extent of Azerbaijan’s ambition in securing alien 
investors. In addition to these incentives, a number of bilateral investment and other 
treaties were signed to create a more favourable investment climate and provide further 
guarantees to private investors.
2.1     The Law on Protection of Foreign Investments (15 January 1992) 
     Definition
The Azeri Law on the Protection of Investment, Article 2 defines foreign investors 
as: 
The  following  persons  and  entities  might  be  foreign  investors  in  the 
Azerbaijan  Republic:  a)  foreign  legal  entities  b)  foreign citizens,  stateless 
citizens and citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic permanently living abroad, if 
they have been registered as participants of economic activity in the country 
of their citizenship or permanent residency c) foreign states d) international 
organizations.853
852 Baker  &  McKenzie,  ‘Doing  Business  in  Azerbaijan’  (2013)  4,  available  at: 
<http://www.bakermckenzie.com/BKAzerbaijanDBI13/  >   July, 2013
853 Article 2, Law of the Azerbaijan Republic About  Protection of Foreign Investments 
(1992)
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The  Law  on  the  Protection  of  Investment  in  the  first  place  defines  foreign 
investors,  in  which  category  it  includes  1)  foreign  entities,  2)  governments,  3) 
international organisations, and 4) individuals permanently residing outside Azerbaijan. 
The legal condition as stated in the article is that alien investors can undertake their 
investment activities uninhibited by Azerbaijani law. Under Azerbaijani law, the foreign 
investments of the investor are protected by the following articles: 
 Legal Protection of Foreign Investors
Article  5  provides  for  national  treatment  or  non-discrimination  among foreign 
investors. In other words, the ‘not-less favoured’ regime automatically applies to private 
investors within the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, unless otherwise stipulated 
by an applicable international, and, unless otherwise provided by Azerbaijani foreign 
investment law,  by default  foreign investors who enjoy the same rights as domestic 
investors, and upon whom may additionally be bestowed preferential rights that might 
not be ceded to domestic investors.854
Stability of Legislations
Article 10 of Azerbaijani Law on the Protection of Foreign Investment regulates 
guarantees against changes in legislation. In the context of this article, the law provides 
for protection against adverse changes in the law for the 10 year period subsequent to 
the investment.855 In other words, if a law adopted by the Azeri parliament adversely 
affects an investor’s investment, the application of that change is subject to a 10 year 
moratorium. Notably, the moratorium has the force of law, thus it is enforceable and it 
has a binding effect over all Azeri state bodies. Article 10 also clearly states the reach of 
such guarantees with changes in legislation in the area of national security,  defence, 
public  health,  environmental  protection,  as  well  as  affecting credits  and finances  as 
falling outside the scope of the moratorium.856 This article clearly states that stabilisation 
clauses are available under the foreign direct investment law of Azerbaijan. 
 Repatriation of profits and Convertibility
Under  article  14  of  the  legislation,  private  investors  are  entitled  to  repatriate 
profits in convertible currency after the payment of applicable taxes and other charges 
that are due.857  This article makes it clear that Azerbaijan is keenly aware of and willing 
854 Article 5, Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Protection of Foreign Investments 
(1992)
855 Article  10,  Law  of  the  Azerbaijan  Republic  on  the  Protection  of  Foreign 
Investments, (1992)
856 ibid
857 Article  15,  Law  of  the  Azerbaijan  Republic  on  the  Protection  of  Foreign 
Investments (1992)
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to legally recognise one of the most crucial interests of private investors with perhaps its 
only condition being the payment of taxes. Nevertheless, the repatriation of profits can 
entail  a  long  bureaucratic  procedure.  Despite  the  fact  that  by  law  foreign 
entities/companies are free to transfer their capital out of Azerbaijan, in practice there 
are some constraints made by the National Bank of Azerbaijan, mostly related to the 
transfer of money to offshore accounts.858
 Expropriation/Nationalisation
Article 11 of the legislation regulates the advent of expropriation/nationalisation 
in Azerbaijan. This Article clearly states that in normal conditions foreign investments 
will  not  be  subject  to  expropriation  or  nationalisation  in  Azerbaijan.  However,  the 
article also stresses that expropriation may take place if deemed in the interests of public 
purpose by the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan. Confiscation is also possible according 
to this article; however this type of taking must be executed only in circumstances of 
natural disaster, epidemics, and other extraordinary situations by decision of the cabinet 
of Ministers. In both expropriation and confiscation cases, private investors have the 
right to receive prompt, adequate and effective compensation. It should be noted that no 
expropriation  or  nationalisation  cases  have  emerged  in  Azerbaijan  thus  far  against 
foreign investors.
Settlement of Disputes
Article 42 of the legislation regulates the settlement of disputes between foreign 
investors,  foreign  institutions  and  state  organs  of  Azerbaijan.  According  to  this 
provision: 
Disputes or disagreements arising between foreign investors and enterprises 
with  foreign  investments  and  state  bodies  of  the  Azerbaijan  Republic, 
enterprises,  public  organizations and other  legal  entities of  the Azerbaijan 
Republic, disputes and disagreements between participants of the enterprise 
with foreign investments and such enterprise itself are to be settled in Law 
Courts of the Azerbaijan Republic or, on agreement between the Parties, in 
the Court of Arbitration, including those abroad.859
According to this article, a dispute between a foreign company undertaking its 
activities in the territory of Azerbaijan and a local entity may be settled in accordance 
with the arbitration method by national or international courts as long as both parties 
can incorporate  this  in their  agreement.  The law also provides for disputes between 
private investors and state authorities or legal bodies with regards to the amount of 
damages that may be decided upon by an international arbitral tribunal, if parties have 
given consent to arbitration. It is clear that the settlement of dispute mechanism exists in 
law; however,  ‘effective means of protecting and enforcing property and contractual 
858 United  Nations,  Foreign  Direct  Investments  in  Central  Asian  and  Caucasian  
Economies:  Policies  and Issues,  Papers  and proceedings  presented at  the Regional  
Round Table on Foreign Direct Investment for Central Asia. (New York, United Nations 
Publications: 2003) 75
859 Article  42,  Law  of  the  Azerbaijan  Republic  About   Protection  of  Foreign 
Investments (1992)
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rights  are  by no means assured.’860  In addition to  this,  it  is  worth mentioning that 
Azerbaijan has been a party of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Awards since 1999. On becoming a party to this treaty, the government adopted 
the Law on International Arbitration (2000) and the Law on the Civil Procedure Code 
(2000). 
There is some doubt around whether these laws are actually the major steps they 
might at first appear, in terms of the guarantees they offer to foreign investors. With 
regards to this doubt, one interview respondent stated that ‘the Law on International 
Arbitration  provides  recognition  and  enforcement  of  foreign  arbitral  awards  in 
Azerbaijan;  however  in  practice,  the  enforcement  of  foreign  arbitral  awards  in 
Azerbaijan is not a well-oiled process because local courts have had little opportunity to 
gain experience with commercial arbitration cases in general’.861 Another interviewee 
noted that ‘although the FDI Law provides for the possibility of application to local 
arbitration  in  international  commercial  issues,  in  reality  Azerbaijani  courts  are  not 
perceived to be the best venue to resolve disputes by foreign investors. The reason for 
this is perhaps the transparency or reliability issue.’862 What it is meant here is that there 
is  no  evidence  that  government  officials  officially  intervene  in  the  economic  court 
system, however in practice economic courts are weak, judges are inexperienced and 
corruption is widespread with the result that judges’ decisions are often inconsistent.863
Concession Agreements
Technically  speaking,  there  is  no  Law  on  Concession  or  institutional  legal 
framework for concession in place in the Azerbaijani legal system. The Law on the 
Protection of Foreign Investment and The Civil Code refers to Concession agreements; 
however the laws do not actually define the concession concept itself. Under Article 40 
of  the  Foreign  Investment  Law of  Azerbaijan,  concession  rights  are  granted  by the 
Cabinet  of  Ministers  of  the  Republic  of  Azerbaijan  and  approved  by  the  supreme 
council;864 however, there is no definition for the term concession, and the rights granted 
for concession are limited to natural resources only, while the article applies merely to 
private investors. 
860Global  Investment  Centre,  Azerbaijan:  Mineral,  Mining  Sector  Investment  and  
Business  Guide:  Strategic  Information  and  Regulations Vol.1  (USA,  International 
Publications: 2012) 37
861 Interview no.16 with Lawyer, 21 November, 2012
862 Interview no. 17 with Lawyer  22 November, 2012
863 Global Investment Centre (n.10 above ) 37
864Article  40  (1),  Law  of  the  Azerbaijan  Republic  on  the  Protection  of  Foreign 
Investment (1992)
209
In the  interests  of  increasing  its  attractiveness  to  foreign  investors,  Azerbaijan 
would be well advised to add to this article a definition of ‘concession’ and the scope of 
the concession ought to be explicitly extended beyond the scope of natural resources. 
Indeed, in the long-run it is essential that the government of Azerbaijan implements a 
proper  concession  law if  they wish  to  continue  to  attract  foreign  investors  into  the 
country, not only from the oil industry but from any sector. Despite the fact that these 
laws  provide  a  considerable  amount  of  protection  to  foreign  investors,  broader 
guarantees  have  also  been  provided  by  the  Azerbaijani  government,  establishing  a 
separate  legal  framework  through  Production  Sharing  Agreements  (PSAs)  for  alien 
investors in the oil industry. 
2.2    Legal status of PSAs in Azerbaijani legal system 
In order to accelerate the flow of foreign investment, the president, Hayder Aliyev 
created a new PSA model with the oil industry in mind. Since 1994, Azerbaijan has 
concluded  a  total  of  32  PSAs:  internationally  recognised  mechanisms  that  include 
stabilisation and arbitration provisions  as a  means to  providing a  secure investment 
environment to oil companies. Moreover, as opposed to standard tax and royalty PSAs 
in Azerbaijan this is ‘a physical mechanism for rendering to the Azerbaijani states its 
share  of  profits  while  allowing  foreign  energy  companies  to  recoup  their 
investments.’865
The question as to why Azerbaijan adopted this model was raised by the former 
president  of  the  State  Oil  Company  of  Azerbaijan  (SOCAR).  According  to  Sabit 
Bagirov, the main reason why Azerbaijan preferred PSAs was that, as a newly founded 
state, especially one with a lack of its own financial capital, it was unable to apply other 
types of contract models that would be beneficial to it as a country.866 More importantly, 
immediately following its establishment, the country suffered from a low credit rating 
and was consequently unable to obtain long term loans from foreign credit institutions 
to fund its oil and gas projects.867 Furthermore, as mentioned in the analysis of host 
government agreements, various different PSA models have been adopted by petroleum 
producing countries around the world. 
What distinguishes Azeri PSAs from the other types is that when SOCAR officials 
and foreign company representatives reach a mutual agreement on a PSA, the approval 
of the president is subsequently required. On obtaining this approval, the contract is 
then sent to the Azerbaijani parliament for ratification. Once the parliament has ratified 
865 D.  I.  Hoffman,  Energy,  ‘Wealth  and  Development  in  Central  Asia  and  the 
Caucasus’, National Bureau of Asian Research Vol. 10, No 3 (August, 1999) cited in R. 
Ebel& R. Menon,  Energy and Conflict  in  Central  Asia and the Caucasus, (Boston, 
Roman & Littlefield Publishers PLC: 2000) 58
866A. Ciaretta  & S. Nasirovm, ‘Development trends in the Azerbaijan Oil  and Gas 
Sector: Achievements and Challenges’, Elsevier Energy Policy Vol. 40, (January, 2012) 
15
867 Ibid
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the  contracts,  it  is  then  returned  to  the  president  for  final  confirmation.  After  the 
signature  of  the  president  and declaration  to  the  public,  the  contract  is  accepted  as 
having the force of law and prevails  over  existing or future laws or decrees  whose 
provisions diverge from or are inconsistent with this contract.  In other words, while 
some  petroleum  producing  countries  regard  PSAs  as  a  type  of  pure  contract,  in 
Azerbaijan all PSAs have the power of law and have a higher legal status than other 
existing laws in the Azerbaijani legal system. 
Moreover,  giving  PSAs  were  first  granted  the  status  of  law  in  1994  by  the 
Agreement on Joint Development and Production Sharing for the Azeri-Chirag-Gunesli 
(ACG).  After  the  ratification  of  this  PSA from  the  MilliMajlis  (the  Parliament  of 
Azerbaijan), it was estimated that the elevated legal status of PSAs would be temporary 
and would be regulated by stringent domestic legislation designed to govern energy 
projects related to the oil and gas industry. One respondent noted that ‘the PSAs have to 
be ratified in parliament because there is no specific petroleum law that governs such 
agreements or an independent regulatory institution to administer such agreements in 
Azerbaijan.’868 It should be noted that the legal framework for the regulation of oil and 
gas agreements is based on the Subsoil Act of 13 February, 1998 and the Energy Act of 
24 November, 1998. As these laws are in effect a collection of uncoordinated laws that 
furnish a  general  framework for  energy resource  legislation  in  Azerbaijan,  in  many 
cases their provisions are inconsistent with each other. In fact, there is no particular 
wording to state whether the general Energy Act has priority over the Subsoil Act or not. 
In Azerbaijan, a different tax regime is applicable to PSAs. If a contractor has 
entered into a PSA in the oil and gas industry in Azerbaijan, such an agreement will 
stipulate the tax protocols relevant to  that  particular investment.  The tax regime for 
PSAs in Azerbaijan is called the Oil consortia; it applies to the contractor and all the 
other project participants of a PSA. Currently, all of the PSAs to which Azerbaijan is 
party supply a grand total of profit tax of around 25 % or 35%, depending on the party’s 
negotiations  when  the  contract  was  signed.  The  PSAs  also  offer  protection  against 
future increases in the profit tax rate. The investors are exempted from all the other 
taxes  to  which  foreign  investors  are  ordinarily  subject  to  outside  the  oil  sector.  In 
addition,  Azerbaijan  has  enacted  a  new  code  on  tax-related  Host  Government 
Agreements (HGAs) which governs the activities of the BTC consortium on the BTC 
pipeline project in Azerbaijan.869 Investors operating outside the jurisdiction of PSAs 
and  HGAs  are  subject  to  a  statutory  tax  system.  All  evidence  suggests  that  the 
Azerbaijani PSA model grants investors a stable model with full protection through the 
stabilisation clause and the other relevant contractual clauses. 
2.3    The legal status of International Agreements under the Azerbaijani legal 
system
  Article 148 (I) of the Azerbaijani Constitution regulates normative legal acts in 
the legislative system. According to the said article, the legislative system consists of ‘1) 
the Constitution; 2) acts accepted by referendum; 3) laws; 4) orders; 5) decrees of the 
Cabinet  of  Ministers  of  the  Azerbaijan  Republic  and  6)  normative  acts  of  central 
868 Interview no 18 with  Lawyer, 21 November, 2012
869  The new Tax Code came into force 1 January, 2001
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executive  power  bodies.’870 In  the  second  section  of  Article  148  (II)  ‘international 
treaties, wherein the Azerbaijan Republic is one of the parties, constitute an integral part 
of  the  legislative  system  of  the  Azerbaijan  Republic.’871 This  article  is  far  from 
determining  the  legal  status  of  international  law  in  the  Azerbaijani  domestic  legal 
system. 
The article only goes as far as to assert the importance of international treaties in 
the national legal system in a general way. However, it should not be assumed that the 
Constitution disregards this  matter. Several of its articles attempt to clarify this. For 
instance,  Article 151 of the Constitution states that ‘whenever there is disagreement 
between  normative  legal  acts  in  the  legislative  system  of  the  Azerbaijan  Republic 
(except the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic and acts accepted by means of a 
referendum) and interstate treaties wherein the Azerbaijan Republic is one of the parties, 
provisions of international treaties shall apply.’872  Taking this article into account, some 
crucial  points  should  be  highlighted.  First,  it  is  clear  that  Article  151  covers  only 
interstate  agreements.  Article  130/III  (6)  of  the  Azerbaijani  Constitution  places 
intergovernmental treaties within the hierarchy of the domestic legal system. According 
to Article 130/III (6):
III. The Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic based on inquiry of 
the  President  of  the  Azerbaijan  Republic,  the  National  Assembly  of  the 
Azerbaijan Republic, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic, the 
Supreme Court  of the Azerbaijan Republic,  the Procurator’s Office of the 
Azerbaijan Republic, and the High Assembly of the Autonomous Republic of 
Nakhichevan, takes decisions regarding the following: […]
6) the correspondence of interstate treaties of the Azerbaijan Republic, which 
have not yet become valid, to the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic; 
the correspondence of intergovernmental treaties of the Azerbaijan Republic 
to the Constitution and laws of the Azerbaijan Republic.873
 It is clear from this article that intergovernmental agreements place lower in the 
hierarchy than the Constitution and general laws. In other words, in light of Article 130 
III-(6) unlike interstate treaties, intergovernmental agreements do not have prevalence 
over domestic law. Furthermore, Article 130/X  clearly states that ‘Laws and other acts, 
individual  provisions  of  these  documents,  intergovernmental  agreements   of  the 
Azerbaijan  Republic  cease  to  be  valid  in  terms  specified  in  the  decision  of  the 
Constitutional   Court  of  the  Azerbaijan  Republic,  and  interstate  agreements  of  the 
Azerbaijan Republic do not come into force.’874
870 Article 148 (I) of Azerbaijani Constitution
871 Article 148 (II) of Azerbaijani Constitution
872Article 151 of the Azerbaijani Constitution. It is worth explaining that the definition 
of interstate treaty is a treaty between two states or an agreement between a state and an 
international organisation.
873 Article 130/III (6) of Azerbaijani Constitution
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What is clear from Article 130/X is that the Constitution asserts the superiority of 
national laws over intergovernmental treaties and confirms that if  there is  a conflict 
between  the  provisions  of  intergovernmental  treaties  and  domestic  laws, 
intergovernmental treaties can be revoked on the decision of the Constitutional Court of 
Azerbaijan.  Giving  annulment  rights  to  the  Constitutional  Court  and  invoking 
international treaty provisions, when they are in conflict with national law, is by no 
means a standard or necessary way of protecting domestic law from an international 
perspective. Indeed, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties clearly 
states that ‘a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for 
its failure to perform a treaty.’875 Notably, Azerbaijan has not ratified the convention, but 
as the convention has become international customary law.876
2.4       Political System of Azerbaijan
   Political Regime
  As mentioned in chapter one, there is a very little consensus on exactly what 
form of political regime exists in Azerbaijan. Many assessments have been made in an 
attempt to reach a conclusion in this matter resulting only in a long list of proposed 
definitions, among which: ‘neo-patrimonial dictatorship, sultanistic, authoritarian, semi-
authoritarian,  sultanistic  semi-authoritarian,  hybrid,  and  partially  democratic.’877 
Despite  there  being  no  mutual  agreement  amongst  scholars  on  the  most  accurate 
description of the political regime, it is widely acknowledged that Azerbaijan belongs to 
the  category  of  presidential  republics  due  to  the  existence  of  state  institutions  and 
general elections for the presidency and for the parliament (both elected for five year 
terms), which are, in a broad sense, defining feature of a democracy. 
Although these formal institutions have remained continuously in place over a 
period of 22 years, Azerbaijan still exhibits many characteristics that fit the traditional 
definition of authoritarianism.878 According to Linz, authoritarian regimes are ‘political 
systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism; without elaborate and guiding 
ideology,  but  with  distinctive  mentalities;  without  extensive  or  intensive  political 
mobilisation,  except at  some points in their  development;  and in which,  a leader or 
occasionally a  small  group exercises  power within formally ill-defined,  but  actually 
874Article 130/X of Azerbaijani Constitution
875Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
876C.  Abdulzade,  ‘The  Status  of  International  Treaties  in  the  Legal  System  of 
Azerbaijan’, Review of Central and East European Law 32 (2007) 243
877O.  Bayulgen,  Foreign  Investment  and  Political  Regimes:  The  oil  Sector  in  
Azerbaijan, Russia and Norway,( Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2010) 97
878A.  Filetti,  ‘Why so  much  Stability?:  An  Overview  of  the  Azerbaijani  Political 
System’, Turkish Policy Quarterly ,Vol. 11, No.3 (2012) 157
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quite predictable limits.’879 Moreover, a report recently published by Freedom of House 
asserts  that  Azerbaijan  places  in  the  non-free  category  due  to  its  insufficient 
performance  in  the  areas  of  civil  liberties  and  political  rights.  The  table  below 
demonstrates Azerbaijan’s country scores for 2013.
    Table 15 the Freedom of House Country Report on Azerbaijan, 2013
Country Azerbaija
n
Status Not Free
Freedom 
Rating
5.5
Civil 
Liberties
5
Political 
Rights
6
Source880: Freedom of House Country Report, 2013
Inadequate institutional checks and controls, and a lack of political competition 
due to the absence of strong opposition political parties in Milli Majlis are two of the 
key  factors  behind  Linz’s  definition.  The  following  subsection  will  examine  these 
factors and their nexus with the necessity for Azerbaijan to agree to stabilisation clauses 
in the contracts it signs and to provide robust stability in its laws.
Dependency of the judiciary on the Executive
Article 99of the Azerbaijani Constitution states that executive power in Azerbaijan 
belongs solely to the president.881 The main duties of the president  are specified by 
Article 109. For instance, that the president appoints the prime minister and the cabinet, 
issues decrees, announces referendums and signs off laws previously passed from the 
Azerbaijani parliament. The president has the ability to dissolve the MilliMajlis and call 
parliamentary elections. Notwithstanding the fact that the Azerbaijani 1995 iteration of 
the Constitution provided for a ‘system of government based on a nominal division of 
powers between a strong presidency, a legislature with the power to approve the budget 
879 J. J. Linz, ‘An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain,’ in E. Allardt & Y. L. 
Cleavages,  Ideologies  and Party  System (Helsinki:  Westermarck Society,  1964)  255 
cited in A. Filetti ( n.28 above) 157-157
880 Freedom of House, Reports on Azerbaijan, 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/azerbaijan  >   July, 2013; 
notably, the institution’s ratings indicate that 1 is the highest and 7 is the lowest.
881 Article 99, The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan
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and impeach the president, and a judiciary with limited independence, in reality these 
state institutions bolster rather than moderate the power of the executive.’882
Article 109 of the Constitution indicates that the president submits proposals to 
the  parliament  of  Azerbaijan  regarding  the  appointment  of  the  judges  of  the 
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal as well as for the 
judges of other courts in the Azerbaijan Republic. In addition to, the president also has 
the power to appoint prosecutors, pending the consent of the MilliMajlis. It is apparent 
that ‘the legislative realities are such that judges effectively operate under direct control 
of the presidential administration’. 883 It can logically be concluded that the probability 
that  the criteria  for  appointment  to  the position of  judge or  prosecutor  may depend 
heavily on being part of the president’s inner circle, demonstrating loyalty to this figure 
and sharing his politics is high.884
 Dependency of MilliMajlis (Parliament) on Executive
 Technically,  Article  95 and 96 of the Constitution of  Azerbaijan provide that 
MilliMajlis works independently as a legislative branch from the executive authorities. 
However,  in  reality the powers of the parliament  and the scope of its  functions are 
vastly overshadowed by presidential powers.885 Since the establishment of Azerbaijan, 
four parliamentary elections have taken place: in 1995, in 2000, in 2005 and in 2010. 
Over the past almost two decades, all of the elections held in Azerbaijan have been 
reported to present serious irregularities and even cases of fraud. As a result, the country 
has  met  with  severe  criticism by international  organisations  who  have  branded  the 
elections as unfair, non-democratic and not free.886 Article 82, stipulates that MilliMajlis 
should consist of 125 members using a mixed majority-proportional electoral system 
and that parliamentary elections be held every five years.887  It should be noted that 
constitutional modifications ratified in 2002 removed the proportional representation of 
882 O.  Bayulgen (n.27  above)  98;  see  also  Article  119 of  The  Constitution  of  the 
Republic of Azerbaijan
883  S. Bagirov, ‘Azerbaijan’s Oil Revenues: Ways of Reducing The Risk of Ineffective 
Use’, Research Paper (January, 2007) 55-56 Unpublished manuscript.
884 Ibid
885 R. Badalov & N. Mehdi, ‘The political  institutions of Azerbaijan: A dichotomy 
between text and reality’, in A. Arakelian,  Constitutional/Political Reform Process in  
Georgia in Armenia and Azerbaijan: Political elite and Voices of the People , (Tbilisi, 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and Caucuses Institute 
for Peace Democracy and Development: 2005) 145
886 Article 82 of The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan
887 ibid
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25 seats in the parliament; all 125 seats are now selected via the majoritarian system.888 
‘This  basically  means  that  fragmented  and  weak  opposition  parties  will  be  further 
under-represented in future parliaments.’889
As a result of this, the parliament becomes more dependent on and resultantly 
obedient to the executive. In other words, whenever the executive organ introduces new 
laws,  MilliMajlis  is  forced  to  adopt  and  pass  these  laws  quickly.  This  fact  can  be 
directly linked to the speedy acceptance of PSAs which include stabilisation provisions. 
As these types of contracts are accepted as law following their ratification, regardless of 
whether a PSA includes strong stabilisation provisions which favour foreign investors 
over the state, they have a strong chance of gaining acceptance in parliament. More 
importantly, as there are limited seats for opposition parties, even if a claim is made by 
them about the inconsistency of PSAs with existing law, the claim would probably be 
rejected  or  ignored  by  Constitutional  courts.  As  Constitutional  courts  are  not 
independent, they would consequently avoid making decisions which might contradict 
the policy of the executive branch.
Absence of Strong Opposition Political Parties
In addition to weak political institutions, the political party system in Azerbaijan 
is  also  underdeveloped.  Azerbaijan  is  a  single  party  dominant  state.  The  New 
Azerbaijani Party is currently the ruling party in the country and has enjoyed an full 
power since 1993.There are around 40 political parties in Azerbaijan; nonetheless there 
are only six opposition political parties890 in the Azerbaijani Parliament. However, the 
political parties in opposition are consistently small, underfunded and ‘often harassed 
and excluded from decision making process.’891 Moreover, the character and policies of 
these opposition parties is largely determined by the interests of their leaders, in other 
words, party politics and ideology do not play a significant role in Azerbaijani politics. 
Weak Civil Society and Interest Groups
There are a number of interest groups in Azerbaijan, concentrating on issues such 
as  gender  inequalities,  human  rights  in  the  Karabakh  war,  legal  awareness  and 
ecological problems. While civil society organisations are officially allowed to operate, 
their  development  in  Azerbaijan  has  been  hampered  on  one  hand  by their  relative 
888 R. Badalov & N. Mehdi (n. 35 above) 156
889G.  Guliyeva,  ‘Democratization  and  the  rule  of  law  in  Azerbaijan:  Europe’s 
relevance’,  in  C.P.M. Waters,  The state  of  Law in  the South  Caucasus,  Euro Asian  
Studies ( New York,  Palgrave Macmillan: 2005) 48 
890Yeni Azerbaijan Party (New Azerbaijan Party), Azerbaijan Democratic Party, Civil 
Solidarity Party, Motherland Party, Equality Party, Azerbaijani Popular Front Party.
891Bertelsmann  Stiftung,   ‘Azerbaijan  Country  Report’  (2012)  9  available  at: 
<http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI
%202012%20Azerbaijan.pdf> August 2013
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newness and inexperience and on the other by their limited or non-existent financial 
resources. Alike political parties of the opposition, they receive little public support and 
are  often  regarded with  suspicion,  mostly due  to  the  fact  that  they rely heavily on 
financial  aid  from international  donor associations.  Moreover,  the  influence  of  civil 
society organisations on government policies is very limited. For example, although the 
foundation of trade unions and the right to strike is officially allowed by law, the vast 
majority of trade unions remain closely allied with the government, and most major 
industries are state owned. For these reasons it is fair to say that trade unions are not 
truly  autonomously  functioning  entities,  which  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  in 
Azerbaijan they have no active role in the political decision making process.892
How active is the political regime in promoting FDI and giving consent to 
stabilisation clauses in investment contracts in Azerbaijan?
Since its establishment as a republic, providing a stable and flexible investment 
environment for alien investors has always been a touchstone of Azerbaijani oil and gas 
industry policy.  Given the  compatibility of  their  interests,  and lack  of  hindrance  in 
pursuing them, political leaders and private investors in Azerbaijan are effectively in 
cahoots. An assessment of the Azerbaijani political structure has revealed that there is a 
distinct lack of robust bodies, political or otherwise likely to present a case against this 
policy let  alone be in  a  strong enough position to  veto it.  In  any case,  there  is  no 
precedential evidence to suggest that they would win the backing of the Azeri general 
public.  The  absence  of  credible  opposition  has  enabled  the  elite  few  in  life-long 
positions of power to make investment decisions and define policy with complete free 
rein. This has given them carte blanche to provide direct, uninhibited, and to a degree, 
unregulated access to foreign investors during the decision making process of oil and 
gas agreements. In Azerbaijan, the president enjoys unique authority and ultimate power 
in dictating energy investment policy on behalf of the whole country. 
As  some  form  of  administrative  and  operational  body  was  required  to  run 
refineries and pipelines and oversee the international consortia that develop them, the 
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) was formed in 1992. Apart from being a 
state-owned oil company, SOCAR, initially functioned as a government ministry and 
SOCAR’s president carried the rank of minister, and consequently was in direct contact 
with  the  president.  It  is  clear  that  formal  government  hierarchy  and  administrative 
bodies were bypassed and SOCAR was the sole body tasked with the responsibility to 
maintain investment activities and deal with contract design and negotiations. It is also 
worth underlining that SOCAR’s management board and its president have always been 
selected from the exclusive group who have ties of kinship with President Aliyev or are 
in some way close to his family. 
For instance, Ilham Aliyev,893 appointed vice president of SOCAR in 1994, was 
the son of the then president, Heydar Aliyev. Natig Aliev,894 who was the president of 
892 Freedom of House Report, 2013 (n.30 above)
893Ilham Alivey has been the president of Azerbaijan since 2003.
894Natig Aliev has been the energy minister of Azerbaijan since 2005.
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SOCAR during Aliyev’s reign, shares the same name but is not a direct relation of the 
president. He was, nevertheless regarded as one of the loyalist elite in President Aliyev’s 
regime.  Crucially,  important  strategic  decisions  regarding  Azerbaijani  hydrocarbon 
development  were  made  within  this  inner  circle,  independent  of  the  usual  formal 
government  hierarchy.  This  method  enabled  President  Heydar  Aliyev  to  avoid  any 
potential  political  divisions  which may have constituted a  threat  to  his  control  over 
energy resources.  It  is  clear  that  unlike  the  other  Turkic  countries  which  have  rich 
natural  resources,  but  are  hampered  in  their  actions  by  complex  bureaucratic 
procedures, Azerbaijan circumvented such obstacles by ring-fencing decision-making 
for the energy sector and assigning it to a select group of compliant cronies, thereby 
achieving the outward appearance of stability. 
As previously related, once the parties reach a mutual agreement on a contract, the 
president’s  approval  is  subsequently  required.  The  contract  is  then  sent  to  the 
MilliMajlis for ratification. An interview respondent touched upon a crucially important 
subject by explaining: ‘ratification of these contracts is a mere formality, no production 
sharing contract was ever rejected or returned by the parliament.’895 In line with this 
view,  another  respondent  noted  that  ‘a  country  that  is  ruled  by  one  man  is  more 
appealing to investors than one run by a democratic regime, because it is in a position to 
provide  contractual  flexibility  in  every  respect  which  supplies  a  great  number  of 
opportunities to foreign investors. 
Conversely,  in modern democracies,  it  is  difficult  to gain approval for foreign 
investment  contracts  that  include  stability  provisions,  because  political  parties  in 
opposition  and  complex  legal  structures  do  not  permit  governments  to  get  such 
agreements through parliament with the same ease.’896 In an attempt to pinpoint the 
motivations of the Azeri government in approving such binding stabilisation provisions, 
in the case of the BTC agreement, the interviewees were probed further. One of the 
respondents provided that ‘the consortium approached the negotiation and enactment of 
host government agreements for the BTC project calmly and amicably because they 
knew that the strong presidency had already disabled or eliminated opposition parties 
and  civil  society  groups  that  may  have  affected  the  contractual  arrangement 
process.’897Another interviewee provided that ‘since 1994, SOCAR have signed many 
PSAs with different western oil  companies. Some agreements were on major export 
pipeline agreements such as BTC and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum. Azerbaijan was politically 
and economically weak when the HGA of BTC was signed; therefore, during Heydar 
Aliyev’s presidency, governments have always avoided any conflict  that might arise 
895 Interview no.16 ( n.11 above)
896 Interview no.8 with Lecturer 4 June, 2012 and 8 November, 2012
897 Interview no.19 with  Lecturer 23 November, 2012
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during the negotiation of contracts with major Western oil companies.’898 Yet another 
interviewee responded that:
In  theory,  democracy  is  a  symbol  of  political  stability  and 
advancement  that  should  provide  confidence,  assurance  and 
guarantees  of  stability  to  foreign  investors  in  the  petroleum 
sector,  as  to  every  type  of  investment.  However,  negotiation 
with  a  democracy  necessitates  the  consideration  of  many 
conflicting issues which does not make for quick wins and often 
entails compromise. The simplicity and straightforwardness of 
authoritarian regimes is succour to negotiation-weary investors, 
especially in the high-stakes petroleum sector.899
Another respondent spelled out the implication in simple terms, ‘SOCAR’s strong 
position  and  its  close  relation  to  the  political  regime  have  always  enabled  foreign 
investors to negotiate the content and context of agreements in the knowledge that they 
are dealing with compliant partners.’900
3.  Turkey
Unlike Azerbaijan, Turkey is not a petroleum rich country, however, its role in the 
transit of oil and importance for the security of energy supplies to Europe is irrefutable. 
Although the country acts as an energy hub for the western world, its transit role in the 
BTC project did not make a significant contribution to its economy, Turkey’s interest in 
involvement was largely strategic.  Taking into account the country’s rapid economic 
growth over the last decade, despite the global economic crisis, it would not be wrong to 
surmise that Turkey’s bargaining position would be likely to alter if new oil and gas 
projects  were  executed  in  the  Caucasus.  Furthermore,  the  Republic  of  Turkey  is 
presently the sixth major economy in Europe and it is estimated by some economists 
that the country is set to reach fourth position by 2050.901
The conditions responsible for  prompting such impressive economic growth over 
this  challenging  decade  is  possibly having  the  right  liberalisation  plans  in  the  FDI 
sphere, the adoption of new FDI law, and sound government institutions. During the 
examination of Turkey, two divergent laws on FDI will be focused upon, because when 
the BTC agreement was signed, Turkey was using The Law for the Encouragement of 
Foreign Capital No. 6224, adopted on 18 January, 1954. The new Law on FDI: no 4875 
898 Interview no. 18 (n. above 18) 
899 Interview no.7 with Lawyer 6 June, 2012 and 12 November, 2012
900 Interview no. 20 with Foreign Trade Expert, 26 November, 2013
901 M. Broad, ‘Turkey Booms, but where are the Brits?’,  BBC News, 17 May, 2013, 
available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22562237>August, 2013
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was adopted on 17 June, 2003, and has granted much-welcomed safeguards to alien 
investors. For this reason, a legal comparison should be made.
3.1    Foreign Direct Investment Law No. 4875 (June 2003)
Definition
Article 2 (a) of Turkish FDI Law, 4875 defines foreign investors as: ‘Real persons 
who possess foreign nationality and Turkish nationals resident abroad and foreign legal 
entities established under the laws of foreign countries and international institutions, 
who make foreign, direct investment in Turkey.’902 The article clearly divides foreign 
investors  into  two  categories.  The  first  includes  real  persons  who  have  foreign 
nationality and Turkish nationals who are residents abroad. The second is foreign legal 
entities formed under the laws of foreign states and international institutions. Compared 
to  the  newer  Turkish  FDI  Law 4875,  the  previous  Law for  the  Encouragement  of 
Foreign Capital No. 6224, did not provide an exact definition of a foreign investor. In 
the absence of a clear definition, perhaps a private investor would have been regarded 
during the term as a person who had a foreign nationality or a legal  entity formed 
according to a foreign legal system. 
Legal Protection of Foreign Investor
The Freedom of Investment and National Treatment principle is regulated under 
Article 3 (a) of FDI Law 4875. According to Article 3 (a) ‘Foreign investors are free to 
make foreign direct investments in Turkey; and foreign investors shall be subject to 
equal  treatment  with  domestic  investors.’903  Similar  to  new FDI  law,  the  previous 
legislation  stipulated  a  non-discrimination  principle  under  Article  10.  According  to 
Article  10,  ‘all  rights,  exemptions,  privileges  and  facilities  recognised  for  domestic 
capital  and  enterprises  shall  be  equally  applicable  to  foreign  capital  and  foreign 
enterprises engaged in comparable fields of business.’904 It  is clear that both articles 
provide non-discriminatory principles.
Stability of Legislation
This subject will be revisited more comprehensively in the comparative analysis 
of this chapter, however at this point it is worth noting that unlike Azerbaijani foreign 
investment law, neither the new FDI Law nor the old Turkish FDI Law includes any 
stability provisions. 
902 Article 2 (a) Foreign Direct Investment Law No. 4875, June 17, 2003
903 Article 3 (a) Foreign Direct Investment Law No. 4875, June 17, 2003
904 Article 10 Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital No. 6224, 18 January,  
1954
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Expropriation/Nationalisation
Regulations regarding expropriation and nationalisation are specified in the sub-
paragraph of (b) of the Article (3) of FDI Law 4875 in Turkey. According to the (b) 
section  of  this  article  private  property  or  assets  of  the  alien  investors  cannot  be 
expropriated and nationalised except for public purpose, the consideration of which are 
paid in accordance with the due process of law.905 There is no doubt that the article 
complies with international law standards; however, some ambiguity in this article is to 
be found in the absence of a definition for public interest. Notably, although previous 
foreign  investment  law  did  not  regulate  protection  against  expropriation  or 
nationalisation per se; the Turkish Constitution of 1982 regulates this principle.906
For as long as the Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital No. 6224 was in 
place, there was no specific article to regulate expropriation or nationalisation cases or 
any article to determine the compensation due. During that time, Expropriation Law No 
2942 was applied for expropriation and compensation.907 The valuation of the property 
or asset and determination of the compensation still applies the rules stipulated by the 
Expropriation Law of Turkey. It should be noted that when the BTC project agreements 
were signed the absence of specific articles on expropriation/nationalisation in the Law 
for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital No. 6224, would have been regarded as a 
major cause of concern by the project consortium. It should be noted that the country 
has,  as  of  yet,  had  no  cases  lodged  against  it  regarding  expropriation  or  the 
nationalisation of foreign investors’ property.
905 Article 3 (b) Foreign Direct Investment Law No. 4875, June 17, 2003
906 According to Article 46 of the Constitution: ‘The State and public corporations shall 
be entitled, where the public interest requires it,  to expropriate privately owned real 
estate wholly or in part and impose administrative servitude on it, in accordance with 
the principles and procedures prescribed by law, provided that the actual compensation 
is paid in advance. The compensation for expropriation and the amount regarding its 
increase rendered by a final judgement shall be paid in cash and in advance. However, 
the procedure to be applied for compensation for expropriated land in order to carry out 
land reform, major energy and irrigation projects, and housing and resettlement schemes 
and  a  forestation,  and  to  protect  the  coasts  and  to  build  tourist  facilities  shall  be 
regulated by law. In the cases where the law may allow payment in instalments, the 
payment period shall not exceed five years, whence payments shall be made in equal 
instalments.  Compensation  for  the  land  expropriated  from  the  small  farmer  who 
cultivates his own land shall in all cases be paid in advance. An interest equivalent to 
the  highest  interest  paid  on  public  claims  shall  be  implemented  in  the  instalments 
envisaged in the second paragraph. Article 47 of the Constitution also states: ‘Private 
enterprises performing public services may be nationalized when this is required by the 
exigencies of public interest. Nationalization shall be carried out on the basis of real 
value.  The methods and procedures for calculating real value shall be prescribed by 
law.’
907 Turkish Expropriation Law No 2942, November 8, 1983
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 Repatriation of Profits and Convertibility
Another principle framed within Article 3(c) of the new FDI Law is the transfer of 
funds. According to this article ‘Foreign investors can freely transfer abroad: net profits, 
dividends, proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an investment, 
compensation  payments,  amounts  arising  from  license,  management  and  similar 
agreements,  and  reimbursements  and  interest  payments  arising  from  foreign  loans 
through banks or special financial institutions’.908 It is apparent that through this transfer 
of  fund  principle,  Turkey  aimed  to  create  an  environment  within  which  business 
transactions could take place freely and efficiently. Indeed, in practice, it is fair to say 
that  foreign  investors  do  not  generally  experience  difficulty  in  obtaining  foreign 
exchange, and no foreign exchange restrictions are actively enforced in Turkey. The 
previous  FDI law also provided safeguards  for the free transfer  of  profits,  fees and 
royalties, and repatriation of capital; however, in some respects the old law was more 
restrictive when it is compared to the new legislation. 
  Article 4(a) of the old FDI Law no.6224 regulated the availability of transfer of profits 
for foreign investors in the following ways: ‘Net profits accruing in favour of the owner 
of the principal capital out of income are calculated in accordance with the tax laws in 
force,  in  case of  a  partial  or total  liquidation of an enterprise  established under  the 
present law, the share accruing in favour of the owners of the principal foreign capital at 
reasonable  prices,  the  proceeds  obtained  from the  sales,  at  a  reasonable  price  and 
whether  in  whole  or  in  part,  of  the  principal  foreign  capital  invested  in  a  business 
founded or  working under  the  terms  of  the  present  law,  repayment instalments  and 
interest payments, as they become due and payable in accordance with the respective 
foreign loan agreements.’909
In  addition  to  this,  the  now  defunct  FDI  Law’s  Article  4(b)  stated  that,  if  
considered necessary, the Ministry of Finance or the Committee may be rendered able to 
order the examination of the accounting books and tax declarations of an enterprise 
formed under this legislation, in order to determine the amount available for transfer and 
order an inquiry in order to ascertain whether the sale of capital shares or of liquidation 
sale of assets, or credit loans are executed in good faith.910 Furthermore, Article 4(c) of 
the old FDI law states that ‘Upon applications for the transfer of profit shares, sales 
proceeds, loan repayment instalments and interest payments of the sorts classified as 
transferable  in  Paragraph  (a)  of  this  Article,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  will  grant 
permission for the same.’911  What is stated in Article 4 of paragraph (a) is that profits 
and  capital  funds  could  only be  transferred  abroad  in  the  national  currency of  the 
principal foreign capital at the current official exchange rate. 
908 Article 3 (c) Foreign Direct Investment Law No. 4875, June 17, 2003
909 Article 4(a) Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital No. 6224
910 Article 4(b) Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital No. 6224
911 Article 4(c) Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital No. 6224
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All evidence suggests that the old FDI law was very restrictive in transferring the 
shares  of  private  investors  because  the  law stipulated  very detailed  terms  regarding 
transferable profit as well as appointing the Ministry of Finance or the Committee to 
control whether the amount was available for transfer or not and check whether alien 
entrepreneur’s  operations  were  executed  with  good  faith  or  not.  Admittedly,  it  is 
impossible  to  find  such detailed  repatriation  of  profit  rules  as  well  as  bureaucratic 
checking authority in modern FDI laws because the expectation of alien investors is to 
be  left  unbridled  to  operate  their  business  and  transfer  their  profits  free  of  these 
bureaucratic hurdles. In addition, the law provides that profits and capital funds could 
only be moved abroad in the domestic currency of the principal foreign capital at the 
current official exchange rate. This rule is not compatible with international investment 
standards which allow an alien investor the freedom to repatriate its profit by choosing 
the currency that most benefits them. 
Foreign petroleum companies  operating in  Turkey met  with some obstacles  in 
transferring their profits due to the insufficiencies of The Petroleum Law of 1954. The 
said law posed some major issues for foreign investment scenarios and needed to be 
amended in a number of areas.  In June, 2013, the Turkish parliament adopted a new 
Turkish Petroleum Law.912 With this new law it aimed to remove the barriers with which 
foreign oil companies has previously struggled as well as harmonising Turkish law with 
EU standards. The removal of the repatriation of registered capital was one of the major 
incentives offered by the new law.913 It should be noted that as Azerbaijan does not have 
a formally adopted petroleum law, the FDI law of the country regulates the repatriation 
of profit.
Settlement of Disputes
Settlement of dispute procedure is outlined by Article 3(e) of the new FDI Law 
No.  4875.  This  article  grants  an  alien  investor  the  option  to  either  apply  to  the 
authorised national local courts or to international arbitration to settle a dispute. The 
article clearly states ‘For the settlement of disputes arising from investment agreements 
subject to private law and investment disputes arising from public service concessions 
contracts and conditions which are concluded with foreign investors, foreign investors 
can apply either to the authorized local courts, or to national or international arbitration 
or  other  means  of  dispute  settlement,  provided  that  the  conditions  in  the  related 
regulations are fulfilled and the parties agree thereon.’914
Providing an opportunity to apply to the arbitration process in local courts and 
international tribunals is a major step. One interview respondent, who works as a judge 
in Turkish local commercial court, gave a very frank view on this matter:
912 Turkish Petroleum Law No 6491 June 11, 2013
913 Article 14 of Turkish Petroleum Law No 6491 June 11, 2013
914 Article 3 (g) Foreign Direct Investment Law No. 4875, June 17, 2003
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If I were an investor, I would not pursue the arbitration process 
in Turkish local courts because the court system is overburdened 
and  the  decision  making  process  is  very  slow.  I,  personally, 
sometimes have to deal with hundreds of complex cases in the 
course of a week. Under these conditions, it would be difficult to 
make a  considered  decision.  The government  should  improve 
the judicial system by establishing specialized courts.915
In contrast with the new law, the Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital No. 
6224  did  not  provide  any  article  which  enabled  foreign  investors  to  apply  to 
international arbitration to settle their disputes. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed 
that this impeded the resolution of disputes entirely, as Turkey is a signatory country for 
some international agreements on arbitration. For instance, the Washington Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is one of the multilateral agreements 
to which Turkey is a party. In addition, the BITs that Turkey entered into also enable 
foreign investors to use the international arbitration process to settle their investment 
disputes.  Taking all  of this  into consideration,  it  is  probably fair  to say that foreign 
investors did not  face major obstacles if  their  home country entered into BITs with 
Turkey.  Nonetheless,  through Article  3(c),  the  boundaries  of  arbitration  applications 
have  been  widened  in  the  Turkish  Legal  System for  the  first  time  and  any issues 
regarding the uncertainty and confidence issue of private investors addressed. All in all, 
foreign investors  are  free to  apply to  arbitration to  settle  any disputes  arising from 
concession contracts as well as disputes arising from agreements subject to private law. 
It should be noted that when the Turkish HGA of the BTC project was signed, there was 
no opportunity for the consortium to apply to international arbitration, because the legal 
status of concession contracts was that of administrative contracts that could only be 
arbitrated in accordance with Turkish law. 
3.2    Concession Agreements
There  is  no  specific  concession  law  in  the  Turkish  legal  system;  however 
concessions have been commonly used for a long time and are referenced in several 
laws916  which, however, do not go as far as to provide a definition of the concept in the 
context  of  Turkish  law.  Until  1999,  Constitutional  amendments  and  Concession 
agreements between private parties and state entities were subject to the jurisdiction of 
administrative law in Turkey, and therefore, any dispute arising out of the concession 
contracts between a project company and the relevant administration were resolved by 
the administrative courts, and not by international arbitration courts. For this reason, 
international arbitration on concession had always been very problematic and was a 
hindrance to the raising of necessary finance from international markets required for 
energy projects. 
Prior  to  Constitutional  amendments,  Article  155  of  the  Turkish  Constitution 
provided  that  concession  agreements  were  subject  to  the  review  of  the  High 
915 Interview no. 11 with a Commercial Court Judge 11 January, 2013
916 For  instance,  BOT Law No.  3996;  Law No.  4501  on International  Arbitration 
Relating to Concessions; International Arbitration Law No. 4686
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Administrative Court (Danistay), in Turkey. In other words, Danistay was the unique 
authority and had exclusive power  of  jurisdiction over  concession agreements.  This 
constituted a paradox, as although no definition for concession existed in the Turkish 
Constitution, it did provide for the appointment of the high administrative court as a 
unique authority for these types of agreements. The necessity of taking the major step of 
allowing  international  arbitration  was  eventually  acknowledged  by  the  Turkish 
Government and several amendments were made to the Turkish Constitution to this end. 
In August 1999, Article 47, 125 and 155 of the constitution were revised, allowing 
public  entities  to  enter  into  private  law  contracts  with  private  parties  for  the 
performance of public services. The following provisions were added to Article 125: 
‘Concession  agreements  concerning  public  services  may  provide  that  the  disputes 
arising  from such  agreements  are  settled  by national  or  international  arbitration.’917 
Moreover, with the amendment of Article 155 of the Constitution, the role of the highest 
administrative court  (Danistay)  in  reviewing the  concession agreements  and settling 
disputes was changed. According to these changes, the administrative court, could only 
give its opinion on the correct resolution. Such opinions would no longer be mandatory 
or legally binding and should be given within a limited period of time.918
Article 47 of the Turkish Constitution was also altered to ‘Nationalisation and 
Privatisation’. Before the constitutional amendment was executed, Article 47 did not 
provide for privatisation. This amendment inserted the concept of privatisation in that 
article. Article 47 sets out the principles and procedures by which the privatisation of a 
state owned business may occur, and outlines which economic enterprises and other 
public legal entities are governed by the statute. The said article states: ‘which of the 
investments or services that carried out by the State, state economic enterprises or other 
public  corporations  may  be  performed  by or  delegated  to  real  or  corporate  bodies 
through private law contracts are prescribed by law.’919 What is meant by this article is 
that the requirements and the procedures for privatisation of public investments and 
services are regulated by statute and the privatisation of such investments and services 
are governed by private law. Article 47, 125 and 155, can be interpreted as a concerted 
effort, by Turkish Parliament, to remove impediments to winning foreign investment. 
The only outstanding piece of legal work that remains is a watertight concession law. 
3.3     Legal Status of International Agreements under Turkish Legal System
The 1982 Constitution determines the status of international treaties under Article 
90(5): ‘International agreements duly put into effect bear the force of law. No appeal to 
the Constitutional Court shall be made with regard to these agreements, on the grounds 
that they are unconstitutional.’920 In May, 2004, the Turkish Parliament adopted Law 
917 Article 125 of Turkish Constitution, 1982
918 Article 155 of Turkish Constitution, 1982
919 Article 147 of Turkish Constitution, 1982
920 Article 90 (5) of Constitution, 1982, Ratification of International Treaties
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No. 5170 which amends several provisions of the Turkish Constitution. Amongst other 
things, perhaps the most noteworthy amendment was to the legal status of international 
treaties.  The new law inserted a new sentence into Article 90: ‘In the case of a conflict  
between international agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms duly 
put  into effect  and the  domestic  laws due to  differences  in  provisions  on the same 
matter, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail.’921
On the adoption of this new law, the question of superiority between international 
treaties on human rights over domestic law was laid to rest. Even if the provisions of an 
international  treaty  related  to  human  rights  were  in  conflict  with  the  provisions  of 
domestic law, the international agreement would automatically prevail over domestic 
law. While this can legitimately be considered an advance in human rights provision in 
Turkey,  this  amendment  has  generated  several  inconsistencies  within  the  Turkish 
constitution  because  Article  90  itself  does  not  determine  the  hierarchical  status  of 
international treaties (other than human rights). 
Therefore,  even  if  any provisions  of  BITs,  IGA or  HGA are  in  conflict  with 
provisions made by national law, these agreements will take precedence over national 
law.  International  treaties  other  than  human rights  should  not  have  superiority over 
domestic law when they are in conflict with the provisions of domestic law. Evidently, 
the Turkish Constitutional Court regards international treaties to be at the same level as 
domestic laws, and in the case of a conflict between the provisions of an international 
agreement and a domestic law, the same principles as those applied in determining the 
superiority between two domestic laws would apply in order to determine which one 
prevails.922 These standards are that: the specific provision prevails over the general one; 
the  newer  provision  has  superiority  over  the  older  one;  and  the  explicit  provision 
prevails over the implicit one. If such agreements were in conflict with the provisions of 
constitution, what would be the status of these agreements? In such scenarios, it cannot 
be considered that they have superiority over the constitution because no law can be in 
conflict with Constitutional provisions or have a higher status than the Constitution. 
3.4   Political System in Turkey
          Political Regime
Since  its  establishment,  the  political  regime  of  Turkey  has  hovered  between 
authoritarian regime and democracy. For this reason the definition of Turkey’s political 
regime  has  always  been  under  debate.  The  regime  combines  both  democracy  and 
authoritarianism; or rather it is a hybrid regime. According to Marshall and Jaggers, 
‘Hybrid regimes possess a wide mixture of democratic and authoritarian characteristics. 
The ruling elites  generally keep themselves  in  power,  despite  the presence of  some 
921 Ibid
922 Turkish High Court Decision No: E.1996/55, K: 1997/33 dated 27 February, 1997.
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institutional features of a democracy. Elections are often not competitive and political 
liberties may be constrained.’923 
In  fact,  according  to  the  Economist  Intelligence  Unit’s  democracy  index 
classification,  Turkey  is  categorised  under  hybrid  regimes.924 This  means  that  the 
country does not place in the category of full democracies or in flawed democracies; 
however,  it  is  also  not  classed  as  an  autocracy.   This  assessment  is  echoed by the 
Freedom of House’s country report, which categorises Turkey as a partly free country. 
The table below exhibits the Freedom of House’s recent country rating for Turkey.
      Table 16 the Freedom of House Country Report on Turkey, 2013
Country Turkey
Status Partly Free
Freedom 
Rating
3.5
Civil Liberties 4
Political 
Rights
3
Source925: Freedom of House, 2013
Turkey has had a parliamentary system in place for 93 years.  In addition,  the 
country has been a secular state since 1937 and has boasted a multiparty system since 
1946.  Turkey also  has  many components  of  a  democracy such  as  a  regularly  held 
general  election,  universal  suffrage  and  free  competition  between  political  parties. 
Despite this, Turkish democracy was challenged by military intervention on a total of 
four separate occasions, in the years of 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. The bureaucratic 
elite and the military have always held on to their self-projection as the guardians and 
923 M. G. Marshall and K. Jaggers ‘Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristic 
and Transition,  1800-2012,’ Societal-systems Research Inc.,  University of Maryland, 
available at: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>August, 2013
924 Economist  Intelligence  Unit’s  Index  of  Democracy,  2011,  available  at: 
<http://www.sida.se/Global/About%20Sida/S%C3%A5%20arbetar
%20vi/EIU_Democracy_Index_Dec2011.pdf>August, 2013
925Freedom  of  House,  available  at:  <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2013/turkey>August,  2013;  It  should  be  noted  that  the  organisation’s  rating 
indicates that 1 is the highest and 7 is the lowest.
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protectors  of  Turkey  against  Islamic  and  separatist  groups  in  and  around  Turkish 
territory.  This  belief  has  impacted on the feasibility and lifespan of formal  political 
institutions in Turkey. After the adoption of a multi-party system in 1946, most of the 
governments formed in Turkey have been coalitions of two or three political parties. 
Indeed, between 1991 and 2002 seven different coalition governments926 were formed 
with the longest duration of a single government being three and a half years, in part  
due to internal divisions and also because much-needed steps to promote investment in 
Turkey  were  not  taken.  A chaotic  investment  environment  was  a  mainstay  of  the 
coalition  years.  The current  government,  the  Justice  and Development  Party (JDP), 
elected in 2002, was the first party since 1991 to be formed by a single majority party 
and that succeeded in retaining strong public support. 
Military intervention and some constraints on the Executive
The 1982 Constitution explicitly states that the Turkish political regime is based 
on a parliamentary regime, indeed the constitution has introduced a sui generis system 
with regard to the legal power invested in the presidency.927 It is a combination of a 
parliamentary  presidential  and  a  semi-presidential  system,  and  is  not  purely  a 
parliamentary system.928 Moreover, the presence of this dual-headed structure has been 
problematic, precisely when there has been conflict between the prime minister and the 
president.When  the  president  and  the  parliamentary  majority  have  differences  of 
opinion,  compromise has  proven difficult  to  achieve  and when such scenarios  have 
occurred they have often resulted in deadlock of the political system.929 The record of 
the last president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, (2000-2007) is testament to this. Sezer used his 
right  to  veto draft  law a full  73 times.  Naturally,  this  had an effect  on government 
morale, its external image, and in practical terms, affected the parliament’s productivity 
and delayed the enforceability of new legislation in the Turkish legal system. 
As mentioned in the political regime section, no Turkish government could have 
been said to have been stable and secure until 2002, due to a succession of military 
coups. On the advent of each of the four coups, the government was forced to resign 
926 It  is  worth mentioning that  during the analysis,  only the coalition governments 
which governed the country during the economic downturns (1994, 1999 and 2001) will 
be examined to understand the economic and political conditions in the country when 
the BTC agreements were signed. 
927 B. Kuzu, ‘TürkiyeIcinBaşkanlıkSistemi’ (in Turkish) Liberal DüsünceDergisi, C.1, 
S.2 (1996), cited in R. Turk, ‘Feasibility of Presidential  System in Turkey’,  Turkish 
Journal of Politics Vol.2 No.1 (2011) 35
928 ibid
929 P.  Uran,  ‘Turkey’s  Hast  Constitutional  Amendments  Devoid  of  Rational  Basis: 
From a Political  Crisis  to a Governmental System Change’,  Journal of  Politics and 
Law, Vol.3, No.1 (March, 2010) 6
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while  the  military held  sway until  a  general  election  could  be organised  to  elect  a 
replacement.  The  Military’s  right  to  usurp  the  government,  while  retaining  its  own 
powers was effectively legitimised by the 1982 Constitution,  as the military is  only 
accountable to the prime minister and not to the secretary of defence and, to date, this 
remains the case. It is a feature of modern democratic constitutions that the place of the 
military in the hierarchy of authority should be under the secretary of defence. After the 
1980’s  military coup,  the  army designed  a  Constitution  in  1982 for  the  country to 
determine  the  future  domestic  and  foreign  policy  of  the  Republic  of  Turkey. 
Unfortunately the version of the Constitution drafted by the military powers is still in 
force. However, thanks to the Helsinki Submit in December 1999, Turkey’s candidacy 
to the EU was approved by the member states and the country was consequently forced 
to make substantial reforms in its law system to comply with EU regulations. 
The EU warned that the existing power of Turkey’s military forces was a cause for 
concern and recommended that some reforms crucial to Turkey’s chances of entering 
the union be made. These suggested reforms were: the transformation of the role and 
composition of the National Security Council; the reduction of the number of military 
representatives  from civilian  boards;  and  an  amendment  concerning  the  powers  of 
military courts.930 Amongst the constitutional reforms, the amendments regarding the 
composition of the National Security Council was the most significant931 because the 
representatives of the council prior to this had a direct influence on the executive branch 
and played an active role in policy-making in Turkey. 
As  a  result  of  this  reform,  however,  the  bureaucratic  mechanisms  previously 
available to the military were disabled and its control over both domestic and foreign 
policy-making in Turkey mitigated. It is notable that a lack of resolve on the part of the 
coalition  government  of  the  time  in  pushing  through  these  reforms,  and  the  long 
bargaining process that ensued, meant that two more years passed before the reforms 
were put in place in 2001. The grapple-hold the military long enjoyed over Turkish 
politics has gradually diminished in force since the electoral victory of the AK Party in 
2002. The party has been elected democratically three consecutive times.  Erdogan’s 
government can now be said to be in effective control of the country’s governance, 
despite some constraints experienced in the early years of its governance due to the 
continuing military influence.  The erosion of Military power has been most  notable 
from 2009, since which the government has been particularly active in implementing its 
own policy. However, behind the scenes, the power struggle continues.
Unfair and Limited Competition 
The organisation of the electoral system in Turkey is the best explanation for why 
there have been so many coalition governments with the consequent effects on decision-
making processes in the country, particularly during the late 1990s. The electoral system 
has also been criticised for placing political parties which represent minority groups in 
the country at an unfair disadvantage. In Turkey, a 10% threshold has been applied in 
930 G. Ozcan, ‘The Changing Role of Turkey’s Military in Foreign Policy Making’, 
UNISCI Discussion papers No. 23 (May, 2010) 30 
931 Ibid
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general elections since the creation of the 1982 Constitution. This threshold is higher 
than any corresponding rate in Europe, and can be said to constitute a major obstacle to 
the sustainability of Turkish democracy. Rates in the EU include 8 % in Liechtenstein 
5% in Germany, Romania, and the Czech Republic, 4% in Austria, Spain and Bulgaria, 
and 3% Sweden and Greece. Under such an exacting threshold system, only three or 
four  of  the stronger  political  parties  can successfully pass  the threshold barrier  and 
thereby exercise their elected powers and have a hand in policy-making. Votes in favour 
of a multitude of other political parties are rendered effectively void. Until this threshold 
rate is addressed through Constitutional amendments; it will be difficult to talk about a 
pluralist democracy in Turkey.
Weak  Coalition  Government  Years,  Economic  Downturns  and  Lethargic 
Legislative Activity
In the years  between 1991 and 2002,  Turkey was administered by a  series of 
seven different incohesive governments whose ineffectiveness at  agreeing legislation 
had a negative impact on development of the country. The last of these was composed 
of:  Demokratik  Sol  Party (left-wing),  MilliyetciHaraketPartisi (nationalist)  and 
AnavatanPartisi (centre-right). Perhaps surprisingly, when the incompatibility of their 
political  views is taken into account,  these parties consented to set  about forming a 
government  and ruling the country.  As is  commonly the case in  countries with less 
mature  democracies,  the  coalition  governments  found it  very difficult  to  implement 
macro-economic discipline and establish an environment of political stability conducive 
to  long  term economic  growth.932 This  was  yet  another  repetition  of  the  failure  to 
provide economic stability of a coalition government in Turkey and was to provoke the 
third major economic downturn in Turkey in less than a decade. 
The first of these economic crises occurred in 1994, with no external factors at 
play,  the crisis  was attributable solely to  the  economic blunders  of  DogruYol  (True 
Path) and  Sosyal  Demokrat  Halkci  (Social  Democratic  Populist)  parties’ coalition 
government in power from 1992 to 1995. The second crisis was deeper and emerged in 
late 1999, while the last crisis closely followed in 2001. The last two crises were to 
manifest  themselves  during  the  term of  the  coalition  government  ofDemokratik  Sol  
Party (the Democratic Left Party),  Milliyetci  Haraket Partisi (the Nationalist  Action 
Party)  and  Anavatan  Partisi (the  Motherland  Party).  Following  the  1999  economic 
downturn, the coalition government forged a stand-by agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for which it was required to initiate radical economic 
reforms in accordance with the stabilisation program proposed by the IMF.933 In line 
with this programme, the Turkish coalition government started to implement a number 
of  laws  designed  to  remove  barriers  to  international  trade,  such  as  international 
arbitration,  changes in the banking system, changes in the tax system, limitations to 
public  sector  employment,  wage  and  salary  rises  and  pledged  to  accelerate  the 
privatization program in Turkey. These reforms must have sufficed to satisfy the IMF of 
Turkey’s commitment to economic responsibility and its desire to modernize as a long 
932 Z. Onis, ‘Crises and Transformations in Turkish Politics’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 
Vol. 9, No. 3 (2010) 57
933 Turkey made its last debt payment to the IMF in May 2013
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term stand-by agreement was signed between the Republic of Turkey and the IMF in 
1999. 
In November 1999, the government of Turkey hosted the European Security and 
Cooperation  Organisation  (ESCO)  in  Istanbul  and  signed  the  Intergovernmental 
Agreement of the BTC project along with Azerbaijan and Georgia. The country was 
accepted  as  a  candidate  country  to  the  EU  in  the  same  year  and  was  required  to 
implement a series of political reforms. The same coalition government oversaw the 
inclusion of Turkey in the G20. Policy reforms and an improved relationship with the 
West gave the sense that things were on the up until 2001, when the country faced a 
dramatic repetition of economic breakdown. The same coalition government that had 
seemed to offer so much promise two years earlier had fallen into disarray due to a 
disagreement  between the president  and the prime minister.  In  February,  2001,  at  a 
meeting of the National Security Council, the then President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, flung 
the Constitution Book onto his desk and warned the then, Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, 
that  the  government  should  respect  the  rules  and  activities  of  the  Constitution. 
According to some observers, the president was poised to raise allegations of corruption 
against  certain  members  of  the  cabinet.934 This  fierce  public  showdown  between 
president and prime minister served to emphasise the fragility of the country’s political 
cohesion  and  its  economy was  to  be  the  next  victim of  this,  as  was  the  coalition 
government itself, as elections were called early, on 1st November, 2002.  
Absence of strong opposition political parties
Since the 3rd November, 2002, Turkish politics have been shaped by a single party 
regime.  Under  the  JDP,  the  country  has  reached  a  state  of  economic  and  political 
stability and taken its  place among the fastest  growing countries in the world,  even 
while it was surrounded by economic and political crisis in neighbouring countries. On 
the other hand, there are those that believe that the party’s policies have turned the 
country  from a  democratic  regime  into  an  authoritarian  state.  In  part,  this  view  is 
propagated by the speed at which the government approve international agreements or 
implement  domestic  law.  A defining  feature  of  JDP rule  has  been  that  laws  and 
agreements pass quickly through parliament as the vast majority of seats (327 seats out 
of 548) in parliament are held by them, so consensus is much easier, than was the case 
in the past, to achieve. 
Questions  have  also  arisen  regarding  the  transparency  of  government 
undertakings and its sense of accountability to Turkish society. In June 2013, the Gezi  
Park demonstration, which started out as a local issue protest, rapidly erupted into a 
national  revolt  with  manifestations  in  all  major  Turkish  cities.  While  the  protestors 
themselves represented a wide range of political affiliations, one of their chief demands 
was for the government, as well as other opposition political parties, to create a more 
participatory decision making system, particularly regarding matters that have a direct 
impact on the lives of Turkish citizens, with demands ranging from gender equality to 
the  adoption  of  new petroleum laws.  When  Turkish  Petroleum Law No 6491  was 
934  M.  Hic  &  A.  H.  Gencer,  Turkish  Economy  and  Politics:  From  1923,  the  
Foundation of the Republic until 2002, (Istanbul, Beykent University Press: 2010) 192
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adopted in June 2013, the ‘Gezi Park’ mass demonstration was in full flow. A generous 
view would be that this can be taken as an example of the efficiency of government 
function even in times of crisis, however, the lack of public consultation that took place 
for  such  disruptive  activity,  planned  in  residential  areas,  can  also  go  some  way to 
provide an  understanding for  the frustration  and disenfranchisement  that  fuelled the 
demonstrations in the first place.  
Weak Public Interest Groups
The transition to democracy was directly shaped by the bureaucratic and military 
elites, rather than public interest groups during the 1990s in Turkey.935 More recently, 
partly as a result  of  the on-going EU accession process,  civilian organisations  have 
increased in number and activity.  However  there is  still  a long way for them to go 
before  they  can  enjoy  the  same  levels  of  influence  as  their  western  European 
counterparts. This is due a lack of financial resources.936 For example, according to the 
newly adopted Turkish Petroleum Law No 6491, the Council of Ministers is the unique 
authority  able  to  provide  licences  to  petroleum  companies  to  explore  and  extract 
petroleum  resources  in  a  specific  region.  However,  in  most  modern  democracies, 
governments  have  a  duty  to  first  inform  public  interest  groups  and  invite  their 
assessments  of  how  this  will  affect  the  region  before  granting  licences  to  foreign 
investors. The local knowledge of such groups and the crucial communication links they 
can provide by being on the ground, informed and being economically, politically and 
socially  aware  can  be  a  huge  asset  to  both  government  and  society  if  properly 
harnessed. Effective consultation with such groups is emblematic of a transparent and 
accountable regime. It is indicative of the distance the Turkish government still needs to 
travel that although there are hundreds of unions and chambers of commerce in Turkey, 
their role in shaping government policy is negligible.
How effective is the political regime in promoting FDI and giving consent to 
stabilisation clauses in Turkish investment contracts?
An  analysis  of  the  political  regime  in  Turkey  illustrates  the  significance  of 
political  institutions  in  the  attraction  of  FDI.  The  series  of  coalition  governments’ 
ineffective performance in legislative activities; the emergence of three economic crises 
in under a decade; the president’s excessive power to veto government decisions, the 
military’s disproportionate control of domestic and foreign policies and the weakness of 
public interest groups all contributed to the bleak picture of Turkish development in the 
decade from 1992 to 2002 in Turkey. This situation of political and economic instability 
accounts for the weak bargaining position Turkey found itself in when it was on the 
point of signing the BTC agreements. This can be contrasted with the leverage that 
935 Please See,  T. Cetin, ‘The Role of Institutions over Economic Change in Turkey’, 
Chapter  2  in T.  Cetin & F.  Yilmaz (Eds.),  Understanding the Process of  Economic  
Change in Turkey: An Institutional Approach, (Turkey, Nova Science Publishers: 2010) 
25
936 G. Seufert, S. Togan and C. Colino, ‘Sustainable Governance Indicators, Turkey’ 
Report,  Bertelsmann Stiftung (2011) 55 available at:
<http://www.sgi-network.org/pdf/SGI11_Turkey.pdf>August, 2013
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Turkey enjoys  comparatively under the current  political  regime. Retrospectively,  the 
first decade of the new millennium can be seen as a turning point for Turkey’s standing 
in  the  international  arena.  Strengthened  political  and  economic  stability,  a  flexible 
investment environment, newly adopted laws and an increase in the number of signed 
BITs with partner states are the key factors to which the country’s accession to a key 
world  player  can  be  attributed.  Does  that  mean  that  Turkey  is  likely  to  agree  to 
stabilisation clauses in its petroleum agreements in the future? 
Respondents  were  fairly  unanimous  in  stressing  the  relative  stability  of  the 
country’s political and economic environment and in underlining the increased harmony 
and efficiency in the functioning of state institutions. In this respect, it is fair to assert 
that a single party regime has improved the stability and sustainability of the Republic 
of Turkey. However, one interviewee argued that ‘Turkey is a motivated country but not 
a  transparent  or  accountable  country.’937 The  respondent  went  further  to  state  that 
‘political  factors  may inform Turkey’s  foreign  investment  policy,  for  instance,  new 
legislation or fiscal regimes over the course of an investment project.’938 
Another respondent expressed a similar view. According to this interviewee:
Turkey  is  located  in  a  diplomatically  fragile  area;  therefore 
political and economic events in neighbouring states can easily 
influence  country’s  politics.  The  advent  of  the  recent  Arab 
Spring and the on-going civil war in the south-east of Turkey 
vividly demonstrate the vulnerability of Turkey’s geographical 
and  diplomatic  position.  Nevertheless,  despite  these  looming 
internal  and  external  risk  factors,  the  successful  political 
programme of the current government regarding FDI has made 
Turkey the fastest growing economy in Europe. Maintaining a 
strong majority vote is very important to eliminate the presence 
of  coalitions  or  strong  opposition  groups  or  a  coalition 
government  that  could  dilute  government  decision  making. 
These could be the factors that help Turkey appear stable and 
welcoming to foreign investors. However, there is no guarantee 
that a state with unconstrained powers would resist taking action 
detrimental to foreign investors in the long term, if politically 
motivated.939
937 Interview no. 15 Anonymity Guaranteed 15 November, 2012
938 Ibid
939 Interview no. 5 Anonymity Guaranteed 11 May, 2012
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4.      A Comparison of Guarantees Available under FDI Laws and 
Political Regimes in Azerbaijan and Turkey
 In  Turkey,  FDI  Law  4875  has  introduced  a  number  of  safeguards  for  alien 
investors  not  provided  for  by  the  version  it  replaced.  There  is  still  scope  for 
improvement in order to render it truly comprehensive. For instance, Article 2 of the 
new law defines the foreign investor; however the article does not explicitly outline the 
status  of  those  individuals  who  hold  Turkish  citizenship  and  live  permanently  or 
temporarily in Turkey, but who are at the same time shareholders in a foreign entity 
registered  abroad.  Arguably,  perhaps  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  2  could  be 
interpreted as referring to a Turkish national who is resident abroad or in Turkey; a 
shareholder of a foreign legal entity formed in accordance with a foreign legal system is  
also accepted as foreign investor. Similarly, notwithstanding the fact that Article 3 of the 
new  FDI  determines  the  legal  justification  (public  purpose)  for  expropriation  and 
nationalisation of a property or an asset, public purpose should be explicitly referenced, 
or at least relevant examples should have been provided. Although previous FDI law did 
not  regulate  protection and nationalisation,  no expropriation or  nationalisation  cases 
have ever emerged in Turkey.
The new FDI law allows for disputes to be settled either in local or international 
tribunals. This option has been provided to alien investors; however, considering the 
backlog of cases in local courts, the vast majority of investors would prefer to settle 
their disputes in international courts. For this reason, reform in the judicial system is 
urgently called for. Furthermore, there is no article that regulates concession contracts in 
the  FDI  law of  Turkey.  Indeed,  there  is  no specific  concession  law in  the  country. 
Despite its aspiration to EU membership, it still does not have a proper concession law. 
Although Constitutional law refers to concession agreements, and points out that they 
are subject private law, the country urgently requires the implementation of a proper 
concession law.
The legal status of international treaties under the Turkish legal system is another 
issue that needs to be addressed. Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution clearly states that 
international agreements on human rights have a higher status in the legal hierarchy 
than domestic law. Even where conflict arises between the provisions of domestic laws 
and international treaties, the latter prevails. However the article does not clarify the 
status  of international  treaties  in  areas  other  than human rights,  thereby creating an 
ambiguity that can be exploited to infer that every international treaty has a higher status 
and prevails over national law. In terms of law technique, international treaties other 
than human rights should not prevail over domestic laws. If treaties and domestic law 
provisions are head to head the same principles as those that are applied in determining 
the superiority between two domestic  laws should be applied in  order  to  determine 
which prevails. Consequently, an amendment to Article 90 of the Constitution is needed 
to determine the legal status of international agreements other than human rights. 
Unlike Azerbaijan, the political regime in Turkey is of a hybrid nature.  Military 
influence and the president’s prerogative to exercise the power of veto have limited the 
scope of the executive branch. While the former has diminished in significance, the 
latter  remains  unchanged.  It  is  more  standard  in  a  parliamentary  system  for  the 
president’s  duties,  responsibility  and  legal  power  to  be  limited.  In  Turkey,  the 
president’s right to veto often results in delays to the adoption of new laws. Perhaps the 
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best model for Turkey is a presidential parliamentary regime because in this type of 
regime, the governments’ life span is relatively longer and their legislative process is 
generally more efficient than in a standard parliamentary regime. More significantly, a 
presidential  regime  would  be  a  safeguard  against  military  influence  or  direct 
intervention in the executive in Turkey because military intervention may often emerge 
when the socio-economic balance changes or in the case of policy deadlock between the 
president and prime minister. The 10% threshold is an additional stumbling block for 
Turkish democracy. In order to create a system that gives representation to minorities as 
well as the overwhelming majority in the context of a country with a number of under-
represented minority groups, a constitutional amendment needs to be drafted to limit the 
current threshold. The presence of a single party government does not pose any issues 
for the workability of democratic institutions in Turkey in itself; however the fact that 
civil  society  organisations,  public  interest  groups  and  political  opposition  political 
parties are still weak means is a cause for concern. 
Azerbaijan  has  established  an  open  and  liberal  investment  regime  for  private 
investors through its legislation. The 1992 FDI law includes a number of safeguards for 
alien investors;  however a well  written modern FDI law is  urgently required.  Equal 
treatment principle (applicable to domestic and foreign investors), guarantees against 
expropriation and nationalisation, dispute settlement mechanisms, repatriation of profits 
and convertibility are all forms of protection provided by current Azeri FDI law. It is 
worthy of note that no expropriation and nationalisation cases have yet been brought in 
Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, although FDI law regulates the free transfer of profits, some 
restrictions  are  imposed  by  the  National  Bank  of  Azerbaijan.  Furthermore,  unlike 
Turkey,  Azerbaijan  provides  stability  of  legislation  under  its  FDI  Law.  Article  10 
provides  a  ten-year  stability  guarantee  for  alien  investors  in  the  event  that  the 
Azerbaijani  government  makes  changes  in  law.  Notably,  this  rule  is  not  applied  to 
changes related to the tax system. 
The existing settlement of dispute mechanisms in Azerbaijan, coupled with Azeri 
FDI law, enable investors to resolve their disputes either in local courts or international 
arbitral  tribunals.  Unlike  Turkey,  where  local  courts  are  simply  overwhelmed  with 
cases, in the Azeri local court system and mechanisms for dispute resolution are still 
evolving and the rights of investors may not be dealt with the expected impartiality due 
to institutionalised corruption and the fact that judges often struggle to keep up-to-date 
with new legislation, resulting in inconsistent rulings. In relation to these weaknesses in 
the judiciary system, the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is also inconsistent, 
despite the fact that the country is a member of the New York Convention formed in 
1958. 
In contrast with Turkey, Azeri FDI law does regulate concession contracts, but the 
extent of this regulation is limited to national resources and the article regulates these 
contracts  but  does  not  provide  a  proper  definition  of  the  concept  of  concession 
contracts. In addition, like Turkey, Azerbaijan does not have a concession law within its 
legal system. 
Considering the dependence of the Azerbaijani economy on the oil sector, it seems 
paradoxical that it does not have a petroleum law and that oil agreements are executed 
through PSAs. When these types of agreements are passed by parliament and ratified by 
the president of the country, they take on the status of laws and prevail over existing 
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domestic law. Conventionally, oil and gas agreements are regulated through the Subsoil  
Act and  the  Energy  Act.  While  these  laws  provide  a  general  framework  for  the 
exploitation of energy resources in Azerbaijan, their provisions are inconsistent with 
each  other  and  do  not  match  or  reference  the  provisions  provided  under  PSAs. 
Surprisingly, there is no single ruling which determines whether the general Energy Act 
takes precedence over the Subsoil Act. 
In both countries, international treaties related to human rights automatically have 
a higher status than domestic law. Meanwhile, the legal status of international treaties 
other than those that pertain to human rights is ambiguous. It would seem that they take 
precedence  over  national  legislation;  however,  intergovernmental  agreements  do not 
have a prevailing status over domestic law in the Azerbaijani Constitution. Why the 
Azerbaijani  government  gave  the  BTC  IGA a  prevailing  status  is  an  outstanding 
question.
The Azerbaijani political structure is based on a presidential parliamentary system. 
However, due to the fact that the regime is unconstrained and uncompetitive; the Azeri 
state is widely regarded as authoritarian. The country ranks considerably lower than 
Turkey in with regards to personal liberty, civil rights and political rights. Although it 
has provided for a separation of powers, political institutions are not free. State bodies 
are controlled by an elite group close to the president. Furthermore, corruption in the 
country is endemic, particularly within the judicial system, while judges and prosecutors 
are assigned by the president, with the selection process determined by their closeness 
to  the  president  and his  family.  Parliament  itself  is  also under  the  influence  of  the 
executive branch. 
Whenever new laws or PSAs are introduced by the executive, draft laws pass with 
suspicious speed through parliament. In Azerbaijan, there are no veto players within the 
state as the MilliMajlis (parliament) is a symbolic institution and there are no strong 
opposition political parties.  Like their Turkish counterparts, public interest groups in 
Azerbaijan are weak and do not enjoy a consultative role in decision making processes. 
According to an interviewee ‘in practice, Turkey can be regarded as a country wedged 
between the Middle East and Central Asia and also appear to be a country not naturally 
inclined to truly democratic politics, in that the majority party is often absolutist and 
unresponsive to criticism in its policy making, however, what differentiates Turkey from 
Azerbaijan is its close relationship with member states of the European Union.’940
5.     Conclusion
Through the analysis of chapter six, the guarantees available to private investors 
under the respective FDI laws and political  regimes of Azerbaijan and Turkey were 
examined.  The  clear  picture  that  emerges  from  an  examination  of  the  guarantees 
available to foreign investors under the FDI law of Azerbaijan and Turkey is that both 
countries’ present laws share the goal of providing a friendly investment environment. 
Providing  a  stable  legal  framework  in  FDI  law  and  a  predictable  legislative  and 
940 Ibid
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regulatory  framework  in  PSAs  have  been  key  accomplishments  of  the  Azerbaijani 
government.  However, taking into account the country’s commercial  potential,  Azeri 
FDI  law is  arguably an  insufficient  pull  factor  for  foreign  investors  outside  the  oil 
sector. While on the one hand law on FDI offers assurance to investors regarding non-
discriminatory  treatment,  stability  in  legislation,  protections  against  risks  such  as 
expropriation and nationalisation, dispute settlement mechanisms, repatriation of profits 
and  convertibility,  on  the  other  hand,  corruption,  red  tape,  an  inexperienced  and 
inefficient  judiciary,  and a poor track record for  the enforcement  of foreign arbitral 
awards detract from Azerbaijan’s appeal. In addition, the country’s heavy dependence 
on the petroleum sector has the potential to trigger social unrest and ensuing economic 
instability.
As stated above, Azerbaijan relies heavily on its rich oil resources and provides a 
number of guarantees through its PSAs. Paradoxically, the country has no petroleum 
legislation to execute and arrange these contracts. Instead, the contracts are drawn up as 
a result of negotiation between oil companies and the country’s state owned petroleum 
company  SOCAR.  The  Intergovernmental  agreement  is  a  treaty  per  se and  is  an 
umbrella legal document of the BTC pipeline project that aimed to create a prevailing 
regime for the pipeline project in each contracting state’s domestic law. As mentioned 
above,  in  some  cases  where  immediate  actions  are  required,  the  Constitution  of 
Azerbaijan  enables  the  government  to  enter  into  intergovernmental  agreement  with 
other states. 
On  signing  the  intergovernmental  agreement  of  the  BTC  project,  Azerbaijan 
resorted to measures conventionally compatible with a situation of national emergency. 
In  such  situations,  it  is  acceptable  to  enable  the  executive  branch  to  enter  into  an 
intergovernmental  agreement.  Whatever  the  case,  according  to  the  Azerbaijani 
Constitution, what is not acceptable under any circumstance is that intergovernmental 
treaties be given prevailing status over domestic law. In doing so, in the case of the BTC 
intergovernmental agreement, the government ignored the hierarchical position of its 
national law as defined by its own Constitution.  
 The Azerbaijani HGA that was annexed to the IGA in the BTC project has the 
status of law as it  was added to the treaty.  The problem here is  that  the HGA is a 
concession or commercial contract and should be subject to private law and therefore 
cannot be regarded as an international treaty. The reason why the BTC Consortium’s 
lawyers applied this method was perhaps lies in concerns regarding the weakness of the 
country’s legal system and international arbitration for this type of agreements was not 
possible when the HGA was signed. 
In essence, Azerbaijan consented to a stabilisation clause because this was the will 
of the authoritarian regime. The regime did not invite comment on this from the parties 
that would normally be consulted in a more developed and freer regime. The overriding 
objective of the regime was to secure investment for this project so important to their 
economic prosperity and political independence and their determination that this project 
go  ahead  silenced  any  other  concerns.  Indeed,  the  overwhelming  will  of 
authoritarianism  serves  as  a  guarantee  to  foreign  investors,  providing  to  them  the 
security that the continuation of the project is so clearly in the interests of the regime it  
will use all of its might to ensure that it goes ahead.
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Turkey managed to liberalise its  economy by adopting new FDI legislation in 
2003. The Law on the Encouragement of Foreign Capital it replaced also recognised the 
principle of national treatment to alien investors and the free transfer of profits derived 
from  that  investment.  However,  the  old  law  did  not  provide  guarantees  against 
expropriation or nationalisation or a settlement of dispute mechanism. In the absence of 
these legal protections, doing business on Turkish territory was perceived to be too high 
a risk by many investors. This goes some way to explain why Turkey gave consent to a 
stabilisation clause in the HGA for the BTC agreement.
Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution regards international agreements and their 
related legal documentation (HGA) as having prevailing status over domestic law. It has 
been  also  emphasised  that  in  the  case  of  a  conflict  between  the  provisions  of  an 
international agreement and a domestic law, the same principles as those that are applied 
in determining the superiority between two domestic laws apply in order to determine 
which one prevails, and that is simply that only those that pertain to human rights can be 
given superior status.  
The legal status of HGAs in the BTC project is another anomaly. These types of 
contracts are subject to administrative law or private law and not to international law. 
Notably, in most civil law systems, these types of contracts are subject to administrative 
law and the awarding authority is administrative courts. More significantly, when HGA 
and  IGA agreements’ impact  on  Turkey’s  national  sovereignty  is  considered,  these 
agreements should not have had a prevailing status over domestic law because their 
provisions  contradict  the  state  sovereignty  principle  provided  by  the  Turkish 
Constitution. Indeed, the Turkish government and the political  parties represented in 
Parliament should have considered this before they approved the BTC agreements.
The  Intergovernmental  Agreement  of  the  BTC  project  was  signed  on  18 
November, 1999. It is revealing that only nine months later, constitutional amendments 
were  executed  in  Turkey  to  change  the  status  of  concession  agreements  from 
administrative contracts  to  private  agreements  so that  they could  become subject  to 
international arbitration. It is conceivable that the BTC Consortium perceived the status 
of concession contracts under the Turkish legal system to be an obstacle which may 
have prompted them to privately lobby for the amendment of the Turkish Constitution 
before a host government agreement was signed between the consortium and Turkey. In 
order to ensure that access to international arbitration could be gained, and to facilitate 
the adoption of the concession contract (which clearly did not have public interest as its 
goal),  it  was  imperative  that  Turkey amended articles  which regulated  the status  of 
concession contracts.
There is a long list of other contributing internal factors that facilitated Turkey’s 
acceptance  of  a  stabilisation  clause  in  its  host  government  agreement  for  the  BTC 
project among which are: the weak coalition governments’ ineffective performance in 
legislative activities; its series of economic crises; the military’s influential role on the 
executive branch and the weakness of public interest groups. In that respect, it can be 
said that a politically and economically chaotic and unstable environment influenced not 
only the attraction of foreign capital into the country but also adversely affected the 
country’s bargaining position in BTC agreement. 
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     Chapter 7
      Conclusions and Recommendations
1.     The Research Findings and Conclusions
Oil and gas related energy projects and the agreements forged to enable them to 
go ahead are inherently open to political risk. In fact, these projects are more vulnerable 
and susceptible to risk than perhaps any other sector in the business world. International 
investors  in  the  petroleum industry  have  always  been  advised  to  equip  themselves 
against  a  range of phenomena that  may endanger  their  investment.  In  the twentieth 
century, common disruptors were mass expropriation, nationalisation and confiscation. 
These  takings  were  motivated  simply  by high  oil  prices  and  the  temptation  of  the 
economic gain to be had. The phenomena of the last century have lingered on into the 
present,  although  the  frequency  of  their  occurrence  has  lessened  somewhat.   The 
recently reported case of nationalisation in Argentina is a reminder to the investment 
community that such takings cannot be relegated to history.  In the past two decades,  
resource  nationalism  has  resurged  and  is  linked  to  indirect  expropriation.  The 
explanation for this trend lies in a myriad of ideological, political and economic factors 
as outlined in chapter two, and perhaps most predictably, in the rise of oil prices. 
Azerbaijan and Turkey have been described as one nation with two states with 
reference to their shared cultural heritage, although in many respects the latter has made 
more significant steps towards modernity in recent decades. Despite the economic and 
political challenges faced by each of these countries in the 1990s, neither state has ever 
attempted to expropriate or nationalise an alien investor’s property rights or assets in 
their  territory.  According  to  interview  respondents  and  literature,  foreign  investors 
seems to have found a friendly investment environment in both countries, however a 
host of unresolved issues can be found at the confines of the shielded oil sector, mainly: 
weaknesses in the judiciary system, corruption, bureaucratic inefficiencies as well as 
transparency issues all of which render doing business in these countries problematic. 
Elsewhere,  recent  resource  nationalism  trends  in  Latin  America  (Bolivia, 
Venezuela) and in Russia have shown that the governments of these countries interfere 
either in the investment agreement either by changing the terms and conditions of that 
agreement, or by implementing new regulations or changing tax provisions with the 
goal of extracting more profit from their natural resources. The interviews conducted for 
this study, recent empirical studies and the information gathered from comprehensive 
literature were used to demonstrate that the most perilous contemporary political risk in 
the energy sector was found to be indirect expropriation. For this reason, a well drafted 
agreement  which  includes  strategic  contractual  clauses  designed  to  safeguard  the 
financial commitment and smooth-running of the project has become a  sine qua non 
requirement for investors. Stabilisation clauses have become the device of choice to 
fulfil this purpose. 
In cases of indirect expropriation, the project is intervened in or indeed taken over 
by the host state with either unilateral state actions or with subtle state actions. In these 
scenarios the state aims to change the terms and condition of the agreements. However 
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the  latter  occurs  slowly  and  aims  to  exclude  investors  from the  project  gradually. 
Imposing a discriminatory tax regime, interference with the management rights of the 
investor, interference with contractual rights, revocation of licence and denial of permits 
are all typical examples of indirect expropriation. It has also been found that measures 
related to environmental or human rights issues have also been used by host states as 
justification for interference in the energy sector. 
A reliable  litmus test  to  distinguish between non-compensable regulatory state 
measures (in the area of environment, human rights, health and safety) has not yet been 
identified by tribunals and consequently remains a significant and unresolved issue in 
the agenda of international law. Furthermore, the analysis of bilateral investment treaties 
of Azerbaijan and Turkey showed that expropriation or nationalisation clauses exist in 
both states’ BIT models. Nevertheless, the definition of indirect expropriation could not 
be  found  in  their  bilateral  investment  treaty  models. Although  both  countries  have 
recently entered into such agreements with different countries; there is no evidence that 
they have adapted or improved their treaty models. 
There are various contractual mechanisms included in oil  and gas contracts  to 
minimise  risk,  many  specifically  targeting  indirect  expropriation  to  protect  foreign 
private  investors  and  to  have  a  stabilising  effect  on  the  host  state  investment 
environment. Stabilisation clauses are one of the most frequently applied contractual 
clauses in international investment agreements, taking their place alongside arbitration 
clauses and choice of law clause. There is no doubt that stabilisation clauses preserve 
the fiscal regime over the course of the project and reduce the political risk which may 
affect  the  economic  return  of  the  investment.  Stabilisation  clauses  are  valid  under 
international law. 
However the validity of these clauses under national law is  still  a conundrum 
because laws or legal constraints in the constitution of the state may have significant 
legal  implications  for  the  validity  and  enforcement  of  stabilisation  clause.  For  this 
reason, international energy investors seek to internationalise contracts. Nevertheless, it 
should not be forgotten that even if the contract between the parties is governed by 
international  law,  the  law will  not  offer  full  assurances  of  stability for  the  contract 
because it  is recognised in international law that a sovereign power has the right to 
intervene in a contract when significant interests are at stake. This should not be taken 
to mean that stabilisation clauses have no effect in risk management against unlawful 
expropriation or nationalisation or indirect expropriation. They have a legal value and 
effect against any state actions that can be deemed illegitimate or unlawful.
The cited international arbitral awards verified that stabilisation clauses are valid 
and  enjoy  legal  status  in  international  law.  The  question  is  whether  stabilisation 
provisions can preclude host states from lawful expropriation or nationalisation. There 
is no hindrance to states from interfering in an on-going project by nationalising or 
expropriating the property of an investor, if the grounds of the intervention are rooted in 
public interest and as long as adequate compensation is paid. 
Sovereign states may fetter legislative activities and promise that the property of 
foreign private investors will not be nationalised or that unilateral action will not be 
undertaken during the life span of the project agreement. However host states cannot be 
required to forgo their sovereign rights in the areas of human rights and environmental 
concerns because these are the non-assignable and inalienable rights which stem from 
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international treaty obligations. The reasonable solution would seem to be to narrow or 
limit  the  scope  of  the  stabilisation  clause  in  the  areas  of  human  rights  and  the 
environment.  Recently  adopted,  modern  BITs  seem  to  have  successfully  excluded 
measures relating to these areas and, in some cases, explicitly assert that measures taken 
in these areas cannot amount to indirect expropriation. 
Despite the provisions for host state sovereignty outlined above, in the agreement 
signed for the BTC project, the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey effectively 
abandoned these irrevocable rights by agreeing not to implement any measures in the 
area of human rights and environment, health and safety during the life span of the 
project agreements. They agreed that the adoption of new laws in the aforementioned 
areas  would  constitute  a  violation  of  their  commitment  to  stability  in  the  project 
agreement.  These  commitments  naturally  came  under  fire  from  NGOs  and  the 
companies involved in the project responded by issuing a legal document called the 
Human  Rights  Undertaking.  This  undertaking  guarantees  that  the  consortium 
participating in the BTC project will not require compensation if these states adopt new 
laws in the area of human rights and the environment or in the interests of health and 
safety. 
By the Human Rights Undertaking, the BTC Company gave guarantees that it 
would not apply the compensation clauses in the IGA and HGAs if one the host states 
involved in the project legislated in the interests of human rights, environment, health 
and safety. From that perspective, it might be said that the Human Rights Undertaking 
represented a breakthrough and was an innovative work, commissioned by the BTC 
Company as an expression of their sensitivity towards Human Rights issues. As this 
action  resulted  in  a  restriction  of  the  reach  of  the  stabilisation  clause  in  the  BTC 
agreements, host states were thereby rendered freer to legislate. In addition, the BTC 
consortium attempted to limit the scope of the stabilisation clause in certain areas by 
this  undertaking.  Notwithstanding, it  is  the case that,  to date,  none of the signatory 
states of the project has proposed or passed new laws in the areas of human rights and 
the environment to test this hypothesis.
This  study  has  argued  that  internal  and  external  driving  forces  trigger  the 
inclusion  of  stabilisation  clauses  in  investment  agreements.  The findings  relating  to 
external factors demonstrate that lenders, political risk insurance providers and credit 
rating  agencies  play a  significant  role  in  the  insertion  of  stabilisation  provisions  in 
investment agreements. In the event of risks, such as change of law, introduction of new 
regulations, expropriation or nationalisation, the inclusion of stabilisation clauses is held 
to  be  an  indispensable  contractual  requirement  for  investors.  The  inclusion  of 
stabilisation clauses also better an investor’s chances of securing the substantial loans 
required to fund major projects, such as trans-national oil  and gas pipeline projects. 
Indeed, the financial institutions able to grant such funds demand that risks are managed 
to secure the prospect of repayment. Moreover, it was found that financial lenders have 
a ‘behind the scenes’, nevertheless, highly influential role in deterring host states from 
introducing new laws that may affect the sustainability and the cost of the project. On 
their part, it was observed that  lenders  would never consider to fund or commit to a 
project without political risk insurance cover.
 It was established that insurers involved in projects provide arbitral award default 
coverage of stabilisation provisions as a safety net for their clients in the event a host 
state fails to pay compensation triggered by the violation of stabilisation provisions. 
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National  insurance  institutions  can  wield  subrogation  rights  against  host  states  to 
pressurise them to make payment. In practice, this means that insurers may use their 
third party rights to compel the host state to reimburse overdue compensation payments 
in situations where insurers have provided the missing funds to the investor in lieu of 
the  host  state’s  payment.  While  this  third  party  right  is  recognised  in  law,  not 
uncommon,  practice  of  asserting  this  right  before  an  arbitral  tribunal  has  passed 
judgement  on  whether  the  state’s  action  actually  violated  stabilisation  provisions  is 
questionable, however. 
The final  external  factor  presented  by this  study was the  role  of  credit  rating 
agencies in indirectly advocating the insertion of stabilisation clauses. It was observed 
that the chief role of these organisations in an investment scenario is to evaluate the risk 
of lending for sovereign countries and multinational organisations. In this evaluation, 
the legal framework that underpins the investment agreement between host state and 
foreign investor may also be taken into consideration.  It  was made evident that  the 
existence of a stabilisation clause in an agreement maximises the chances of that project 
winning the commitment of lenders who will consult the information made available to 
them by credit rating agencies. 
The study has provided that the reach of the stabilisation clause in the form of 
economic equilibrium is much broader than is conventionally acceptable in the BTC 
project. In this context, whenever a host state affects the economic equilibrium of the 
project as a result of changes in law they have to pay compensation to the consortium, 
even when those changes are made in the interests of human rights and the environment. 
This  effectively  inhibits  the  host  countries  in  question  from  honouring  their 
international law obligations and can be characterized, at the very least, as over-zealous 
protectionism on the part of the investors and other stakeholders. Although the project 
consortium lawyers  were directly responsible  for  preparing  the  legal  framework for 
each contract; these legal professionals were merely following the requirements of their 
clients. The consortium, for its part, sought to satisfy the World Bank group (particularly 
the IFC and the MIGA amongst others), the EBRD and the other ECAs, in order to 
receive the project loan and to gain insurance for this major project. It was also found 
that diplomatic power of the European Union, the United States, the World Bank, and 
the EBRD were also highly influential on Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey during the 
during the creation of the legal agreements.
The research has  also assessed the bargaining position held by each state  and 
noted its interests in the BTC project. In the case of Azerbaijan, as the most significant 
possessor of natural resource, the country’s bargaining position was relatively stronger 
than Georgia and Turkey. However, Azerbaijan’s on-going dispute with Armenia over 
the  Nagorgo  Karabakh  territory  was  a  major  drawback  from  the  perspective  of 
investors. Azerbaijani expectations of the BTC project were both financial and territorial 
and the two were interwoven. It was hoped by the Azeri authorities that any economic 
benefit gained from the project could be used to fund military action against Armenia so 
that the country could definitively win power over the Nagorgo Karabakh region. 
The singular strength of Georgia was its unique position, in light of the dispute 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, to act as a conduit country for the natural resources. 
The  weakness  of  the  country  was  an  on-going  Russian  threat,  as  were  its  fragile 
economy and poor standard of living. For Georgia, the BTC project had both strategic 
and economic value.  In the case of Turkey, the potential enhancement of its strategic 
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partnership  with  its  diplomatic  partners  in  the  EU  and  the  US  overshadowed  any 
economic benefits to be had. In any case, Turkey’s prospects for financial gain for the 
project were more modest than those stood to be had by Azerbaijan and Georgia.
The political structure and guarantees available to foreign investors in Azerbaijan 
and  Turkey were  the  internal  driving  forces  that  led  them to  agree  to  stabilisation 
clauses in the BTC project. In the case of Azerbaijan, the 1992 law on FDI provided 
guarantees  to  foreign  private  investors  regarding  non-discriminatory  treatment, 
legislative stability, protections against risks such as expropriation and nationalisation, 
dispute settlement mechanisms, repatriation of profits and convertibility. However, in 
practice, investors face major challenges in dispute settlement, particularly in terms of 
achieving the repatriation of their profits. In addition, FDI law does not define the term 
‘concession’ and those concessions to be had are limited to natural resources. In fact, 
there is no concession law, as such in domestic legislation.  In Azerbaijan, endemic 
corruption, obstructive bureaucracy and the inexperience of judges all contribute to a 
very low rate of foreign arbitral award enforcement. In the oil sector, guarantees and 
assurance are given to foreign investors via PSAs. When these agreements are signed by 
the president, they take on the status of law and enjoy prevailing status over domestic 
law. Somewhat  surprisingly,  no existing petroleum legislation was found to regulate 
these  types  of  contracts.  In  addition,  it  was  observed  that  the  legal  status  of 
intergovernmental  treaties  do not  possess  a  privileged status  over  domestic  law.  By 
signing the IGA of the BTC project, the government of Azerbaijan technically breached 
the hierarchical status of national laws over intergovernmental treaties asserted in its 
own constitution.
 An  analysis  of  the  political  structure  of  Azerbaijan  has  evidenced  that  the 
President of the country is the absolute power.  The judicial  branch is  weak and the 
legislative organ is under the influence of the executive branch. The absence of strong 
veto players, strong political parties or opinion-leading public interest groups left the 
actions of the executive unchecked. 
In the case of Turkey, the law on FDI, implemented in 2003, can be seen as a 
breakthrough. The law provides a number of safeguards to foreign private investors, in 
the interests of exactness it would be advisable for several minor amendments to be 
made,  particularly  regarding  the  provision  of  definitions  of  ‘investor’  and 
‘expropriation’.  Comparisons  between  the  Law  on  the  Encouragement  of  Foreign 
Capital and the new FDI Law demonstrated that guarantees against  expropriation or 
nationalisation and the settlement of dispute mechanism were not available under prior 
FDI law in Turkey. It can be surmised that when the BTC project agreements were 
signed, these omissions must have been regarded as an unwanted complication for the 
consortium. Furthermore, international agreements and host government contracts have 
a higher status in legal hierarchy than domestic law. Notably, a HGA is a concession 
contract  and  subject  to  either  administrative  or  private  laws.  Before  the  project 
agreements of the BTC projects  were signed this  type of contract  would have been 
subject to national administrative law. The disputes that arose from concession contracts 
between  foreign  investors  and  the  relevant  administration  used  to  be  managed  by 
national courts rather than by international arbitration courts in the past. Proof that this 
was seen as a major hurdle is provided by the fact that the project consortium lobbied 
the  Turkish  authorities  to  make  constitutional  changes  to  the  status  of  concession 
contracts in order to render them subject to private law. It was also found that there is no 
law on concession in Turkey. 
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An  analysis  of  Turkey’s  political  regime  has  provided  that  several  factors 
contributed to Turkey’s weak bargaining position on signing the BTC agreement. These 
included:  a  series  of  weak  coalition  governments’  unsuccessful  performance  in 
legislative  activities;  a  chaotic  investment  environment  marred  by  two  dramatic 
economic crises in  a  short  period;  the president’s strong veto power in  government 
decisions coupled with the military’s  excessive control  over executive domestic and 
foreign policies;  all  unchecked by any significant pressure from public interest groups. 
While more recently, the stranglehold of the military over politics has diminished, the 
exclusive veto powers of the president still constitute a barrier to the modern concept of 
democracy.  The 10% threshold  imposed by the 1982 Constitution  still  constitutes  a 
major problem for the country’s future. In addition, public interest groups and political 
opposition parties are still weak and do not play an active role in decision making.
2. Recommendations
Recommendations deriving from the findings of the present study are as follows:
With respect to indirect expropriation and Stabilisation clauses:
(1) What has been gathered from comprehensive literature, empirical studies and the 
interviews conducted for this study is that in all probability the energy industry will 
continue to be exposed to political  risk.  What can be done to shield investors from 
political risk? A risk assessment of the host state needs to be carried out, taking into 
account both historical factors and its current situation with a view to foreseeing the 
potential disruption to operations oil companies could experience as a result of these. 
Such an analysis would enable investors to determine which contractual clauses would 
be most effective in mitigating those risks. 
(2) Although indirect expropriation is inarguably the most menacing destructive and 
form of risk; there are means in existence to prevent its occurrence and to mitigate its 
effects. The insertion of stabilisation clauses in the investment agreement is generally 
the most effective in discouraging host states to interfere the project unlawfully. 
(3) A sovereign state should be free to exercise its sovereignty by regulating on matters 
that  have a  direct  effect  on the standard  of  living  and safety of  its  citizens  and its 
territory such as  the  environment,  human rights  and health  and safety.  Stabilisation 
commitments  in  investments  agreements  cannot  force  a  host  state  to  relinquish  its 
international  treaty  obligations  in  these  areas.  For  this  reason,  stabilisation  clauses 
should be fair and flexible. More significantly, the aforementioned areas of jurisdiction 
should be singled out from the scope of any stabilisation commitment. Referencing the 
inalienable rights of a host state to freely legislate in these areas independently of any 
other commitment in the investment agreement would help avoid any ambiguity and 
would inhibit an investor from lodging indirect expropriation claims on this basis.  
(4) Developing countries’ economies are mostly fragile and unsteady. Therefore contract 
drafters should take this factor into their account. Inserting a broad stabilisation clause 
may lead host  state  to  breach the terms and conditions of  the contract  and triggers 
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resource  nationalism in  that  country.  Rather  than  designing  a  firm contract,  energy 
investors should attempt to bring flexibility and stability together in one clause. 
(5) When international tribunals are evaluating whether a measure taken by a host state 
amounts  to  expropriation  it  would  be  advisable  for  them to  apply  both  sole  effect 
doctrine and police power notion in order to achieve a balanced assessment, as the use 
of only the former would suggest a bias in favour of alien investors, while the latter  
takes  into  consideration  the  state’s  right  to  regulate.  Perhaps  this  combination  of 
doctrines constitutes the fairest approach, removing the uncertainty around the question 
of distinguishing a non-compensable regulatory measure from indirect expropriation.
(6) Most of the cited cases demonstrate that the inclusion of stabilisation clauses in 
investment  agreements  is  valid  and  has  legal  standing  in  international  law.  These 
decisions  can  serve  as  useful  future  reference  for  cases  examining  the  validity  of 
stabilisation clauses under international law; however it would not be appropriate to 
regard the outcomes of any of these tribunals from a ‘one size fits all’ perspective as 
each  case  should  be  considered  by  tribunals  taking  into  account  each  stabilisation 
provision’s sui generis character.
With respect to Azerbaijan and Turkey:
(7)  Pervasive  corruption,  obstructive  bureaucracy,  issues  regarding transparency and 
weaknesses within the judiciary system are the concerns that foreign investors are issues 
foreign  businesses  meet  with  when  doing  business  with  Azerbaijan.  The  recently 
adopted anti-corruption law is undeniably a breakthrough but the government could go 
further to demonstrate its commitment to change and maximise its potential to attract 
foreign investment by initiating an anti-corruption campaign. In addition, it would be 
advisable for the government to work with the WTO and the OECD with this objective 
in order to benefit from their knowhow and to make it known in the international arena 
that  the  country  is  seriously  committed  to  change.  Under  the  guidance  of  these 
organisations,  Azerbaijan  would  be  very  visibly  working  towards  bribery  in 
international business and with their advice could implement effective anti-corruption 
laws and criminalise the bribing of public officials. 
(8) The Azerbaijani government should extend the reach of their BITs by entering into 
agreements with more states. This measure would increase their chances of attracting 
international investors into the country. It is to be recommended that both Azerbaijan 
and  Turkey  modify  their  BIT  models  as  the  current  iterations  do  not  define  the 
phenomenon  of  indirect  expropriation.  Should  this  omission  be  addressed,  it  would 
provide further reassurance to potential investors that the countries’ acknowledge their 
concerns and are committed to transparent dealings.
(9)  The definition  of  a  foreign  investor  in  Turkish  FDI  law should  be  amended as 
currently it does not explicitly provide for the situations of those individuals who hold 
Turkish citizenship and lives permanently or temporarily in Turkey, while at the same 
time have the status of a shareholder of a foreign entity incorporated abroad. It can be 
recommended that the article defining foreign investors should be amended to read: a 
Turkish national who is a resident abroad or in Turkey; a stakeholder of a foreign legal  
entity  formed in  accordance  for  a  foreign  legal  system is  also  accepted  as  foreign  
investor.
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(10) Azerbaijan’s FDI is dated and is unspecific and incomprehensive. Turkey’s FDI is, 
arguably,  adequate  in  comparison,  but  would  still  benefit  from  some  minor 
amendments. For instance both states’ FDI laws regulate for expropriation phenomena 
in stating that a taking can be made only for public purpose. However neither of the 
states provides a definition of public purpose. The researcher would suggest that the 
insertion of the following sentence, or a differently-worded sentence to the same effect, 
would achieve greater clarity:  Public purpose in this article includes cases of persons  
that  will  cover  any  business  or  corporation  or  individuals.  Their  property  shall  be  
expropriated  for  purposes  useful  for  the  general  public  are  roads,  parks,  schools,  
hospitals, other public buildings.
(11) The Azerbaijani government should either establish a specific institution for the 
training  of  economic  court  judges  to  educate  them in  the  settlement  of  disputes  in 
international commercial cases and provide practice of the same or judges should be 
drafted  onto a  compulsory training  program abroad.  The latter  would enable  native 
professionals to gather knowledge of how judges deal with commercial cases abroad 
that  can  be  adapted  to  suit  the  needs  of  Azerbaijan.  In  the  case  of  Turkey,  the 
government should establish specialised courts designed to deal solely with disputes 
between domestic entrepreneurs and international investors.  This would alleviate the 
load of overburdened local courts and reduce the waiting times for cases to be dealt 
with, meaning there would be a greater chance that such cases could be dealt with in a 
Turkish court, rather than being escalated to international courts. 
(12)  Governments  of  both  countries  should  urgently  implement  a  well-drafted 
concession law. This would establish a legal reasoning for the types of contracts based 
on concession. Similarly, host government contracts entered into for the BTC project are 
commercial or concession contracts; thus they should be subject to administrative law. 
Both  governments  should  make  constitutional  modifications  to  remove  the  right  of 
international investors to apply to international arbitration for these types of concession 
agreements.
 (13) The Azerbaijani government should urgently implement petroleum and pipeline 
legislation. If a new specific petroleum law is implemented, there may be an argument 
for its  reach not extending to  previously signed PSAs but  future agreements  should 
definitely  be  provided  for.  It  is  of  great  significance,  from  the  perspective  of 
Azerbaijan’s  international  reputation and in  terms  of  properly exercising  its  rightful 
powers that the government limit the activities of the SOCAR Company in defining 
PSAs. In this respect, new petroleum laws should   explicitly restrict SOCAR’s powers.
(14) The legislative organ in Turkey should immediately add a paragraph to Article 90 
of the Turkish Constitution to emphasise the legal status of international treaties other 
than human rights. An amendment to Article 90 should provide an equal hierarchical 
weighting for both international and domestic laws. In the case of conflict between the 
provisions of national and international treaties, perhaps the best method is to follow the 
same  principles as those that are applied in determining the superiority between two 
domestic laws in order to determine which one prevails.
(15) The legislative branch of Azerbaijan should implement new petroleum laws to run 
the  country’s  PSAs.  The  existing  Subsoil  Law  and  Energy  Act  should  also  be 
restructured  by  the  legislative  organ  because  these  laws  are  uncoordinated  and  the 
provisions are mostly inconsistent with each other. In a hierarchical sense, the Energy 
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Act should have superiority over the Subsoil Law. Nevertheless, there is no particular 
wording to state whether the general Energy Act has priority over the Subsoil Act or not. 
Therefore, the legislative branch should not take for granted the correct application of 
these laws and, instead ought to articulate a clear hierarchical distinction between these 
two laws. In the case of Turkey, the recently adopted petroleum law seems to accelerate 
FDI flow into the country,  as it is more flexible than the previous petroleum law in 
operation. On the other hand, the new petroleum legislation could go a lot further in 
terms of the protection offered to indigenous people and the environment. It would be 
advisable to take a consultative approach, seeking the advice of NGOs and actively 
soliciting public opinion. 
(16)  The Turkish government, and other political parties in parliament, should strive to 
reach  a  consensus  on  the  need  for  reform of  the  political  structure  and  conduct  a 
referendum. Perhaps the most appropriate model for Turkey is the presidential system. 
This type of political regime may provide more transparent and accountable governance 
in the country. 
(17) Both Azerbaijan and Turkey should prepare a reform package which invite and 
encourage public interest groups to participate in decision making processes. Perhaps 
the  most  important  step  that  can  be  taken  is  to  make  funds  available  to  these 
organisations to enable them to raise their profile and attract membership to ensure they 
are truly representative of the civilian population. In order to execute these reforms, 
both governments should collaborate with the EU.
(18) With the exception of Azerbaijan, which does not have a threshold restriction under 
its constitution, constitutional amendments should be made, particularly by Turkey, to 
reduce the threshold from 10% to at least 5 % or remove this completely. A survey of 
the  average  threshold  restriction  in  modern  democracies  would  guide  the  Turkish 
government towards a more reasonable limit. 
In conclusion, indirect expropriation cannot be entirely eradicated; however the 
risk of it can be mitigated somewhat through the insertion of stabilisation clauses. The 
stabilisation technique used against indirect expropriation seems to have been applied 
for  many years  by energy investors  because  such  risk  emerges  not  only economic 
reasons but also politic and legal issues. The resulting evidence, obtained through the 
knowledge of the sector held by interview participants,  is  that  apart  from economic 
protectionism, a set of key internal and external factors actively conspire to induce the 
inclusion of such clauses. Generally, it is difficult to ascertain whether the driving forces 
discussed  in  this  work  are  the  same ones  that  influence  every  host  state  to  accept 
stabilisation clauses in each oil and gas project. However, selected countries in the BTC 
project have successfully proved the influence of these key factors. 
The  researcher  of  the  present  study  hopes  that  the  research  has  successfully 
addressed the questions posed and that the analysis provided stimulates further studies 
into other related issues which have not been discussed or to apply methodologies not 
utilised for this work. This research has conducted an empirical investigation through 
interviews and a  comparative analysis  of Azerbaijan and Turkey to  understand how 
internal  and  external  forces  have  been  influential  on  these  countries  to  agree 
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stabilisation clauses in the BTC project. Further research into stabilisation clauses might 
look afield to petroleum producing countries from other regions to better understand 
how internal and external factors conspire to promote the inclusion of stability in their 
investment contracts. The transferability of the research findings could be enhanced by 
extending the sample of interview participants in international petroleum companies, 
non-governmental organisations, law firms, financial institutions, insurers, government 
bureaucrats and academics from all over the world. Additionally, further research into 
stabilisation may also focus on landlocked oil and gas importer Turkic countries in the 
Caucasus region and may introduce the question of how their geographic disadvantages 
affect their bargaining position in the contract negotiation with western oil companies.
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